Weber Clarification Project

I have chosen as my general topic an exploration of how brain and cognitive processes intersect with rhetoric, metaphor, and language use. It should be no surprise that I have chosen this project largely on Nathaniel's influence, and owe much of my knowledge on the subject to him.

However, I did read a text this summer which may tangentially inform this project: The First Idea by Greenspan and Shanker. The book argues that human language processes are owed more to institutions and traditions than actual genetic coding, which is a direct counterposition to someone like Pinkert who believe in the language gene. They also argue that human cognition is as dependent on functional emotional development as it is on rational and logical development.

I have also read a bit of George Lakoff's Don't Think of an Elephant as well as his book Metaphors We Live By. Lakoff is a linguistic turned liberal analyst who argues that metaphors make up the basics of perception and cognition, and that language based in metaphors works as a frame that orders thoughts, both defining and limiting human perception.

Lastly, I have a passing familiarity with the idea of mirror neurons, which are the neurons in the brain, active as soon as 45 minutes after birth, that cause humans to experience empathy by mirroring the emotions and actions of others they witness. This concept was presented in a paper by Diane Davis at the IDIS rhetoric lecture series, as well as in a paper at the Semiotics Conference held at Purdue last fall. I think that mirror neurons will play into my research as a possible physical manifestation of Burke's identification as well as a basis for non-rational cognition (though it should be noted that Davis argues that mirror neurons actually complicate and invalidate some of Burke's arguments about identification.)

Submitted by Ryan on Wed, 2007-02-07 14:15.

David Blakesley's picture
Submitted by David Blakesley on Thu, 2007-03-01 10:12.

This is certainly the hot topic of the day:

"I think that mirror neurons will play into my research as a possible physical manifestation of Burke's identification as well as a basis for non-rational cognition (though it should be noted that Davis argues that mirror neurons actually complicate and invalidate some of Burke's arguments about identification.)"

I think that there are all sorts of ways to develop this. DDD's work should be published soon (or you can get a copy from her). I have an essay in development that's paired with hers (for a Pre/Text issue) that's not all the way finished yet, but you can have it in early April (if it helps at all). Thomas Rickert has one also (maybe ask him if he'll let you read it). Those papers came out of our CCCC panel last year.

I don't think that Burke's arguments about identification will be invalidated by all this. On the contrary, we'll find that what people think he means by identification (common perceptions) will be invalidated because they don't have much to do with Burke at all, but more with general cultural conceptions of identification.


Ryan's picture
Submitted by Ryan on Thu, 2007-02-08 10:59.

Thanks for pointing that out, Jackass! You've caught me not narrowing my scope yet, which is an indication of how little I really know about the subject - I have yet to narrow down my project focus.


magnoliafan's picture
Submitted by magnoliafan on Thu, 2007-02-08 10:47.

Is it doable in one paper, though? Is there a particular angle you're planning on approaching?

I ask because I'm curious, not teacherly or scoldiferous.

L-Train


mark p's picture
Submitted by mark p on Thu, 2007-02-08 10:51.

Are you doubting Mr. Weber's ability! Why, he ought slap glue on your upper lip and moustache you!