

Two Theories About the Cognitive Architecture Underlying Morality

In this chapter we compare two theories about the cognitive architecture underlying morality. One theory, proposed by Sripada and Stich (2006), posits an interlocking set of innate mechanisms that internalize moral norms from the surrounding community and generate intrinsic motivation to comply with these norms and to punish violators. The other theory, which we call the M/C model, was suggested by the widely discussed and influential work of Elliot Turiel, Larry Nucci, and others on the “moral/conventional task.” This theory posits two distinct mental domains, the moral and the conventional, each of which gives rise to a characteristic suite of judgments about rules in that domain and about transgressions of those rules. We give an overview of both theories and of the data each was designed to explain. We go on to consider a growing body of evidence that suggests the M/C model is mistaken. That same evidence, however, is consistent with the Sripada and Stich theory. Thus, we conclude that the M/C model does not pose a serious challenge for the Sripada and Stich theory.

1 Introduction

In recent years, many cognitive scientists and empirically oriented philosophers have turned their attention to questions about morality.¹ Among the issues that have been actively discussed are the nature of the cognitive mechanisms subserving various aspects of moral cognition, and whether or to what extent those mechanisms are innately specified (Dwyer, 1999, 2006; Greene and Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Hauser, 2006; S. Nichols, 2004; Prinz, 2007; Sripada and Stich, 2006). In this chapter we will compare two accounts of the cognitive architecture underlying morality. The first of these, which was proposed by Sripada and Stich (2006), posits an interlocking set of innate mechanisms that underlie the acquisition of moral norms from the surrounding community and the generation of

1. For overviews of this work, see Doris and Stich (2005, 2006).

characteristic motivations to comply with those norms and to punish others who violate them. In section 2 we'll give a brief sketch of the Sripada and Stich (S&S) model.

The second account has a more complicated provenance. Since the mid 1970s, some of the most influential work in moral psychology has been aimed at exploring and explaining the distinction between moral and conventional rules. Inspired by the pioneering work of Elliot Turiel, researchers in this tradition have published over 60 papers in which they investigate the emergence of the distinction in children and study its contours in an impressive range of subject populations. In section 3, we'll present an overview of this research and some of the important conclusions that have been drawn from it. Researchers in this tradition have devoted relatively little effort to proposing explicit accounts of the psychological mechanisms and processes that underlie people's ability to draw the moral/conventional distinction. So, in section 4, we will suggest one sort of psychological model that might be posited to explain the experimental results described in section 3 and the conclusions drawn from them. That model, which we'll call the M/C model, is dramatically different from the S&S model and, as we will argue in section 4, the two models lead to very different predictions. Since it promises to explain a vast array of empirical findings, the M/C model is also, arguably, the best-supported competitor to the S&S theory.

In section 5, our stance turns critical. Though there are many studies compatible with the conclusions about the moral/conventional distinction assembled in section 3, we believe there is mounting evidence that points in the other direction, suggesting that those conclusions are in fact false and thus that the M/C model, which is designed to explain those conclusions, is untenable. However, as we'll argue in section 5, this evidence is all comfortably compatible with the S&S model. So the conclusion for which we'll be arguing is that the M/C model does not pose a serious challenge to the S&S theory.

2 *The S&S Theory of the Psychological Mechanisms Underlying Norms*

Norms are a ubiquitous and important element of morality and of social life in general. In "A Framework for the Psychology of Norms," Sripada and Stich (2006) offer a theory about the innate cognitive architecture that gives rise to many of the individual and social level facts about norms. In this section we'll begin by recounting some of those facts. We'll then sketch some of the central elements of the S&S model, focusing on those that are most important when comparing the S&S model with the M/C model.²

S&S argue that norms are a theoretically important class of behavior-regulating social rules characterized by the following features:

- *Independent normativity*: Norms are rules which specify behaviors that are required or forbidden independently of any legal or social institution

2. For further details, along with an extended discussion of the evidence supporting the empirical claims made in this section, which is drawn from a number of different disciplines, see Sripada and Stich (2006).

or authority, though of course some norms are also enforced by laws or other social institutions.

- *Punishment-supported stability*: Violations of norms result in a variety of punitive attitudes—including anger, condemnation, and blame—directed at rule violators, and these attitudes sometimes lead to punitive behavior; the presence of these punitive attitudes in members of the community contributes to a norm’s long-term stability.
- *Universal presence*: All human societies have norms and sanctions for norm violations; this includes human groups that have been in long-standing isolation from other groups.
- *Ubiquity and importance*: In virtually all societies, norms regulate a vast array of day-to-day behaviors, including behavior in a large number of quite important domains, such as social exchange, status relationships, sexual behavior, mate choice, diet, and a host of others.
- *Reliable pattern of ontogenesis*: All normal children appear to have knowledge of some norms by the age of three to five, and much of the cross-cultural diversity of normative rules among adults in different societies is already present and stable by the age of nine.
- *Cultural conformity*: Children typically acquire the normative rules which prevail in their cultural group, regardless of their own biological heritage.
- *Substantial cross-cultural diversity*: The specific behaviors required or forbidden by norms vary dramatically from culture to culture.

Together, these last two features of norms—cultural conformity and substantial cross-cultural diversity—strongly suggest that norm development is significantly culturally determined. Another important pair of properties of norms involves the motivational effects they have on agents. Philosophers have long emphasized that from a subjective perspective, norms present themselves with a unique kind of authority that differs from standard instrumental motivation. Sripada and Stich argue that this philosophic tradition is largely correct. More specifically, they maintain that an internalized norm generates robust and reliable motivation to comply with that norm and to punish those who violate it. Moreover, this motivation does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about the social or personal consequences of compliance or non-compliance.

Let’s now consider what sort of psychological architecture might explain the features of norms that we’ve assembled. The facts that norms are universally present in all societies, that they differ dramatically from one society to another, and that they exhibit a reliable pattern of ontogenesis suggest the existence of *innate mechanisms dedicated to norm acquisition*. The function of these mechanisms is to locate and internalize the norms prevailing in the surrounding society. Once a normative rule is acquired, it gives rise to reliable and robust intrinsic motivation to comply with the norm and to punish those who violate it. It is worth emphasizing that this pair of motivations sharply distinguishes norms from other rules or information that may be mentally represented elsewhere in an agent’s cognitive system. This suggests that *norm utilization is subserved by its own, dedicated “execution” mechanism, and that this mechanism, too, is innate*. Thus a first pass at characterizing the psychological architecture subserving the




FIGURE 18.1 The S&S model. A first pass at characterizing the cognitive architecture underlying the acquisition and utilization of norms.

acquisition and utilization of norms might look like the system labeled with black type in figure 18.1.³

The mechanism for acquiring norms depicted in figure 18.1 performs a cluster of functions that includes identifying behavioral cues which indicate that a punishment-enforced normative rule prevails in the local cultural environment, inferring the content of the rule, and passing that information on to other cognitive mechanisms for storage and utilization. On the S&S account, the acquisition mechanism operates automatically—a person does not decide to turn it on and cannot decide to turn it off, though it *may* be the case that the acquisition mechanism gradually turns itself off starting at some point late in adolescence. The mechanism for executing norms performs a set of functions that includes maintaining a database of the normative rules that were identified and passed along by the acquisition mechanism, generating intrinsic motivation to comply with those rules, detecting violations of the rules, and generating intrinsic motivation to punish the violators.

Of course, people also accept and follow many behavior-governing rules that they do not treat as norms, in the robust sense just described. The motivation for following these other types of rules varies, and can include considerations of prudence, fear of social sanctions, and a variety of other factors. These rules, it is plausible to assume, are stored and executed by a variety of different mental mechanisms, represented by the black boxes in the lower right of figure 18.1. What distinguishes this heterogeneous set

3. Figure 18.1, we should stress, is *only* a first pass. In the last section of their paper, S&S develop a much more complicated model, aimed at accommodating a significantly larger collection of empirical findings. We focus on the simplified model in figure 18.1 because it makes it easier to see the differences between S&S's model and the M/C model that we'll elaborate in section 4.

of rules from norms, according to the S&S theory, is that they are not acquired by the innate norm acquisition mechanism and they *do not* automatically engender either the compliance motivation or the punitive motivation associated with norms.

It is important to note that the architecture depicted in figure 18.1 allows considerable variation with respect to the sorts of rules that the norm system can acquire and the sorts of punishments these rules can motivate.⁴ The normative rule database can contain rules governing a wide variety of behaviors include harming others, sexual practices, food preparation and consumption, burial rituals, and so on. Moreover, rules can include information about the people to whom they apply, and different rules can apply to different groups of people. Some might apply to everyone, while others might apply only to more narrowly circumscribed groups such as adult women, or unmarried men, or members of a specific religion or caste, or even menstruating women in one's own tribe or village. And while all rule violations lead to punitive attitudes, the rules themselves can specify how serious a transgression is and what sort of punitive behavior is appropriate.

3 An Overview of Research on the Moral/Conventional Distinction

We now set aside the S&S theory and turn to the M/C model, which has a much different point of departure. Common sense sanctions a vague but intuitively appealing distinction between two quite different sorts of rules that govern behavior: *moral rules* and *conventional rules*. On the one hand, prototypical examples of moral rules include those prohibiting killing or injuring other people, stealing their property and breaking promises. On the other hand, prototypical examples of conventional rules include those prohibiting wearing gender-inappropriate clothing (e.g., men wearing dresses), licking one's plate at the dinner table, and talking in an elementary school classroom when one has not been called on by the teacher. This intuitive difference has caught the attention of philosophers of various orientations. Many have attempted to clarify the distinction, some by specifying those features that are distinctive of moral rules (Mill, 1863; Rawls, 1971; Gewirth, 1978; Dworkin, 1978; Gert, 2005), and others by giving an account of systems of conventions and the rules that are embedded within them (Lewis, 1969; Searle, 1995). Despite (or perhaps due to) the wide range of approaches philosophers have taken to this issue, no single account has been widely accepted.

Psychologists have taken an interest in the distinction as well. Starting in the mid-1970s, a number of developmental psychologists, following the lead of Elliot Turiel, have offered their own characterization(s) of the intuitive distinction between moral and conventional rules. Moreover, they have gone on to argue that the distinction, as they characterize it, is both psychologically real and psychologically important (Turiel, 1979, 1983; Turiel et al., 1987; Smetana, 1993; Nucci, 2001). Let us start with the proposed characterization of the distinction. Though the details have

4. See, however, Sripada and Stich (2006, sec. 5.6) for a discussion of the various ways in which the contents of the database might be constrained or biased.

varied over time and from one author to another, the core ideas that researchers in this tradition have advanced about moral rules are as follows:

- Moral rules have an objective, prescriptive force; they are not dependent on the authority of any individual or institution.
- Moral rules hold generally, not just locally; they not only proscribe behavior here and now, they also proscribe behavior in other countries and at other times in history.
- Violations of moral rules involve a victim who has been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been subjected to an injustice.
- Violations of moral rules are typically more serious than violations of conventional rules.

By contrast, the following are the core features of conventional rules according to the account proposed by researchers in this tradition:

- Conventional rules are arbitrary, situation-dependent rules that facilitate social coordination and organization; they do not have an objective, prescriptive force, and they can be suspended or changed by an appropriate authoritative individual or institution.
- Conventional rules are often local; the conventional rules that are applicable in one community often will not apply in other communities or at other times in history.
- Violations of conventional rules do not involve a victim who has been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been subjected to an injustice.
- Violations of conventional rules are typically less serious than violations of moral rules.⁵

Having offered a characterization of the distinction between moral and conventional rules, Turiel and his associates then set about developing an experimental paradigm to explore the psychological status of the distinction they had described. Experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that the moral/conventional distinction, characterized in this way, is both psychologically real and psychologically important. In these experiments (employing what has come to be called the “moral/conventional task”), subjects are presented with examples of transgressions of both prototypical moral rules and prototypical conventional rules, and are then asked a series of probe questions. These questions are designed to elicit subjects’ judgments about the transgressions along a number of significant dimensions, often called criteria. More specifically, “criterion judgments” were elicited from subjects to determine the following:

1. whether the subjects consider the transgressive action to be wrong, and if so, how serious it is;

5. Although there seems to be general agreement that violations of moral rules are *typically* less serious than violations of conventional rules, some authors downplay the importance of seriousness in their formal characterization of the moral/conventional distinction. For example, Smetana (1993, p. 117) maintains that “severity of the transgression is not considered to be a formal criterion for distinguishing moral and conventional rules and transgressions.”

2. whether the subjects think that the wrongness of the transgression is “authority dependent” (i.e., does it depend on the existence of a socially sanctioned rule or on the pronouncement or endorsement of an authority figure?). For example, a subject who has said that a specific rule-violating act is wrong, might be asked: “What if the teacher said there is no rule in this school about [that sort of rule-violating act]? Would it be right to do it then?”;
3. whether the subjects think the rule is general in scope; whether it is applicable to everyone, everywhere, or just to a limited range of people, in a restricted set of circumstances;
4. how the subjects would justify the rule; in justifying the rule, do subjects invoke harm, justice, or rights, or do they invoke the fact that the rule prevails locally and/or that it fosters the smooth running of some social organization?

Results from the initial experiments using this paradigm supported the claim that the moral/conventional distinction, as characterized by Turiel and his associates, is indeed psychologically significant. They indicated that subjects’ responses to prototypical moral and conventional transgressions differed systematically, and in just the way suggested by the characterization given above (Nucci and Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981; Nucci and Nucci, 1982). More specifically, transgressions of prototypical moral rules (almost always involving a victim who has clearly been harmed) were judged to be wrong and to be more serious than transgressions of prototypical conventional rules; the wrongness of the transgression was judged not to be “authority dependent”; the violated rule was judged to be general in scope; and these judgments were justified by appeal to harm, justice, or rights. Subjects judged transgressions of prototypical conventional rules quite differently. They were judged to be wrong but usually less serious; the rules themselves were judged to be authority-dependent and not general in scope; and the judgments were not justified by appeal to harm, justice, or rights. Adding to the case that the distinction thus characterized is psychologically real was the fact that the pattern of replies appeared to be quite robust. The pattern was not significantly affected, for instance, by the way in which transgressions were presented to subjects, the wording of the questions, or the order in which the questions were asked.

Supporting the contention that this pattern of results—along with the moral/conventional distinction as characterized by Turiel and his followers—is psychologically important is the prevalence of the pattern across a wide range of subject populations. Since the mid-1970s, the same pattern reported in the initial studies has been found in an impressively diverse set of subjects ranging in age from toddlers (as young as three and a half years) to adults, with a substantial array of different nationalities and religions.⁶ The pattern has also been found in children with a variety

6. For a study that included three-and-a-half-year old children, see Smetana and Braeges (1990). Among the cultural and religious groups studied were Chinese preschoolers (Yau and Smetana, 2003), Korean children (Song et al., 1987), Ijo children in Nigeria (Hollos et al., 1986), Virgin Islander children, teens, and adults (Nucci et al., 1983), Roman Catholic high school and university students (Nucci, 1985), Amish and Mennonite children and teens, and Dutch Reformed Calvinist children and teens (Nucci and Turiel, 1993). For reviews, see Smetana (1993), Tisak (1995), and Nucci (2001).

of cognitive and developmental abnormalities, including autism (Blair, 1996; Blair et al., 2001; Nucci and Herman, 1982; Smetana et al., 1984, 1999). The pattern is notably absent, however, in both psychopaths and children exhibiting psychopathic tendencies (Blair, 1995, 1997). Though many researchers see significance in this latter finding, no single explanation yet enjoys a consensus.

This large and *prima facie* striking set of experimental results seems laden with psychological implications. So it is hardly surprising that researchers in the moral/conventional tradition have drawn ambitious conclusions from their work. Here again the details of those conclusions have varied over time and from one author to another, and unfortunately, some of the crucial notions appealed to in those conclusions have not been explained as carefully as one might like. Nevertheless, it is clear that a majority of investigators in this research tradition would likely endorse something like the following collection of conclusions:

(C-1) The Clustering of Criterion Judgments: In moral/conventional task experiments, subjects typically exhibit one of two *signature response patterns*. In the first signature pattern, rules are judged to be authority-independent and general in scope; violations are wrong and typically judged to be serious; and judgments are justified by appeal to harm, justice, or rights. We call this the *signature moral pattern*. In the second signature pattern, rules are judged to be authority-dependent and not general in scope; violations are wrong but usually less serious; and judgments are not justified by appeal to harm, justice, or rights. We call this the *signature conventional pattern*. Moreover, these signature response patterns are what philosophers of science sometimes call “nomological clusters”—there is a strong (lawlike) tendency for the members of the cluster to occur together.

(C-2) Response Patterns and Transgression Types: Not only do criterion judgments cluster into two distinct response patterns, but each pattern is reliably evoked by a certain *type* of transgression. Specifically, (a) transgressions involving harm, justice, or rights evoke the *signature moral pattern*, while (b) transgressions that do not involve harm, justice, or rights evoke the *signature conventional pattern*.

(C-3) Universality: The regularities described in (C-1) and (C-2) are pancultural, and they emerge quite early in development.

4 Explaining the Results: The M/C Model

As we noted in the Introduction, we are skeptical about these conclusions, but in this section we propose to bracket that skepticism. Instead, we will assume that (C-1), (C-2), and (C-3) are true and ask what sort of cognitive architecture could explain such (putative) facts. Researchers who work on the moral/conventional distinction maintain that their results can be explained by the hypothesis that moral rules and conventional rules belong to two quite different conceptual “domains.” By way of clarifying this hypothesis, these researchers highlight several important characteristics of the domains, maintaining that they are *distinct* and *independent* from each other, that they *underlie* subjects’ capacity to differentiate between different types of rules, and that they are *present cross-culturally* and *in place quite early in development*.

According to Nucci, for example, “[t]hese two forms of social regulation, morality and convention, are both part of the social order. Conceptually, however, they are not reducible to one another and are understood within distinct conceptual frameworks or domains” (Nucci, 2001, p. 7; emphasis added). Turiel similarly claims that “social convention and morality a) constitute two distinct conceptual domains, which b) develop independently of each other” (Turiel, 1979, p. 77). While they are sometimes hard to interpret, advocates of the domain hypothesis also suggest that the differences between the conceptual domains have an important role to play in explaining the criterion judgments elicited from subjects on the moral/conventional task. The nature of that role is often left vague because advocates emphasize subjects’ *ability* to differentiate different kinds of social rules, rather than spelling out the alleged role of the domains in *explaining* the ability. For example, Smetana remarks: “Children have been asked to make judgments along a set of dimensions that are hypothesized to differentiate moral and conventional rules. . . . In general, this research has indicated that children across a wide age range distinguish between moral and social-conventional rules and transgressions in their reasoning and judgments” (Smetana, 1993, pp. 114–15). Nucci more directly connects this ability to the domains, and to the specific criterion judgments elicited in the M/C task experiments: “[w]hat we have learned through research over the past twenty-five years is that people in general . . . reason very differently about matters of morality, convention and personal choice. More specifically, these conceptual differences become apparent when people are asked to evaluate different actions in terms of criteria [like those set out above] (Nucci, 2001, p. 6). Nucci also makes the following remarks regarding the explanatory link between the domains and performance on the M/C task experiments:

In order to gain clear-cut answers to whether or not people make distinctions between morality and convention, researchers have asked people to make judgments that would constitute prototypical examples of moral or conventional issues [*sic*]. . . . Consistent with the assumptions of domain theory, children and adults distinguish between morality and convention *on the basis of these criteria*. (2001, p. 10; emphasis added)

In elucidating the (putative) relationship between subjects’ performances on the M/C task and the hypothesized conceptual domains, comments such as these suggest a cognitive architecture like the one we are about to propose. Finally, advocates of the moral/conventional domain theory hold that these domains are cross-cultural, and in place early in psychological development. Nucci maintains that “in all cases, children and adolescents have been found to treat moral issues entailing harm and injustice in much the same way” (2001, p. 12) and that “the domain of morality is structured around issues that are universal and nonarbitrary” (p. 19). Yau and Smetana hold that “[r]esearch in diverse cultures has shown that children across a wide age range differentiate morality from social convention” (2003, p. 654).

While the moral/conventional domain theorists do not go on to offer explicit cognitive models like those proposed by S&S, the details of their domain hypothesis suggest what such a model might look like. For if the fact that a rule belongs to a particular domain is to *explain* the pattern of responses that subjects offer when




FIGURE 18.2 The M/C model of the psychological mechanisms underlying performance on the moral/conventional task

presented with questions about the rule and transgressions of the rule, then a domain is best thought of as a *functionally distinct component of the mind* that stores rules (or representations of rules). In addition to its proprietary set of rules, each distinct domain would also contain a proprietary body of information. The information stored in each domain would lead subjects to respond as they do to questions about the rules stored that domain, and also to questions about transgressions of those rules. The information stored in the moral domain, for example, would indicate that rules stored therein are authority-independent and general in scope; it would also indicate that those rules can be justified by appeal to harm, justice, or rights, and that transgressions of those rules are typically serious. Furthermore, in order to explain facts such as those described in (C-2a), which claims that the signature moral response pattern is evoked only by rules that deal with harm, justice, or rights, the domain hypothesis must also insist that the component of the mind that we're calling the moral domain is restricted in such a way that it contains only rules of that sort. Figure 18.2 is our attempt to capture the essential features of the domain hypothesis. We will call it the M/C model.

The M/C model depicted in figure 18.2 raises two important questions. First, where does the information in the domains come from? Second, what explains the fact that only rules dealing with harm, justice, or rights end up being stored in the moral domain, while only rules dealing with things other than harm, justice, or rights are stored in the conventional domain? Several answers to these questions have been

proposed. First, though they are often hard to interpret, many researchers in the Turiel tradition suggest that the information about moral and conventional rules in the two domains is “constructed,” by which they seem to mean that it is not conveyed by other people. Rather, that information is acquired via individual learning as the child interacts with the social environment. Researchers in this tradition also apparently believe that particular features of these interactions with the social environment enable the child to figure out which rules belong in which domain.⁷ Others, most notably Susan Dwyer (1999, 2006), impressed by the claim that the information contained in the domains is both pancultural and available early in development, argue that the information is innately specified. Dwyer may also believe that some of the rules in the moral domain are innately specified as well. In support of this view, she offers a version of the “poverty of the stimulus” argument commonly found in discussions of linguistic knowledge. It is hard to see how the information that the child ends up with could possibly be inferred from the limited information available in the child’s physical and social environment.⁸ Finally, Shaun Nichols (2002, 2004) has offered a rather different account in which both social transmission and innate predispositions play a role. On Nichols’s hypothesis, the *content* of both moral and conventional rules is acquired via social transmission. However, people are innately disposed to have affective responses to actions with certain sorts of consequences, and rules proscribing those actions evoke the signature moral response.

Obviously, each of these alternatives needs to be spelled out in greater detail. That’s not a project we propose to undertake here, however. Nor need we take a stand on which alternative is more plausible. For it is our view that the architecture proposed in the M/C model is seriously mistaken. To put the point bluntly, we don’t believe that the psychological domains posited by the M/C model exist. If we are right, then questions about where the information in the domains comes from and how particular rules get assigned to one domain or the other are otiose.

Before setting out our case against the M/C model, it will be useful to underscore the differences between that model and the S&S model, and to draw out some of the ways in which the models lead to quite different predictions. Since the M/C model was designed to explain (C-1), (C-2), and (C-3)—the major conclusions that researchers in the Turiel tradition have drawn from moral/conventional task

7. For instance, Turiel (1983, p. 9) says that “thought is organized and . . . it is constructed out of the child’s interactions with the environment.” See also Turiel (1979, p. 108): “the child’s conceptual knowledge is formed out of his actions upon the environment: To form concepts about objects and events the child must act upon them. Thus conceptual development is a constructive process stemming from individual-environment interactions.” In response to the second question, what explains the fact that only rules dealing with harm, justice, or rights come to be stored in the moral domain, while only rules not dealing with harm, justice, or rights come to be stored in the conventional domain, domain theorists appeal to the (putatively) distinctive and intrinsic features of actions that violate moral rules. Rules dealing with harm, justice, or rights end up in the moral domain because transgressions of those rules, in contrast to transgressions of conventional rules, are marked by distinctive and intrinsic features, namely, “consequences such as harm inflicted upon others, violation of rights, effect on general welfare” (Turiel, 1979, p. 80).

8. For more on poverty of the stimulus arguments, see Segal (this volume) and Baker (this volume). For another discussion of the innateness of the moral/conventional distinction, see Wilson (1993, p. 141ff.).

experiments—it is no surprise that the M/C model is comfortably compatible with those conclusions. But if the S&S model is correct, we should expect each of those conclusions to be false.

To see why, let's focus first on (C-1), the clustering of criterion judgments. The claim here is that the two signature response patterns in moral/conventional task experiments are *nomological clusters*, and thus that the members of each cluster will typically occur together. On the M/C model, this is just what we should expect, since responses to moral/conventional task questions are guided by the information in the domain where the rule being investigated is stored. On the S&S theory, on the other hand, no such nomological clustering is to be expected. According to the S&S theory, *any* rule in the normative rule database will generate reliable and robust intrinsic motivation to comply and to punish violators. Since these motivations are intrinsic, they do not depend on authority, or on the existence of social rules, or on fear of social sanctions. So, for any rule stored in a subject's normative rule database, we would expect the subject to judge the rule to be authority-independent when given the moral/conventional task, since the subject feels motivated to comply and to punish violations whether or not the rule is sanctioned by an authority. However, the S&S theory gives no reason to think authority independence will regularly be accompanied by any other specific criterion judgment. On the contrary, rules stored in the normative rule database can vary in how general they are, how serious transgressions are, and what their justification is. Thus, we should *not* expect that rules judged to be authority-independent will also be judged to be applicable to everyone, that their transgressions will be judged to be serious, or that they will be justified by appeal to harm, justice, or rights.

The S&S theory also maintains that lots of different sorts of behavior regulating rules will be stored outside the normative rule database—in the black boxes in figure 18.1. Though some rules stored there might evoke an authority-independent response, many will not. Moreover, rules stored outside the normative rule database may evoke any pattern of answers on the seriousness and generality questions. So if the S&S model is on the right track, there should be no nomological clustering of the signature response patterns. Indeed, the S&S theory leads us to expect that responses in the moral/conventional task could occur in just about any combination.

(C-2) deals with the alleged correlation between response patterns and transgression types. More specifically, it maintains that transgressions involving harm, justice, or rights will evoke the signature moral pattern, while transgressions not involving harm, justice, or rights will evoke the signature conventional pattern. And here again, of course, this is just what the M/C model would predict, since on that model only rules involving harm, justice, or rights can be stored in the moral domain, and only rules *not* involving harm, justice, or rights can be stored in the conventional domain. On the S&S model, by contrast, neither rules involving harm, justice, or rights nor rules *not* involving harm, justice, or rights constitute a distinctive psychological category. Some rules from each group may find their way into the normative rule database, and others may be stored in other components of the mind. So, for example, on the S&S account, it is entirely possible that a rule prohibiting harm of a certain sort would be stored outside the normative rule database, and thus that a transgression of that rule would evoke an authority-*dependent*

response. It is also possible that a rule prohibiting behavior that does not involve harm, justice, or rights would be included in the normative rule database, and thus that a transgression of that rule would evoke an authority-*independent* response.

Finally, according to (C-3), the regularities described in (C-1) and (C-2) are both pancultural and early emerging. The M/C model, as we have developed it, predicts that the patterns will be pancultural, though it does not explain why they emerge early in development.⁹ The S&S theory need not worry about the patterns being pancultural or early emerging, since, as we've just seen, the S&S theory predicts that the patterns do not exist at all!

Clearly, there is no shortage of empirically testable disagreements between the two models. Let's now ask which one fares better in accommodating the data.

5 The Models and the Evidence

In section 3 we gave an overview of some of the findings that have led many researchers in the Turiel tradition to advocate conclusions (C-1) through (C-3). Not everyone has been persuaded by these conclusions, however. Most of the dissenters have been impressed with the diversity in the sorts of behaviors that different cultures “moralize” by treating them as wrong in an authority-independent way. These researchers have focused on rules and transgressions that do not involve harm, justice, or rights. (C-2b) predicts that such transgressions should evoke the signature conventional response pattern. But, the dissenters maintain, there are many societies in which such transgressions evoke one or more of the signature *moral* responses. If this is correct, then not only is (C-2b) false, but so is (C-3)—the claim that the regularities described in (C-1) and (C-2) are pancultural.

For example, in a pioneering and influential study Haidt et al. (1993) employed much of standard moral/conventional task methodology, and showed that low socioeconomic status (SES) groups in both Brazil and the United States judged activities such as privately washing the toilet bowl with the national flag and privately masturbating with a dead chicken to be generally and seriously wrong, and that this judgment did not depend on any authority figure or explicit rule prohibiting these activities. In addition to the standard probe questions, Haidt et al. added another question that allowed subjects to explicitly specify which transgressions they took to be harmless. Even when the low SES groups acknowledged that no one was harmed by a particular sort of behavior, those groups still judged many of the harmless transgressions to have most of the features of the signature moral response pattern. Other researchers employing the moral/conventional task methodology have reported similar results. In a study of children in traditional Arab villages in Israel, Nisan (1987) found that all of the transgressions tested evoked most of the signature moral response pattern, including such transgressions as mixed-sex bathing and addressing a teacher by his first name—behaviors that clearly do not involve harm, justice, or

9. To the best of our knowledge, advocates of moral/conventional domain theory have never offered an explanation of the (putative) fact that the patterns emerge early in development.

rights. In another study, Nucci and Turiel reported that Orthodox Jewish children in the United States judged a number of religious rules to be authority-independent even though the rules did not deal with harm, justice, or rights (Nucci and Turiel, 1993; see also Nucci, 2001, chap. 2 for discussion).

Perhaps most interestingly, Nichols (2002, 2004) showed that for a particular subset of *etiquette* rules, namely, those that prohibit disgust-inducing actions, American children judged transgressions to be serious, authority-independent, and general in scope. American college students judged transgression of those same etiquette rules to be serious and authority-independent, though they did *not* regard the rules as general in scope. Like the other studies just described, Nichols's work clearly raises problems for claim (C-2b). However, his results are unique in that they also pose a particularly clean challenge to (C-1), the claim about the clustering of criterion judgments. In Nichols's study, not only do transgressions that do not involve harm, justice, or rights evoke most of the elements of the signature moral response pattern, contrary to what (C-2b) predicts, but the putative nomological clusters posited in (C-1) come apart in two different ways. Indeed, Nichols finds three different sets of responses to rules that do not involve harm, justice, or rights,¹⁰ and finds that adults and children respond differently to the same rules.

Taken together, we think the findings just cited pose a significant challenge to (C-1) through (C-3), and thus to the M/C model which predicts those conclusions. Since the S&S theory does not predict that transgressions not involving harm, justice, or rights will exhibit the signature conventional response pattern, and does not expect criterion judgments to exhibit any systematic pattern or nomological clustering, all of the findings we've just cited are comfortably compatible with the S&S theory. Moreover, we suspect that the results described in the previous two paragraphs may be only the tip of the iceberg. For a variety of reasons, researchers using the moral/conventional task have looked only at a relatively narrow range of transgressions that do not involve harm, rights, or justice. However, the literature in cultural psychology and anthropology, as well as reports in the popular press, lead us to expect that if researchers using the moral/conventional task were to study a more extensive range of transgressions in a wider range of cultural groups, they would find (C-1) through (C-3) *massively* disconfirmed. For example, we would expect that a vast majority of Americans, along with people in many other cultures, would judge that consensual sibling incest is wrong, and that the wrongness of incest is authority-independent.¹¹ We would expect much the same judgment about homosexual sex from the 55 percent of the American public who tell opinion researchers that homosexual behavior is a

10. The third pattern that Nichols found was the only one predicted by (C-2b): Etiquette rules prohibiting actions that are *not* disgust-inducing evoke the signature conventional pattern.

11. Haidt (2001) reports a study in which university-age subjects could not justify their strong moral condemnation of a case of consensual sibling incest in which the couple used two forms of birth control. Though Haidt did not ask questions designed to gauge subjects' views about authority independence, the tapes of some of the interviews in that study make it hard to believe that the subjects thought the wrongness of incest was authority-dependent.

sin.¹² We are also prepared to bet that in traditional societies where taboo violations and failure to respond appropriately to “polluting” acts such as being touched by a low caste person are taken very seriously, these violations would not lead to the full set of signature conventional responses that would be predicted by the M/C model.¹³

It is noteworthy that none of the studies we have described as posing a challenge to (C-1) through (C-3) use transgressions involving harm, justice, or rights. Nor have we been able to find any other study in the literature that contradicts (C-2a) by demonstrating that transgressions involving harm, justice, or rights do not evoke the signature moral pattern. One possible explanation for the absence of such studies in the literature is that (C-2a) is both true and pancultural. Perhaps transgressions involving harm, justice, or rights do reliably and cross-culturally evoke the signature moral response pattern. However, we think there are at least three reasons to be skeptical of this explanation. First, though there are many studies employing the moral/conventional task paradigm, the range of transgressions involving harm that have been included in these studies is remarkably narrow. Early work using the paradigm was done by developmental psychologists and was focused on young children. Thus the examples of harmful transgressions studied were all behaviors that would be familiar to youngsters, such as pulling hair and pushing someone off a swing. In the intervening years, the moral/conventional task has been used with a number of different subject populations, and the set of transgressions that do not involve harm, justice, or rights has broadened somewhat as well. Though we know of no study that asked subjects to consider incest, homosexuality, or taboo violations, some of the transgressions described in more recent work were behaviors that might not be familiar to young children. Oddly, however, all of the *harmful* transgressions studied have been of the “schoolyard” variety, even when the experimental subjects were incarcerated psychopathic murderers (Blair, 1995)! As a result, little is known about how people respond to a broader range of harmful transgressions in the moral/conventional task. Second, philosophical views such as Bernard Williams’s “relativism of distance” and the sophisticated version of moral relativism defended by Gilbert Harman encourage the speculation that there may be many moral rules—including those prohibiting slavery, corporal punishment, and treating women as chattel—that people do not generalize to other cultures or other historical periods (Williams, 1985; Harman, 2000). Though these philosophers offer only anecdotal evidence, we think these speculations have considerable intuitive plausibility. Third, our informal sampling of public discussion about recent news stories dealing with issues such as the treatment of detainees at the U.S. military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, suggests that a significant number of people do not consider rules prohibiting harmful treatment in such cases to hold independently of authority.

In order to explore the possibility that many harmful transgressions that are not of the schoolyard variety would *not* evoke the signature moral response pattern, we designed a Web-based study, in collaboration with Kevin Haley, Serena Eng, and Daniel

12. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, <http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=38#4>.

13. See Shweder et al. (1987, 1997) for some suggestive discussion of norms governing polluting acts, and Fessler and Navarrete (2003) for very useful material on taboos.

Fessler, in which participants were asked about a number of such transgressions (Kelly et al., 2007). For example, to explore whether rules prohibiting use of corporal punishment are judged to be authority-independent, participants were presented with the pair of questions in box 18.1. The results were quite dramatic: 8 percent of participants said it was OK to spank the boy in response to question (A), and 48 percent said it was OK to spank the boy in response to question (B). Similar results were found when the questions, appropriately modified, were asked in the opposite order.¹⁴ So for a very substantial number of respondents, it appears that the rule against spanking is *not* authority-independent. Five other scenarios were used to explore whether rules prohibiting serious harms would be judged to be authority-independent, and in each case the results indicated that for a significant number of subjects, they were not.¹⁵

BOX 18.1 A Pair of Questions Designed to Determine Whether Participants Judged a Rule Against Corporal Punishment to Be Authority-Independent

(A) It is against the law for teachers to spank students. Ms. Williams is a third grade teacher, and she knows about the law prohibiting spanking. She also has received clear instructions from her principal not to spank students. But when a boy in her class is very disruptive and repeatedly hits other children, she spanks him.

Is it OK for Ms. Williams to spank the boy?

YES NO

On a scale from 0 to 9, how would you rate Ms. Williams' behavior?

Not at all bad Very bad

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

(B) Now suppose that it was not against the law for teachers to spank students and that Ms. Williams' principal had told her that she could spank students who misbehave if she wanted to.

Is it OK for Ms. Williams to spank the boy?

YES NO

On a scale from 0 to 9, how would you rate Ms. Williams' behavior?

Not at all bad Very bad

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

14. Pooling the two orders, 5 percent judged that spanking was OK in response to question (A) and 44 percent judged that it was OK in response to question (B). $p = 0.000$.

15. The full text of all questions used in this study, along with all of the data, are available on line at <http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/Data/Scenarios%20&%20Results.rtf>.

The pair of questions in box 18.2 was designed to determine whether participants judged rules prohibiting harmful behavior to be temporally universal. Are actions that are judged to be wrong now also judged to be wrong in the past? Once again the results were quite dramatic, clearly confirming Williams's claims about the "relativism of distance." In response to question (A), 52 percent of participants said that it was OK to whip a drunken sailor 300 years ago, but only 6 percent said it was OK to do it today!¹⁶ A second pair of questions asked subjects to judge the wrongness of slavery in the American South and in ancient Greece and Rome. In this case, too, significantly fewer subjects judged slavery to be wrong long ago and far away.

Box 18.2 A Pair of Questions Designed to Determine Whether Participants Judged a Rule Against Corporal Punishment to Be Temporally General

(A) Three hundred years ago, whipping was a common practice in most navies and on cargo ships. There were no laws against it, and almost everyone thought that whipping was an appropriate way to discipline sailors who disobeyed orders or were drunk on duty.

Mr. Williams was an officer on a cargo ship 300 years ago. One night while at sea, he found a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor should have been on watch. After the sailor sobered up, Williams punished the sailor by giving him five lashes with a whip.

Is it OK for Ms. Williams to whip the sailor?

YES NO

On a scale from 0 to 9, how would you rate Mr. Williams' behavior?

Not at all bad Very bad
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

(B) Mr. Adams is an officer on a large modern American cargo ship in 2004.

One night while at sea, he finds a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor should have been monitoring the radar screen. After the sailor sobers up, Adams punishes the sailor by giving him five lashes with a whip.

Is it OK for Mr. Adams to whip the sailor?

YES NO

On a scale from 0 to 9, how would you rate Mr. Adams' behavior?

Not at all bad Very bad
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

16. Asking the questions in the opposite order had no significant effect. When the results from the two orders were pooled, 51 percent said whipping was OK in response to (A) and 10 percent said it was OK in response to (B). $p = 0.000$.

We believe that the Kelly et al. experiment poses a serious challenge to (C-2a), which claims that harm norms evoke the signature moral pattern. Rather, it seems, when we go beyond the narrow range of schoolyard transgressions that have been used in previous studies, many subjects think that rules prohibiting harmful actions are neither authority-independent nor general in scope. In directly challenging the conclusion (C2a), these findings significantly add to the case against the M/C model, which was designed to predict that conclusion and explain why it was true. As we noted earlier, the S&S model, in contrast with the M/C model, accords harm norms no special status. According to the S&S theory, some harm norms may be stored in the normative rule database, and those that are, will be judged to be authority-independent, though they may be of limited generality. Others may be stored in other components of the mind, and those may be judged to be both authority-dependent and of limited generality. So the Kelly et al. results are fully compatible with the S&S theory.

6 Conclusion

Our goal, in this chapter, has been to assess the merits of two competing accounts of the cognitive architecture underlying morality: the S&S model, which was designed to account for a range of findings in a variety of disciplines, and the M/C model, which was designed to explain the main conclusions drawn from a large body of work using the moral/conventional task. We've tried to shape the discussion in a way that emphasizes the differences between these two models and highlights the fact that they are incompatible with one another: they make divergent predictions about a wide range of moral judgments, including the sorts of judgments that are central to the m/c task. The view we've been arguing for is that the S&S model is clearly superior, especially in light of the growing body of evidence indicating that the conclusions (C-1), (C-2), and (C-3), which the M/C model was designed to explain, are themselves very problematic. A leitmotif in our critique of the conclusions drawn from moral/conventional task studies is that these studies have focused on a very narrow range of rules and transgressions. As researchers have begun to explore people's judgments about a broader and more varied class of rules and transgressions, the shortcomings of the conclusions drawn from earlier work using the moral/conventional task have become increasingly apparent.

While the focus of this chapter has been largely restricted to two specific accounts of cognitive architecture, there is reason to think that, if correct, our grim assessment of the conclusions drawn from studies using the moral/conventional task has implications of much wider relevance. In recent years, a number of psychologists and philosophers have assumed that the moral/conventional task tells us something important about moral psychology, and they have used this assumption in arguing for a variety of important claims. For example, the philosopher Shaun Nichols (2004) has claimed that the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction "reflects the ability to appreciate the distinctive status of morality" (p. 4), that it "plumbs a fairly deep feature of moral judgment" (p. 6), and that it can be used "as a measure of moral cognition" (p. 196). And the psychologist James Blair

(1995, 1996, 1997; Blair et al., 2001) has used the task to draw conclusions about the moral capacities of psychopaths and individuals with autism. We've argued that the evidence reviewed above shows the M/C model of cognitive architecture is false. That evidence also suggests that the moral/conventional task itself is not a good assay for the existence of a psychologically important distinction. If that's right, then the reasoning behind claims like Nichols's and Blair's merits very careful scrutiny.

We are often asked whether we think that our critique of work in the Turiel tradition indicates that there is no moral/conventional distinction at all. Our answer is that the question itself is far from clear. If what is being asked is "Do the commonsense concepts of *moral rule* (or *moral transgression*) and *conventional rule* (or *conventional transgression*) pick out different sets of rules (or transgressions)?", the answer is almost certainly yes. But if what is being asked is "Are the sets of rules picked out by these commonsense concepts *disjoint*?", the answer is that we don't know, since no one has done the sort of careful work that would be required to answer this question in a convincing way. We suspect, however, that the answer is no, since lots of transgressions strike us as both moral *and* conventional. In our culture, for example, it would be both a moral transgression and a violation of convention to wear a clown suit to one's father's funeral. But whatever the facts may be about the ordinary concepts of moral rule and conventional rule, they won't get researchers like Nichols and Blair off the hook. For when Nichols says that the capacity to draw the moral/convention distinction "reflects the ability to appreciate the distinctive status of morality," and when Blair uses the inability to draw the distinction as evidence about the moral cognition of psychopaths, what they have in mind is the distinction *as drawn by Turiel and his followers*. And if we are right, *that* ability cannot be used "as a measure of moral cognition" (Nichols, 2004, p. 196) or of anything else of psychological interest.