Why Isn't Black a Color in the Rainbow? Examining the Role of the Black Church in the Debate over Gay Marriage in America

The Shape of Things to Come: American Generational Value Change and Developing Global Civil Society

Political Movement Theory and Otpor: The Concept of Political Opportunity Structure and the Student Movement Which Organized in Opposition to Milosevic of Serbia

Toward a Local Institutional Understanding of Naturalization

Pi Sigma Alpha
Delta Omega Chapter
Purdue University

Joy Nyenhuis-Rouch
Editor-in-Chief
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Editor’s Preface to the Spring 2007 Edition

I am pleased to present the Spring 2007 edition of The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics. This is the sixth edition of the Journal sponsored by Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society and the thirteenth edition since original publication.

There are several people I wish to recognize. First, I would like to thank the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council and the Executive Committee, particularly President Jon R. Bond, Executive Director James I. Lengle, and Administrator Nancy McManus. Next, I wish to recognize our faculty advisor, Rosalee A. Clawson, and Purdue Political Science Department staff member, Michelle Conwell. I am grateful for the support afforded to the Journal by the Political Science Department and its head, Bert A. Rockman. Finally, I wish to recognize the Faculty Advisory Board and Editorial Board members. Thank you, everyone! The Journal could not be published without your hard work and dedication.

This is my first and last semester as Editor of the Journal; in the fall, responsibility for publishing the Journal will be assumed by the Pi Sigma Alpha chapter at Union College. I am sorry to see the Journal leave Purdue, but I wish Union College the best of luck in future publications.

Thank you.

Joy Nyenhuis -Rouch
Editor-in-Chief
Submission of Manuscripts

The Journal welcomes submissions from undergraduates of any class or major; submissions from Pi Sigma Alpha members are especially encouraged. Our goal is to publish manuscripts of the highest quality. In general, papers selected for publication have been well-written with a well-developed thesis, compelling argument, and original analysis. We typically publish papers 15-35 pages in length that have been written for an upper level course. Manuscripts should include an abstract of roughly 150 words. Citations and references should follow the American Political Science Association Style Manual for Political Science. Please be sure references are complete and accurate. Students may be asked to revise their manuscript before it is accepted for publication. Submissions must be in the form of a Microsoft Word document and should be e-mailed to psajournal@union.edu. Please include name, university, and contact details (i.e., mailing address, e-mail address, and phone number).
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Why Isn’t Black A Color in the Rainbow? Examining the Role of the Black Church in the Debate Over Gay Marriage in America

Greg Demers
Seton Hall University

Historically, the church has served as a focal point for the African-American community, harnessing the economic, social and political energy of this oppressed group for decades. The progressive attitudes embodied by the Black church helped to forge a seemingly unbreakable alliance between African Americans and the Democratic Party; however, when the debate over gay marriage achieved national prominence in 2003, Black ministers across the country were at the forefront of the movement to protect traditional family values. This unexpected political phenomenon raises many questions: Why did this issue in particular create such a divide within the Black church? How did it affect national elections? Will it continue to have a lasting impact on American politics in the future? The following paper explores these important questions and ultimately concludes that the Black vote cannot be taken for granted any longer.

Introduction

On Saturday, December 11th of 2004, Bishop Eddie Long led worshippers from his 25,000-member New Birth Missionary Baptist Church in a march that began at the grave site of Martin Luther King, Jr. As members first gathered, this appeared to be a fairly commonplace event. Black mega-churches held rallies across the nation every year, often paying tribute to the memory of their fallen hero—but the message being sent by this congregation set an entirely new precedent.

Rather than denouncing the war in Iraq or calling for an end to discrimination, Bishop Long and his followers urged listeners to condemn homosexuality and support a statute that would prevent same-sex couples from marrying—all in the name of Martin Luther King, Jr. The backlash was swift and furious. “To march from the King Center against the rights of gays is a slap in the face to the legacy of Dr. King,” exclaimed Keith Boykin, former president of the
National Black Justice Coalition (The Associated Press 2004, 23). “Dr. King said injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere, but Bishop Long seems to think that injustice against gays and lesbians is perfectly fine.”

While the views of Martin Luther King, Jr. on homosexuality remain open to speculation, one thing is certain: this event cannot be ignored as an isolated incident. Since the issue of gay marriage gained the national spotlight in 2003, members of the Black community have continued to express their opposition to this new movement. Much of this opposition originates within the Black church, which historically has served as a focal point of political activism for African Americans. At the same time, however, other Black leaders such as Keith Boykin have come out in favor of gay rights, calling the ban on same-sex marriage a fundamental violation of civil rights. As this internal struggle continues, America is left with a critical question: exactly what kind of impact is the issue of gay marriage having on the Black church?

This question holds particular significance for three reasons. First, the Black church plays a crucial role in the political lives of its members. While in other ethnic groups religion may occasionally intertwine with politics, such experiences are often the exception rather than the rule. For many African Americans, however, the church continues to be the heart of social and political activity. It is not uncommon to see Black ministers organizing after-school programs, luncheons, service projects, and political rallies all while preaching the gospel of Jesus Christ. Historically, the church has served as a beacon of shelter for African Americans who faced decades of oppression from the outside world. No other group in contemporary America can lay claim to such powerful historic ties, from which the Black church continues to derive its influence. Thus, the Black church provides a unique lens through which to examine this issue.

Second, African Americans have a storied history of fighting for liberal causes in the United States. For much of the twentieth century, the Black community maintained a singular focus: to advocate for equal rights among all races. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s eventually brought this ideal to fruition, allowing African Americans to begin to shift their energy to other pressing issues in society. The Democratic Party’s emphasis on protecting civil rights and aiding the oppressed made it a long-time winner of the Black vote. While such a large demographic could never achieve true consensus, African Americans nonetheless have continued to put their support behind Democratic
candidates year after year, remaining the Democratic Party’s most consistent voting block regardless of the issue.

Third, the issue of homosexuality—and gay marriage in particular—represents a serious problem for the Black church. Many African Americans, including prominent Black celebrities, project negative views regarding homosexuality. Frequently, this opposition is rooted in religious belief, as Christians use biblical references in order to condemn homosexuality. While other social issues also evoke conflicting opinions, homosexuality retains a distinctive stigma in the Black community.

This paper seeks to examine the nature of the Black church’s response to the issue of gay marriage and what it will mean for American politics in the future. Such a topic lends itself to a more descriptive rather than empirical approach, so research for this paper consists primarily of various books, newspaper articles, and websites on gay marriage and the Black church. For more information on the history of the Black church, the reader should consult The Black Church in the African-American Experience, published in 1991 by C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence H. Mamiya. This book offers an in-depth look at the origins of the Black church, its growth throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and its role in modern American life. Gayraud S. Wilmore’s 1983 book Black Religion and Black Radicalism as well as E. Lincoln Frazier’s 1963 book The Negro Church in America nicely supplement the research done by Lincoln and Mamiya. (Wilmore 1983; Frazier 1963) The former takes an all-encompassing approach to the subject of religion in the Black community, while the latter provides an authoritative account of the evolution of the Black church prior to the civil rights movement.

Regarding the issue of homosexuality, the reader may find it helpful to consult Horace L. Griffin’s recent work Their Own Receive Them Not: African-American Lesbians and Gays in Black Churches. This timely book (published in October of 2006) details the experiences of homosexuals within the antagonistic environment created by many Black churches in contemporary America. By employing both individual examples and a broader analysis of this issue, Griffin provides unique insights into this nebulous socio-political realm of the Black community. (Griffin 2006)

Finally, it would be remiss to explore the rising voice of social conservatives within the Black church and not mention Earl Ofari Hutchinson’s new book The Emerging Black GOP Majority. Also published in 2006, The
Emerging Black GOP Majority provides a good overview of the shifting dynamics of the Black church and the mixed response of the Black community to the issue of gay marriage. It is an excellent resource for anyone interested in learning more about the growth of conservatism within the Black community.

For the purposes of this paper, the “Black church” will refer to all Christian congregations in which the majority of members are of African-American descent. Undoubtedly, a rich diversity exists within this overarching institution that is the Black church; however, shared experiences and structural similarities unite the individual arms of the Black church under his larger concept, making it appropriate for scholarly analysis.

In order to better understand this question about the impact of gay marriage on the Black church, the paper will be divided into two distinct sections. The first section will provide a foundation for the discussion, exploring the political origins of the Black church, its influence on partisan politics, and the unique problem created by the issue of homosexuality. Next, the paper will turn to the actual debate over gay marriage and examine the reactions of both liberals and conservatives within the Black church. This section will be limited primarily to the three year period occurring between November of 2003 and November of 2006. It will examine the arguments made by members of the Black community regarding gay marriage, how this issue affected the 2004 presidential election as well as the 2006 midterm elections, and the implications it will have for the future.

Ever since the issue of gay marriage gained widespread media attention in the United States, political analysts have speculated about how the issue was affecting certain demographic groups. Ultimately, this paper seeks to prove that the debate over gay marriage in America has energized social conservatives within the Black church, challenging the church’s long tradition of liberal causes and threatening to fracture one of the most loyal constituencies of the Democratic Party.

The Black Church in American Politics

Voice of the Oppressed

Before examining how the Black church has been affected by the recent debate over gay marriage, it is important to fully grasp the power of this
institution and the unique position it maintains in American life. The rise of social conservatism in the Black church is significant only when viewed in light of the church’s firmly rooted ties with the Democratic Party. While the issue of gay marriage created tension in many churches across America, the history of the Black church made this debate especially significant.

It is impossible to examine the growth of Black religiosity in America outside of the context of White oppression. In *African-American Religion*, Baer and Singer (1992) note that “the need to respond to racism and economic oppression…is of such compelling urgency that its effect has closely shaped the very heart and soul of African-American religion in all of its complexity” (3). Living in a world of institutionalized oppression, African Americans needed a place in which they could join together and support one another against these antagonistic forces. They needed a point of stability that would provide comfort and shelter during this immense transition, and the church took on that responsibility. Lincoln and Mamiya (1991) describe the church as evolving into the “cultural womb of the black community” (8). As the church rapidly increased membership, it began to use its newfound power to help improve the daily lives of African Americans. Schools, banks, and low-income housing sprouted all over the major cities in the United States, run by African Americans and primarily funded by the Black church. Church activities became the lifeblood of the African-American community. In the face of continued oppression throughout the early 1900s—from poll taxes to segregation to random lynchings—Blacks continued to turn to the church for protection.

Perhaps even more significant than the Black church’s growing social and economic power was its emergence into the political arena. The rapid expansion of the Black church coincided with the foundation of many pro-Black institutions such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Urban League, the Universal Negro Improvement Association, and the African Communities League, along with several Black fraternities and sororities. Frequently, these organizations were headed by Black ministers and worked closely with the church to effect change. The NAACP, for example, met in churches during its early years, offered prayers at the beginning and end of each session, and gave special privileges to clergymen in its meetings (Wilmore 1983, 143).

As the power of White supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan declined, the Black church took an even more active role in the fight for political
reform. Lincoln and Mamiya (1991) note that the Black church “became an intensive training ground of political experience….It was the one area of social life where leadership skills and talents could be honed and tested, and it was the only area for most African Americans where the struggle for power and leadership could be satisfied” (206). The church allowed ambitious African Americans to develop skills that could be used to influence the rest of America. Bright, talented young men learned the arts of public speaking, fundraising, administration, and mass mobilization all through the Black church. Black ministers lobbied government officials to remove social and political barriers to the upward mobility of African Americans. Often times, the church served as an intermediary between the Black community and the rest of America. The extent of the church’s impact was increasingly evident throughout the 20th century as African Americans became more involved in the political process. The cadence of Black political reformers mirrored that of Black preachers, and the response of crowds at political rallies echoed the sounds coming from the pews in Baptist churches across America. As Baer and Singer (1992) explain, “African-American politics has always had and continues to have a decidedly religious slant, while African-American religion is deeply political” (xxii). In its earliest days, the Black church served as a shelter from the outside world, and in its later stages, it became a tool of empowerment, a voice for African Americans to express their dissatisfaction with the social and political climate surrounding them.

Although the Black church did not have much influence on partisan politics until after the civil rights movement, its message has always maintained an unquestionably liberal tone. The church’s individual objectives evolved from the elimination of slavery to the deconstruction of Jim Crow Laws to the push for affirmative action and urban housing today. But while the individual goals of the Black church changed, its fundamental role in American politics remained the same: to remove obstacles to freedom and empower marginalized groups within society. Gayraud Wilmore (1983) explains that the Black church “discovered something that had been obscured by white Christians at the core of the faith: a bias for justice and the liberation of the poor that stood in stark contrast to the benign conservatism of the white church and its sanctification of Euro-American hegemony over the darker races” (169).

In a key strategic move, the Democratic Party made civil rights reform a central tenet of its platform in the 1960s, in spite of vehement opposition from southern Democrats. High-profile Republicans like 1964 presidential candidate
Barry Goldwater labeled these efforts a violation of states’ rights, winning support from conservative southerners and galvanizing a gradual shift of southern states to the Republican Party. Although this shift created newfound political support for Republicans, it was counterbalanced by the influx of African Americans into partisan politics, which left them firmly planted within the Democratic Party.

The alliance between the Democratic Party and the Black church occurred for three principal reasons. First, many Blacks viewed conservative arguments about states’ rights as nothing more than thinly veiled racism. By adopting these arguments as a part of its “Southern Strategy,” the Republican Party immediately lost any sympathy that existed within the Black community and created a stigma in the eyes of African Americans that it has not been able to shed since then.

Second, the Democratic Party took advantage of the great political opportunity before it, courting Black leaders who rewarded them by rallying voters for the Democratic cause. John Lewis of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), James Farmer of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, Whitney Young of the National Urban League, Martin Luther King, Jr. and A. Philip Randolph comprised the “Big Six”—a group of Black leaders who worked with members of the Kennedy administration to pass civil rights legislation. While these individuals felt alienated by the Republican Party, they found widespread support among Democratic politicians who wanted to improve the lives of African Americans.

Third, this transition into partisan politics, and specifically into the Democratic Party, seemed natural for Blacks who found many of their own long-held beliefs to be in line with modern liberalism. Stemming back to the earliest days of the Black church, African-American activism centered on achieving progressive social change. By focusing their party platform on the need to help society’s most vulnerable citizens, liberal Democrats found widespread support from African Americans who continued to suffer under a history of oppression in the United States.

The combination of these three factors created a lasting allegiance between the Black church and the Democratic Party, soon making African Americans the most outspoken advocates of the liberal agenda. After the civil rights movement, each national election reaffirmed that African Americans were the most loyal supporters of the Democratic Party, generally voting around 90%
in favor of the Democratic candidate. Like in its early years, the Black church did not have one specific outlet for its political agenda; however, it produced leaders such as Reverend Al Sharpton and Reverend Jesse Jackson who became mouthpieces of the Black church in late 20th century America. These individuals claimed to represent the African-American community, and they projected a hardline liberal stance on almost every divisive issue.

After the civil rights movement, African-American voters gradually became entrenched within the Democratic Party, as America’s Black leadership (including prominent members of the Black church) continued to emphasize that the Republican Party did not support their interests; however, the role of the Black church during this period was not as one-dimensional as many of these Black leaders would make it seem. With the civil rights movement fading farther into the backdrop of American history, a new dynamic emerged within the Black church. For the first time in its existence, the Black church did not have to serve as a buffer to the outside world. Not only was the system of slavery completely dismantled, but African Americans finally retained the same rights as all other citizens. While pockets of racism still existed in American culture, the measures of racial oppression built into the American political system were forever destroyed. The identity of the Black church was always inextricably tied to its message of liberation and, therefore, such a critical change in the social and legal status of African Americans fundamentally reshaped the role of the Black church.

For decades, the Black church existed as a shelter for African Americans to protect them from White racism and to speak out in one, unified voice. Ironically, the success of the civil rights movement left the Black church partially crippled, as a key component of its identity had been shattered. The one attribute uniting all African Americans was skin color—and, as a corollary, the desire for racial equality. Lincoln and Mamiya (1991) note that “the one constant factor in any survey of the relationship between black churches and politics is the history of white domination and racial oppression. In all of the varieties of black political strategies and tactics that have unfolded over several hundred years, the target has always been the white system of domination and oppression that has often attempted to define the limits and choices of the African-American subculture” (199). When racial oppression remained an inherent part of the American political system, the Black church could speak out on behalf of all African Americans. When the civil rights era came to an end, the Black church lost this ability. The Black community, like any other group in society, includes a wide
variety of individuals who hold diverse opinions. A system of institutionalized racism forced African Americans to ignore such differences in order to present a unified front in the face of White oppression—and the deconstruction of that system gradually brought to light these ideological differences for the first time.

In December of 1980, a group of Black intellectuals, politicians and religious leaders gathered together in San Francisco’s Fairmont Hotel. Aptly named “The Black Alternatives Conference,” this meeting represented the first time Black conservatives formally organized to discuss their dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party. Thomas Sowell, Walter Williams, Clarence Pendleton, and other influential African Americans condemned the Democratic Party for its views on affirmative action, government regulation, and entitlement programs. They argued that, despite Democratic rhetoric about helping the Black poor, such policies in reality only benefited Blacks who were already living in privileged positions. The members of the conference echoed the sentiment conveyed by Booker T. Washington almost a century earlier—that the best way to achieve progress for African Americans was by spreading a mentality that emphasized hard work, individual initiative, and the importance of the family (Sowell 1980).

While the majority of African Americans continued to vote overwhelmingly for Democratic candidates, the message of the Black Alternatives Conference became increasingly attractive to the religious community. The surging influence of White evangelicals throughout the 90s brought a new wing of the Republican Party into the national spotlight, and by the time George H. W. Bush took office, the religious right had become one of the most powerful political forces in the United States. The views espoused by the religious right reflected the social conservatism of many African Americans, especially members of the Black church. Earl Ofari Hutchinson (2006) explains that “the odd symbiosis of God, politics, the GOP, and the black church had been quietly connecting for years” (79). Many Black ministers found themselves supporting the same causes as White evangelicals, which created a serious ideological division among African Americans—and nowhere was this disparity more evident than in the ongoing discussion about homosexuality within the Black community.
A Unique Stigma

To understand the response of the Black church to the recent gay marriage proposals, it is important to first examine the prevailing attitudes towards homosexuality within both the church and the wider community. Gay Black men and women have faced tremendous hostility from members of their own community with the Black church often leading the charge. Undoubtedly, the unique stigma placed on Black homosexuals added a whole new dimension to the debate over gay marriage.

The social messages conveyed by leaders of the Black community revealed some of the undercurrents traveling through the broader population. Reggie White was revered as a role model for many African Americans, not only breaking various records as a Hall of Fame defensive end for the National Football League, but also serving his community as a well-spoken minister in Tennessee. This unblemished reputation made it particularly shocking when he condemned homosexuals in front of the Wisconsin legislature in 1998. Calling homosexuality “one of the biggest sins in the Bible,” White implored gays to renounce their way of life (Vecsey 1998, 5).

In 2001, basketball superstar Allen Iverson was fined by the National Basketball Association for making anti-gay remarks to audience members at a game in Indiana (The New York Times 2001). Commissioner David Stern also forced Iverson to remove from his new rap album lyrics that contained implications about killing gay people. Iverson’s lyrics, however, were not uncommon in the hip-hop community. According to one prominent Black gay rights advocate, Brand Nubian, Canibus, Common, Cypress Hill, Eazy E, Goodie Mob, Ice Cube, Ja Rule, Jay Z, Mase, Mobb Deep, Public Enemy, Snoop Dogg, and T.O.K were among the many Black rap artists who have verbally lashed gays in their music (Boykin 2003).

The words and actions of these celebrities illustrate the animosity towards homosexuals that has deeply pervaded the Black community—and, in particular, the Black religious community. The attitudes fostered by the Black church have made it a hostile place for many churchgoers. Jacquelyn Holland, a Black lesbian, felt forced out of her church when a minister called homosexuality an “abomination” and equated the act with “murder, a heinous crime” (Fears 2004, A03). Rather than endure the insults being levied at her each week,
Holland chose to join the Unity Fellowship Church of Christ, which was openly accepting of gays and lesbians.

Holland’s experience has been increasingly common for Black homosexuals in recent years. The oppression of gay Blacks in their own communities brought the phrase “on the down low” into common usage, signifying a Black man who has sexual relations with other men but publicly declares himself to be heterosexual. Many of these men truly consider themselves heterosexual and get involved in relationships with women, while continuing to have homosexual experiences “on the down low.” In 2004, J.L. King published a book titled *On the Down Low: A Journey Into the Lives of ‘Straight’ Black Men Who Sleep With Men*, fully uncovering this social phenomenon for the first time. King says the Black church’s message regarding homosexuality forces Black men to live their lives on the down low, and the importance of the Black church in the lives of African Americans only heightens the problem: “For many of us the church is the anchor of our lives. The Black church has been a central place for people to seek salvation and acceptance…. [But] this finger-pointing and judgment by the church and its leaders have not saved lives. They have turned people away from the very thing that may save their lives and their souls—God” (78, 80).

Stigmatizing Black homosexuals has deep roots in religious dogma, the Black psyche and American history. In *Their Own Receive Them Not: African-American Lesbians & Gays in Black Churches* (2006), Horace L. Griffin provides a detailed discussion of the relationship between homosexuals and the Black church, examining the origins of Black homophobia and the impact it has on church members. He explains, “The denial of their sexual identity is a battle that most gays have endured in black churches. When African-American gay Christians are believed to be gay, however, they often live with messages that define them as problematic, immoral, and inferior to heterosexuals in black churches” (147).

A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2003 found that 74 percent of Black Protestants believed homosexuality was a sin, surpassing all other groups except for White evangelicals. These views often derive from Christian fundamentalism, which takes a literal interpretation of scripture and uses it to justify anti-gay remarks. Black ministers cite the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorrah as well as other pieces of scripture that explicitly condemn homosexual behavior (*Pew Research Center* 2003b). Keith Boykin published
several works describing the plight of Black homosexuals. In his first work, *One More River to Cross* (1997), Boykin calls religion “the most frequently cited factor in Black homophobia” (155).

Some individuals argue that the animosity displayed towards homosexuals in the Black community also derives in part from the Black male psyche. According to Earl Ofari Hutchinson (2006), “[homosexuality] stirs their exaggerated notion of manhood. From cradle to grave, many black men believe and accept the gender propaganda that real men talk and act tough, shed no tears, and never show their emotions….In a vain attempt to recapture their denied masculinity, many black men mirror many Americans’ traditional fear and hatred of homosexuality as a dire threat to their manhood” (98). Such a theory could help to explain why so many Black rap artists feel the need to lash out at gays in their music—it establishes them as “Alpha males” who should be admired by the rest of the Black community.

In addition, this phenomenon can be traced back to stereotypes about Black sexuality that came about during the segregation of African Americans. Horace L. Griffin (2006) argues that the history of racism in the United States is partially to blame for homophobia in Black communities:

Much of black heterosexuals’ antihomosexual sentiment exists as a means of countering the perception of black sexuality being perverse in order to survive and gain respectability and acceptance by the majority. Thus, it is understandable that African Americans would approach homosexuality with more dread and disdain than others, often denying a black homosexual presence to avoid being further maligned in a racist society (57).

Black males were frequently regarded as sexual predators who could not be trusted in the company of White women. Dr. Alton Pollard III, director of Black Church Studies at Emory University, explains that "blacks have been stigmatized for so long as sexual beings that any discussion of homosexuality causes even greater discomfort” (Banerjee 2006, 11). In order to assimilate into an already oppressive society, Blacks became wary of any signs of sexual deviancy. The realization that an individual was both Black and gay would engender such hatred that it would become a death sentence, socially and perhaps even literally.
From these religious, historical, and psychological origins developed a unique stigma against gays within the Black community. Black homosexuals not only had to contend with the racism of White Americans, but they also felt a deep sense of alienation within their own community; thus, the prevailing attitudes in the Black church regarding homosexuality clashed with the liberal leanings of many Black leaders, making it fertile ground for a political war. The only thing missing was a catalyst, and it came in the form of a judicial ruling in November of 2003.

Gay Marriage and the Black Church

The Debate

When the Massachusetts Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in the case of *Goodridge v. Department of Public Health* allowing same-sex couples the right to marry, it sparked a firestorm of criticism across the country. Tension had been building since the Vermont Supreme Court ordered the state legislature to establish civil unions that would afford homosexuals the same legal rights as heterosexuals in 2000. Many analysts predicted it was only a matter of time before a state fully sanctioned gay marriage, and on November 18, 2003, that prediction came true.

It did not take long for the decision to influence other parts of the country, as San Francisco began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples in February of 2004. When Mabel Teng, the distributor of marriage licenses in San Francisco, said “We're at capacity right now. We normally do about 20-30 couples a day. We're doing about 50-60 an hour,” it played into the fears of many Americans across the country (Min 2004). Gary Bauer, chairman of the conservative American Values organization, discussed how these events rejuvenated the religious right: “There was a little bit of burnout, but there has been a spontaneous reaction to this issue, in both its intensity and the numbers involved, that has surprised all the conservative public-policy groups” (Leonard 2003, A1). It was no surprise that James Dobson, Jerry Falwell, and other White Evangelicals led the charge against gay marriage, proclaiming that it would aid in the destruction of the American family. After all, these individuals had been at the forefront of the family values campaign for the past two decades; however, the outcry from members of the Black church was simply unprecedented.
When Bishop Eddie Long invoked the name of Martin Luther King, Jr. in the same breath with which he condemned gay marriage, it shocked those who assumed the Black church to be a close ally of the Democratic Party. Even more shocking was the tremendous wave of support that he received from other African Americans. Across the United States, Black ministers joined the political fray in opposition to gay marriage. In Massachusetts, the Boston Ten Point Coalition, the Black Ministerial Alliance, and the Cambridge Black Pastors Conference issued a joint statement condemning the state Supreme Court’s ruling. Bishop Gilbert A. Thompson Sr. of the New Covenant Christian Church in Mattapan who runs Massachusetts’ largest Protestant congregation stated that he believes homosexuals can choose not to act on their impulses and that “to say there is such a thing as a gay Christian is saying there’s an honest thief.” While some members of the Massachusetts Black clergy spoke out in favor of it, they generally came from historically White denominations. The *Boston Globe* reported that within Massachusetts’ historically Black churches, on the other hand, “there appears to be a near consensus that marriage should be defined as a man and a woman” (Paulson 2004, B1).

Reverend John Halbert of St. Peter’s African Methodist Episcopal Church in Minneapolis declared that “The Bible laid down laws about how we should live, and same-sex is not one of those things.” He also proclaimed that homosexuality “stinks in the nostril of God and confuses our youth. We are letting down the moral standards in America by saying anything goes” (Bethea 2004, 7B).

The sentiments conveyed by Bishop Thompson, Bishop Long, and Reverend Halbert were echoed by other Black church leaders across America in the wake of the Massachusetts ruling. On August 28 of 2004, fifty Black ministers representing 30,000 church members met with other prominent Black leaders in front of the Lincoln Memorial, simultaneously commemorating the anniversary of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s March on Washington and lobbying for a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage. William Turner, pastor of Pasadena's New Revelation Missionary Baptist Church, was among the participants at the rally in D.C. Turner leads a coalition of roughly 500 ministers who oppose gay marriage and, when he met Bishop Harry R. Jackson who runs a Black megachurch in Maryland, Turner agreed to support Jackson’s national campaign labeled the “Black Contract With America on Moral Values.” This campaign became the central focus of the High Impact Leadership Coalition, an
organization founded by Jackson, and it seeks to promote traditional family values within the Black community in an effort to improve the general well-being of African Americans. To that end, its goal is to gain one million signatures from Americans nationwide who support its mission (“The Truth in Black and White”).

Jackson’s arguments against same-sex marriage mirror those of many other social conservatives. Not only does he believe that homosexuality contradicts scripture, but he also feels that it will have negative societal implications as well. “Children deserve to be raised in strong families headed by both a mother and father,” he wrote in an editorial published by USA Today. “The traditional family structure is almost extinct within today’s black community because of both poor personal decisions teamed with poor public policy decisions. The staggering number of out-of-wedlock births and abortions underscores the need for greater value to be placed on both kids and traditional family” (Jackson 2006). Jackson emphasized that he harbors no animosity for homosexuals; he simply believes that positive maternal and paternal influences are both vital to the raising of children.

While many Black Christians surprised political analysts by advocating a brand of social conservatism similar to Jackson’s, other members of the Black church remained in line with the Democratic Party by staunchly defending the rights of same-sex couples. William Shaw heads the National Baptist Convention USA, one of the largest organizations of Black Christians in America. Shaw challenged the idea that the government should ban same-sex marriage simply because it might complicate an already weakened family life in the Black community: “Marriage is threatened more by adultery, and we don’t have a constitutional ban on that. Alcohol is a threat to the stability of the family, and we don’t have a constitutional ban on that” (Maxwell 2005, 1P).

Other Black ministers attacked the notion that same-sex marriage contradicts the teachings of the Bible. "Oppression is oppression is oppression," Reverend Kelvin Calloway, pastor of the Second A.M.E. Church in Los Angeles, told the New York Times. "Just because we're not the ones who are being oppressed now, do we not stand with those oppressed now? That is the biblical mandate. That's what Jesus is all about" (Banerjee 2005, 23). According to Calloway, the Bible taken literally could be used to justify slavery in much the same way that social conservatives have used it in their campaign against gay marriage.
Such comparisons between the struggle of African Americans to overcome racial oppression and the plight of homosexuals have become a major point of contention in the debate over gay marriage. In *Why Marriage Matters: America, Equality and Gay People’s Right to Marry* (2002), Evan Wolfson discusses the argument made by gay rights advocates likening civil unions to the “separate but equal” laws that institutionalized the prejudices of 20th century America against African Americans and women. Wolfson quotes legal expert Barbara Cox as stating, “the heterosexism inherent in restricting same-sex couples to civil unions is reminiscent of the racism that relegated African Americans to separate railroad cars and separate schools and of the sexism that relegated women to separate schools” (135).

This sentiment was taken up by one of the most symbolic, if not influential, leaders of the Black community. Coretta Scott King repeatedly defended the rights of homosexuals throughout the 1990s, invoking the words of her late husband to justify her message. In 1998, she stated that the oppression of homosexuals in contemporary America paralleled the racism displayed towards African Americans fifty years ago. “We are all tied together in a single garment of destiny….I can never be what I ought to be until you are allowed to be what you ought to be,” she said, quoting a speech from Martin Luther King, Jr. She went on to explain in her own words, “I've always felt that homophobic attitudes and policies were unjust and unworthy of a free society and must be opposed by all Americans who believe in democracy” (Houlihan-Skilton 1998, 15).

These views generated considerable criticism from the Black religious community, and when King publicly supported gay marriage in 2004, conservative ministers responded immediately. "To equate a lifestyle choice to racism devalues the work of the entire civil rights movement," explained a statement issued by more than two dozen Black pastors shortly thereafter. "People are free in our nation to pursue relationships as they choose. To redefine marriage, however, to suit the preference of those choosing alternative lifestyles is wrong" (*The Associated Press* 2004, 23).

Martin Luther King, Jr.’s daughter Bernice King and his niece Alveda King were among the members of the Black church echoing this opposition to gay marriage. Despite the parallels existing between the modern gay rights movement and the 1960s civil rights movement, Black ministers and Black churchgoers continued to denounce this analogy as both inaccurate and downright offensive. Reverend Talbert Swan II, pastor of Massachusetts’ Solid
Rock Church of God in Christ, maintained that the two struggles were not similar because Blacks were labeled inhuman, denied property rights and lynched. "Homosexuality is a chosen lifestyle," he said. "I could not choose the color of my skin….For me to ride down the street and get profiled just because of my skin color is something a homosexual will never go through" (The Boston Globe 2003).

Since the Massachusetts Supreme Court made history with its 2003 ruling, African Americans have been at the forefront of this heated debate over gay marriage. Specifically, Black ministers from across the country weighed in on both sides of the issue, passionately arguing that gay marriage represented either a fundamental civil right or a breakdown in one of society’s most sacred institutions. While Black supporters of gay marriage certainly made their voices heard, the more significant aspect of this event was the massive opposition coming out of the Black religious community. The issue of gay marriage uncovered an intense social conservatism and religious fundamentalism deeply rooted in the Black church, which had been hidden beneath the church’s long history of support for liberal causes. Only after a careful analysis of how both political parties reacted to this ideological division will it become clear what implications these events have for the Black church and American politics in the future.

The 2004 Presidential Election

Reverend Ted Frazier, chairman of a group consisting of roughly 75 African-American Baptist ministers, felt divided between the 2004 presidential candidates. Regarding the concerns displayed by Democratic strategists, he stated “There should be worry, because sometimes the other side goes too far and takes people for granted and supports issues that may not fit well with their constituents. If you don’t represent your constituents, they will go someplace else” (Johnson 2004, B1). Republicans recognized all too clearly the implications of this sentiment prior to the presidential election of 2004. The outcry against gay marriage from the Black religious community could create dire consequences for a Democratic Party that assumed it had the Black vote already locked up. If Republicans could rally socially conservative African Americans around this issue, then they might be able to pull just enough votes away from the Democrats to win the election. John Zogby, co-founder of the Zogby polling firm,
underscored the truth to these statements: "The opportunity is there, especially among many African Americans who feel that the Democratic Party has let them down" (The Observer 2006, 38).

In light of these events, President Bush made it clear that, if reelected, he would continue to push for an amendment to the United States Constitution to strictly define marriage. "The union of a man and a woman is the most enduring human institution, honored and encouraged in all cultures and by every religious faith," Bush proclaimed in February of 2004. "After more than two centuries of American jurisprudence and millennia of human experience, a few judges and local authorities are presuming to change the most fundamental institution of civilization," Bush said. "Their actions have created confusion on an issue that requires clarity" (CNN Online 2004).

While John Kerry also disagreed with gay marriage, his defense of civil unions and opposition to a constitutional amendment defining marriage clearly separated his views from George W. Bush’s unequivocal stance on the issue. Stephanie Cutter, a spokeswoman for the Kerry campaign, countered Bush's comments regarding gay marriage, saying that his re-election strategy was to "use wedge issues and the politics of fear to divide the nation" (CNN Online 2004). Some analysts looking back on the election referred to the issue of gay marriage as a “political smokescreen” and a “red herring” (Crawford 2005).

Bush’s motives for pushing gay marriage to the front of his agenda may have been primarily political, but according to a national poll issued by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, his efforts appeared to pay off. In November of 2004, Bush’s support in the Black community had nearly doubled since 2000, from 9 percent to nearly 18 percent (Spencer 2004). Many attributed this incredible shift in support to the fact that the issue of gay marriage finally brought to light the social conservatism of many African Americans. In a 2003 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center, 64 percent of African Americans opposed gay marriage—at least 10 percent more than both Whites and Hispanics (Pew Research Center 2003a).

Amendments banning gay marriage sprouted up on state referenda across the country, frequently backed by conservative Black pastors. By October of 2004, two such amendments had already passed overwhelmingly in Missouri and Louisiana. The November elections brought 11 more successful state constitutional amendments in Montana, Oregon, Utah, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, and Mississippi. The referenda
in the majority of these states won the approval of more than 70% of voters (Pew Research Center 2006).

As Republicans stepped up their campaign against gay marriage and as Black ministers joined the outcry, Democrats knew that they had to present a counter to this issue that appeared to be gaining momentum each day. Earl Ofari Hutchinson describes how this realization affected the Democratic Party: “During the 2004 presidential election, the GOP-leaning Black evangelicals forced the Democrats to scramble to find an effective counter to the powerful emotional appeal that religion and social conservatism held among many blacks” (106). In October of 2004, John Kerry visited a Miami Baptist church with Jesse Jackson, who asked the crowd, "How many of you — someone from your family — married somebody of the same sex?" When no one responded, he asked, "Then how did that get in the middle of the agenda?" (Dinan 2004). To the chagrin of the Democratic Party, the election results proved that Jackson’s last-ditch effort to downplay the issue of gay marriage in the Black community was too little, too late.

Even before the final tallies for the presidential election came in, speculation over causes of Bush’s success flooded the airwaves. Some pointed to the war on terror, while others argued that Kerry simply came across as too left-wing. Still others cried foul, blaming Kerry’s loss on a GOP conspiracy to prevent Democrats from getting to the polls; however, many analysts at the time overlooked the impact of Bush’s defense of marriage campaign on Black voters. After the election, political commentators rightly guessed that, to some extent, the outcome of the election hinged on moral values issues. In What’s Wrong With Kansas: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America, Thomas Frank provided an accurate representation of this theory, discussing the GOP’s successful efforts to energize its conservative base in the Midwest (Frank 2004). But what Frank and others failed to realize was the importance of the role played by Americans who traditionally voted Democrat but switched parties on account of their stance on moral values issues—particularly, African Americans.

On a national scale, the change in support in the Black community seemed fairly insignificant. Bush increased his portion of the Black vote by slightly more than 2 percent, from an estimated 9 percent in 2000 to 11 percent in 2004. Initially, it seemed that in spite of the GOP’s success in doubling Bush’s approval ratings among African Africans in the prior weeks, this increased
support did not translate into increased votes on election day. A closer analysis of the voting breakdown, however, painted a very different picture.

In some states, Bush’s newfound support among African Americans in fact had little chance of impacting the election. Pastor Earl Crawford, executive director of the California Coalition for Inner City Renewal, became a vocal supporter of President Bush leading up to the 2004 election. Crawford was part of a statewide coalition of Black pastors voting for Bush because of his stance on gay marriage. While the GOP eagerly accepted this support from the West Coast, Republican strategists did not truly expect to win the left-leaning Golden State; however, they did recognize what it could mean for swing states.

As Americans remained glued to their televisions into the night on November 2nd, 2004, reporters repeatedly predicted that the winner would be decided by the outcome in Ohio. The 20 electoral votes represented by Ohio did, in fact, seal the victory for George W. Bush as he ended with 50.7 percent of the vote compared to Kerry’s 48.3 percent. This was the smallest margin of victory in any state won by Bush. Bush’s campaign tactics in Ohio came under strict scrutiny from both sides, eager to find clues to success for future elections, and the focus soon became the GOP’s heavy defense of marriage campaign within the state. Although analysts initially pointed to Bush’s ability to rally White evangelicals, his success among African Americans was far more significant. Bush won only 9 percent of Ohio’s Black vote in the 2000 election, but the results of the 2004 election showed that this support had climbed to 16 percent—an increase of more than 75 percent (Pew Research Center 2006).

Deroy Murdock, a conservative Black columnist for the National Review, opined, “blacks essentially handed President Bush Ohio, and thus a second term” (Murdock 2006). Murdock might be overstating the case, especially considering that Bush did not accomplish anything dramatic in terms of the national Black vote. In addition, given the complexity of a presidential election in the twenty-first century, it is impossible to isolate only one cause that led to this result. But even while a multitude of factors helped to swing the election in Bush’s favor, it would be careless to discount the role played by traditionally Democratic Black voters who responded to the GOP’s emphasis on family values. Reverend Dwight McKissic, pastor of Virginia’s Cornerstone Baptist Church, commented, "I hope this last election was a wake-up call to the Democrats. Do I see a trend? Yes. Blacks who voted Republican made the difference in this election” (Crawford 2005). Although no one could be certain,
political analysts suspected that the issue of gay marriage and the Black vote influenced the election more than any analyst could have predicted—and both parties were determined to learn from these events.

**Homework for the Midterms**

Both Republican and Democratic strategists immediately started making preparations to achieve a desired outcome in the midterm elections. Acknowledging the importance of the Black vote, President Bush began his second term with a meeting that gathered 14 members of the Black clergy and 10 Black business leaders on January 18, 2005. The goal was to highlight how Bush’s policies benefited African Americans on a variety of political topics. The President discussed how private accounts helped African Americans more than the traditional social security system, since African Americans have a lower average life expectancy than most other ethnic groups. He also promised to increase trade with Africa, which could aid the economies of underdeveloped nations (Fletcher 2005, A04).

More symbolic than this meeting, though, was the GOP’s announcement regarding the upcoming midterm elections: it would be running three African-Americans candidates for high-profile positions. Both Ken Blackwell, current Secretary of State in Ohio, and Lynn Swann, a former NFL superstar, made gubernatorial bids, while Michael Steele sought one of Maryland’s senate seats. This appeared to be a clear show of confidence by the Republican Party in its increased ability to rally Black voters, as only three Black Republicans have made successful congressional bids in the history of the Party. *The Observer* of England noted that “All three of them are playing the socially conservative card with voters,” as they emphasized their opposition to abortion and gay marriage” (*The Observer* 2006). If a White evangelical could increase his support by more than 75% among African Americans in one state by pushing moral values, then a Black candidate should expect even greater success. Certainly, this was not the first time that the Republican Party attempted to court the Black vote by choosing African-American candidates, and in the past these efforts were viewed as little more than an attempt to disprove allegations of racism that frequently simmered beneath the surface of Republican campaigns. At the same time, the decision to put *three* African Americans in high profile races and urge them to highlight
social issues was a clear attempt to build upon the success that Republicans saw in Ohio in 2004.

Democrats recognized these efforts as a way to loosen their firm grasp on the Black vote, and with the 2004 election still in recent memory, they knew they had to act fast. The liberal National Black Justice Coalition held a conference of 150 African-American ministers and gay rights activists in January, 2006, to discuss ways of combating social conservatism in the Black church. "In 2004, the religious right was concerned about re-electing George W. Bush," said Reverend Al Sharpton. "They couldn't come to black churches to talk about the war, about health care, about poverty. So they did what they always do and reached for the bigotry against gay and lesbian people” (Banerjee 2006, 11). Recognizing their failings in the 2004 presidential election, Democrats made a concerted effort to reach out to the Black community. A spokeswoman for the Democratic National Committee said that, in the midterm elections, the DNC would not take the Black vote for granted. According to the Associated Press of June 27, 2006, “the committee has been hiring black organizers, meeting with black leaders and speaking out on issues that concern black voters” (Glick 2006).

In June, Al Sharpton took it upon himself to organize the National Conference and Revival for Social Justice in the Black Church to steer Black voters away from the Christian Right. The three-day conference, located in Dallas, brought together hundreds of Black clergy members who remained loyal to the Democratic Party. Sharpton continued his theme that gay marriage is not a pressing issue for the Black religious community: "If I was to ask the black preachers if their congregations are having problems with Medicaid, have loved ones in Iraq, youth violence, education or employment, 70 to 80 or 90 percent of them will say yes, but if I ask them if they are being asked to perform gay marriages, only 1 percent likely would say yes," Sharpton stated (DeBose 2006). Sharpton’s approach became common among Democratic strategists prior to the midterm elections, hoping to shift the minds of African Americans from social issues to topics like health care and the war in Iraq.

As if playing into Sharpton’s worst fears, the GOP again began mobilizing efforts to put new “defense of marriage” amendments on state ballots across the country. Referenda gradually appeared in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Alabama, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia prior to the election; however, this time Democrats were able to muster enough support to create formidable opposition to the ballot initiatives. “The opponents
of these measures have had a lot more time to organize and fund their efforts; that has made for a bit of a different complexion," said Julaine K. Appling, the executive director of the conservative Family Research Institute of Wisconsin. *The New York Times* also noted that “Slick advertising, paid staff and get-out-the-vote drives have become a two-way street” (Stolberg 2006, 1).

The midterm elections appeared to be shaping up very differently from the 2004 presidential election. Liberal Black ministers like Al Sharpton and Jesse Jackson provided a strong counter to the GOP’s efforts to rally the Black community, while gay rights advocates flooded communities with messages of acceptance. But just when Democrats felt as though they were gaining the upper hand, another state Supreme Court ruling came crashing onto the American political stage.

The New Jersey Supreme Court ruling, which gave same-sex couples the same legal rights as others, did not set any new precedents like the 2003 Massachusetts ruling, but it similarly provided a new rallying cry for the Republican Party. During a speech President Bush gave in Iowa the next day supporting a Republican candidate for the senate, he made a point to address the New Jersey decision. "Yesterday in New Jersey, we had another activist court issue a ruling that raises doubts about the institution of marriage,” Bush stated. Some political analysts thought that this issue again had the potential to motivate a large turnout for the GOP. Joseph Cella, president of the national Catholic advocacy group Fidelis, said "I think they've been a little sedate," in reference to social conservatives in the months preceding the election. With the New Jersey ruling, though, he believed that they "are really getting motivated, and this is a shot in the arm to propel that” (Stolberg 2006, 1).

Despite the optimism of conservatives like Joseph Cella, the results of the midterm elections proved devastating for the Republican Party. The Republicans lost control over both houses of Congress, a switch that had not happened since the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. All three African Americans running on GOP tickets—Blackwell, Swan and Steele—failed in their respective elections. More significantly, all three men did poorly among African-American voters. Swan received a shocking 13 percent of the Black vote, Blackwell won 20 percent and Steele topped the list with 25 percent. Swan’s performance in the Black community would appear paltry to any analyst, but the same cannot be said for the others. Commenting on Steele’s race, spokeswoman for the Republican National Committee Tara Wall stated, “That’s historic for any Republican to get
25 percent of the Black vote….You can compare that with the last Republican that ran for that seat in ’88….I think we’ve made great strides” (Edney 2006). Wall was referring to Alan Keyes’ unsuccessful campaign in which he received only 14 percent of the Black vote. These comments, however, must be viewed in light of the fact that nationwide Republicans received only 11 percent of the Black vote.

At best, the Republican Party’s ability to generate support in the African-American community was unimpressive—but it did not represent quite as much of a disappointment as the movement to ban gay marriage. The movement itself proved to be a great success, with every state except for Arizona passing its referendum strictly defining marriage; however, the fact that this success did not translate into votes made the effort a colossal failure for the GOP. As Hunter College political science professor Kenneth Sherrill observed in a study for the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, "the election returns indicate that President Bush did less well in these battleground states with anti-same-sex marriage ballot initiatives than in battleground states that did not have referenda on same-sex marriage" (CBS News 2006). For instance, in Tennessee, where the ban on gay marriage passed with a resounding 81 percent of the vote, Republican Bob Corker won by only 3 percent—a surprisingly close race, considering earlier predictions and the state’s reputation as a solid “red” state.

After Bush’s successful reelection campaign, Republican strategists prided themselves on their ability to use the issue of gay marriage to increase support from social conservatives, especially within the Black church. The GOP hoped to replicate this success in the midterm elections, and some analysts went so far as to predict 2006 to be the “year of the black Republican.” The results showed that this could not have been further from the truth, as all three Black Republicans lost their elections and the gay marriage debate failed to mobilize voters, White or Black. Regardless, much can be learned from the Black church’s response to the issue of gay marriage and the impact it had on recent elections. After examining these events, it is now possible to extrapolate some of the implications they will have for American politics in the future.
Future Implications

The Black Church

The passionate defense of the traditional family displayed by members of the Black clergy since the 2003 Massachusetts ruling opened up a wide array of possibilities for the direction of the Black church in the coming years. Undoubtedly, if Black ministers remain hostile toward homosexuals while American society becomes gradually more accepting, gay Blacks will shift to other congregations or renounce religion altogether. Although some Black men “on the down low” might continue attending church, Horace Griffin argues in Their Own Receive Them Not: African-American Lesbians and Gays in Black Churches that openly gay individuals will not be able to tolerate the anti-gay sentiment that pervades the Black church. Not only will this social conservatism force out gays, but it also has the potential to alienate other young Blacks who do not respond well to these traditional teachings. Bill Maxwell, columnist for the St. Petersburg Times, explains, “Black men—already scarce in the pews—are being pushed further away from the church, the one institution that could make a positive difference in their lives” (Maxwell 2005, 1P). Americans are constantly inundated by a progressive, secular media, and according to Maxwell, the impact of these forces on young Black males has been reflected in a decreased turnout in churches across the country. If Black ministers hope to bring young Black men back to the church, they must reexamine the nature of their messages and their means of conveying those messages.

At the same time, though, Black congregations must understand the repercussions of adopting more “progressive” views. The experience of Dr. Kenneth Samuel of Victory Church in Georgia highlights the problems associated with changing ideologies. When Dr. Samuel began openly speaking about the need to accept gays in the Black community, roughly 1,000 of his 5,000 parishioners left in protest. This had a severe impact on the church’s finances, and it may have been enough to even destroy a small congregation. For that reason, Dr. Samuel said other ministers may be less inclined to speak out (Banerjee 2006).

Such events are not unique to Dr. Samuel’s church, and they may have other, more significant impacts on the Black religious community. For instance, several individual congregations threatened to break away from the United Church of Christ when its leaders endorsed gay marriage. After hearing the
stance of church leadership, Reverend J.R. McAliley of Center Congregational Church in Atlanta said his church would most likely leave the United Church of Christ and align with another group. John Evans, associate professor of sociology at the University of California—San Diego, describes how the church has positioned itself: "They've become identified as the most liberal denomination and are proud of it. You're making a conscious choice when you join a United Church congregation to be a liberal Protestant" (Milicia 2005). This event has profound implications for not only the Black church, but all churches in the future. If churches are increasingly defined by their political views, it will add a new layer of stratification to American society. People may decide to leave one religious congregation and join another based solely on the churches’ political leanings, just as Reverend McAliley did. The fact that the overarching religious tradition does not explicitly comment on these issues provides ample opportunity for such division to take place. On one hand, this may help to foster religious pluralism in America, but on the other, it could weaken the bonds that unite individual congregations under one religion.

Besides causing divisions within Christian denominations, the recent political activities of the Black church hint at something much more fundamental: a large ideological rift separating Black pastors themselves. The vitriolic attacks coming from Black pastors on both sides of the gay marriage issue illustrate just how different these individuals are. Although Al Sharpton and Jesse Jackson would like to come across as the icons of the Black church, the reality is that many Black pastors strongly disagree with them on a number of issues. "There is a new black church that Al and Jesse don't speak to, and they are threatened by the new black megachurches and their pastors; and they tend to talk about us as if we are just uppity Negroses, asking 'why can't they just fall in line?',' said Bishop Harry Jackson, founder of the Black Contract with America on Moral Values (DeBose 2006). No matter how hard Sharpton and Jackson try to unite members of the Black clergy, they will never receive the support of ministers like Harry Jackson. Stephen Strang, publisher of the popular religious magazine Charisma, said that Jackson’s views were representative of “a seismic shift” in the Black religious community (Banks 2005). While the social conservatism of these individuals was hidden beneath a wave of support for the Democratic Party for many years, the issue of gay marriage finally uncovered these differences.
Pastors like Jackson find their views to be much more similar to those of the religious right, previously thought to consist almost entirely of White evangelicals. When the Christian Coalition was founded by Pat Robertson in the 1980’s, Black support seemed virtually nonexistent. But with prominent Black ministers like Harry Jackson now publicly defending traditional family values, the face of the religious right is now changing. In regard to the efforts of Bishop Jackson, National Association of Evangelicals president Ted Haggard observed, “He’s building a bridge between white evangelicalism and African-American evangelicalism that we haven’t had in 20 years” (Banks 2005). As socially conservative Black ministers continue to speak out against liberal Black politicians, the Black church will continue to fracture along these ideological grounds. Conservative Black ministers will become incorporated into the religious right, while liberal White religious leaders find themselves in the company of the Al Sharptons of America. Instead of a dichotomy between largely conservative White evangelicals and largely liberal Black evangelicals, the dichotomy will lose its racial boundaries altogether, becoming conservative evangelicals of all stripes opposed to liberal evangelicals of all stripes.

While this certainly represents a distinct possibility, other analysts maintain that differences still exist between White evangelicals and the socially conservative Black ministers who joined with them in opposition to gay marriage. Melissa Harris-Lacewell, a political science professor at the University of Chicago, spoke of “a growing chasm between the largely white Christian conservatives, who helped make opposition to gay marriage and abortion Republican priorities, and religious Blacks, who tend to be socially conservative but politically progressive” (The Associated Press 2006). Harris-Lacewell has identified an important distinction between Black evangelicals and White evangelicals, even though her description is somewhat misleading. In the past, most religious Blacks were socially conservative, but they still sent their votes to the Democratic Party. These individuals were “politically progressive” in the sense that they voted for Democratic candidates, but that did not mean that they fell in lockstep with Democratic leaders. The stigma surrounding the GOP for African Americans since the 1960s made it highly unlikely for them to vote for a Republican candidate even if he best represented their views. Contrary to what Harris-Lacewell implies, religious Blacks should not be loosely labeled as political progressives.
The truth to Harris-Lacewell’s statement lies in the fact that, unlike the vast majority of White evangelicals, many socially conservative Blacks often simultaneously support an array of liberal causes. Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, pastor of Greater New Light Missionary Baptist Church in Cincinnati, is one of many religious Blacks who disagreed with liberals on “family values” issues such as gay marriage, but supported other liberal initiatives like universal health care. “To me that’s one of the biggest sins of the world,” he said, regarding the state of the nation’s health care system. “God sent Jesus to help the needy” (Spencer 2004). Shuttlesworth voted for Ohio’s ban on gay marriage and for John Kerry during the 2004 elections. If other religious Blacks follow this mentality, it will be difficult for evangelicals to form a united, racially diverse front that would transform the religious right. If, however, the GOP continues to target social issues and plays to the social conservatism of many religious Blacks, it could have an impact on future elections; thus, it leads to questions about how this issue has the potential to transform partisan politics in the future.

Partisan Politics

The 2004 election proved that rallying social conservatives in the Black church can influence American politics. Of course, it is impossible to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between Black support for the GOP in Ohio and Bush’s ultimate victory, but even so, the implications of this event cannot be ignored. Bush increased his support among Black voters in Ohio by more than 75 percent since the 2000 election, largely due to his emphasis on traditional moral values such as the opposition to gay marriage. Whether or not this landed Bush back in the White House, it made a crucial point for the GOP: the Black vote is not monolithic—and the Democrats’ iron grasp on the Black vote can be cracked. Conservative commentator Joseph C. Phillips explains, “I don’t expect a Black exodus from the Democratic Party any time soon. You can’t turn a Mack truck around on a dime. I do, however, expect that the slow trickle of Black support away from the Democratic Party will continue to grow” (Phillips 2004). Phillips based this prediction partially on a poll taken by Black America’s Political Action Committee in 2004, which revealed that 40 percent of African Americans feel that the Democratic Party takes them for granted. While the Black church has found much common ground with Democratic candidates in the past, this will not necessarily be the case in the future. The emergence of social issues into
the public forum will generally benefit the Republican Party in terms of the Black vote, as demonstrated by the Ohio turnout in 2004; however, in 2006 Democrats were better prepared to handle the GOP’s last-minute efforts to win votes by pushing the issue of gay marriage. A concerted effort by gay rights activists to counter the GOP’s message and the Democrats’ ability to shift the focus of the election to other issues made for a tragic failure by the Republican Party. These events hold many implications for both parties in the future.

First, it is important to note that a multitude of factors may have influenced the midterm elections. Just as Bush’s reelection cannot be wholly attributed to the GOP’s success at rallying social conservatives, the Republican breakdown in 2006 cannot be wholly attributed to its failed efforts to win the Black vote or push social issues. Fred Barnes of the conservative *Weekly Standard* presents a straightforward analysis of the elections: “Republicans lost the House and probably the Senate because of Iraq, corruption, and a record of taking up big issues and then doing nothing on them. Of these, the war was by far the biggest factor” (Barnes 2006). Even prior to the elections, a series of Gallup polls indicated that events were shaping up pretty poorly for Republicans, and social issues and the Black vote had nothing to do with it. Support for the war in Iraq plummeted in 2006, with the President’s approval ratings not far behind. Gallup reported that Bush held a 38 percent approval rating in November of 2006, down from 63 percent prior to the 2002 midterm elections (*Gallup Poll News Service* 2006). Undoubtedly, this massive shift in support negatively affected voters’ perception of the GOP. Allegations of Republican misconduct, such as the Mark Foley scandal, served to further exacerbate an already tenuous situation.

In addition, the lack of support from Black voters can be attributed to another important factor as well: the weather—or, more specifically, Hurricane Katrina. Black leaders across the country lambasted the Bush administration for its haphazard response to the emergency in New Orleans, which disproportionately affected poor African Americans. John Zogby commented on how the event influenced the GOP’s effort to gain a larger share of the Black vote: “There was a huge opportunity for Republicans before that, but afterwards it had undone all their work” (*The Observer* 2006). Popular rap artist Kanye West famously summed up the anti-GOP sentiment in America when he went off script during a nationally televised Katrina relief effort and told viewers that “George Bush doesn’t care about black people.” While even Democrats defended Bush
from this highly charged attack, the damage had been done. Even the NAACP, the leading Black advocacy group in America, added to the old Democratic mantra that Republicans were racists, as President Bruce Gordon states “it’s clear that the administration has not had [Black and poor people] as high on their priority list as they should have” (Hutchinson 2006, 128). This all contributed to what Earl Ofari Hutchinson referred to as a “post-Katrina Bush racial meltdown” (Hutchinson 2006, 128).

To say that this event discouraged Black voters would be an understatement, and to think that Republican candidates had any chance of taking away a larger portion of the Black vote after the Katrina debacle would be supreme naiveté. If the Republican Party hopes to succeed in the Black community in future elections, it will have to alter its strategy in a few key ways. First and foremost, it has to distance itself as much as possible from its segregationist history. Democratic politicians have not failed to capitalize on any opportunity Republicans have given them to imply to Black voters that the GOP is racist. John McWhorter, columnist for the New York Sun, told the GOP after the elections, “If your party was hoping they would usher more Black voters into pulling the lever for you, you were neglecting something crucial. Millions of black people remain convinced that the R in Republican stands for racist” (McWhorter 2006). Political gaffes like Trent Lott’s comment implying that he supported segregation must end if the GOP wants any chance of attaining a bigger portion of the elusive Black vote. Such events only play into the hands of liberal politicians, such as Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton, known for demonizing the Republican Party. During their campaign to rally Black voters before the midterm elections, Jackson asked if the gay marriage issue “was worth sleeping with the enemy” and Sharpton referred to Bush’s faith-based initiatives for the Black church as “a business deal with the devil” (Samuels 2006). When Black leaders succeed in creating this portrayal of Republicans, even the most effective GOP strategies are rendered useless. As conservative Black Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas noted, “if blacks hate or fear conservatives, nothing we say will be heard” (Thomas 1997, 5).

In addition, Republicans need to spend time showing Black voters how their policies directly benefit the African-American community. For many years, Republicans simply neglected the Black vote because they believed the Democratic Party’s hold on African Americans to be unbreakable. The issue of gay marriage and the election of 2004 showed that this is not necessarily the
case. The GOP must have more meetings like the one Bush held with Black leaders in 2005, in which he discussed how private accounts were more advantageous to Blacks than the current social security system. In recent years, the GOP has begun a discussion of how the issue of school choice could positively impact many low-income African-Americans living in urban areas. Even lifelong Democrats like former New York Congressman Floyd Flake responded well to this message (Dickerson 1999, 18A).

Most importantly, though, Republicans must cater to the needs of the Black religious community, as the Black church still plays a large role in the political lives of African Americans. Republicans have a clear advantage in the Black community when it comes to moral values issues, specifically those issues that speak to Christians, and it must capitalize on that opportunity. Reverend Gregory Groover, Sr., a Black pastor in Boston explained, “As black preachers, we are progressive in our social consciousness, and in our political ideology as an oppressed people we will often be against the status quo, but our first call is to hear the voice of God in our Scriptures, and where an issue clearly contradicts our understanding of Scripture we have to apply that understanding” (Paulson 2004).

In a personal interview (October 2006), chairwoman Frances Rice of the National Black Republican Association summarized the challenge facing Republicans in the future:

Every election cycle, Democrats avoid discussing social issues and accuse Republicans of being responsible for the deplorable conditions in black communities, even though Democrats have been running our urban communities for the past 30-40 years. With the complicity of African-American clergy and so-called civil rights leaders, Democrats use incitement, not enlightenment, to get African-Americans to cast a protest vote against Republicans, rather than a vote for Democrats.

If the GOP can overcome these obstacles, then it might be able to once again break into the Black vote, thought to be virtually monolithic prior to the election of 2004.

The Democrats, on the other hand, have a very straightforward task ahead of them if they wish to maintain a lock on the Black vote: continue
emphasizing issues unrelated to questions of personal morality. Al Sharpton and Jesse Jackson clearly made this their goal prior to the midterm elections, visiting Black churches around the country and telling church leaders that social issues should not be at the top of their agenda. “These ministers are allowing moral and social issues to become confused. I speak at churches as often as I can, hoping to make sure people understand what’s happening,” said Jackson. “The end of the war in Iraq, higher minimum wages and affirmative action--those are our issues right now. Not same sex marriage or even abortion” (Samuels 2006). This tactic appeared to pay off, as many Black ministers responded positively to the emphasis on other issues. Reverend Gene Rivers, president of the violence-prevention program titled the National Ten-Point Leadership Foundation, succinctly described the ambiguous political situation of many Black voters: “Most of the same people who believe fundamentally that marriage is between a man and a woman and who will stand up and support that with conservatives voted for Al Gore in 2000 and oppose tax cuts for the rich and cutting social services in 2004” (Clemetson 2004, 1). While Republicans try to win the hearts of Black voters on moral values issues, Democrats must counter by pointing to the economy, the war in Iraq, health care and other topics which energize the liberal side of the Black community.

Conclusion

Since its inception, the Black church has displayed undeniably liberal leanings. It was born in an atmosphere of oppression, serving as a shelter for African Americans. When the slaves were freed, they found themselves floundering in a society still very much hostile to them and their way of life. The Black church was a point of stability, eventually giving African Americans a voice with which to address the larger society. In the mid-twentieth century, Democrats capitalized on the weaknesses of the Republican Party, which was forced to walk a tightrope between supporting civil rights and maintaining the loyalties of southern segregationists. The Republican Party succeeded in winning the support of southerners, but it did so at the expense of alienating a core demographic that was gaining political power with each passing year. African Americans never forgave the Republican Party for its stance on civil rights, and this animosity is strikingly evident in the voting record of the Black community; however, in spite of these events, the civil rights movement caused divisions among Black leaders who disagreed on how best to represent the political views
of African Americans from that point forward. This ideological divide did not come about until the issue of gay marriage struck America in 2003, playing into a long-held animosity towards homosexuals in the Black community and energizing Black conservatives. The presidential election of 2004 turned out to be a great success for the Republican Party, which achieved a key victory in Ohio partially due to the tremendous shift in support of African Americans. In spite of its efforts, the GOP could not replicate its success in the Black community during the midterm elections of 2006. Republicans learned that they must continue to emphasize moral values issues, which rally African Americans, while rejecting all arguments that would portray them as racists. On the other hand, Democrats will continue to highlight other issues that stir up the long tradition of liberalism within the Black community. At the very least, the debate over gay marriage in America proved that the Black vote, in fact, is not monolithic—but only time will tell whether Republicans choose to exploit this advantage or allow Democrats to further strengthen their alliance with the Black church.
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The Shape of Things to Come: American Generational Value Change and Developing Global Civil Society

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Global civil society is emerging in a world dominated by nation-states and thus requires the approval of the great powers, among which the United States is chief. Global civil society critically needs the U.S. government’s acceptance — motivated by the American people’s involvement in or support of transnational society — to become a functional and valid forum for policy development. The willingness of U.S. citizens to be personally involved, or supportive of others’ involvement, on the world stage is inseparable from their attitude toward the overarching phenomenon of globalization and the attempt to govern it, a perspective that has been in flux since the end of the Cold War and the wakeup call of September 11 — especially along generational lines. This analysis investigates the existence of an American generational value change toward a globalist perspective, which would contribute to the function and validity of global civil society as part of the struggle to shape things to come.

Introduction

Globalization, perhaps more than any other force, defines the modern era as it has emerged from the Cold War’s threat of nuclear annihilation. Efforts to harness the dynamic and powerful elements of globalization have generated focus on global governance, a break in emphasis from the traditional form of international relations. Governance does not mean the creation of a world government; it refers to the efforts of numerous global actors to develop global policy. The nation-state is arguably the primary actor. Another actor vying for say in governance issues is global civil society, a transnational stage on which globally-minded individuals have the opportunity to help tackle challenges facing humanity in a more democratic system than is presently afforded in state-centric negotiations.

Because global civil society is emerging in a world dominated by nation-states, its survival requires the approval of the great powers, among which the United States is chief. Global civil society critically needs the U.S. government’s
acceptance – motivated by the American people’s involvement in or support of transnational society – to become a functional and valid forum for policy development. The willingness of U.S. citizens to be personally involved, or supportive of others’ involvement, on the world stage is inseparable from their attitudes toward the overarching phenomenon of globalization and the attempt to govern it, a perspective that has been in flux since the end of the Cold War and the wakeup of September 11 – especially along generational lines. This analysis investigates the existence of an American generational value change toward a globalist perspective. Such a change would contribute to the function and validity of global civil society as part of the struggle to shape things to come.

Literature Review

If the beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms, the understanding of global civil society is still in its infancy. Thirty-six years ago, international relations theorists Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane noted how a non-state-centric system was just beginning to be explored (Nye and Keohane 1971, 331). Many definitions have been offered to describe the phenomenon of a global, or transnational, society and its impact on governance; however, understanding how an American generational value change toward globalism and involvement would affect the long-term prospect of global civil society requires the marriage of two concepts: the development of global civil society and the theory of generational value change. Understanding these models creates a bridge to understanding schools of thought regarding the United States’ place in the shrinking world. The division between these schools is principally the division between those who are for globalization and those who are against it – Supporters and Rejectionists – with polar-leaning moderates, who fall between world government and defending the modern state at all costs, identified respectively as Reformers and Regressives (Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius 2004, 3). If the development of global civil society is to receive significant American contribution and support in the near future, any generational value change of the U.S. citizenry must be toward the Reformer and Supporter’s globalist perspective.

While global civil society views global processes “from below,” in the sphere of individuals (Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius 2004, 1), it will better serve the study to frame the discussion from the top down. This will be accomplished by considering general views on global civil society, examining generational
value change, and exploring the spectrum of attitudes on globalization, from Supporters to Rejectionists.

Global Civil Society

The 1995 United Nations Commission on Global Governance emphasized the growing desire of individuals to be involved in the decision-making process in ways that not only affect them locally but across national borders (“Our Global Neighborhood,” 1995). The continued pressures of globalization have heightened this aim for more effective and democratic governance. The emergence and use of the term “global civil society” as a partial answer to this emphasis began in the past decade (Kaldor 2003, 583). Understanding the concept relies on grasping what is meant by civil society.

Political theorists, from Thomas Paine to Georg Hegel, defined civil society as parallel to but separate from the state (Carothers 1999-2000, 18). This definition was later expanded to present usage, indicating the place where negotiation, debate, and struggle occur in the development of sound policy and public action (Kaldor 2003, 585); it is the “realm where citizens associate according to their own interests and wishes” (Carothers 1999-2000, 18). Most important for this study, civil society identifies nonpartisan politics – seen in the U.S. and Europe as “a means of social renewal” (Carothers 1999-2000, 19) – and in the case of global civil society, reaction to the spirit of rash nationalism (Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius 2004, 2). As noted, global civil society and the overarching study of governance issues present a deviation from the state-centric view of traditional international relations (Nye and Keohane 1971, 331). Global civil society involves the same definition as civil society, save for the all-important distinction that it is not contained to territorial states. Rather, its effect reaches much further in the operation of both international organizations and national governments. It includes social movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals (Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius 2004, 8); however, in the literature they are not equally weighted.

Most scholarly work on global civil society has investigated specific issues, such as human rights, coupled with particular forms of organization, including NGOs, social movements, networks (Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius 2004, 8), labor unions, professional associations, ethnic associations, religious organizations, student groups, and cultural organizations (Kaiser 1971, 803). There are several reasons to consider each issue independently thanks to an
increasingly complex world’s demand for “instruments of analysis [to] be refined accordingly” (Kaiser 1971, 803). But for the basic analysis of this study, global civil society will include an amalgamation of issues, but the limitations for such a view must be noted. Additionally, each of the approaches on particular organizational forms gives little attention to individuals’ attitudes and identities, focusing solely on associations rather than the micro level of the individuals that make such groups operative.

According to Heba Raouf Ezzat, global civil society needs to be investigated at the level of individuals, their changing perceptions, associations, and identities of themselves and the world. “It is, after all, the individual who decides to communicate, network, act and move, travel and demonstrate, and embrace notions of moral responsibility on a global scale. She or he transcends national boundaries and bridges different public spheres – domestically and globally” (2004, 46). Ezzat points out that focus on the individual as part of global civil society has been marginalized because of the emphasis on the “‘societal’ nature of global civil action” (2004, 46). A look at individuals and individual attitude change will afford a deeper view of the possibilities of global civil society. In such analysis, it must be remembered “that people in any society associate and work together to advance nefarious as well as worthy ends,” a realization that is “critical to demystifying the concept of civil society” (Carothers 1999-2000, 20). Global civil society has existed for centuries – consider the transnational impact of the Roman Catholic Church – but it is the transformation, thanks to it “both feeding and being fed by globalization” that makes the study of its foundations essential. “It carries the potential to reshape the world in important ways, but one must not oversell its strength or idealize its intentions” (Carothers 1999-2000, 28).

Generational Value Change

Ronald Inglehart is a noted scholar on the topic of generational value change. His work on population replacement, as one generation follows another, has focused primarily on European society. There he has noted the shift in values from materialism to post-materialism following World War II – materialism referring to such concerns as maintaining order and fighting inflation and post-materialism focusing on ideals such as belonging or self-expression (Abramson and Inglehart 1987, 231). While not exactly the materialism/post-
materialism continuum, considering the changing attitudes and identity of the American public may follow the same model of generational value change and replacement following an all-consuming conflict.

In psychology, identity is viewed as the result of experience within two periods of life. First, identity is the result of “deep socialization” during an individual’s early years. Second, it is recognition of sociological and cultural inputs after initial development and throughout life (Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius 2004, 9).

It is supposed that global civil society is more developed in Europe thanks to European thought being more cosmopolitan and ready to embrace a multiplicity of identities. This too is part and parcel with that continent’s apparent shift toward post-materialism. In fact, it has been found that associating internationally is more pronounced amid the rising generation of Europeans (Inglehart 1997).

This makes sense on a number of levels, not the least of which concerns the early development of the younger generation outside the confines and memories of conflict. The generation born outside of early influence of war or the fear of war maintains a different perspective on society generally and its own identity and opportunity specifically, as described by Inglehart. Constant fear motivates different self and societal perception than the comforts of relative peace. As previously noted, the Cold War spread the threat of nuclear annihilation across the United States. No other conflict of the twentieth century, not even the terrorist attacks of September 11, has evoked the ultimate fear of total destruction for U.S. citizens. Thus, it would be expected that the post-Cold War generation, where individual identities were not limited by rash nationalism in response to fear of nuclear annihilation, would be more favorable to globalization thanks to their experience with comparative peace and worldwide interdependence.

Globalization Schools of Thought

Individual attitudes toward globalization are the fuel for international cooperation and therefore global civil society. But what is globalization? Nye and Keohane suggest that global is to transnational what globalization is to interdependence (2000, 104), all buzzwords that describe the process of the world’s getting smaller on a number of fronts. The four-part continuum
developed by Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius effectively describes attitudes toward globalization and thereby identifies schools of thought.

First are Supporters who praise the spread of globalization in all fields – economics, politics, law, and culture (Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius 2004, 3). Such individuals would be in support of the creation of a world government and complete surrender of sovereignty to a world federation or something similarly democratic. Supporter views would most strongly indicate a shift toward a globalism.

On the other end of the continuum are Rejectionists, those who oppose interconnection in all fields as vehemently as Supporters seek universal interdependence (Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius 2004, 3). Such individuals support domestic issues and the preservation of their country’s sovereignty exclusively--reminiscent in thought to true isolationists.

The moderates in this categorization include the Regressives and the Reformers. Regressives lean toward the Rejectionist viewpoint, supporting globalization in selected fields when it serves best to advance nationalist interests (Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius 2004, 3). Such feeling is indicative of much of the world today, especially the dominant state actors. To preserve sovereignty, or at least to hope to preserve it from the complex onslaught of global forces, they strive to pick and choose what will be advanced in an effort to continue to maneuver and further their own cause. The American Cold War mentality was Regressive. Throughout the Cold War, countries “complained that Washington too often asserted that all disorder in the world emanated from Moscow” (Schulzinger 2002, 13). Such a simplistic view of the world and a rejection of the realities of globalization are included in the Regressive position.

Following the end of the Cold War, the opportunity to address the world’s complexities properly dawned; however, the present administration has heralded a return of Cold War simplicity in the face of the war on terror. In this Regressive vein, the United States has hindered the expansion of global civil society in a number of ways. Global civil society conferences were held for NGOs prior to official state functions of international organizations throughout the 1990s. The U.S. pushed for a moratorium on the conferences and its wish was granted (Bennett 2002), but not without reason. The United States’ lone status as the world’s superpower places it in a position to potentially reject any threats to its hegemony. According to Kaldor, “the United States is the only country not hemmed in by globalization, the only state able to continue to act as
an autonomous nation-state...a ‘global universalist,’ as Javier Solana puts it, or the last nation-state” (2003, 591). Therefore, as Kaldor points out, an expanded global civil society would provide a system of governance where decisions can be made by deliberation and not by the whim of the American hegemony (2003, 592).

Finally, the types of individuals one would expect to find in support of increased international awareness and involvement, and therefore those who identify and associate more readily with global civil society, are categorized as Reformers, persons who support interconnectedness and the effective use of global governance to benefit all of humanity and not just select countries (Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius 2004, 3). Reformers lean toward the Supporters’ aims and focus on governance as an effort to provide for the needs of humanity. These efforts include the expansion of international law – especially law concerning human rights (Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius 2004, 3).

**Conclusion**

An American generational value change toward either Reformer or Supporter viewpoints would spell promise for global civil society. The Reformer’s focus on globalization is best propagated by the flow of ideas indicative of social and cultural globalism, which affects personal identity and therefore international affiliation (Nye and Keohane 2000, 106). Reformers would emphasize the opportunity to push the U.S. “toward a more pragmatic and multilateral policy appropriate to the era in which we live” (Haass 2005, 27). More than that, the Reformers’ view on multilateral decision-making is embodied in the concept of global civil society, whereby individuals, and not just nation-states, have a say in the development of global policy. On the other hand, the Bush administration’s attempt to resurrect the Cold War mentality is indeed an attempt to preserve international relations in the traditional, state-centric sense (Kaldor 2003, 591).

**Premise for Investigation**

Out of the four schools of thought characterizing the different attitudes toward globalization, a shift toward a Reformer or Supporter stance would show promise for developing global civil society. This relationship can be demonstrated as a correlation chain:
A generational shift toward Reformer or Supporter stance

Greater validity for global civil society

If the American generational value change toward globalization is indeed toward the Reformer or Supporter’s globalist stance, the possibility of a sustainable contribution to developing and legitimizing global civil society is promising.

Mapping Generations and Attitudes

Determining if an American generational value change exists and leans toward globalism, thus accommodating global civil society, requires understanding the definitions and measurements of such concepts as generations and attitudes toward globalization, the tools to accomplish the measurements, and the source of data to achieve these ends.

Definitions and Measures

To determine if a value shift toward globalism exists and is generational first requires understanding what is meant by generation, specifically what is meant by the Cold War and post-Cold War generations. For this purpose, generation fundamentally has reference to the two aspects of identity development. As noted, the divide among psychologists is whether identity is a result of “deep socialization” during an individual’s early years or the sociological and cultural inputs after initial development and throughout adult life (Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius 2004, 9).

Because the debate in developmental psychology is beyond the scope of this study, both schools of thought can be accommodated by limiting each generation to a span of years in which both deep and additional socialization would have substantially occurred, each in the respective times of Cold War or post-Cold War eras. The Cold War generation can be identified as individuals born after 1950 and the start of the Cold War. The post-Cold War generation can be identified as individuals whose identities were developed following 1980 and the relative end of the Cold War.
Attitudes toward globalization, and thus global civil society, can be identified according to a number of measures. The fundamental, albeit nebulous, measure is how an individual self-identifies on a local to global scale. Other obvious indicators of a Reformer or Supporter attitude toward globalization would be noted by an individual’s belief that issues of a global nature ought to be handled by international organizations – which in the general sense would include global civil society – or at the least by national governments with U.N. assistance.

**Tools and Data**

A series of questions relating to these selected indicators of attitudes toward globalization were taken from the myriad questions posed in the World Values Survey. The World Values Survey is an extension of the European Values Survey, performed in 79 countries in four waves spanning from 1990 to 2005. More than 6,000 Americans participated in each wave.

The questions and responses used to determine the existence and nature of an American generational value change are: Who should decide on issues relating to international peacekeeping, environmental protection, aiding developing countries, refugees, human rights, and where individuals identify themselves geographically. These questions are pertinent, even if not asked in every survey wave, to determine an individual’s attitude toward global cooperation – the true essence of global civil society – on topics that are of definite concern to globalists: human rights, the environment, developing nations, and peacekeeping.

For each question, the responses of U.S. citizens will be categorized into the two generations and compared, taking note of the responses indicative of a generation value change. For the geographical identification question, which was asked in each wave of the survey, an analysis of change in generations over time will be conducted. The accumulated analyses will offer a clear look at the existence and nature of a generation value change between Cold War and post-Cold War Americans, the real substance of the argument relating to the reality of support for a developing global civil society.
Results

The shift toward American globalism exists and appears to be generational. A clear break in ages at the 1980 mark was not possible because the data was lumped into either six or three age intervals, without any raw birth date information. The point of division for the questions, except for the geographical identification question, is 1977; in other words, the Cold War generation is identified as individuals born pre-1977 and the post-Cold War generation is identified as individuals born post-1977. The questions, minus geographical identification, were jointly tested with a Chi-square test on their crosstabs. The test showed there is significant difference, and thus a clear distinction, between the two groups’ answers. While that significance is not applicable to the difference in each question’s answers specifically, it is clear that the observable distinctions have significance for the variation between the two generations across the board.
Deciding International Peacekeeping

Figure 1

Figure 1 details American responses to the question concerning who should decide international peacekeeping, asked in the 1999 World Values Survey. Few from either generation felt the national government should determine international peacekeeping on its own. Nearly 30% of each generation felt the United Nations alone should determine the use of international peacekeepers, with the post-Cold War generation slightly more in favor of the United Nations acting unilaterally than the Cold War generation. The majority of both generations felt the national government ought to cooperate with the United Nations to determine the use and placement of international peacekeepers. The fact that both groups, and especially the post-Cold War generation, lean toward options involving the United Nations than toward national unilateralism gives credence to the case for a generational value change toward globalism.
Deciding Environmental Protection

Figure 2

Figure 2 details American responses to the question concerning who should determine how to protect the environment, asked in the 1999 World Values Survey. While the mainstay of both generations is again in support of national government cooperation with the United Nations, and the post-Cold War generation is again the clear supporter of United Nations initiative, this response leans significantly more toward a Regressive or Rejectionist stance, indicative of the American public’s view, regardless of generation, on this specific issue.
Deciding Aid to Developing Countries

Figure 3

Figure 3 details American responses to the question concerning who should determine aid to developing countries, asked in the 1999 World Values Survey. This response again supports the moderate stance of national governments cooperating with the U.N. Unlike the first question, however, this question drew much clearer support among the post-Cold War generation for the proposition that the United Nations should be the chief decision-maker concerning foreign aid. In one of the most significant topics of Reformer or Supporter concern, this is sure support for globalism in the generation value change.
Deciding Refugees

Figure 4

Figure 4 details American responses to the question concerning who should determine how to provide for refugees, asked in the 1999 World Values Survey. About half of the responders in each generation favored national government action supported by the United Nations. The remaining responders were about evenly split between unilateral action and action by the United Nations alone, with the younger generation more likely to favor the United Nations.
Deciding Human Rights

Figure 5 details American responses to the question concerning who should determine the preservation of human rights, asked in the 1999 World Values Survey. This question provides an interesting break from other “who should” questions asked in the survey. The only other question to get more of a pro-national government than pro-United Nations response was the question dealing with environmental issues. But members of the post-Cold War generation are more likely to support national government decision-making than are members of the Cold War generation, and Cold War generation members are more likely to support United Nations intervention. Perhaps this noteworthy difference, a nationalist-leaning response, stems from the post-Cold War generation’s early exposure to the successful unilateral U.S. efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo and the catastrophic lack of U.N. action in the Rwandan genocide.
Geographical Identification

The geographical identification question was asked in each wave of the World Values Survey, unlike the previous questions, and was also included in the American outreach of the 1982 European Values Survey. Although the age groups are not a split between Cold War and post-Cold War generations – since no one of the post-Cold War generation would be a part of the survey until the late 1990s – each year’s responders can be split into two age groups. On the graph, the younger generation’s responses are coded darker than the older generation’s.

Figure 6
Figure 7

Geographical Group Belong to First: Region

Figure 8

Geographical Group Belong to First: Country
Save for the fluctuation in identification at the awkward “continent” level, this question shows a clear change from a local or regional identity to a national or globalist perspective, more pronounced for the younger generation on worldwide identification and the older generation on affiliating with country.

The 1999 response to this question, which again details the Cold War and post-Cold War generations as previously specified, shows perhaps the best summarized evidence of a generation value shift and its globalist nature. The Cold War generation has shifted from locality but remains at the national level. The post-Cold War generation has shifted further to become cosmopolitan and globalist.

The Shape Of Things to Come

Because the collective perspective of the American people presently has such potential power, thanks to the United States’ global hegemony, their attitude toward the overarching phenomenon of globalization and issues relating to global civil society in particular have great possible influence regarding global civil society’s functionality and validity. A generational value change obviously exists and leans in support of globalism for the post-Cold War world. The responses to the environment and human rights questions appear to be exceptions to this rule, however. The other selected questions, along with geographic identification, showed support for a globalist generational value change.

A break from traditional international relations is significant for the public, academia, and policymakers. Granted, this investigation considers one small facet of a single body interested in governance, but it is important to look at the attitudes of the individuals who have great power to influence the acceptance or rejection of a transformation to a non-state-centric international order. Future studies might look at surveys specifically concerning global civil society and not use the scattered method of selecting survey questions that deal indirectly with the issue. The differences highlighted in both the environment and human rights questions also lend support to considering each issue independently. With more precision would come more opportunity to provide truly important findings on the differences between generations and other divisors, especially if conducted concerning attitudes toward globalization following both September 11 and the Iraq War. Breaking down responses by variables other than age, such as race or gender, could reveal how support for globalism varies within the younger generation.
Considering the impact of individual attitudes on the development of a global phenomenon is true to the premise of globalization: greater opportunity thanks to the shrinking and interdependence of the world. The more accessible the stage, the more individuals will become part of the global decision-making process, whether on their own or as part of NGOs, social movements, and nation-states. Despite efforts to inhibit or stop such evolution of international relations, a non-state-centric system is the shape of things to come.
References


In 2000, the semi-authoritarian leader of Serbia and Montenegro, Slobodan Milosevic, was removed from power. Many sources have been credited with ending his tenure. This article examines one such factor, Otpor, a student movement, in relation to political movement theory. Specifically, this movement is evaluated with regard to political opportunity structure. The case study of Otpor is also used to reflect upon the utility of current scholarship on political opportunity structure and to encourage more study of this unique and recent case of successful collective action.

Introduction

A political movement can be defined in many ways. Sidney Tarrow articulates political movements as a series of “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (1998, 4). Others, such as Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian offer a simpler definition, specifying a social movement as “a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote change in the society or group of which it is a part” (1972, 246). Along with many understandings of what constitutes a political movement (the definitions above are a sampling), there are also varied perceptions of what factors explain or help to predict these political mobilizations. The three widely recognized concepts which assist in understanding and analyzing the “emergence and development” of social movements are political opportunity structure, mobilization structure, and framing (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 2-5). While most scholars seek to analyze movements with regard to one of these three factors, these concepts are interdependent and can be utilized simultaneously to garner a more complete comprehension of both specific and general mass political mobilization. It is certain that a combination of recognition of available opportunity, mobilization techniques, and purposeful framing of themselves and their opponents constitutes
any (successful) social movement. Further, while comprehension of a political movement can be aided by the consideration of all of the tools provided by political movement theory (and, to be sure, movements would not have any hope of success without sufficient resource mobilization and framing), this paper concerns itself with the analysis and application of the political opportunity model, specifically with regard to the student movement which organized in opposition to Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia.

There was much support for the overarching social movement organizing in opposition to Milosevic’s rule of Serbia in the 1990s, but the voice of a specific student movement organization, Otpor, rose above all the rest. At the time, there were many competing social movement organizations and political parties which shared the objective of removing Milosevic from power. Many of these groups also had other individualized goals. Additionally, these organizations lacked a consensus concerning what tactics should be used to accomplish their joint and specific goals. Otpor mobilized the passively dissenting population and unified the other, active voices of opposition through support for the creation of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, the coalition of those dissenting to Milosevic’s reign that ultimately removed him from power.

The student population had been actively opposing Milosevic’s presidency almost since his inauguration in November 1989. But the movement initially lacked an overarching, organized structure. (“Chronology of Milosevic Rule” 2000). The first murmurs of organized, visible dissent to his rule of this former Yugoslav republic were observed as early as March of 1991 in response to the government’s siege of Sarajevo that had occurred throughout that year (Cevallos 2001, 2). These early protests were not limited to students alone, but they are important to consider when examining the origin of dissent to Milosevic’s government in a more general sense. The violent response of the government to these demonstrations did not deter stubborn voices of dissent from continuing to voice their opposition to the siege of Sarajevo; student protests of this military action occurred throughout 1992 (Cevallos 2001, 2). Again, while these protests did not begin as the action of a student protest movement, it is important to realize that it was this population that continued to mobilize despite

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1 Milosevic was elected President of Serbia in 1989. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was formed in 1992 and consisted of the two remaining republics of the former state of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro. In 1997, Milosevic became President of the FRY (“Chronology of Milosevic Rule” 2000).
state repression. Furthermore, this was the first experience this nascent activist pool had with collective political action. The tactics utilized (mostly street demonstrations), the sustained interaction this group managed to present, and the relatively little success with which their efforts were rewarded are important to consider when analyzing the later, more organized student movements (Thomas 1999, 80-92, 107-129).

The movement organization to which Otpor can be considered a successor movement is the student protest committee that was formed in conjunction with the Zajedno (Together) coalition in 1996. The Zajedno coalition was established in order to present a unified political opposition to Milosevic and his communist party in the upcoming elections (Thomas 1999, 277). These elections were the first in over 40 years to be open to candidates other than those chosen by the communist party (Ackerman and DuVall 2000, 478). On November 17, 1996, the coalition unofficially won this election, but the government refused to recognize the results (Thomas 1999, 285; Cevallos 2001, 2). The following day, this perceived election fraud elicited a protest in the capital which attracted approximately 35,000 people (Thomas 1999, 286). A few days after this demonstration began, a student protest committee formed with the dual tasks of supporting Zajedno as the winner of the election and of advocating the reform of university policy (Thomas 1999, 286). Through a series of boycotts and nonviolent demonstrations taking place for over three months, Zajedno and the student protest committee succeeded in having the election results recognized (Thomas 2000, 286-289; Ackerman and DuVall 2000, 478-479). On February 21, 1997, the election results were recognized and the popularly elected officials were allowed to assume their positions (Ackerman and DuVall 2000, 481; Thomas 2000, 315). With the achievement of its singular goal of acceptance of the election results, the Zajedno coalition fell victim to competition between the opposition groups it represented, the very factor which had prevented unification prior to 1996 (Thomas 1999, 323, 428, 429; Ackerman and DuVall 2000, 481).

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2 The Zajedno coalition began forming in March of 1996, but was not made official until September 2nd, a month after the election date was announced (Thomas 1999, 277). The coalition was made official when the leaders of the opposition parties signed an agreement stipulating that they would split the seats won between all participating parties.
Much like the opposition political parties involved in Zajedno, the student protest committee lost much of its purpose when it achieved its main goal; however, their second tenet, university reform, activated these same students over a year later, in late 1998, when laws were passed restricting the independence of the university (Anastasijevic and Borden 2000, 102; Cevallos 2001, 2). With this law, Milosevic’s government transferred “the right to hire and fire staff from faculty committees to government-appointed deans. The deans were also allowed to change curricula” (Anastasijevic and Borden 2000, 102). To oppose this encroachment on faculty and student freedom, approximately twelve former members of the student protest committee formed Otpor, which means “resistance” (Anastasijevic and Borden 2000, 102). Otpor was founded upon these principles: “remove Milosevic because otherwise nothing will change, spread resistance to the provinces,” and “galvanize a cowed population by providing examples of individual bravery,” in addition to opposing restrictive university law (Cohen 2000, 45). Beginning as this small group of university students, its membership remained sparse throughout 1998 (Anastasijevic and Borden 2000, 103).

During the assault by NATO forces (in retaliation for the conflict with Kosovo) throughout 1999, it was very difficult for those opposing Milosevic to be active because “any protests during the bombing would have been portrayed and perceived as treasonous” (Hilty 2005, 12). Additionally, once the bombing ceased, those dissenting to Milosevic’s reign could not agree on how to “capitalize on popular discontent after the bombing” (Bringing Down a Dictator 2001). The general population was “dissatisfied” with both Milosevic’s government and an opposition that could best be described as “disunited” (Cevallos 2001, 3; Hilty 2005, 13). Despite the difficulty most opposition organizations were experiencing, in 1999, after the NATO bombing of Serbia, Otpor’s membership “experienced a surge in growth” (Hilty 2005, 12).

Otpor was popular because it differentiated itself from both the ruling elite and the disunited opposition. The organization had grown far beyond its university reform impetus and now acted “as a catalyst of discontent, constantly challenging the regime but also demanding that the opposition parties stop their bickering, put their differences aside, and unite in order to effect political change in the country” (Anastasijevic and Borden 2000, 103). Although Otpor urged political conciliation, it refused to become a political party; the organization had a “purposeful aversion to political office and political affiliation” (Bringing
The student movement organization took advantage of this strategic position, however. Otpor would invite the opposition politicians to appear together at rallies and demonstrations and the politicians would all have to attend because not doing so would give an advantage to their competitors (*Bringing Down a Dictator* 2001). Otpor understood “early on the necessity of a united opposition if any of them hoped to change the regime and spent many hours behind closed doors pressuring the party leaders to do so” (Hilty 2005, 15; Anastasijevic and Borden 2000, 106; Cevallos 2001, 7).

Otpor was not unique just because of its relationship with Milosevic’s government and simultaneous social movement organizations; it was also noted for its ardent dedication to nonviolent ideals. Members of the group benefited from training in nonviolent techniques from consultants ³ from the United States (*Bringing Down a Dictator* 2001; Cevallos 2001, 5; 8). They were taught that nonviolent methods would be crucial towards the achievement of their goals because of the “enormous price - domestic and international paid today for using force against a nonviolent movement” (Cohen 2000, 46). In these educational sessions, Otpor members were also taught about the “pillars of support” which acted as the foundation of Milosevic’s regime and how to establish such pillars of their own (Cevallos 2001, 5). Through this training, the students learned “that if they could affect Milosevic’s ability to have his orders obeyed and enforced by these pillars, they would have disabled the source of his power” (Hilty 2005, 15).

Additionally, the student group was notable because it used a tactic of horizontal leadership. Otpor had “not one leader, but many leaders responsible for varying activities of the group. This offered both creative freedom and made it difficult to hinder the group through arrests and assassinations” (Hilty 2005, 14; Cohen 2000, 45; *Bringing Down a Dictator* 2001). Otpor was “most known” for its use of “memorable slogans” (Hilty 2005, 14). One of their original goals ³ Three of the groups that have been specifically highlighted for working with *Otpor* are the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Endowment for Democracy, and the National Democratic Institute. It is estimated that the United States government funding of the democratization efforts (through organizations such as the three above) in Serbia during this time hovers around $25 million. More specifically, leaders of *Otpor* received much of their training from a retired United States military officer, Colonel Robert Helvey, an IRI consultant (*Bringing Down a Dictator* 2001; Cevallos 2001, 5; 8).
was to “be hip, funny where possible, in order to create a contemporary message” (Cohen 2000, 45). Slogans such as “Fight the System,” “Resistance, because I love Serbia,” “Freedom,” and their signature black fist, adopted from the Black Power Movement in the United States, worked towards this goal (Bringing Down a Dictator 2001). Otpor also utilized humorous television commercials and rock concerts to bring their message to the people in a fresh, youthful manner (Bringing Down a Dictator 2001).

In the two years since its inception, Otpor’s membership had increased from a dozen to 70,000 people in 130 branches throughout the country (Cohen 2000, 45). It is important to note that the constituency of the organization had changed from a homogeneous student group to an inclusive movement. While the leadership of Otpor remained young, the organization had support across the age groups. At its first congress in 2000, Otpor “formally declared itself to no longer be a movement for the students, but a populist movement for all people” (Hilty 2005, 14; Anastasijevic and Borden 2000, 105). The group had universal appeal not only because of the widespread opposition to Milosevic throughout the population (and Otpor’s visible activism in opposition to him), but also because actions taken against students were felt by parents and communities as a whole. The government would call members of Otpor terrorists, yet such a terrorist would be the child of a family friend that one had known one’s whole life (Bringing Down a Dictator 2001). This sense of community connection available to the youth of Serbia was further exploited by the organization’s nonviolent strategy - when government authorities responded violently to the country’s nonviolent youth, Otpor gained support (Hilty 2005, 16). Otpor also gained respect from the general population because its members simply endured the various attacks (both violent and not) the state mounted against them (Hilty 2005, 16).

Throughout the mobilization of citizen support prior to the first elections that could conceivably remove Milosevic from office, Otpor members were visible and active on many fronts. Once the opposition political parties united under the title of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, the coalition worked with Otpor, utilizing both its methods of outreach to the provinces and “strong and succinct messages” with the catchphrases of “He is finished!” and “It’s time” to lend support to the coalition (Hilty 2005, 18; Cevallos 2001, 8). Otpor members worked with and mobilized volunteers for the Center for Free Elections and Democracy, a non-governmental organization which trained poll watchers to
ensure election validity (Bringing Down a Dictator 2001; Cevallos 2001, 9). Because of the widespread support Otpor had activated and the nonviolent training the leadership had undergone, crucial tactics such as miners’ strikes, a general strike, and rolling blockades were utilized to force recognition of the election results (Bujosevic and Radovanovic 2003, 7; Bringing Down a Dictator 2001). Otpor and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia organized a “demonstration of proportions never seen before to converge” upon the Parliament building in Belgrade (Hilty 2005, 21). This date, and the protest which occurred on it, was ultimately referred to as “the October 5th revolution” because it resulted in Milosevic’s surrender and the recognition of the election results the next day (Bujosevic and Radovanovic 2003).

Although the widespread opposition to Milosevic was the most significant contributor to the eventual success of Otpor’s goals, the actions of the group itself played a large role. It was its slogans under which the people of Serbia united. These students had learned from the mistakes of previous movements and consulted outside literature on revolution and nonviolence. The members of the organization strongly advocated and worked towards the unification of the opposition parties to defeat Milosevic through fair and open elections. They learned how to mobilize the general population for nonviolent collective action on a mass scale, the very type of action that forced Milosevic to recognize the results of the election which removed him from office. Otpor utilized several points of access to enact change, interacting with all potential actors - the opposition parties, the government, the international community, and the general population of Serbia itself. Through use of a platform of issues that had easy support across Serbia, Otpor was able to take appropriate action to enable mass mobilization of the Serbian population to successfully remove Milosevic from power.

Before beginning to examine how political opportunity structure (as a component of social movement theory) contributes to the understanding of the Otpor movement, it is important to articulate specifically what is meant by this term. The concept of political opportunity structure asserts that there are certain conditions under which social movements are more likely to emerge (and, ultimately, be successful). The grievances which underlie collective mobilization can be present long before a movement establishes itself because the opportunity to address these grievances can be either open or closed. A movement can only emerge if there is opportunity, or “room” for it to do so. Doug McAdam, John D.
McAdam, McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald assert that “social movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader set of political constraints and opportunities,” or political opportunity structure, “unique” to the situation from which any movement emerges (1996, 3). In addition to movements being influenced by the political opportunity structure, proponents of this model highlight the fact that the states themselves are susceptible to “social changes” which “render the established political order more vulnerable or receptive to challenge” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 8). Tarrow explains this phenomenon as “dynamic statism” - the understanding of states (those sets of institutions and practices that hold sole legitimate coercive powers) as fluid, changeable bodies, not rigid institutions (1996, 44). He supports this saying, “entire political systems undergo changes which modify the environment of social actors sufficiently to influence the initiation, forms, and outcomes of collective action” (1996, 44). The political opportunity model is applicable beyond the emergence of a movement; it also has utility in understanding movements after the inception of collective action. Similar to the circularity of influence during the period of emergence, once a movement is established, it is not only the movement that is shaped by the political opportunity structure. The opening which allows a movement to take action is shaped by its interactions with the movement itself (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 13).

There are four factors which establish the availability of political opportunity to a movement: the openness of the system, the stability of elite alignments, the presence of elite allies, and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 10). The dimensions of this model characterize the availability and breadth of the opportunity from which a movement can emerge. The first tenet, openness, refers to the number of access points available to a movement - the more opportunity to access or effect change as a movement participant, the more likely a nascent movement will come into existence (and, eventually, succeed at achieving its goals) (McAdam 1996, 27-28). Before continuing to the next component of political opportunity structure, the term “elite” must be defined. Elites are individuals characterized by the possession of power and privilege. The “stability of elite alignments” causes a limiting of opportunity if there is stability and a creation of opportunity if there is not. If the alignment of the elites is both opposed to the ideals of the movement and unified in that opposition, the movement will have to wait for a better political situation to fully emerge and take action (Tarrow 1996, 56). Again
relying upon the concept of elites, the third factor is the presence of elite allies or supporters within the larger body of all those possessing power and privilege (Tarrow 1996, 55-56). If there is an opportunity for effective movement emergence, there will be some instability within the body of elites. Elite allies usually engage in elite signaling to indicate to a movement and other elites that now is the time to engage in action (Tarrow 1996, 56). Finally, the last component of political opportunity structure is the state’s capacity and propensity for repression. If a state is willing to engage in large-scale repression, there is little opportunity for movement emergence or success (McAdam 1996, 28).

With the working knowledge of the specifics of political opportunity structure, application of this concept to the Serbian student movement is now possible. Throughout Milosevic’s rule of Serbia, there were both active and inactive pools of dissent. As a result of the widespread dissatisfaction, there were many attempts to establish an organized opposition (Triantaphyllou 2000, 2); however, popular dissent to his rule did not lead to large-scale collective mobilization until 2000 - an action that resulted in his removal from power. The Otpor student movement has been credited with both the mass mobilization of the general Serbian populace and with the unification of the opposition political parties to which Milosevic’s fall from power has been attributed (Cevallos 2001; Cohen 2000; Hilty 2005). In striving to understand this political movement, it is useful to examine the political opportunity structure which Otpor faced and under which it thrived, in addition to its mobilization strategy and collective identity construction.

Before examining the four components of political opportunity outlined by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, one must comprehend how the theory of dynamic statism applies to the Serbian student movement. It is crucial to examine the concept of dynamic statism in relation to Otpor because it helps to understand how Milosevic held elected office for almost a decade before a successful movement emerged. The actual institutions which made up the Serbian government did not undergo significant change during Milosevic’s tenure. These formal bodies had been established during the separation of Yugoslavia into autonomous republics after the fall of communism. While these institutions did not change (did not appear to be dynamic), the perception and acceptance of them did. Additionally, according to the theory of dynamic statism, the fact that the institutions were not changing does not mean that the state itself was not dynamic. The Serbian people’s changing opinion of their
government caused a dynamic shift (which allowed the space for the political movement to exist) even before governmental institutions reflected that a metamorphosis had taken place. Otpor’s success in comparison to the other opposition movements that came before it can be attributed, at least in part, to an altered political opportunity structure because, without such a change, the mobilization and framing techniques would have had no space within which they could have come to fruition.

Openness of the system, the first component which constitutes the availability of political opportunity, has extensive application to the Otpor movement. It is important to note that, while Milosevic did rule Serbia throughout a ten-year period, the political opportunity structure - specifically with regard to the openness of the political system - shifted significantly during his tenure. As mentioned above, this is not surprising as his country and those surrounding it were in the process of democratizing following the fall of communism in 1989-1990. With the end of communism in Yugoslavia, “a system of regular multiparty elections” was instituted, which led to the “founding of numerous independent political organizations” (Thompson and Kuntz 2004, 163). The presence of different political parties and multi-party elections, “despite their substantive flaws, bestowed a kind of procedural legitimacy upon Milosevic” (Thompson and Kuntz 2004, 164). The fact that elections were held and political parties allowed to exist, regardless of election fraud and repression of the opposition, created a democratic appearance despite a semi-authoritarian reality (Hilty 2005, 36; Thompson and Kuntz 2004, 163). While elections took place throughout Milosevic’s rule, the openness of the elections themselves grew as his tenure lengthened.

The legitimacy the elections once lent to Milosevic began to unravel as time passed, however. The population of Serbia, now transitioned to its “pseudodemocracy,” celebrated their right to vote (Thompson and Kuntz 2004, 163). When Milosevic was perceived as interfering with this right and engineering election fraud, much of his former credibility was threatened. Prior to the 1996 and 2000 elections, Serbs may have disagreed with his policies, but at least they viewed him as a legitimate leader. Milosevic had also lost some of his previous authority with the loss in Kosovo and his failure to address Serbia’s problematic economy (Triantaphyllou 2000, vii; Thompson and Kuntz 2004, 164). Furthermore, the leader appeared to have a lack of respect for democracy and legality both when he called early elections and practiced patronage in his
government (Thompson and Kuntz 2004, 164). With the presidential elections being open to opposition politicians and the unification of these feuding parties into the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, the people of Serbia were given a relatively large point of access to articulate their dissatisfaction. While elections had existed previously in this political opportunity structure, the alternative to Milosevic did not exist, nor did the means for enforcing and ensuring victory.

In addition to a change in the openness of the political system, there were additional factors of political opportunity which influenced the emergence and development of Otpor. The first of these opportunities is the combination of unstable elite alignment and the presence of elite allies. While there were no public expressions of dissent to Milosevic’s governing of Serbia by his elites, there was much suspicion of it. The frequent and unexplained terminations of employment of members of his elite hinted at the presence of such an instability and gave Otpor operatives confidence that this was the time for action (Triantaphyllou 2000, 1). Capitalizing on their belief in the timeliness of action and the general population’s hope that they were correct, Otpor used the slogan “It’s Time!” (Bringing Down a Dictator 2001). Elite allies also seemed to be present in policing organizations that were said to have coordinated with the student group during the October 5th revolution (Bringing Down a Dictator 2001). Another major shift in the political opportunity structure simultaneous to Otpor’s emergence (and the NATO bombing) was the attitude of the international community - an outside force of elites. 4 In the past, Milosevic possessed at least the implicit endorsement of the global community. With the indictment by the war crimes tribunal in 1999 (Cevallos 2001, 5) and the willingness of American non-profit organizations to give funding and training to the opposition (Cevallos 2001; Bringing Down a Dictator 2001; Thomas 1999, 297-298), Milosevic no longer had international support. And, due to the recent availability of independent news media through the internet, the people of Serbia were made aware of it (Bringing Down a Dictator 2001; Ackerman and DuVall 2000, 480). This lack of endorsement was made explicit when several countries, including the United States, called for Serbia’s ruler to recognize his electoral loss in 2000

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4 A possible limitation, or a need for expansion, of the concept of political opportunity structure can be noted in the lack of literature evaluating the contribution of the international opportunity structure, specifically shifts therein, to individual national movements. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, in an overview of the theory, consistently refer to this component only in terms of national opportunity (1996, 3).
(Cevallos 2001; *Bringing Down a Dictator* 2001). Finally, addressing the last of the four components articulated by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, while the state did possess the capacity for repression, Otpor’s nonviolent strategy and framing of such incidents made it detrimental for Milosevic’s regime to employ such methods.

In conclusion, by exploring the theoretical framework within which a specific concept of movement theory exists and examining that concept in itself and in application to a specific social movement, this paper strives both to increase the understanding of an historical political movement through the use of movement theory and to begin to assess the utility of the theory itself in analyzing such actions. After first establishing a theoretical basis of social movement theory, primarily through three main concepts - political opportunity structure, mobilization, and cultural framing, a description of the social movement in question is provided in order to provide sufficient background information to assess the claims made in the successive section of analysis. Through application of the Otpor movement to the concept of political opportunity structure, it is possible to begin to reflect upon the utility of movement theory as a tool for understanding specific collective actions and, through that, its utility as a whole. Furthermore, the examination of the Serbian case was crucial because little attention has been devoted to analyzing this recent and successful collective political action with regard to its application to social movement theory. This case of the student movement in Serbia has much to contribute to social movement research and scholarship as it both supports and challenges the current literature on political opportunity structure.
References


Towards a Local Institutional Understanding of Naturalization

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Comparing cities in Canada and the United States, I explore the role of local government and non-governmental actors in the naturalization process of each city’s immigrant population. I begin by contrasting the legal requirements for acquiring citizenship in both countries, followed by a literature review of naturalization and assimilation. Inspired by urban regime theory, I focus my study on the interactions of city governments and community-based organizations in Toronto, Ontario; New York City, New York; and Los Angeles, California. These are cities that represent the major destinations of immigrants in Canada and the U.S. I compare the naturalization levels of these three cities and provide a qualitative analysis of the differing approaches of public and private actors. Finally, I outline possibilities for further research.

Introduction

In a comparative study of citizenship acquisition in the United States of America and Canada, sociologist Irene Bloemraad (2002) poses an intriguing and perhaps simple question: what accounts for the dramatic “North American naturalization gap” between the countries; that is, why in 1990 had 72.7% of immigrants living in Canada become citizens, while only 43.3% of immigrants in the U.S. had done so? (197). More recent statistics show this gap has widened: while the Canadian level has remained nearly the same, the level in the U.S. dropped to 38% in 2004 (Bloemraad 2006). The author argues that easy answers to this question are easily rejected. She contends that the gap cannot be attributed to differences in immigrants’ national or ethnic backgrounds or other defining socio-economic factors, nor can it be described as the effect of widely divergent naturalization laws since the national laws are quite similar between the two countries.

Refuting insufficient causal theories based on differences of the immigrants themselves or the two countries’ legal systems, Bloemraad (2006) offers a new framework that focuses on the institutional determinants of naturalization. She argues that Canada’s “interventionist” approach and official
pro-naturalization stance contribute to much higher levels of naturalization than the United States’ more autonomous approach with no official endorsement of naturalizing. Bloemraad examines how these national perspectives manifest in Boston, Massachusetts and Toronto, Ontario by comparing the institutional reception of Portuguese immigrants. She interviews naturalized citizens in both cities about the factors influencing their decisions to become citizens and also explains the roles of community-based organizations and government actors in helping immigrants become citizens.

While Bloemraad’s (2006) empirical research is limited in scope to the experience of one immigrant group across two cities, her work is nevertheless path-breaking in that it calls our attention to the puzzle of the naturalization gap and the institutional differences that might explain it. But the study leaves room for further investigation at the local level. Bloemraad highlights the relationships between the federal government and local government and community actors, but does not provide a systematic comparison of how institutional approaches compare across multiple Canadian and U.S. cities. This kind of comparative analysis would allow us to see whether the national naturalization gap persists or disappears at the local level when comparing the naturalization levels of cities from each country. This line of research would help us better understand the degree to which local state and non-state actors contribute to the naturalization process of their cities’ immigrants.

It is this kind of analysis that is the focus of my research here. To begin, I consider the reasons why naturalization matters as a topic of study and provide a brief background of U.S. and Canadian citizenship laws.

Naturalization, the process by which a foreign-born resident becomes a recognized citizen in his or her host country, bestows upon that individual all, or nearly all, the political and juridical rights afforded to native-born citizens of the host country. Only as citizens can immigrants in the United States and Canada vote in governmental elections, an ability which gives them considerably more political power than other legal foreign-born residents. Acquiring citizenship, at least in the U.S. and Canada, is a voluntary and involved process taken on by immigrants themselves, who must first learn about the receiving country’s civic history and possess relative proficiency in its predominant language, English in the U.S., and English or French in Canada. Given the requisite level of commitment, naturalization has historically been viewed as an important marker of assimilation (Yang 1994; Gilbertson and Singer 2003). Many scholars today
challenge this assumption (see Literature Review of this paper). Naturalization matters for other reasons not directly related to cultural integration. In the U.S., becoming a citizen grants immigrants the right to receive federal benefits such as welfare and the opportunity to sponsor the legal entrance of a greater number of family members than is allowed for non-citizens (Bloemraad 2002; Gilbertson and Singer 2003).

Bloemraad finds remarkable similarity between the U.S. and Canada in the federal laws related to naturalization. A brief analysis of such polices confirms her findings. Both states require applicants to be 18 years or older, with special exemptions for the children of naturalized adults. Residence requirements are similarly short. Candidates for citizenships in Canada must have lived in the country for three years; five years is the standard in the U.S., with shorter lengths of time allowed for spouses of U.S. citizens or those serving in the Armed Forces. Both countries have language requirements for the oral and written sections of their citizenship exams. Immigrants in the U.S. must be able to communicate in English and immigrants in Canada must be proficient in either English or French. The exams of both countries also measure immigrants’ knowledge of the receiving country’s history and structure of government. Pledging an oath to the receiving country is also required by both states (Department of Homeland Security 2004; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2004). Despite this requirement of loyalty, both states allow dual citizenship: Canada officially, and the United States in practice, by refraining from enforcing the law mandating single citizenship (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2006a; Gilbertson and Singer 2003). Finally, Canada and the United States charge somewhat substantial fees for naturalizing, $420 in the U.S. and $200 in Canada\(^5\) (Department of Homeland Security 2006a; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2006b). Comparing the requirements of the two countries, it is clear that federal laws alone do not explain the naturalization gap. In fact, the benefits of naturalizing in the United States, related to welfare provisions and the opportunity to bring additional family members to the U.S., should correlate with a higher naturalization level in the U.S.

Literature Review

In general, past sociological studies of citizenship acquisition have focused on immigrants themselves, highlighting their socio-economic and demographic attributes as the chief determinants explaining why they naturalize. In a well-cited study, Philip Yang (1994) provides a multivariate analysis of the factors influencing levels of citizenship acquisition among immigrants to the United States. Drawing on data from the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 1980 U.S. Census, Yang finds that individual characteristics of immigrants, including owning a home, having children under age 18, speaking English well, and possessing a high school education, do correlate with higher levels of naturalization. Important social determinants matter as well. Emigrating from socialist or poorer countries and being a member of an ethnic group with most of its members residing in urban areas also increase one’s likelihood of naturalizing.

In a more recent study of naturalization in the United States, Karen Woodrow-Lafield et al. (2004) assess naturalization largely in terms of individual choice and socio-economic factors, but give some attention to the state’s influence. The authors measure the variables of an immigrant’s country of origin, length of residence in the U.S., and visa status as predictors of naturalization. They observe that immigrants who have lived in the U.S. longer and have emigrated from countries farther away are more likely to naturalize. The article also finds higher naturalization levels among highly-skilled immigrants with employment-sponsored visas as opposed to those who are sponsored by family members.

Comparable studies in Canada are harder to come by. An important exception is Fernando Mata’s (1999) work, although it addresses the subject somewhat obliquely by measuring how immigrants’ patterns of naturalization affect social and economic integration. The author uses micro-level data from the 1991 Canadian Census to assess the naturalization process as the net effect of a battery of socio-economic and demographic predictors including: age, gender, year of immigration, country of birth, and residence in a major Canadian metropolitan city. While this last variable could be particularly relevant to my research, Mata devotes precious little attention to actually analyzing this data, concentrating instead on how naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants compare in the labor market. He does, however, note types of immigrants who
fail to naturalize: those who are older, “well-established,” and come from
countries with high standards of living (180).

Bloemraad (2002) argues that these kinds of causal theories based on
attributes of immigrants themselves do not explain the difference in how many
immigrants become citizens in Canada and the U.S. Comparing naturalization
levels of eligible immigrants from 12 home countries, she finds that in each case,
naturalization levels are higher for immigrants residing in Canada than their
counterparts in the U.S. Even when immigrants’ length in residence in the host
country is taken into account, immigrants from the same home country naturalize
more quickly in Canada. Woodrow-Lafield et al.’s point that professional
employer-sponsored immigrants are more likely to naturalize might make sense
of the naturalization gap; Canada’s point-based entry policies favor employer-
sponsored immigrants, whereas in the United States, a greater proportion of
immigrants come with family sponsorship (Reitz 2004; Martin 2004). Bloemraad
borrows Jeffrey Reitz’s (1998) argument, however, that while this legal
difference may account for the difference in naturalization levels of Hispanic
immigrants in the two countries, it fails to account for the difference of other
immigrant groups: “the United States attracts better educated [and higher skilled]
immigrants from almost all other sending countries despite the Canadian
immigration system’s greater focus on skills” (Bloemraad 2002, 208).

In summary, current theories of naturalization leave us with
unsatisfactory accounts of the naturalization gap between the two countries.
Nevertheless, certain aspects of the literature highlight important questions for
further study. The attention scholars pay to urban residence and visa status as
predictors of naturalization speaks to the broader need to understand the spatial
and institutional dimensions of the topic. Mata, referring to Toronto as the
favored destination of most immigrants in Canada, sums up the scholarly
imperative perfectly:

[M]ore research should be undertaken on the spatial specificity
of the citizenship acquisition process. For instance, from a social
planning perspective, the bulk of present and future citizenship
applicants are concentrated in the Metropolitan Toronto area.

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6 The reason being that Canada’s entry policies favor Hispanic immigrants who generally
have better language skills and higher levels of education than Hispanic immigrants to
the United States.
Most immigrants who are likely to change their legal status in Canada will do so within the social milieu of the Toronto environment. If naturalization decisions are to be systematically studied, the geographical specificity of these decisions has to be taken into account in the future analytical frameworks to be developed (1999, 180).

This kind of “geographical specificity” encourages us to examine naturalization at the local urban level and understand how social and institutional factors may affect the experience of immigrants wishing to become citizens. Mata’s attention to “the social milieu of the Toronto environment” asks us to think about naturalization as it fits into the larger concept of integration, the ways in which immigrants adapt to and participate in the surroundings of their host society.

“Integration” is a relatively neutral term, one that could suggest very different and sometimes conflicting policy goals and social outcomes for immigrants. For example, assimilation, often evoked by a “melting pot” metaphor, implies processes in which immigrants adopt, or are forced to adopt, the prevalent mainstream culture of the receiving country. In contrast, multiculturalism, sometimes regarded as a “salad bowl” approach, describes ways in which immigrants are incorporated into some aspects of the receiving country’s political and economic processes but retain much of their cultural autonomy.

Naturalization has traditionally been treated as an important sign of assimilation, but this thinking has changed. In a review of recent assimilation literature, Mary Waters and Tomás Jiménez (2005) define and discuss the “four primary benchmarks of assimilation” on which recent sociological studies have concentrated. The benchmarks are socio-economic status, spatial concentration, language assimilation, and inter-marriage. Waters and Jiménez look at the changing geographic patterns of recent U.S. immigration and consider how cities respond to becoming “new immigrant gateways” and how the presence of immigrants changes the existing local communities. Naturalization is never mentioned in their discussion, but the attention that is paid to the spatial and urban dimensions of migration flows reaffirms the appropriateness of studying matters of immigration at the local level.

Victor Nee and Richard Alba (2004) offer an alternative assessment of assimilation. The authors envision assimilation as the result of institutional
forces, individual actions, and network mechanisms. Discussing institutional forces, the authors offer examples of the ways in which U.S. federal and local laws in the 1950s prevented Asian Americans from naturalizing and severely restricted the property rights and civil liberties of ethnic minorities. Individual choices could include the kinds of trends identified by Waters and Jiménez, but could also include the ways in which immigrants aid in their own assimilation by seeking well-paying jobs, quality education for their children, and safe neighborhoods for their families. Network mechanisms are the third factor the authors consider, by which they mean the connections with friends and family and presumably community organizations that help immigrants make economically and socially successful transitions. While naturalization is not discussed in detail, Nee and Alba’s focus on institutional and network mechanisms invites further discussion of the work of state and non-state actors in the processes of assimilation and naturalization.

To summarize the literature reviewed here, studies of naturalization by and large fail to account for the role of the state, while studies of assimilation fail to account for naturalization. Both bodies of work call for analysis at the local level.

Questions, Hypotheses, and Methodology

Scholars have not linked the literatures of assimilation and naturalization; however, local actors may see connections that academics do not. For example, we can reasonably expect that local officials and community leaders value their city’s social order and peaceful interactions among immigrant groups and native residents. One way cities may achieve this kind of social cohesion is by encouraging immigrants to participate in mainstream political activities, such as voting or neighborhood organizing, instead of disengaging from local civil society, or worse, resorting to more violent means of expression. Research by John Mollenkopf (1999) provides empirical evidence of this argument. Comparing ethnic relations in New York City and Los Angeles, Mollenkopf finds that the lower level of ethnic conflict and violence in New York City is indicative of greater political mobilization among ethnic minorities and immigrants.

To see how local actors contribute to the process of naturalization and what effect their work may have, I aim to compare the naturalization levels and
actions of government and non-governmental actors across cities in the U.S. and Canada. With this approach I seek to answer two questions: (1) Does the national naturalization gap persist at the local level?; that is to say, are the naturalization levels in Canadian cities consistently higher than in U.S cities? (2) If there is significant variation in the levels among cities, do these differences reflect alternative approaches of local governments and community organizations?

In constructing this research, I am inspired by the literature of urban regime theory. Perhaps the most frequently cited application of the theory is Clarence Stone’s 1989 study of the city of Atlanta and how it came to be governed by a biracial coalition, in spite of its long history of racial tensions. Stone explained the phenomenon as a function of alliances between local government agencies and city businesses working together toward shared political goals. (Stone 1989, chapter 1) More recently, urban regime theorists have suggested that scholars analyze the specific goals of urban regimes and include non-profits and community-based organizations in their assessments. Scholars are cautioned, however, not to a priori assume the existence of urban regimes around all issues; not all issues and not all cities can claim such alliances (Mossberger and Stoker 2001).

By stating that this project was “inspired” by urban regime theory, I mean to say that I do not offer a true assessment of urban regimes in Canadian and U.S. cities. Stone and others analyze the long-standing public-private collaborations on a wide variety of political issues; my work here focuses primarily on how local actors address naturalization. It is likely, however, that organizations promoting naturalization also assist immigrants in other ways as well. For example, if a government agency and community-based organization co-sponsor a citizenship preparation course, they may also help immigrants find affordable housing or employment. Widening the scope of analysis to include these other kinds of interactions across organizations provides a better understanding of how local actors approach naturalization within the larger context of immigrant integration.

If the political incorporation of immigrants matters to local officials and community organizations, then these actors in both U.S. and Canadian cities have vested interests in naturalization. However, if local governments follow their country’s federal approach to the issue, then we would expect that only Canadian cities would actively work to naturalize immigrants.
According to the Department of Canadian Heritage, which oversees the Multicultural National Office, the country’s multiculturalism law aims to ensure “that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging” (Department of Canadian Heritage 2007). The Canadian state combines this respect for diversity with explicit efforts to incorporate immigrants into Canadian society, including the active promotion of naturalization: “Through multiculturalism, Canada recognizes the potential of all Canadians, encouraging them to integrate into their society and take an active part in its social, cultural, economic and political affairs” (2007).

This combination is paradoxical in that it upholds both traditional ideas of multiculturalism and certain aspects of assimilation. Although the approach may be paradoxical, it may not be contradictory. Bloemraad argues that Canada’s mix of multiculturalism and government intervention “allow[s for the inclusions of ] immigrant voices into the public sphere […] and] promotes immigrants’ sense of full citizenship in the polity, encouraging naturalization and participation” (2006, 159). If local governments in Toronto adhere to the same philosophy as the federal government, we would expect to see local agencies actively support citizenship acquisition.

U.S. city governments, in contrast, might refrain from promoting naturalization if their actions reflect the U.S. federal attitude. Bloemraad argues that U.S. maintains a more laissez-faire approach to naturalization with federal immigration policies that emphasize border control over incorporation. “The bureaucracy dealing with immigration and citizenship engages in little proactive outreach, and the federal government only provides sustained settlement support to legally recognized refugees” (Bloemraad 2006, 11). If U.S. cities behave in a similar manner to the federal government, then we would not expect an official endorsement or promotion of naturalization. If city officials see citizenship acquisition as an important facet of maintaining the social order, then an

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7 It is interesting that the Department of Canadian Heritage articulates this position in very similar terms: “Multiculturalism has led to higher rates of naturalization than ever before. With no pressure to assimilate and give up their culture, immigrants freely choose their new citizenship because they want to be Canadians” (Department of Canadian Heritage 2007).

8 This approach could be thought of as a kind of de facto multiculturalism, in that the state allows for diversity by not actively promoting integration.
alternative hypothesis could be constructed that local governments will diverge from the “autonomous” federal stance and actively help immigrants become citizens.

In both countries, immigrant community-based organizations are likely to be interested in helping their clients acquire citizenship. Some groups may see teaching citizenship classes or providing other means of support as vital components of helping their clients transition to life in the new country. Organizations may alternatively see their support of naturalization as a means of bolstering immigrants’ political clout in their city by creating a greater number of potential voters and office holders sympathetic to the needs of migrant communities.

I have chosen to focus my research here on three cities: Toronto, Ontario; New York City, New York; and Los Angeles, California. These cities represent their country’s largest metropolitan areas and foremost destinations for immigrants. Toronto claims 37% of Canada’s immigrant population, and New York City and Los Angeles, including their surrounding suburbs, are home to 16.6% and 16.5%, respectively, of the U.S. immigrant population (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2005; U.S. Department of Commerce 2001). Toronto claims the highest immigrants per capita of all major Canadian cities, with foreign-born residents constituting 43.7% of the population (Good 2005; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2005). By this measure, Los Angeles and New York City rank 2nd and 4th nationally,9 with immigrants accounting for 40.9% and 35.9%, of the city’s population, respectively (U.S. Department of Commerce 2006b; U.S. Department of Commerce 2006a; Mollenkopf, Olson, and Ross 2001).

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9 Mollenkopf, Olson, and Ross calculate this number based on the number of immigrants and their children as a percentage of the total city population. Miami, Florida, and San Francisco, California rank 1st and 3rd, respectively.


### TABLE 1: Numbers and percentages of immigrants in Toronto, N.Y.C., and L.A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Immigrants as Percent of City Population</th>
<th>Total Foreign-Born Population</th>
<th>Total City Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada (2001)</td>
<td>Toronto (CMA)(^{10})</td>
<td><strong>43.7</strong></td>
<td>2,032,960</td>
<td>4,647,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States (2000)</td>
<td>New York City</td>
<td><strong>35.9</strong></td>
<td>2,871,032</td>
<td>8,008,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td><strong>40.9</strong></td>
<td>1,512,720</td>
<td>3,694,820</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The three cities constitute very different models of local governance. New York City has a highly “centralized power structure” in which the mayor holds considerably more power over the local bureaucracy than the city council or other city agencies (Joyce 2003, 58). Despite the strong centralization, community boards are active and responsive throughout the city, effectively relaying neighborhood concerns to the powers that be. New York City claims the largest bureaucracy of any U.S. city, in terms of both the raw number of public employees and their proportion of the total population. Given the importance of community boards and the size of the public sectors, citizens in New York City have many opportunities to run for public office or otherwise work directly with the local government.

Los Angeles, by contrast, has a decentralized, largely fragmented power structure in which political power is distributed more diffusely among the city’s mayor, city council, and local agencies. The central authorities of the city are also disconnected from neighborhood affairs due to the relatively weak role of

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\(^{10}\) All figures for Toronto refer to the “Toronto census metro area” (CMA), consisting of the central city and surrounding suburbs (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2005). Figures for New York City and Los Angeles refer to only the central cities.
community boards. Los Angeles has a relatively smaller bureaucracy. The combination of these factors indicates that the city provides residents with fewer entry points into public office or direct involvement with the state (Joyce 2003).

Describing the structure of local government in Toronto is more complex given the city’s recent history and how it relates to my data. In 1998, the city underwent a massive amalgamation that fused together the six formerly independent municipalities that comprised the city of Toronto. My statistical data on the city’s naturalization level reflects the number of immigrants who become citizens before 1996 and before the amalgamation. My descriptive data, however, reflects the current work of local institutions, after the amalgamation. Given this peculiarity, I offer a brief description of Toronto’s local political structure before and after the reconfiguration.

Known to some as the “city that works,” Toronto was recognized internationally through the 1990s for its effective blend of regional governance and local autonomy (Keil 2000, 765). Until 1998, the city operated as a two-tiered structure consisting of six independent municipalities and a Toronto Metropolitan Council which maintained jurisdiction over services common to the six cities, including the maintenance of a police force, board of trade, and labor council (“Toronto Enlarged” 1998). P.S. Reddy (2002) defines the governance of the former Metropolitan Council as “highly decentralized,” with the city’s departments, agencies, boards, and commissions operating with “considerable autonomy” (71).

In 1998, under considerable pressure from provincial authority to reduce local fragmentation and duplication of public services, the six cities were consolidated, replacing the two-tiered system. What is now known as the City of Toronto represents a single municipality, in which local governance is heavily concentrated in the hands of the 45-member city council, with councilors representing each of the city’s 44 wards. The mayor occupies the 45th seat and is the only local official popularly elected by the entire city, a distinction which

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11 Toronto, Ecobicoke, York, East York, North York, and Scarborough.

12 Although the census data are technically from 2001, the authors exclude from their analysis all immigrants who had arrived in Canada between 1996 and 2001. The researchers assume that the three year residency requirement for naturalization applicants would have barred many of these newcomers from becoming citizens in this timeframe (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2005, 24).
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confers considerable power on the office (City of Toronto 2005; Reddy 2002). That said, the mayor has only one vote on the city council and on each of its seven standing committees (City of Toronto 2005, 4). These committees oversee the city’s various agencies and boards which must routinely report back to the committees about their work. Although all agency work is funneled through the city council in this way, it is not clear how much autonomy these organizations have under the new amalgamated structure.

Toronto does not have neighborhood committees in the same way as New York City. Reddy contends that that local citizens oppose such committees fearing that they would be staffed by party loyalists rather than neighborhood advocates and would “become a barrier between the Council/Councillor and [the] local community” (82). The city does have six community councils, staffed by city council members, which serve as “forum[s] for local input into [the city] council’s decision making process” (City of Toronto 2005, 5). It is uncertain whether these committees are effective in relaying residents’ concerns to local officials. Reddy (2002) argues that the uneven workloads among the councils have made some councils less effective than others. However, he also notes that they have “proved to be very popular and have been accepted as part of the new dispensation” (77). 13

With similarly high immigrant populations but distinct models of local governance, Toronto, New York City, and Los Angeles make for a dynamic comparison. If naturalization is to be studied at the local level research ought to begin here.

For this study I rely on both quantitative data and qualitative analysis. I measure the naturalization level as the percentage of a city’s documented foreign-born population who have acquired juridical citizenship. The actions of local governments and community-based organizations are studied qualitatively. I review the websites of the agency or agencies in each city that deal with immigration issues to see how they view naturalization and to assess their interaction with local organizations. In particular, I consider the role of the public school district in each city. Finally, I evaluate the websites of representative

13 It should be noted that Reddy’s article was published in 2002, only four years after the consolidation and at a time when the city had only four community councils. This number has since increased to six, an expansion which may have resulted in a more even and manageable distribution among the councils.
community-based organizations in each city and include relevant scholarly literature to highlight the interactions among these political actors.

**Data and Analysis**

Toronto has a significantly higher naturalization level than the other two cities. Comparing statistics from 2001 and 2000, respectively, I find that 68.5% of Toronto’s immigrant population had naturalized, over one and a half times higher than the figure for New York City and over twice the level in Los Angeles. New York City’s level is nearly a third higher than Los Angeles’. The level in Toronto is slightly lower than the national level of 72.7%, while the figures for New York City and Los Angeles fall on either side of the national level of 38%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percent of Immigrants Who Have Naturalized</th>
<th>Population of Naturalized Immigrants</th>
<th>Total Foreign-Born Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada (2001)</td>
<td>Toronto (CMA)</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>1,393,126</td>
<td>2,032,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States (2000)</td>
<td>New York City</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>1,278,687</td>
<td>2,871,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td></td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>509,841</td>
<td>1,512,720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One cannot *a priori* assume that these disparities reflect the action or inaction of local state and non-state actors. Differences in individual attributes of immigrants in these cities could account for a significant proportion of the variance. In particular, Los Angeles’ low naturalization may be due in large part to its high numbers of Mexican and other Latino immigrants, as research shows that Mexican immigrants have historically had low levels of citizenship.
The acquisition (Woodrow-Lafield 2004; Marrow 2005). Yet this does not rule out the influence of local institutions. Indeed, analyzing the interactions of government and community-based organizations across the three cities reveals significant differences.

**Toronto**

The City of Toronto boasts a robust set of services for its foreign-born residents. The “Information for new immigrants” section of its website provides basic information about the demographics and history of the country and city and hosts numerous links to other relevant government agencies. Specifically, the site tells those considering coming to the country how to: attain permanent resident cards, contact the Canadian consulate in their home country, and acquire citizenship. The section related to citizenship informs readers of the legal benefits of naturalizing, namely the right to vote, and provides links to information about upcoming elections and “Citizenship Application Kits” produced by Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the federal immigration agency. Especially compelling is how the site lists multiple organizations willing to help individuals prepare for the citizenship test. The four organizations listed represent two government bodies, the Toronto Public Library and the Toronto District School Board, and two private or non-profit community-based organizations, the Toronto Catholic District School Board and Settlement.org (City of Toronto 2006).

The work of the Toronto District School Board and Settlement.org deserves extended discussion. The School Board offers numerous kinds of services for immigrants, including numerous kinds of Adult English as a Second Language (ESL) programs and citizenship preparation classes in at least eight locations throughout the city (Toronto District School Board 2007a). The Board also hosts Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC) courses, intensive 25-hour per week classes which combine language instruction with “basic life skills for life in Canada” and computer training. In sponsoring this program, the Board partners with the Toronto YMCA which assesses potential students on their eligibility for the program and language competency. Citizenship and Immigration Canada provides funding for the LINC courses in Toronto and in other locations across the country (Toronto District School Board 2007b).
Settlement.org is an organization similarly invested in assisting Toronto’s immigrant population. Comprehensive in its scope, the site offers advice and resources about topics as diverse as employment, housing, health, and legal services. While the site describes its target audience as all “newcomers” to Ontario, it is clear from many of the pages that immigrants constitute much of the intended readership. The term “newcomer” is important in that it communicates to immigrants that they are already welcome in the city and will not be distinguished by the organization on the basis of their foreign status. The site provides a detailed but readable page about citizenship acquisition; immigrants can learn about various political parties in Canada, download practice tests for the naturalization exam, and learn about the rights and responsibilities of citizens. Settlement.org represents a collaborative effort between government and non-governmental actors. The Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI) sponsors the site (and many of the services to which the site links) and funding is provided by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Settlement.org 2006).

These data suggest considerable collaboration between federal and local government agencies and between government and non-governmental organizations in providing services to immigrants, including assistance with naturalization. A recent article by Kristin Good (2005) confirms this finding. Good compares how seven Canadian cities respond to the needs of their immigrant populations. She defines a city’s responsiveness as a function of having both “comprehensive” and “pro-active” practices. Good argues that comprehensive practices include funding local community-based immigrant organizations, actively seeking immigrants’ participation in local political matters, and sponsoring multicultural events. Pro-active practices meet immigrants’ needs “before problems arise, using research, the collection and mapping of demographic information, and consultation with community groups and city departments” (Wallace and Frisken 2000, as quoted by Good 284).

Looking at the actions of municipal state and private actors, Good finds that cities with biracial populations containing one dominant immigrant group generally have more responsive policies and practices than cities with more diverse, multiracial populations. Toronto, however, is an important exception as a multiracial city with a remarkably responsive local government. Referencing urban regime theory, she attributes Toronto’s responsiveness to a cohesive and comprehensive coalition of local government agencies and non-governmental
organizations working together to promote the integration of the city’s immigrant population.

The kind of public-private collaboration and promotion of naturalization found in Toronto represents the kind of interventionist approach Bloemraad describes. Its clear manifestation at the local level suggests that city officials and local organizations regard naturalization as an important part of immigrants’ political incorporation and overall integration into Canadian society.

New York City

The Mayor’s Office of Immigrant Affairs (MOIA) in New York City fills a similar role as Settlement.org in Toronto: it aims to assist local immigrants in finding city services and to help community-based organizations meet the needs of their immigrant clients. The office also works to provide information about applications already submitted to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). MOIA defines its role as bringing together different community groups and government agencies in their shared goals of serving the city’s immigrant communities. By this measure, MOIA appears to be a principal actor in a regime-style coalition similar to that in Toronto (New York City Mayor’s Office of Immigrant Affairs 2006).

Yet it seems that the office is less comprehensive in its provision of information and services than the agency in Toronto. While MOIA purports to help immigrants find pertinent social services, it is questionable whether the organization, or at least its web-based manifestation, meets this goal. The site provides links to other pertinent federal and local government agencies, but unlike the City of Toronto, offers little explanation of what these other agencies do or why readers ought to take notice.

This lack of information would seem to constitute a laissez-faire stance on naturalization on the part of MOIA: a link to the USCIS is provided but with no explanation about the process. However, other data demonstrate that the city has and continues to support immigrants becoming citizens. A 1998 article from the New York Times discusses former Mayor Giuliani’s “Citizenship NYC” program which sought to “help needy legal immigrants […] become United States citizens so that they can hold on to federal benefits” (Ojito 1998). The New York City Department of Youth and Community Development, which originally administered the program, no longer operates the Citizenship NYC
program in its original form, but continues to support citizenship acquisition in more diffuse ways by funding various types of immigration programs, including civics (and presumably citizenship) classes (New York City Department of Youth and Community Development 2007b).

Reviewing other city government sites reveals more explicit local-state support for naturalization. A recent press release from MOIA describes a forum co-sponsored by the NYC Voter Assistance Commission with the goal of “help[ing] facilitate the participation of new citizens in the electoral process” (NYC Voter Assistance Commission et al. 2005). Additionally, the Department of Youth and Community Development provides information about organizations that host public workshops for immigrant advocates on such topics as the eligibility requirements of naturalization and strategies for petitioning the USCIS for changes in immigrants’ legal status (New York City Department of Youth and Community Development 2006).

The New York City Department of Education plays an important but indirect role in the naturalization process. The Department’s Office of Adult and Continuing Education supplies teachers to agencies and organizations across the city that wish to teach adult literacy classes, including ESL, and citizenship classes. The Division’s revenue comes primarily through state funding of the Board of the Education, but also through local money from York City Adult Literacy Initiative (NYCALI) grants, which are distributed by the Department of Youth and Community Development14 (New York City Department of Education Office of Adult and Continuing Education 2007a).

The Office also collaborates extensively with the Literacy Assistance Center, an umbrella group of community-based organizations which claims to be the only organization in the city responsible for training adult education teachers, a contingent of whom work for the Department of Education. For its services, the Center receives funding from the state of New York and private donors; the city government once provided direct funding, but no longer does so. The Center hosts training workshops for teachers of citizenship classes approximately twice a year. This infrequency may reflect the fact that citizenship classes offered alone constitute only a small subset of the work the Center supports. A representative from the Center explains that organizations often include citizenship preparation

14 It is somewhat of a misnomer to call NYCALI funds “local” money; while the local department distributes the funding, the state of New York actually provides the monies (New York City Department of Youth and Community Development 2007a).
education as a component of their ESL classes rather than offer dedicated citizenship classes (Adult Literacy Center 2007).

As another connection to the Department of Education, the Center trains Department of Education employees in the data collection and reporting techniques needed to present the state with an accurate assessment of the literacy efforts in the city. The representative I spoke with was unsure whether these reports included specific information about ESL classes or the citizenship acquisition levels among students in these classes (Adult Literacy Center 2007).

While the Center works with some groups that offer ESL/citizenship classes, it seems that citizenship is not a primary focus for the Center, nor is it necessarily central for many of the organizations which it supports. Nevertheless the Center’s work with the Department of Education does represent a long-standing public-private collaboration on issues related to immigration.

This kind of cooperation typifies what Hector Cordero-Guzman (2005) sees as prevailing trend among local New York City agencies and immigrant community groups. Studying some 300 immigrant community-based organizations, the author finds that 76.5% of such groups provide citizenship services which include teaching citizenship classes and providing “support services necessary for the naturalization exam” (901). Additionally, 89% of the groups surveyed received funding from city grants and contracts (899). While it is not known if these monies are intended or used for services related to naturalization, the findings by Cordero-Guzman, in conjunction with the organizations studied here, point to a high level of cohesion between the New York City government and immigrant organizations.

Los Angeles

The City of Los Angeles deviates significantly from the other two cities in its approach to naturalization and immigrant incorporation. Surprisingly, the city government does not maintain a website dedicated to immigration issues (City of Los Angeles 2006). The city’s Human Relations Commission website refers to immigration, but places the topic alongside seven other “inter-groups relations” issue areas, including public safety, GLBT issues, and homelessness. The commission purports to work “with local, state and federal government personnel, as well as with community-based organizations...to develop city policies in these issue areas” but it is unknown which of these seven issues the
commission prioritizes or what kind of attention is paid to immigration issues (City of Los Angeles Human Relations Commission 2006). The organization reported that in 2004 it lobbied the local government to create a “new Mayor’s Office of Immigrant Affairs,” but no evidence can be found that this office has since materialized.\footnote{The webpage of the Mayor of Los Angeles makes no reference to such an office (City of Los Angeles Office of the Mayor 2007).} Nowhere on the site does the commission mention naturalization.

Another government body in Los Angeles with local connections is the USCIS, which has a district office in the city. Its website provides information about how the office relates to local organizations, citing multiple monthly meetings with community organizations to gain feedback about its work in the city. The office hosts “informational and educational outreach forums” to immigrant audiences to discuss various topics including “citizenship and immigration benefits” (Department of Homeland Security 2006b). This statement is unfortunately vague, but could speak to an endorsement of naturalization. It remains unclear what actions, if any, the office takes to actually aid immigrants in the naturalization process. It is also unclear whether the city government takes on this role or provides funding to local non-profits.

The Los Angeles Unified School District Division of Adult and Career Education represents at least one government organization engaged in naturalization. The Division offers citizenship preparation only as a component of more general ESL classes. State and federal funding allow the Division to offer these classes free of charge. The City of Los Angeles does not provide dedicated funding. In an email correspondence with a representative from the office, I asked if the Division collaborates with other local government agencies or community organizations in assisting immigrants in the naturalization process. The representative wrote “we collaborate with other agencies and organizations by providing classes” but presented no further explanation (Los Angeles Unified School District Division of Adult and Career Education 2007).

The work of two community organizations, the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles and Catholic Immigration Services, may offer at least anecdotal clarification about the interaction between local state and community actors. Among the many services the Legal Aid Foundation provides, the organization assists immigrants who wish to become citizens by challenging the USCIS when naturalization requests are denied. Legal Aid does not mention joining forces
with city officials. Some of the organization’s funding comes from the city of Los Angeles, although it is not known whether the city’s money went to immigration or naturalization services (Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles 2006).

Catholic Immigration Services’ online presentation is similarly vague. The group helps clients become legal residents and bring family members to the United States. The site does not specifically state whether the organization aids in the naturalization process, but implies that many staff members are former immigrants and have first-hand experience with the processes of becoming naturalized citizens. The group does not mention receiving any funding from the local government (Catholic Charities of Los Angeles, Inc. 2006).

Given the relative poverty of available information, the experience in Los Angeles represents the most ambiguous picture of public-private interactions of the cities studied here. Perhaps city agencies and local organizations do work together in encouraging naturalization and incorporating immigrants, but such collaboration is not as readily apparent as in the other two cities.

Conclusions, Limitations, and Call for Further Research

Although this study is exploratory in nature, several conclusions can be drawn. First, I find that naturalization levels vary dramatically by city, at least among the three locales considered here, meaning that the national naturalization gap does widen or narrow depending upon the cities studied. I also find varying levels of institutional engagement which seem to correlate with the levels of naturalization. Toronto, with its comprehensive approach to incorporation and endorsement of naturalization, has the highest naturalization level of the three cities. New York City, breaking away from the federal *laissez-faire* approach, seems to have similarly active coalitions of public and private actors. This may explain in part why the city’s naturalization level of 44.5% is higher than the U.S. national average, although still much lower than Toronto’s or the national Canadian level. It is much more difficult to assess the situation in Los Angeles, but from the limited information I could gather, it does not appear that the city government or community organizations are as actively engaged as those in Toronto or New York City. If that is accurate, then there may be reason to believe that Los Angeles’ low naturalization level is due at least in part to a lack of institutional support.
Conventional wisdom tells us that the city’s low naturalization level is a function of its high percentage of Mexican and other Hispanic immigrants who are statistically less likely to become legal citizens. This variable alone, however, cannot explain the differences between New York City and Los Angeles. Mollenkopf, Olson, and Ross (2001) find that Latino immigrants in New York City naturalize in greater numbers than Latinos in Los Angeles and that “even after controlling for [the] three factors [of length in residence, individual income, and education levels], immigrants living in New York City were still significantly more likely to naturalize than those in L.A. County” (41). Mollenkopf, Olson, and Ross’s analysis supports the hypothesis that place matters and that only by accounting for place-based variables, which could include local institutional response, can we fully understand why immigrants do or do not naturalize.

It is always easy to conclude that “more research is needed,” but this is indeed the case for this project. The analysis herein is of course preliminary and I hope that this line of research provokes further discussion of a local institutional understanding of naturalization.

Before offering suggestions for further research, I should first address explicitly the shortcomings of this study. I encountered limitations with both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the analysis. Many of the statistical limitations stem from my inability to access micro-level data for the three cities. Using only aggregate-level statistics, I am unable to compute an accurate naturalization level. In this study I provide the percent of all immigrants who have naturalized. A truer assessment would measure only the percent of eligible immigrants who have naturalized, excluding from the total foreign-born population those individuals who have arrived too recently to apply for citizenship status or were otherwise disqualified. This kind of calculation, however, is impossible without micro-level data. As well, without such data, I am unable to perform multivariate analysis to statistically isolate the effect of living in a specific city on an immigrant’s likelihood to naturalize.

Regarding the qualitative analysis, my limited time and resources severely restricted my assessment of local institutional actors. I was only able to infer the interactions of public and private actors from their websites, news coverage, and recent scholarship. It is entirely possible that these actors do far more or less to promote naturalization than is publicly known. As well, with this web-based methodology, I cannot fully assess how these organizations interact.
with their immigrant clients or even how immigrants access the organizations’ online resources.

Data from the City of Toronto presented notable problems worth discussing here in some detail. To begin, the city’s naturalization level as calculated in this paper represents a composite figure of the City of Toronto and its neighboring suburbs, a limitation I was forced to accept because the census data provided no way to isolate the number of naturalized immigrants living in the central city. The suburbs may have considerably different naturalization levels, which could affect the city average. If the central city in fact has many fewer naturalized immigrants, then there is less evidence that a strong institutional response leads to more immigrants becoming citizens.

An additional problem concerns the discontinuity between the statistical data and the analysis of Toronto’s local organizations. As previously mentioned, these sources of data reflect two significantly different times in the recent history of Toronto: before and after the city-wide amalgamation in 1998. Even though I used the most current statistics publicly available, the data excludes naturalizations that took place after 1996, or after 1998 for that matter. Conversely, when exploring the work of the city’s relevant agencies, I could not assess how the organizations operated before 1998. Because Canada’s federal multiculturalism policy, which seems to inform much of the work of the local institutions, has been in effect across this period of time, it is only a moderate leap of faith to assume that the organizations studied here functioned in a similar manner before 1998. Of course, further study could disprove this claim.

With these limitations in mind, I offer the following guidelines for future research. As previously alluded to, this area of study strongly warrants more comprehensive multivariate analysis of micro-level data of Canadian and U.S. cities. Expansion of this kind of research to additional cities in both countries could tell us how naturalization levels vary across a wide range of cities of different sizes and ethnic compositions. This process could also show how residence in a specific metropolitan area influences an immigrant’s likelihood of naturalization and which immigrant populations experience the greatest variance in their naturalization levels across cities. If such analysis reveals that residence in specific cities is a statistically significant determinant of naturalization, then there would be greater support for the hypothesis that local institutions can affect this variable.
Further statistical inquiry ought to be combined with qualitative measures to assess in greater depth how local actors conceive of their role in the naturalization and incorporation processes and how these conceptions inform their work. Following Bloemraad’s lead, future research could consist of interviews with local officials and leaders of pertinent community organizations to better understand their approaches to naturalization. Other issues important to immigrant populations should be considered as well. If cities and community organizations work together on issues such as housing, health, or employment, a stronger argument could be made for the presence of immigration-related urban regimes in these cities.

If anything, my work highlights the salience of the questions I set out to answer. While I cannot prove that local institutions have an effect on immigrants’ decisions to naturalize, I do have reason to believe that naturalization levels vary in accordance with local institutional responses. If naturalization matters to immigrants themselves and to their host cities, then this line of research could prove profitable not only to scholars but to city officials as well. Perhaps we will find that the kinds of practices in Toronto and New York City do foster greater incorporation and do increase the rate at which immigrants become citizens. If so, then we might learn how to both explain and close the North American naturalization gap.
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