Conference on “Faith and Reason: Themes from Swinburne” Sept 25-27, 2014
“Knowing in Religion and Morality” Project
BOOKS:
Justification without Awareness, Oxford 2006.
Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition. Oxford 2021.
EDITED BOOKS:
Divine Evil? The Moral Character of the God of Abraham, Oxford 2010.
Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution, Oxford 2014.
Reason and Faith: Themes from Richard Swinburne, Oxford 2016.
Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford 2016.
PAPERS:
Epistemology
- “Internalism, Externalism, and the No-Defeater Condition,” Synthese 110 (1997), 399-417.
- “Deontology and Defeat” ” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000), 113-28.
- “Externalism and Skepticism,” The Philosophical Review 109 (2000), 159-94.
- “Commonsense Naturalism,” in Naturalism Defeated? Essays On Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, ed. James Beilby (Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 61-90. [pre-print]
- “What’s Not Wrong with Foundationalism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004), 161-65.
- “Externalist Justification without Reliability,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004), 35-60.
- “Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004), 709-27.
- “Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005), 419-36.
- “A Dilemma for Internalism,” in Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga, eds. Thomas Crisp, Matthew Davidson and David Vander Laan (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2006), pp. 137-77.
- “BonJour’s Dilemma,” Philosophical Studies 131 (2006), 679-93.
- “Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2006), 198-207.
- “Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification”, Philosophical Studies 134 (2007), 19-24.
- “Externalist Responses to Skepticism,” Oxford Handbook to Skepticism, ed. John Greco (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 504-38. [pre-print]
- “Reidian Externalism,” in New Waves in Epistemology, eds. Vincent Hendricks and Duncan Pritchard (Palgrave, 2008), pp. 52-74. [pre-print]
- “Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure,” Episteme 6 (2009), 336-53.
- “Evidentialism and the Great Pumpkin Objection,” Evidentialism and its Discontents, ed. Trent Dougherty (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 123-33.
- “Phenomenal Conservatism and Internalism’s Dilemma,” in Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, ed. Chris Tucker (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 154-78.
- “Klein and the Regress Argument,” Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism, eds. Peter Klein and John Turri (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 37-54.
- “Externalist Justification and the Role of Seemings,” Philosophical Studies 166 (2013), 163-84.
- “Foundationalism,” Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology, eds. William Abraham and Frederick Aquino (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 253-73.
- “Externalist Versions of Evidentialism” in Kevin McCain (ed.) Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism (Springer, 2018), pp. 109-23.
- “Concerns about Lycan’s Commonsensism,” Metaphilosophy 53 (2022): 573-82.
- “Precis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition,” Analysis 82 (2022): 695-7.
- “Replies to Nagel, Neta, and Pritchard,” Analysis 82 (2022):725-37,
- “Precis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (2023): 91-94.
- “Replies to Chudnoff, Lemos, and McCain,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (2023): 140-81.
Metaphysics
- “A New Argument from Actualism to Serious Actualism,” Noûs 30 (1996), 356-59.
- “(Serious) Actualism and (Serious) Presentism,” Noûs 33 (1999), 118-132.
- “Agent Causation and Responsibility: A Reply to Flint,” Faith and Philosophy 20 (2003), 229-35.
Philosophy of Religion
- “Might-Counterfactuals, Transworld Untrustworthiness and Plantinga’s Free Will Defense,” Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999), 336-51.
- “Skeptical Theism and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from Evil,” Noûs 35 (2001) 278-96.
- “Molinist Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Free Will Defense,” Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002), 462-78.
- “Grounds for Belief in God Aside, Does Evil Make Atheism more Reasonable than Theism?,” (co-authored with Daniel Howard-Snyder) in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Michael Peterson (Blackwell Publishers, 2004), pp. 13-25.
- “Reply to Rowe,” (co-authored with Daniel Howard-Snyder) in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Michael Peterson (Blackwell Publishers, 2004), pp. 27-29.
- “In Defense of Skeptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy,” (co-authored with Michael Rea) Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005), 241-51.
- “A Theistic Argument Against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity),” (co-authored with Jeffrey Brower) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2 (2006), 357-86.
- “Divine Responsibility without Divine Freedom,” (co-authored with Jan Cover) Faith and Philosophy 23 (2006), 381-408.
- “The God of Eth and The God of Earth”, (co-authored with Jeffrey Brower) Think: Philosophy for Everyone 14 (2007), 34-38.
- “Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil,” Oxford Handbook to Philosophical Theology, eds. Thomas Flint and Michael Rea (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 374-99. [pre-print]
- “Rational Religious Belief without Arguments,” Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, eds. Louis Pojman and Michael Rea (Wadsworth Publishing, 2012), pp. 534-49.
- “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” Science, Religion, and Metaphysics: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga, eds. Kelly Clark and Michael Rea (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 9-30. [pre-print]
- “Is Plantinga a Friend of Evolutionary Science?” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (2013), 3-17.
- “Skeptical Theism, Atheism, and Total Evidence Skepticism,” Skeptical Theism: New Essays, eds. Trent Dougherty and Justin McBrayer (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 209-20.
- “Religious Disagreement and Rational Demotion,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, 6 (2015), pp. 21-57.
- “Religious Disagreement and Epistemic Intuitions,” Philosophy 81 (2017), 19-43.
- “Modest Molinism: An Explanation and Defense,” TheoLogica 8, no. 2 (2023), 1-31. https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i2.77783 .
- “Reformed Epistemology: Rational Religious Belief without Arguments” in John Greco, Jonathan Fuqua, and Tyler McNabb (eds.) The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology (Cambridge University Press, 2023), pp. 41-55.
- “Lessons from Commonsensism for Religious Epistemology” in Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford, and Matthias Steup (eds.) Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles (Routledge, 2024).