

# Deontology and Defeat

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It is currently fashionable to hold that *deontology induces internalism*. That is, those who think that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of duty fulfillment are thought to have a good reason for accepting internalism in epistemology. I shall argue that *no* deontological conception of epistemic justification provides a good reason for endorsing internalism. My main contention is that a requirement having to do with epistemic defeat—a requirement that many *externalists* impose on knowledge—guarantees the only sorts of deontological justification that have a chance at inducing internalism. Given this compatibility of externalism and deontology, we may safely conclude that deontology by itself doesn't lend support to internalism.

It is currently fashionable to hold that *deontology induces internalism*. That is, those who think that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of duty fulfillment are thought to have a good reason for accepting internalism in epistemology.<sup>1</sup> I shall argue that *no* deontological conception of epistemic justification provides a good reason for endorsing internalism. My argument, in brief, goes as follows. Externalists can quite properly hold that: *a subject knows that p only if she does not think her belief that p is defeated*. But the absence of this sort of defeat (the sort that is present when one thinks one's belief is defeated) guarantees the only sorts of deontological justification that have a chance at inducing internalism.<sup>2</sup> So one can hold that knowledge requires these sorts of deontological justification while consistently rejecting internalism. If this argument is sound, it has important ramifications for the

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<sup>1</sup> Thus, Steup, in his recent introductory epistemology text (1996, 86), says “[d]eontological theories, therefore, are necessarily internalist”. See Alston 1986, 198–200 and 214–16 and Plantinga 1993b, 15–25 for discussions of this supposed connection between deontological construals of epistemic justification and internalism. They help us to see the intuitive appeal of the move from deontology to internalism and argue that though this (putative) connection is not always explicitly mentioned by internalists, it is the *main* (and perhaps the strongest) reason they have for endorsing internalism. Examples of philosophers whose internalism is clearly motivated by such deontological considerations are BonJour (see his 1985, 38–45), Chisholm (see his 1977, 14–15 and his 1986, 49–56) and Ginet (see his 1975, 28–36).

<sup>2</sup> Throughout this paper, I will use the locutions *A induces B* and *A provides a good reason for B* interchangeably.

internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology. For it demonstrates the deficiency of one of the main reasons for endorsing internalism.

### 1. Setting Up the Argument

Externalism is the view that no internal condition other than the no-defeater condition (NDC) is necessary for warrant;<sup>3</sup> internalism is the denial of externalism.<sup>4</sup> I should explain my use of the terms ‘warrant’, ‘internal’ and ‘NDC’. *Warrant* is whatever it is which, together with true belief, yields knowledge.<sup>5</sup> (Those who think justification is necessary for knowledge will tend to think of warrant as something like justification plus whatever is required to handle Gettier problems.) An *internal* condition is one such that a typical subject can tell by reflection alone whether or not a belief of hers satisfies it; an *external* condition is one that is not internal. And, to a first approximation, we may say that *NDC* is satisfied by a belief B just in case the person holding B does not believe B is defeated. I will say more about NDC in section 2.

Given the above definition of internalism, we can say that a deontological conception of justification induces internalism only if there is some *internal* deontological justification condition (DJC) that is necessary for warrant and is not entailed by NDC (i.e., its satisfaction is not entailed by the satisfaction of NDC).<sup>6</sup> For clearly, in denying that there are internal conditions other than NDC that are necessary for warrant, the externalist is not committed to denying that internal conditions whose satisfaction is entailed by the satisfaction of NDC are necessary for warrant. I will argue that the only internal sorts of DJC that are necessary for warrant are entailed by NDC.

It will be helpful to have before us a more formal *schematic* statement of my argument:

- (1)  $NDC_1, NDC_2, \dots$  and  $NDC_n$  are internal versions of NDC whose necessity for warrant is compatible with externalism.

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<sup>3</sup> In Bergmann 1997, I argue that this is the understanding of externalism implicit in our usual classifications of internalists and externalists. Space restrictions prevent me from restating that argument here (though I say a little about it in the final paragraph of section 2).

<sup>4</sup> Although I now reject the fairly common assumption (which I took for granted in Bergmann 1997) that internalism and externalism are complements of each other (I think they are merely contraries) I will grant that assumption here in order to simplify the argument of this paper. My conclusion does not depend on this simplifying assumption.

<sup>5</sup> This way of using the term ‘warrant’ is suggested by Plantinga (1993b, 3). But Plantinga thinks that warrant comes in degrees (1993b, 4). Thus, I use the term ‘warrant’ as a name for what Plantinga would call that degree of warrant which, together with true belief, is sufficient for knowledge.

<sup>6</sup> This ‘is entailed by’ relation that holds between conditions is equivalent to the ‘is a subcondition of’ relation that I defined in Bergmann 1997.

- (2) The only versions of DJC that are both internal and necessary for warrant are  $DJC_1$ ,  $DJC_2$ , ... and  $DJC_n$ .
- (3) Each of  $DJC_1$ ,  $DJC_2$ , ... and  $DJC_n$  is entailed by either  $NDC_1$ ,  $NDC_2$ , ... or  $NDC_n$ .
- (4) If each version of DJC that is both internal and necessary for warrant is entailed by some internal version of NDC whose necessity for warrant is compatible with externalism, then the view that justification is to be understood deontologically does not provide a good reason for endorsing internalism (i.e., if (1), (2) and (3) then (5)).
- (5) Therefore, the view that justification is to be understood deontologically does not provide a good reason for endorsing internalism.

In order for this argument to do the work I want it to, I must identify and defend nonschematic versions of premises (1), (2) and (3). This is what I do in sections 2 and 3. In the final section I will consider two objections to premise (4).

## 2. The No-Defeater Condition

Let's turn to the task of identifying a couple of internal versions of NDC whose necessity for warrant is compatible with externalism. Earlier I said that NDC is satisfied by a belief B just in case the person holding B does not believe B is defeated. But what is it for S to believe B is defeated? Let's focus first on *defeat*. S believes B is defeated just in case she believes B is *epistemically irrational*. And S believes her belief that p is epistemically irrational just in case she believes that the considerations counting for and against p<sup>7</sup> are so weighted that *now* believing truly and not falsely with respect to p is *not* best achieved by believing p.

I wish this to be understood so that even small children can have the concept of epistemic irrationality. Of course they would not express this concept as I just have. But they might say that some assertion proposed as a candidate for belief is *silly* (where they have in mind the sort of silliness that inclines them to doubt the truth of the assertion). And the process by which they come to believe or disbelieve a seemingly silly claim reported with apparent sincerity may involve their considering and weighing such factors as the plausibility of interpreting the proposal as a joke or a lie, the degree of silliness of the proposal, etc.

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<sup>7</sup> I impose no restrictions on the sorts of things S thinks of as considerations counting for or against p.

Now that we have some idea of what it is for a belief to be *defeated*, let's consider what's involved in a subject's *believing* that B is defeated. Suppose you feel hungry, that you notice you feel hungry but that you don't explicitly entertain the proposition 'I feel hungry'. Let's say that in such a case you *consciously take* yourself to be hungry. Does this mean that you *believe* you feel hungry? This is a difficult question, one I'd rather not tackle here. My concern is not with how the concepts of belief and conscious taking are related. I am interested only in how we should interpret the fairly common claim (at least among epistemologists) that a necessary condition of B's warrant is that the subject does not *believe* B is defeated. Is this claim to be understood as saying (among other things) that a necessary condition of B's warrant is that the subject does not *consciously take* B to be defeated? Suppose you consciously took your belief that p to be epistemically irrational. If you did, could you know that p? Anyone who thinks NDC is necessary for warrant would, I think, be inclined to answer 'No'. I take this as a good reason to think that in requiring (for warrant) that the subject does not *believe* her belief is defeated, NDC (as it is typically understood) is also requiring that the subject does not *consciously take* her belief to be epistemically irrational.

So one version of NDC requires that the subject does not consciously take her belief to be epistemically irrational. Another version of NDC requires that the subject *would not on brief reflection* consciously take her belief that p to be epistemically irrational. Let's call the former the *no-conscious-defeater* condition (NDC<sub>c</sub>) and the latter the *no-reflective-defeater* condition (NDC<sub>r</sub>) and define them as follows:

NDC<sub>c</sub> is satisfied by S's belief B if and only if S does not consciously take B to be epistemically irrational.

NDC<sub>r</sub> is satisfied by S's belief B if and only if S *would not on brief reflection* consciously take B to be epistemically irrational.

Notice that both of these conditions are *internal*.<sup>8</sup> We can tell on reflection alone whether or not we consciously take a belief to be epistemically irrational; likewise, we can tell on reflection alone whether or not we would on brief reflection alone consciously take a belief to be epistemically irrational (we need only briefly reflect and then consider whether or not, in doing so, we consciously take the belief in question to be epistemically irrational).

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<sup>8</sup> In fact, the reason I formulated versions of NDC in terms of conscious taking rather than in terms of belief is that I wanted to make clear that they are *internal* conditions without getting into a prolonged discussion about whether or not a person can tell on reflection alone what she believes.

Is the necessity of  $NDC_c$  and  $NDC_r$  for warrant compatible with externalism? As I explain in Bergmann 1997, there are basically two reasons for saying that the necessity of *some* internal version of NDC for warrant is compatible with externalism. First, certain paradigm externalists make it clear that they think some internal version of NDC is necessary for warrant.<sup>9</sup> And, second, several internalist critics of externalism insist that the endorsement of the view that some internal version of NDC is necessary for warrant is not sufficient for making one an internalist.<sup>10</sup> Since  $NDC_c$  is one of the versions of NDC most plausibly thought to be necessary for warrant, it is reasonable to assume that the externalists who concede that some version of NDC is necessary for warrant would agree that  $NDC_c$  is. For the same reason, it is natural to assume that the internalist critics I alluded to would agree that the necessity for warrant of  $NDC_c$  is compatible with externalism. And although it is not as obvious that these same externalists would think  $NDC_r$  is necessary for warrant, it is highly doubtful that the internalist critics who insist that it is *not* sufficiently internalistic to think that  $NDC_c$  is necessary for warrant would think that it *is* sufficiently internalistic to think that  $NDC_r$  is necessary for warrant. After all,  $NDC_c$  is “more internal” than is  $NDC_r$  (in the sense that its being satisfied or not is more readily accessible upon less reflection). One would think that if a version of NDC is “*less* internal” than is  $NDC_c$ , internalists would not be *more* inclined to think that endorsing its necessity for warrant is sufficiently internalistic. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that both  $NDC_c$  and  $NDC_r$  are internal versions of NDC whose necessity for warrant is compatible with externalism. This gives us a non-schematic version of premise (1).

### 3. The Deontological Justification Condition

A nonschematic statement of premise (2) will identify the only versions of DJC that are both internal and necessary for warrant. It will be helpful in formulating this premise to recognize that some of the more common versions of DJC are either *external* or *not* necessary for warrant.

#### 3.1 An External Version of DJC

Consider first the following version of DJC:

<sup>9</sup> See Goldman 1986, 62–63 and 111–12, Nozick 1981, 196 and Plantinga 1993a, 40–42 as well as my discussion of these externalists in section 4 of Bergmann 1997.

<sup>10</sup> BonJour (1985, 37–41) considers a modified version of Armstrong’s position (a version which merely adds NDC as a necessary condition of warrant). Lehrer (1990, 165–66) discusses Goldman’s acknowledgment of the necessity of NDC for warrant. And Moser (1985, 128–29) proposes and rejects a version of externalism which imposes NDC.

DJC<sub>o</sub> is satisfied by S's belief that p if and only if, in believing that p, S violates no *objective* doxastic duties.<sup>11</sup>

The distinction between objective and subjective *moral* duties is a fairly common one. And the distinction has been carried over into the realm of *doxastic* duties (this is what I will call those duties that are concerned with our acts of believing).<sup>12</sup> The idea is, roughly, that there are, on the one hand, the duties we *think* we have (these are our subjective duties) and, on the other, the duties we *in fact* have whether we think so or not (these are our objective duties). I think it is very plausible to hold that, if we have any objective doxastic duties, we have objective doxastic duties that we cannot on reflection alone tell that we have.<sup>13</sup> But if so, then it is clear that DJC<sub>o</sub> is not an internal condition. For we cannot tell on reflection alone whether or not we have fulfilled *all* the doxastic duties we *in fact* have, including those we cannot on reflection alone tell that we have.

But suppose I am mistaken and we *can* tell on reflection alone what our objective doxastic duties are (at least what our *general* objective doxastic duties are). One might even argue that since a priori ethics is possible I must be mistaken.<sup>14</sup> Does this show that DJC<sub>o</sub> is an internal condition? No. At most it implies that we can tell on reflection alone what our *general* objective duties are. But of course we might be able to tell on reflection alone what our general objective duty is (e.g. to maximize human pleasure) without being able to tell on reflection alone whether or not we have violated this general objective duty. For we might not be able to tell on reflection alone whether or not some particular act is in conformity with the duty in question. So even if a priori ethics is possible, it is plausible to think that DJC<sub>o</sub> is an external condition.<sup>15</sup>

And this is important to recognize because it is easy for internalists sympathetic to the view that epistemic justification is to be understood deontologically to think that DJC<sub>o</sub> is necessary for warrant. The problem is that such internalists might think (or be tempted to think in response to my argument outlined in section 1) that, since DJC<sub>o</sub> is not entailed by any internal version of NDC, the necessity of this version of DJC for warrant

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<sup>11</sup> The 'o' subscript in DJC<sub>o</sub> is for 'objective'.

<sup>12</sup> See for example Goldman 1986, 73–74 and Pollock 1986, 141–42. See Feldman 1988, 415–18 for an example of someone who denies that this distinction is neatly transferable to the intellectual realm.

<sup>13</sup> See Brueckner 1996, section 2 and Goldman 1986, 25–26 and 59 for a defense of this claim.

<sup>14</sup> My thanks to Joel Pust and an anonymous referee for bringing this sort of response to my attention.

<sup>15</sup> Note that even if DJC<sub>o</sub> is not an external condition, this will, presumably, be because DJC<sub>o</sub> is entailed by one of the internal versions of DJC I consider in subsections 3.2 and 3.3. But in that case, what I say in those subsections will constitute a response to the suggestion that, contrary to what I've said in this subsection, DJC<sub>o</sub> is internal after all.

(assuming, for the sake of argument, that it *is* necessary for warrant) is a good reason for endorsing internalism. But since  $DJC_o$  is an external condition this would be a mistake.<sup>16</sup>

### 3.2 Internal Versions of DJC that are Not Necessary for Warrant

What would an *internal* version of DJC look like? Consider the following definitions of two internal versions of DJC modeled after  $NDC_c$  and  $NDC_r$ :

$DJC_c$  is satisfied by S's belief that p if and only if, in believing that p, S does not consciously take herself to be violating a doxastic duty.

$DJC_r$  is satisfied by S's belief that p if and only if, in believing that p, S would not upon reflection consciously take herself to be violating a doxastic duty.

These conditions are internal for the same reason  $NDC_c$  and  $NDC_r$  are internal. But are they necessary for warrant? It seems not. For suppose a subject considers herself to have a doxastic duty to believe in accord with some policy and that she thinks she is bound by this duty even when, as far as she can tell, believing in accord with that policy is not truth-conducive. For example, suppose Linda consciously takes herself to have a doxastic duty to believe what her parents tell her to believe. Suppose also that Linda is told by her parents to believe that  $\sim p$  where p is 'The earth is much more than 6000 years old'. Suppose further that Linda believes that p, that this belief is reliably formed by properly functioning faculties and that p is in fact true. We can add that Linda takes herself to have excellent reasons for believing p and no good reasons for thinking p is false. In particular, she does not take her parents' endorsement of  $\sim p$  as an indication that p is false; she merely takes it as a sufficient condition for her having a doxastic duty to believe  $\sim p$ . It seems clear that Linda could, in such a case, know that p despite the fact that she consciously takes herself to have violated a doxastic duty in believing p. This shows that  $DJC_c$  is not necessary for warrant. A similar counterexample could be constructed for the claim that  $DJC_r$  is necessary for warrant.

### 3.3 Internal Versions of DJC that are Necessary for Warrant

Why does the fact that  $DJC_c$  is not satisfied by Linda's belief about the age of the earth not prevent that belief from being warranted? It's because Linda does not consciously take her violation of the duty in question to prevent her from believing in a way that best achieves the end of her now believing truly and

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<sup>16</sup> I will address some further concerns about the connection between external versions of DJC and internalism in the final section of this paper where I consider some objections to premise (4).

not falsely with respect to  $p$ . In other words, it's because she does not consciously take her violation of the duty in question to have the result that her belief that  $p$  is epistemically irrational (in the sense defined earlier). Let's modify  $DJC_c$  and  $DJC_r$  to accommodate this insight:

$DJC_c^*$  is satisfied by  $S$ 's belief that  $p$  if and only if, in believing that  $p$ ,  $S$  does not consciously take herself to be *violating a duty the violation of which makes her belief that  $p$  epistemically irrational*.

$DJC_r^*$  is satisfied by  $S$ 's belief that  $p$  if and only if, in believing that  $p$ ,  $S$  *would not on reflection* consciously take herself to be *violating a duty the violation of which makes her belief that  $p$  epistemically irrational*.

(These conditions are to be understood as requiring that  $S$  does not, or would not on reflection, consciously take herself to be doing something she conceives of as *violating a duty the violation of which makes her belief that  $p$  epistemically irrational*.)

Notice that  $DJC_c^*$  is satisfied by Linda's belief that  $p$ . For although Linda, in holding  $p$ , consciously takes herself to be violating the doxastic duty to believe what her parents tell her to believe, she does not take herself to be violating a duty the violation of which makes her belief that  $p$  epistemically irrational.

Are  $DJC_c^*$  and  $DJC_r^*$  both internal and necessary for warrant? Let's suppose they are. Are they entailed by either  $NDC_c$  or  $NDC_r$ ? It seems so. For suppose  $S$ 's belief that  $p$  fails to satisfy  $DJC_c^*$ . Then, in believing that  $p$ ,  $S$  consciously takes herself to be doing something she conceives of as *violating a duty the violation of which makes her belief that  $p$  epistemically irrational*. But then she consciously takes her belief that  $p$  to be epistemically irrational. Consequently,  $S$ 's belief that  $p$  also fails to satisfy  $NDC_c$ . This shows that  $DJC_c^*$  is entailed by  $NDC_c$ . A parallel argument shows that  $DJC_r^*$  is entailed by  $NDC_r$ .

Are  $DJC_c^*$  and  $DJC_r^*$  the *only* versions of  $DJC$  that are both internal and necessary for warrant? I say they are.<sup>17</sup> But that sort of claim is hard to defend. So I will proceed as follows. I ask those who are skeptical not just to identify another version of  $DJC$  that is both internal and necessary for warrant. In addition, make sure that it is not (for reasons similar to those outlined in the previous paragraph) entailed by a corresponding internal version of  $NDC$

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<sup>17</sup> Of course I'm not counting versions of  $DJC$  that are entailed by either  $DJC_c^*$  or  $DJC_r^*$ . And I am assuming that any version of  $DJC$  whose definition involves only a very insignificant difference from the definitions of  $DJC_c^*$  and  $DJC_r^*$  is not really *another* version of  $DJC$ .

whose necessity for warrant is compatible with externalism. I do not think this can be done.<sup>18</sup>

We now have nonschematic versions of the first three premises:

- (1)  $NDC_c$  and  $NDC_r$  are internal versions of NDC whose necessity for warrant is compatible with externalism.
- (2) The only versions of DJC that are both internal and necessary for warrant are  $DJC_c^*$  and  $DJC_r^*$ .
- (3) Each of  $DJC_c^*$  and  $DJC_r^*$  is entailed by either  $NDC_c$  or  $NDC_r$ .

#### 4. Objections to Premise (4)

Suppose that my nonschematic versions of the first three premises (or something like them) are true. What about the fourth premise:

- (4) If each version of DJC that is both internal and necessary for warrant is entailed by some internal version of NDC whose necessity for warrant is compatible with externalism, then the view that justification is to be understood deontologically does not provide a good reason for endorsing internalism?

Let's look at a couple of objections to it.

##### 4.1 *Objection One*

The first, which I will deal with briefly, runs as follows: "The first three premises of your argument have as their focus warrant and not justification. So, even if you establish the antecedent of (4), this will not show that internalism with respect to *justification* is not induced by a deontological conception of justification. But it is internalism with respect to justification that is at issue in the I-E debate." This objection is misguided unless the focus of the I-E debate is a sort of justification that is not necessary for warrant. For, of course, in showing that there is no internal DJC distinct from NDC and the conditions NDC entails that is necessary for warrant, I am also showing that there is no such DJC that is necessary for any sort of justification necessary for warrant. But the I-E debate is about justification only insofar as the latter is entailed by warrant. Internalism is not vindicated when externalists (about warrant) concede that there are kinds of justification that are internal but not necessary for warrant.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Space restrictions prevent me from illustrating the difficulty of meeting this challenge.

<sup>19</sup> Examples of such externalists are Alston (1988a, 233–39 and 1988b, 178–79), Plantinga (1993b, 15–25 and 45) and Audi (1988a, 112–15, 1988b, 329 and 1993, 29). See section 3

## 4.2 Objection Two

The second objection (which will be the focus of the remainder of the paper) goes something like this: “Suppose you are right that all internal versions of DJC that are necessary for warrant are entailed by some internal version of NDC whose necessity for warrant is compatible with externalism. It doesn’t follow that a deontological conception of justification does not provide us with a good reason for internalism. I grant that the appropriate sort of *internal* DJC—one that is necessary for warrant but not entailed by NDC—would provide a *very obvious and uncomplicated reason* for endorsing internalism. And, for the sake of argument, I’m supposing you are correct in saying that there is no such condition. But then the most that follows from the antecedent of (4) is that a deontological conception of justification does not provide an *obvious and uncomplicated reason* for endorsing internalism. For there may be an *external* version of DJC that provides some more elaborate and involved reason for endorsing internalism.

“For example, consider again  $DJC_o$  (the condition satisfied by S’s belief that p if and only if, in believing that p, S violates no objective doxastic duties) and assume that we have objective doxastic duties that we cannot on reflection alone tell that we have. Then  $DJC_o$  is an external condition. But suppose there are internal conditions that are *not* entailed by NDC but *are* entailed by  $DJC_o$ . This will be the case if some of our objective doxastic duties require that we hold beliefs only if they satisfy certain internal conditions. These considerations enable us to see that even if there is no *internal* version of DJC that is necessary for warrant, a deontological conception of justification can nonetheless induce internalism. For there may be an *external* version of DJC (such as  $DJC_o$ ) that is necessary for warrant and it may turn out that this entails that certain internal conditions other than NDC (and the conditions NDC entails) are also necessary for warrant.”

What we have here is not so much an objection to premise (4) as a suggestion for how one might go about trying to come up with an objection to premise (4). One worry, which I will simply ignore, is whether or not  $DJC_o$  (or some other external version of DJC) *is* necessary for warrant. Let’s just assume that there is some suitably qualified way of stating  $DJC_o$  such that it is at least plausible to think it is necessary for warrant. The more serious worry is that we don’t have an objection until we are given an argument for the conclusion that there are internal conditions that are entailed by some external version of DJC but not entailed by NDC.

Furthermore, the more complicated and controversial the argument for this conclusion, the less plausible the claim that it is the deontological conception of justification that is providing a reason for internalism. For if the

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of Bergmann 1997 for a defense of the claim that the I-E debate is best construed in terms of warrant rather than justification.

argument in question relies on controversial assumptions which need not be conjoined with a deontological conception of justification, then it seems as if it is these assumptions (or them in conjunction with a deontological conception of justification) that are providing the reason for internalism. But strictly speaking, that is to concede that deontology does not provide a reason for internalism (more on this later).

So, in order to actually *have* an objection to premise (4) we will need an argument—one that does not rely on controversial premises. I will consider two candidates for this post.

#### 4.2.1 *Argument One for Objection Two*

The first runs as follows: “Suppose that we have at least one objective doxastic duty requiring us not to hold beliefs without some feature F (i.e., suppose we ought to refrain from holding beliefs without F). Then the condition of being F is an internal condition. For consider the following argument which has this supposition as its first premise:

- (i) S ought to refrain from holding beliefs without F.
- (ii) What S ought to do S can do.
- (iii) Therefore, S can refrain from holding beliefs without F.
- (iv) S can refrain from holding beliefs without F only if S can tell, with respect to any proposed belief, whether or not it is F.
- (v) S can always tell this only if S can tell this on reflection alone.
- (vi) If S can always tell on reflection alone whether or not a belief is F, then the condition of being F is an internal condition.
- (vii) Therefore, the condition of being F is an internal condition.<sup>20</sup>

“Furthermore, this internal condition of being F is entailed by  $DJC_o$ . For we have assumed that we have an objective doxastic duty requiring us not to hold beliefs without F. And S’s belief that p satisfies  $DJC_o$  only if, in believing p, S violates no objective doxastic duties, including the objective doxastic duty not to hold beliefs without F. So a belief’s satisfaction of  $DJC_o$  guarantees that belief’s satisfaction of the condition of being F. Thus, deontology induces internalism as follows: If justification is understood deontologically in the way suggested by the external condition  $DJC_o$ , then we have reason to think  $DJC_o$  is necessary for warrant and that we have at least one

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<sup>20</sup> This argument is modeled after Alston’s formal restatement of an argument proposed by Ginet. See Alston 1986, 214–17 and Ginet 1975, 36.

objective doxastic duty requiring us not to hold beliefs without feature F.<sup>21</sup> But then we are led, by the above argument, to the conclusion that there is some internal condition that is entailed by DJC<sub>o</sub> and, therefore, a necessary condition of warrant.”<sup>22</sup>

By way of response, note first that the conclusion of the argument is not that deontology provides us with a reason for internalism but rather that deontology provides us with a reason for the view that at least one internal condition is necessary for warrant. But that view is consistent with externalism since it is consistent with externalism to think that at least one internal condition (i.e., NDC) is necessary for warrant. The only way around this, as far as I can tell, is to stipulate that being F is not entailed by NDC. But, given this stipulation, the supposition of premise (i) seems entirely gratuitous. Such a supposition certainly doesn't simply follow from the view that justification is to be understood deontologically; there are further assumptions at work.

So the conclusion of the argument is not that deontology induces *internalism*. And if we try to alter the argument so that it does clearly lead to internalism it becomes doubtful that it is the *deontology* that is providing the reason. But even if we ignore these difficulties, a more serious problem remains. For, as Alston has pointed out, premise (v) is false.<sup>23</sup> When we say that S can fulfill her duty to do A and, therefore, that she can tell whether or not she is doing A, we are not committing ourselves to the view that she can tell this on reflection alone. We can grant that ought implies can without granting that ought implies *can without doing any research other than mere reflection*. The ought implies can principle is entirely consistent with the view that although we can do our duty, doing so often requires much more of us by way of research than mere reflection.

The argument we've been considering in support of the second objection to premise (4) does not seem promising. Recall that that argument was proposed to establish

- (P) There is some internal condition that is *not* entailed by any internal version of NDC (whose necessity for warrant is compatible with externalism) and *is* entailed by DJC<sub>o</sub>.

Having such an argument was important because without one, the second objection to premise (4) wasn't so much an objection as a suggestion for how one could go about trying to come up with one. Is there another argument for (P) that we could use in the place of the one we've just rejected?

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<sup>21</sup> I find this inference suspect but I will let it go for the sake of argument.

<sup>22</sup> My thanks to an anonymous referee whose comments suggested this line of argument to me.

<sup>23</sup> Alston 1986, 217–18.

#### 4.2.2 Argument Two for Objection Two

Well, one could identify a particular condition C and argue

- (a) that C is an internal condition that is not entailed by any internal version of NDC whose necessity for warrant is compatible with externalism

and

- (b) that we have an objective doxastic duty to refrain from holding beliefs that don't satisfy condition C.

By establishing (a) one would be demonstrating the truth of the first conjunct of (P). And by establishing (b) one would show that C is entailed by  $DJC_o$  (thereby demonstrating the truth of the second conjunct of (P)). For if we have an objective doxastic duty to refrain from beliefs that don't satisfy condition C then our beliefs will satisfy  $DJC_o$  (the condition of our not violating any objective doxastic duty in holding those beliefs) only if our beliefs satisfy C. Thus, by establishing (a) and (b) with respect to some condition C one would be showing that (P) is true.<sup>24</sup>

Of course, we still haven't got an objection so much as an improved suggestion as to how one could go about finding one. For C must be specified and one must establish both (a) and (b) with respect to it in order for us to have an argument that will constitute an objection to premise (4).<sup>25</sup> I'm not optimistic about the prospects of succeeding at such a task. But let's suppose that someone establishes (a) with respect to some specified condition and that there seems to be *some hope* of establishing (b) with respect to it (maybe there is a controversial argument for the conclusion that (b) is true with respect to the condition or perhaps some people just find it plausible to think this conclusion is true without argument). There are a couple of reasons to think that even if this were the case, our imaginary objector would still not have succeeded at showing that a deontological conception of justification induces internalism.

First, it might be the case that the reason there seems to be some hope of establishing (b) with respect to a condition C is that there is some hope of establishing that C is necessary for warrant. Anyone inclined to think that we have an objective doxastic duty to refrain from holding beliefs that aren't warranted will, if they also think C is necessary for warrant, be inclined to think that there is some hope of establishing (b) with respect to C. But if *this* is

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<sup>24</sup> My thanks to Michael Rea for suggesting this line of argument to me.

<sup>25</sup> In fact even more is required. It must be the case that it is at least plausible to think that fulfilling the duty in question – the objective doxastic duty to refrain from beliefs that don't satisfy condition C – is necessary for warrant. Otherwise, it is not *internalism* that will have been induced.

why there seems to be some hope of establishing (b) with respect to C, then what induces internalism is the independent intuition that (or argument for the conclusion that) C is necessary for warrant. For we're assuming that (a) has already been established with respect to C (i.e., that it has already been shown that C is the sort of internal condition whose necessity for warrant would entail internalism). So this intuition (or argument) would induce internalism even if one didn't think of justification deontologically. This shows that, in these circumstances, it is not the deontology that is doing the inducing.

But what if the reason there seems to be some hope of establishing (b) with respect to C is not what I've just said it might be? What if the reason is simply that it seems to some people that (or there is some controversial argument for the conclusion that) we do in fact have the objective doxastic duty to refrain from holding beliefs that don't satisfy C? Well, unless this seeming becomes more widely shared and obvious or the argument is made less controversial, we should *not* conclude that a deontological conception of justification induces internalism. Rather, we should conclude merely that a deontological conception of justification *together with a controversial view* about the content of our objective doxastic duties (*and* the view that fulfilling the duty in question is necessary for warrant) entails internalism.

Let me be more explicit about what is required (in this context) for a view to provide a good reason for internalism. In order for a view to induce internalism it must do so by itself or in conjunction with uncontroversial or obvious premises.<sup>26</sup> For suppose we were to say that a view provided a reason for internalism even if it did so only in conjunction with further controversial premises. Then far too many views (including some externalist views) would induce internalism.

For example, consider a parallel situation with respect to an analysis of warrant in terms of proper function.<sup>27</sup> Those who endorse such an analysis are widely regarded as externalists. Now suppose some people thought that a human functioning properly in the relevant respects would not hold a belief that did not satisfy C (we're still assuming that we've established (a) with respect to C). Would that show that an analysis of warrant in terms of proper function induces internalism? Certainly not. It would only show that a proper function analysis of warrant *together with a controversial view* about what constitutes proper human functioning entails internalism.

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<sup>26</sup> Notice, by the way, that if the antecedent of premise (4) were false, a deontological conception of justification would, by this standard, induce internalism. For the move from 'There is some internal version of DJC that is necessary for warrant and is not entailed by any internal version of NDC whose necessity for warrant is compatible with externalism' to 'Internalism is true' is uncontroversial and obvious (given my definitions of internalism and externalism).

<sup>27</sup> E.g., Plantinga 1993a.

Of course, if the conclusion that we have an objective doxastic duty to refrain from holding beliefs that failed to satisfy C were established by an *uncontroversial* argument, or if it were *obvious* that we have such a duty, then (if it is plausible to think that fulfilling the duty in question is necessary for warrant) it might be reasonable to say that a deontological conception of justification induces internalism. Likewise, if the conclusion that humans functioning properly in the relevant respects would refrain from holding beliefs that didn't satisfy C were obvious or established by means of an uncontroversial argument, then it might be plausible to say that a proper function analysis of warrant induces internalism. But neither of these conclusions is either obvious or established by an uncontroversial argument. And there doesn't seem to be much hope of things changing in that respect.

So the second objection to premise (4) of the main argument of this paper fails. The gist of the objection was that, even if no internal version of DJC (that is not entailed by NDC) is necessary for warrant, deontology would induce internalism *if* there were some external version of DJC that entailed some internal condition that is not entailed by NDC. I considered two arguments (actually, two suggestions for formulating arguments) for the conclusion that there *is* such an external version of DJC and found them both wanting. Until there are available some more impressive arguments for that conclusion, it is reasonable to conclude that premise (4) is true and (in light of the previous sections of this paper) that *no* deontological conception of justification provides a reason for internalism.<sup>28</sup>

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