Molten Part One
I think part of the complexity in trying to formulate an interpretive response to Burke’s analogy of “molten mass” is that the analogy itself represents the point Burke is trying to make, that our way of interpreting is dependent upon our scope of interpretation, which can lead to multiplicities of responses when we consider rhetoric. Stated another way, the ambiguity of the statement itself leads one to an interpretation based one’s interpretation of the Burkean concept of rhetoric (which may be why Burke selected the analogy). Because of this, I think my response for today will merely attempt to produce one particular answer to the question – one that may be limited and should only be seen as an interpretation and one I will try to follow up on later.
For this response, I think I will try to use the analogy to analyze a single term or the development of a single term over time. One way of looking at the analogy is to view terms as being culturally influenced by current situations and to view terms as inherently carrying with them historical symbolisms representing the diverse situations they have previously occupied – similar to how Burke explains the terms he uses. Because of this, a term like freedom will not only have currently situated cultural determinations attached to it, it will also have “cultural byproducts” that influence and impact our understandings of the term. As Burke points out, “a man is not only in the situation peculiar to his ear or to his particular place in that era (even if we could agree on the traits that characterize his era). He is also in a situation extending through centuries” (84). In other words, terms are really a conglomeration of understandings that represent a variety of complex systems of interpretations. As an example, if we take the term freedom and attach it to an idealized version of democracy the term can mean “free to make our own decisions,” but the term freedom can also historically mean free from incarceration and can make democracy a symbol of something that is not a prison.
Current uses of a term then, are not only situational, but carry with them symbolic connotations of the situations they were used in previously. Because of the multitude of use, the substance of the term freedom is wrapped in ambiguities, which Burke labels “a major resource of rhetoric” (51). By deflecting some of the representations of the term freedom in favor of other connotations of the term, we can then use rhetoric to mask some of the interpretations of freedom and highlight other favorable interpretations that align themselves more closely to our cause (whatever our cause maybe and our need to use the term freedom) (17). In our example of freedom, we can selectively use the term to make a symbolic analogy that compares democracy (free from imprisonment) to other institutions that are non-democratic like a dictatorship (or existing in a prison).
To illustrate this point, I think we need to turn back to Burke’s “Molten Mass” analogy. From a contemporary standpoint, an interpretation of the term freedom is really one molten crust in a sea of other interpretive molten crusts – or pilled on-top-of other interpretive crusts -, which were formed as distinctive outcrops from the “central moltenness” of merged ideals. As each new crust of interpretation forms, it will solidify with the curst underneath it or next it, and fragments of it will enviably reseed to its source carrying with it fragments of all the other crusts it is situated on-top-of. In other words, whenever we use the term Freedom, regardless of our interpretation of the term, the term itself is permeated by all the other interpretations of the term which existed in the “central moltenness” or that reseed back to the “central molteness.” Our term freedom then, is really a historically ambiguous term determined by our circumference of interpretation and eventual reductions of the term (more on an interpretation of circumference and reductions in a follow up post). Our scope of interpretation then, or our terminology used to define a particular term, can thus hide and highlight specific interpretations of the term in question.
Duder, Indeed, we attempt to
Duder,
Indeed, we attempt to find motive behind other people’s words and we do so based on our terministic screen which depends on our upbringing, readings, milieu, etc. You mention the “cultural byproducts” that terms have when talking about the word “freedom,” its meanings, and the ambiguities and the circumference that may arise when utilizing such a term. However, what happens when, in time, words gain the opposite meaning? I am thinking of the word “nice,” which comes from O. Fr. nice, meaning “silly, foolish.” The French word derives from the Latin nescius, which means “ignorant” and derives from the negative prefix ne- and the verb scire, “to know” (Online Etymology Dictionary). The meaning of the world “nice” has changed from “timid” to “fussy, fastidious” to “dainty, delicate” to “precise, careful” to “agreeable, delightful” to “kind, thoughtful” (Online Etymological Dictionary).
Words can be funny
Words can be funny like that sometimes. I think part of the fun in analyzing language is finding those words that have taken on new or modified meanings over time and then try to figure out why their meanings have become augmented. I the case of “nice,” I think all the old “byproducts” are still with us in some aspect today. Think about the comment “nice guys finish last,” in this example the word “nice” almost take on all the historical characteristics of the word you illustrate. By “nice” the term seems to imply the person was too “timid” or too “silly,” but was “kind” and “thoughtful.” Take the same term then and put in this phrase “That is a nice vase, ” in this example we can use the word “nice” to represent “daintiness,” “delicate,” or “agreeable,” but at the same time it could be used to call the vase “silly” or label the artist as “fastidious” if used in a sarcastic way. I think the term illustrates the idea that all words carry with them historical “byproducts” and that it depends on how we decide to throw them from the “molten mass” of meaning on-top-of other layers of use which gives them their scope or meaning in context.
Analogous History
I like how you take Burke's analogy and place it in an explicit cultural/historical context. I too often am inclined to take Burke's writings in a philosophical way, and sometimes flounder for specific examples.
Molten part Two
By focusing on one of the terms of the pentad, or focusing on someone’s “God term,” through analysis we can establish a particular interpretation of motive. But, focusing or reducing our analysis around one term inevitably leads to ambiguities or discrepancies in our analysis and eventual interpretation. Using the other terms of the pentad then, allows our interpretation to branch out again and use the other terms to seek a sort of “transformation’, which we can then use as a way to add an additional layer of analysis to your use of the “God term” and gain a more complete interpretation.
Thus, by continuously returning to the “molten center” each time we take up a circumference of terminologies a reduction occurs and we then need to return to the source of our inquire and search for a new distinction that will add to the complex layers of interpretation we have already constructed.