Groundwork
of the Metaphysics of Morals
(1785)
H.
J. Paton: “In spite of its horrifying title Kant’s Groundwork of the
Metaphysic of Morals is one of the small books which are truly great:
it has exercised on human thought an influence almost ludicrously disproportionate
to its size.”
Morality
is a priori
For
Kant, universality and necessity are the hallmarks of the a priori. Morality
commands universally (all rational beings, not just all humans) and necessarily
(no exceptions, regardless of circumstance). Therefore,
....
A
second reason (not given by Kant) for regarding moral knowledge as independent
of experience: the logical gulf between descriptive and prescriptive statements,
aka Hume's “is/ought” problem. Since
it is impossible to deduce how we ought to behave from observations of
our actual behavior, our knowledge of moral principles could not have arisen
from experience. Hence, it
must come, a priori, from reason alone.
The
Good Will
Kant
on why a good will is the only thing that is good without qualification. Take
anything (other than a good will) that we normally regard as good. In
every case, we can imagine that, when not accompanied by a good will, these
things would make the world worse rather than better. Therefore,
none of these things is good without qualification. (529)
What
does Kant mean by will? What
does Kant mean good will?
To
will something is NOT the same as merely wishing it or desiring it or having
an inclination towards it. To will is to choose or decide upon a course
of action. Kant assumes that
the faculty of will is rational. Thus,
when we will something, we always follow a maxim, a subjective principle
of action. And it is impossible
to will a contradiction or anything that we know to be impossible. A
good will is a morally good will, that is, a morally good decision to act
on a maxim. Such as act of
willing is good, Kant thinks, only if it is done (solely?) for the sake
of doing what one recognizes to be one’s moral duty.
The
Good Will and Its Results
“Even
if, by some special disfavour of destiny or by the niggardly [miserly]
endowment of stepmotherly nature, this will is entirely lacking in power
to carry out its intentions… even then it would still shine like a jewel
for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself.” (530)
1. Actions
that violate duty
2. Actions
that accord with duty, but for which we have no immediate inclination;
but we do them anyway because of some other inclination (such as self-interest
or love of fame). E.g., the
prudent merchant.
Obviously,
neither 1 nor 2 is done from duty.
3. Actions
that accord with duty and that we have an immediate inclination to perform. E.g.,
preserving one’s life when life is enjoyable; not committing adultery because
one finds one’s spouse to be “the most desirable creature in the whole
world” (Kant’s own example)
4. Actions
that accord with duty and are contrary to all our inclinations. E.g.,
the person who desperately yearns for death but refrains from suicide on
principle; the misanthrope who helps others purely from a sense of duty.
Obviously,
4 are cases of acting from duty. But
what about examples of case 3? Many
of Kant’s critics accuse him of being a moral fanatic because, they allege,
Kant denies that any cases of 3 have moral worth. If
this were so, very few actions indeed (only those of case 4) would have
moral worth. For the genuinely
saintly persons, none of their actions would have moral worth.
I
suggest that Kant does not have to be so extreme. He
can acknowledge the possibility of acting from duty in cases where duty
and inclination coincide if we apply the following, counterfactual test:
Would the person have done the action that coincides with duty even if
he or she had had no inclination to perform it? In
other words, is the person’s sense of moral duty strong enough to lead
them to act as he should, regardless of his desires and inclinations?
Another
point. Is Kant claiming that
our moral duty, first and foremost, is not to perform actions of type X
but to perform actions of type X out of a sense that doing X is our moral
duty? W. D. Ross criticized
Kant because (a) it presupposes that we already have a moral duty to do
X simpliciter; (b) it seems to conflict with Kant’s own insistence
that motives (desires, inclinations) cannot be commanded.
The
Categorical Imperative
Kant’s
classification of imperatives (532-33): imperatives are either hypothetical
(if you desire X, then do Y) or categorical (do Y!)
When
hypothetical imperatives take happiness as their goal, Kant calls them
assertoric (because there is no question about the satisfaction of the
“if” part: all rational creatures desire to be happy).
Moral
imperatives are categorical (with a small “c”). Kant
thinks that they can all be derived from The Categorical Imperative
(with a big “C”)
First
Formulation of the CI: The Formula of Universal Law
(535)
Act
only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law.
Second
Formulation of the CI: The Formula of the End in Itself (538)
Act
in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person
or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the
same time as an end.
See
O’Neill’s discussion of what it means to treat someone as a mere means,
546-48. Compare with Kant’s
own treatment of his four examples, 538-39.
Kant’s
CI and the Golden Rule
CI:
It is morally permissible for you to act on maxim M only if you can consistently
will that M become a universal law.
GR
(A revised formulation of the Golden Rule, “Do unto others as you would
have them do unto you”): It is morally permissible for you to perform an
action only if you refrain from treating others in ways that you would
not want them to treat you.
Kant
insists that CI and GR are not equivalent. Why?
Kant’s
Four Examples as Illustrations of the First Formulation of the CI (536-37)
1. If
it morally permissible for you to act on maxim M, then you can will that
M become a universal law.
2. You
cannot will that M become a universal law. (Either
because of an internal contradiction in the maxim or because, while internally
consistent, it would contradict something else that all rational agents
must will.)
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3. It
is morally wrong for you to act on M
The
Suicide Example: A perfect duty to oneself.
The
Lying Promise Example: A perfect duty to others.
The
Rusting Talents Example: An imperfect duty to oneself.
The
Helping the Needy Example: An imperfect duty to others.
A
perfect duty “allows no exception in the interests of inclination” (note
6, page 545)
Criticisms
of Kant’s Deontological Moral Theory
(1) Kant
has not told us when an act is a moral duty. Passing
the CI test is not sufficient. E.g.,
“Always wash your hands before eating.”
Reply:
Define the opposite of a maxim. If
a maxim says “In situations of type S, do X,” then the opposite of the
maxim says, “In situations of type S, do not do X.”
Acting
on a maxim is morally permissible but not obligatory (i.e., is merely permissible)
if and only if one can consistently will the maxim to be a universal law
and one can consistently will the opposite of the maxim to be a
universal law.
Acting
on a maxim is morally obligatory if and only if one can consistently will
the maxim to be a universal law and one cannot consistently
will the opposite of the maxim to be a universal law.
(2) Some
acts are permissible yet fail the CI test.
(3) Some
acts are wrong but pass the CI test.
(4) When
perfect and imperfect duties conflict, Kant’s theory gives the wrong answer.
1. If
Kant’s theory is true, then all conflicts between a perfect duty and an
imperfect duty should be resolved in favor of the perfect duty.
2. But
some such conflicts should be resolved in favor of the imperfect duty.
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3. Kant’s
theory is false.