The Incompatibilist Thesis (IT): If determinism is true, then no human action is free.
Incompatibilists interpret freedom as the liberty of indifference: the power to do something different in exactly the same circumstances. Compatibilists interpret freedom as the liberty of spontaneity: the power to do as we choose, to act as we will. (More precise definitions will follow.)
Compatibilists insist that there is only one kind of causation in the world, event causation. Incompatibilists hold that there are two kinds of causation operating in the world: event causation and agent causation. Agent causation is the way in which persons (substances) bring about acts of will without being caused to do so by anything else.
Libertarians are indeterminists, but they insist that
there is more to freedom of the will than mere indeterminism (what Taylor
calls “simple indeterminism.”
The Hard Determinist Argument
Determinism is true.
Note: the excerpt “Of Liberty and Necessity” (426-36) is section VIII of Hume’s Enquiry (not from Hume’s Treatise as announced at the bottom of page 426)
“By
liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according
to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain
at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now
this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one
who is not a prisoner and in chains.” (432, bottom right)
The Locke/Hume Definition of Acting Freely: S is free with respect to doing X if and only if (1) S can do X is he chooses, and (2) S can refrain from doing X if he chooses.
Note: if an action satisfies (1) but not (2), Locke says that the action is voluntary but not free. Freedom in the full sense requires the ability to do otherwise.
Hume accepts premise B of the incompatibilist argument, but rejects premise A. Hume’s rejection of premise A rests on his conditional analysis of “S could have done otherwise.” (Liberty of spontaneity)
The Conditional Analysis of Freedom: “S could have done otherwise” means “S could have done otherwise if S had chosen to do otherwise.”
The
Campbell/Taylor Criticism of the Conditional Analysis of Freedom and Hume’s
Soft Determinism
See Campbell (419-20) and Taylor (443-45)
(C) If determinism is true, then S could not have chosen or willed otherwise (since S’s act of choice or will, like every other event, is completely determined).
Campbell’s Definition of Willing Freely: S wills X freely if and only if (1) S is the sole author of her volition, and (2) S could have unconditionally willed otherwise. (See the beginning of section 3, page 420)
Frankfurt’s Hierarchical (“Double-Decker”) Theory of Freedom of the Will
Frankfurt’s account is in the compatibilist tradition: it offers a theory of acting freely (and thus of being morally responsible for one’s actions) that is compatible with determinism.
What is essential to being a person (and distinguishes persons from mere “wantons”) is the having of second-order volitions.
A second-order volition is the desire that a particular first-order desire be our will, that is, that it be the one that moves us to act.
Young children and severely retarded adults have first-order desires but, without second-desires they behave wantonly: they are incapable of caring about their will, that is, they are incapable of caring about which of their wishes and desires are the ones that lead them to act.
See Frankfurt’s contrast between the unwilling addict and the wanton addict (453-4)
The unwilling addict has conflicting first-order desires: he wants to take the drug and he also wants not to take the drug. He also has a second-order volition: he wants the second desire to be his will and struggles desperately, but unsuccessfully, to make it so.
· acting freely
Someone has freedom of the will only if he could have made some other desire his will (that is, the desire he acted on). “He is free to have the will he wants....He could have done otherwise than to constitute his will as he did.” (457, right) “He is free to want what he wants to want.” (455, right) So, freedom of the will does require that, in some sense, the person could have done otherwise. Neither the unwilling addict nor the wanton addict has freedom of the will. The unwilling addict lacks free will because his desire for the drug is irresistible; no matter how hard he struggles to make some other desire his will, he cannot succeed. The desire he acts on is not the will he wants. The wanton addict lacks free will “by default” (455, right) because he has no second-order volitions: there is no desire that he wants to be his will.
A person acts freely if he performs an act because he really wants to. That is, if the act is caused, in an appropriate way, by his second-order volition. And that, Frankfurt insists, is sufficient for moral responsibility. So, the “willing addict” (the “happy addict”) is morally responsible for taking the drug because his action conforms to his second-order volition. He is morally responsible even though he could not have made any other desire his will and thus lacks freedom of the will.
Is Frankfurt’s condition sufficient for acting freely? The case of Marcel, the reluctant back teller.
Is Frankfurt’s condition necessary for acting freely?
The case of Pierre, the petty thief.
Note Frankfurt’s discussion of the willing addict (457-8): someone can act freely and of his own free will (and thus be morally responsible for his actions) even though his will is not free, even though he could not have willed or done otherwise.
Note Frankfurt’s criticism of the Hume/Locke theory
(455, left): doing what one wants is part of what is involved in acting
freely, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient for having a free will.
“A person’s will is free only if he is free to have the will he wants.”
(457, right)