“Kant and Naïve Realism”

Andrew Roche (Wheaton College, MA)

Sunday, October 19, 9:00AM (EDT)

What is Kant’s theory of perception?  In particular, what is for Kant the nature of the “mind-

world relation” unique to the perception of objects?  This paper is part of a longer project

dedicated to answering this question.  Here, my aim is primarily negative:  to rule out a naïve

realist reading, an interpretation that has an able defender in John McDowell.  In Part I of this

paper, I briefly stake out available readings of Kant’s understanding of perception.  In Part II, I

make a case for a naïve realist reading.  In Part III, however, I show why such a reading

ultimately proves unsatisfactory.

ABSTRACT

We are thankful for the support of the sponsors for our 2008 Meetings:

The North American Kant Society

   Department of Philosophy, Purdue University

    Religious Studies Program, Purdue University

European Studies Program, Purdue University

Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures, Purdue University

Experience Liberal Arts Program, College of Liberal Arts, Purdue University

Kant lecturing to Russian Officers by I. Soyockina and V. Gracov

EUROPEAN STUDIES PROGRAM