NORTH AMERICAN KANT SOCIETY

2008  MIDWEST STUDY GROUP

PURDUE UNIVERSITY

October 18-19, 2008

 

“Three Proposals for Reading Section 2 of Groundwork III”

Jeremy Schwartz (University of Chicago)

Saturday, October 18, 1:30PM  (EDT)


Although Groundwork III is both famous and important it has met with little sympathy amongst its most important critics. Chief among the dissatisfactions is the second section of Groundwork III, which many take to be the central argument of the chapter. In this paper, I offer three proposals on how to read the second section of Groundwork III which I hope may allay some of these dissatisfactions. First, I propose that section 2 contains an argument that starts by assuming rational causality and argues from this assumption to non-instrumental rational causality. This is also my interpretation of Kant’s claim that he provides a “deduction of freedom from the concept of pure practical reason,” (G: 447), and I try to show that there is no reason for supposing that the argument given in Section 2 does not constitute Kant’s deduction of the moral law. Next, I propose that Kant’s argument proceeds by making an appeal to the first person perspective of rational agency. Kant does not argue from the way that rational agency is, but from the way that rational agency must be regarded by a rational agency itself. If successful, such an argument would offer a necessary, but non-analytic connection between rational agency and freedom. Finally, contrary to many critics, I propose that Kant’s argument in section 2 is wholly practical and does not rest on an analogy with theoretical reason. After these three proposals have been explained and defended, I offer a speculative reconstruction of Kant’s argument that is consistent with these three proposals.

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