International relations:
Security issues and political development
“The Evolution of Society and the Modern State”- Doctoral Dissertation, Purdue University, August 2013
Scholars agree the modern territorial state first appeared in Europe despite man settling in this region much later than Asia or Africa. Why societies in this region first evolved into this type of political organization with the strongest capacity is a critical question for social science to answer. Doing so provides clues as to why Europe dominated the international system for most of the modern era and why African states have failed to develop institutions with the same capacity as European ones. Qualitative case studies and quantitative results confirm states with the greatest capacity formed in the areas that faced the harshest conditions and, thus, the gravest threat from issues of competition-scarcity. Eventually states expanded beyond the safety of their buffer zones bringing them into closer contact with rivals. This contact typically resulted in war, which, in turn, increased the need for an efficient administrative structure with the capacity to ensure survival. The modern territorial state emerged as the most efficient organizational structure for achieving this goal. Resource abundant areas, on the other hand, escaped this cycle of interaction decreasing the frequency of war significantly; under such conditions, states either failed to form until foreign intervention or formed with little institutional capacity. The findings not only provide us with clues as to the evolution of society and the modern territorial state throughout history, but the theory provides state builders with concrete policies to help states increase institutional capacity while avoiding the disastrous results that occur when democratic institutions are imposed without proper background conditions.
"Strengthening States Through Sustainable Development"
Research finds during antiquity the introduction of fixed agriculture in an area had reciprocal effects that strengthened prior institutions and created new ones. Fixed agriculture also created different social cleavages within society as it opened avenues of opportunity for individuals to engage in other pursuits. I hypothesize the same impact fixed agriculture had on societies in antiquity is replicable in the modern era. Using data obtained from Heifer International I will quantitatively test whether or not sustainable development programs have the same impact in the modern era as the introduction of fixed agriculture had in antiquity. If the results confirm the hypothesis then policymakers will gain a better understanding of the steps necessary to rebuild and strengthen states.
Research Assistants: Ashton Alexander and Sabre Jones
"Resource Scarcity and War in the Pre-Modern Era"
Increasingly, conflict occurs as states fight over access to valuable and finite resources. In fact, scholars argue the new threat to global security is the issue of resource scarcity. Even though this threat is seen as new, societies have experienced war over access to resources since antiquity. Until recently, research in political science has done little to explore the relationship between the environment and war, with even less attention paid to the pre-modern era. This article fills the gap in the existing literature by providing a quantitative analysis of the cause of war prior to 1600. I find the availability of resources in relation to the level of population determines whether or not conflict occurs. This provides important insight that supports current research which warns resource scarcity is an increasing threat states face that is likely to lead to conflict even in the modern era.
"Resource Scarcity and the Making of Empires", Co-author, Mark Petersen, Bethany College
This project tests hypotheses regarding the different types of empires that emerged throughout history. Specifically, we hypothesize the same conditions that determine the capacity of states also result in more nuanced distinctions in the policies empires pursue. New variables will be operationalized to better capture the relationship between the primary trigger for state formation and the political behavior of states towards conquered nations. The qualitative case studies will also be updated to expose any patterns that support our argument.
A cursory review of the data reveals states that suffered significantly from competition-scarcity issues pursued more progressive policies as they established their empires. States facing less harsh conditions were more likely to rely on less coercive policies when governing conquered territories. If after a full investigation of the data reveals our hypotheses are correct these findings will add significantly to our knowledge of empire building. In addition, if the conditions in which a state resides can impact the types of policies it pursues with regard to empire building, then we will continue to explore this relationship since it may also provide insight into the different types of policies states pursue in the modern era. For example, European states – known sufferers of competition-scarcity issues – are far more likely to pursue precautionary policies with regard to sustainable development and alternative energy solutions. The United States, a resource-rich country on the other hand, approaches these same issues from a reactionary stance causing it to lag far behind its European counterparts. Although there are obviously many factors that determine the policies a state pursues, enough evidence already exists that a state’s historical experience can shape its future policy decisions in addition to its present day considerations. If we know why states pursue the policies in which they do, even if it is just one aspect of the complex process, then we are placed in a better position to identify and reshape the norms that lead to bad policy decisions.
Research Assistant: Ivan Wei
"Patriotism or Egoism: Toward Trade Liberalization during Economic Crises" co-author, Yoo-Sun Jung, Purdue University
A logic of leader-specific punishment shows that policy makers are responsive to domestic supporters due to the threat of removal from office (de Mesquita et al., 2005). Considering the logic of political survival for domestic leaders, we address a political economic question of why some countries experience more trade liberalization during an economic slump while others turn toward protectionist trade policies. We show some countries are able to carry out open trade policies during economic crises where there are more protectionist needs based on previous research. What accounts for this empirical observation? To explain the puzzle that there are more open trade policies during hard economic times, this paper attempts to link patterns of trade liberalization across economic performances to trade preferences of voters. We introduce an additional dimension of sociotropic perception to our analytical framework of understanding individuals' trade preferences along with the logic of political survival. We do not argue that political leaders are responsive to neither their constituents nor voters due to urgent national needs to overcome poor economic performances. Nevertheless, we argue that economic hardship allows varying individual preferences across skills, industrial sectors to which they belong, and income levels to converge into what is necessary to boost national economy as a whole. We further argue that the convergence of individual trade preferences depends on stylized facts of nations, particularly cultural characteristics.
“The Political Economy of Crises” - Midwest Political Science Association Conference (March 2011)
Why do states engage in protectionist policies even though economists advocate the benefits countries experience through free trade? I hypothesize if a state is experiencing economic prosperity, free trade will prevail. If a state is experiencing an economic decline, then protectionist policies will increase. Both international and domestic constraints explain this behavior. First, the anarchic nature of the international environment and the concern over relative gains hinders economic cooperation. Second, policymakers establish policies out of fear of reelection defeat. As a result, politicians yield to domestic pressure to protect sectors of society suffering during times of economic decline. I test the hypotheses through time series analysis and find, contrary to my expectations, protectionist policies do not increase during economic decline. The results suggest states do, in fact, recognize the benefits of free trade, but engage in policies such as low interest loans or government bail-outs instead of blatant protectionist policies to protect important sectors of society suffering during an economic slump.
Scholars agree the modern territorial state first appeared in Europe despite man settling in this region much later than Asia or Africa. Why societies in this region first evolved into this type of political organization with the strongest capacity is a critical question for social science to answer. Doing so provides clues as to why Europe dominated the international system for most of the modern era and why African states have failed to develop institutions with the same capacity as European ones. Qualitative case studies and quantitative results confirm states with the greatest capacity formed in the areas that faced the harshest conditions and, thus, the gravest threat from issues of competition-scarcity. Eventually states expanded beyond the safety of their buffer zones bringing them into closer contact with rivals. This contact typically resulted in war, which, in turn, increased the need for an efficient administrative structure with the capacity to ensure survival. The modern territorial state emerged as the most efficient organizational structure for achieving this goal. Resource abundant areas, on the other hand, escaped this cycle of interaction decreasing the frequency of war significantly; under such conditions, states either failed to form until foreign intervention or formed with little institutional capacity. The findings not only provide us with clues as to the evolution of society and the modern territorial state throughout history, but the theory provides state builders with concrete policies to help states increase institutional capacity while avoiding the disastrous results that occur when democratic institutions are imposed without proper background conditions.
"Strengthening States Through Sustainable Development"
Research finds during antiquity the introduction of fixed agriculture in an area had reciprocal effects that strengthened prior institutions and created new ones. Fixed agriculture also created different social cleavages within society as it opened avenues of opportunity for individuals to engage in other pursuits. I hypothesize the same impact fixed agriculture had on societies in antiquity is replicable in the modern era. Using data obtained from Heifer International I will quantitatively test whether or not sustainable development programs have the same impact in the modern era as the introduction of fixed agriculture had in antiquity. If the results confirm the hypothesis then policymakers will gain a better understanding of the steps necessary to rebuild and strengthen states.
Research Assistants: Ashton Alexander and Sabre Jones
"Resource Scarcity and War in the Pre-Modern Era"
Increasingly, conflict occurs as states fight over access to valuable and finite resources. In fact, scholars argue the new threat to global security is the issue of resource scarcity. Even though this threat is seen as new, societies have experienced war over access to resources since antiquity. Until recently, research in political science has done little to explore the relationship between the environment and war, with even less attention paid to the pre-modern era. This article fills the gap in the existing literature by providing a quantitative analysis of the cause of war prior to 1600. I find the availability of resources in relation to the level of population determines whether or not conflict occurs. This provides important insight that supports current research which warns resource scarcity is an increasing threat states face that is likely to lead to conflict even in the modern era.
"Resource Scarcity and the Making of Empires", Co-author, Mark Petersen, Bethany College
This project tests hypotheses regarding the different types of empires that emerged throughout history. Specifically, we hypothesize the same conditions that determine the capacity of states also result in more nuanced distinctions in the policies empires pursue. New variables will be operationalized to better capture the relationship between the primary trigger for state formation and the political behavior of states towards conquered nations. The qualitative case studies will also be updated to expose any patterns that support our argument.
A cursory review of the data reveals states that suffered significantly from competition-scarcity issues pursued more progressive policies as they established their empires. States facing less harsh conditions were more likely to rely on less coercive policies when governing conquered territories. If after a full investigation of the data reveals our hypotheses are correct these findings will add significantly to our knowledge of empire building. In addition, if the conditions in which a state resides can impact the types of policies it pursues with regard to empire building, then we will continue to explore this relationship since it may also provide insight into the different types of policies states pursue in the modern era. For example, European states – known sufferers of competition-scarcity issues – are far more likely to pursue precautionary policies with regard to sustainable development and alternative energy solutions. The United States, a resource-rich country on the other hand, approaches these same issues from a reactionary stance causing it to lag far behind its European counterparts. Although there are obviously many factors that determine the policies a state pursues, enough evidence already exists that a state’s historical experience can shape its future policy decisions in addition to its present day considerations. If we know why states pursue the policies in which they do, even if it is just one aspect of the complex process, then we are placed in a better position to identify and reshape the norms that lead to bad policy decisions.
Research Assistant: Ivan Wei
"Patriotism or Egoism: Toward Trade Liberalization during Economic Crises" co-author, Yoo-Sun Jung, Purdue University
A logic of leader-specific punishment shows that policy makers are responsive to domestic supporters due to the threat of removal from office (de Mesquita et al., 2005). Considering the logic of political survival for domestic leaders, we address a political economic question of why some countries experience more trade liberalization during an economic slump while others turn toward protectionist trade policies. We show some countries are able to carry out open trade policies during economic crises where there are more protectionist needs based on previous research. What accounts for this empirical observation? To explain the puzzle that there are more open trade policies during hard economic times, this paper attempts to link patterns of trade liberalization across economic performances to trade preferences of voters. We introduce an additional dimension of sociotropic perception to our analytical framework of understanding individuals' trade preferences along with the logic of political survival. We do not argue that political leaders are responsive to neither their constituents nor voters due to urgent national needs to overcome poor economic performances. Nevertheless, we argue that economic hardship allows varying individual preferences across skills, industrial sectors to which they belong, and income levels to converge into what is necessary to boost national economy as a whole. We further argue that the convergence of individual trade preferences depends on stylized facts of nations, particularly cultural characteristics.
“The Political Economy of Crises” - Midwest Political Science Association Conference (March 2011)
Why do states engage in protectionist policies even though economists advocate the benefits countries experience through free trade? I hypothesize if a state is experiencing economic prosperity, free trade will prevail. If a state is experiencing an economic decline, then protectionist policies will increase. Both international and domestic constraints explain this behavior. First, the anarchic nature of the international environment and the concern over relative gains hinders economic cooperation. Second, policymakers establish policies out of fear of reelection defeat. As a result, politicians yield to domestic pressure to protect sectors of society suffering during times of economic decline. I test the hypotheses through time series analysis and find, contrary to my expectations, protectionist policies do not increase during economic decline. The results suggest states do, in fact, recognize the benefits of free trade, but engage in policies such as low interest loans or government bail-outs instead of blatant protectionist policies to protect important sectors of society suffering during an economic slump.
US Foreign Policy: Presidential Unilateral Power
Young, Laura. 2013. “Unilateral Presidential Policymaking and the Impact of Crises.” Presidential Studies Quarterly (June) 43:2, 328-352.
Scholars interested in the power of the presidency often overlook the importance of a crisis. The right kind of event however has characteristics which create a window of opportunity for a president to exert or expand his unilateral power. Failure to explore this relationship leaves a gap in our knowledge regarding presidential power which this paper addresses. The results show foreign policy crises provide the largest window for a president to increase his authority. Economic crises and most natural disasters have little to no impact on unilateral power. Epidemic outbreaks are the exception, though compared to a foreign policy crisis the impact is relatively small. Finally, the findings suggest a president suffering from institutional constraints or lacking in skill and will has the ability to increase his power whenever a foreign policy crisis occurs.
Research Assistants: Arden S. Holderby, Evan Sobe, Walter Schostak
"Let’s Talk Crisis: Presidential Rhetoric and Unilateral Power” - American Political Science Association Conference (August 2013), Northeast Political Science Association, Revised (November 2013)
American presidents have long enjoyed increases in their power during the occurrence of a foreign policy crisis. Recent research by Young (2013 forthcoming) has demonstrated that this increase in power is quite extensive, around 70%, and comes with the added bonus of reduced
institutional constraints. Crises are therefore a powerful tool for the President if he wishes to increase his unilateral power. However, in many ways the world is a much safer place today than it was in the heyday of great power interstate conflict. Thus, a president wanting to gain leeway to enact an agenda and reduce the institutional constraints surrounding the office has fewer windows of opportunity. Despite this fact, research shows presidents spend more time talking about crises than ever before. Since it is doubtful presidents are unaware that the world is a safer place, why do they spend so much time talking about potential threats?
Since it is well established that crises increase presidential power, the next step is to determine the role of crisis rhetoric. We argue presidents use more crisis rhetoric because they are aware of the increase in power they receive when one occurs. Using quantitative, time-series analysis for data gathered from 1945-2008, this study tests whether or not the use of crisis rhetoric increases presidential power. We also test whether the president is strategic in his use of crisis rhetoric; choosing to “talk more crisis” when institutional conditions or public opinion are unfavorable, or when he is addressing a non-supportive group.
Research Assistants: Cameron Wilson, Anna Lippert, Ryan Buss, and Brandon Adams
“Making the Most out of Disasters: The Power of Presidential Disaster Declarations”, American Political Science Associations, (August 2013).
The "two presidencies" theory posits foreign policy crises give leverage to the President with regard to unilaterally establishing policies. Prior
quantitative research confirms foreign policy crises increase presidential unilateral power by as much as 70%. Domestic crises, however, resonate much differently with the public since these events often only affect a small subset of the population. Thus, the potential for a domestic crisis to produce a rally effect is minimal. Prior research, however, has only explored the impact of these events at the national level. It is possible domestic crises may offer the president a localized rally effect from which he may draw power.
We argue since presidents are aware of the potential benefit of foreign policy crises, they are also aware the potential exists at a more local
level. Using quantitative, time-series, negative binomial analysis for data gathered from 1945-2011, this study tests whether or not the president will seize on domestic crises to increase his power. Because public opinion is one of the most important determinants of a president's power, we specifically test whether a president will issue more disaster declarations with higher dollar amounts for relief in those areas where his public approval rating is the lowest.
Research Assistants: Simon Uljarevic, Olivia Steele, Nicole Qu, Sara Weaver
“Why Crisis Matters: Foreign Policy Crises and Presidential Power”
Previous work finds foreign policy crises increase the power of the President by as much as 70%. This paper follows up on those findings and explores the relationship of foreign policy crises and presidential power further. Relying on the International Crisis Behavior Dataset (ICB), I account for unique characteristics of different foreign policy crises from 1945-2011. When complete,the results will reveal which foreign policy crises yield the largest windows of opportunity for a president to increase his power.
Research Assistants: Walter Schostak, Dingyuan Duan
"Measuring the Rally 'Round the Flag"
I am currently developing a research design and identifying possible data sources for a project which will examine the 'rally round the flag' effect in more depth. Drawing from Anthony Downs' Issue-Attention Cycle I believe it is possible to calculate the length of time a rally will last as well as its various stages. Whether one argues the media shapes public opinion, helping shift it from one issue to the next or that the media simply follows what the public is interested in, patterns of reporting may help identify if a trend exists regarding the length of rallies. The ICB dataset will provide each instance of a foreign policy crisis that occurred in America. I will collect data on various attributes regarding the news reports, both in print and media, and compare those using several different models to account for various characteristics of each crisis. The results should identify any trends in how long the public will rally, and if certain types of crises cause shorter or longer rallies. In addition, it should also determine how long each stage of the effect will last.
Scholars interested in the power of the presidency often overlook the importance of a crisis. The right kind of event however has characteristics which create a window of opportunity for a president to exert or expand his unilateral power. Failure to explore this relationship leaves a gap in our knowledge regarding presidential power which this paper addresses. The results show foreign policy crises provide the largest window for a president to increase his authority. Economic crises and most natural disasters have little to no impact on unilateral power. Epidemic outbreaks are the exception, though compared to a foreign policy crisis the impact is relatively small. Finally, the findings suggest a president suffering from institutional constraints or lacking in skill and will has the ability to increase his power whenever a foreign policy crisis occurs.
Research Assistants: Arden S. Holderby, Evan Sobe, Walter Schostak
"Let’s Talk Crisis: Presidential Rhetoric and Unilateral Power” - American Political Science Association Conference (August 2013), Northeast Political Science Association, Revised (November 2013)
American presidents have long enjoyed increases in their power during the occurrence of a foreign policy crisis. Recent research by Young (2013 forthcoming) has demonstrated that this increase in power is quite extensive, around 70%, and comes with the added bonus of reduced
institutional constraints. Crises are therefore a powerful tool for the President if he wishes to increase his unilateral power. However, in many ways the world is a much safer place today than it was in the heyday of great power interstate conflict. Thus, a president wanting to gain leeway to enact an agenda and reduce the institutional constraints surrounding the office has fewer windows of opportunity. Despite this fact, research shows presidents spend more time talking about crises than ever before. Since it is doubtful presidents are unaware that the world is a safer place, why do they spend so much time talking about potential threats?
Since it is well established that crises increase presidential power, the next step is to determine the role of crisis rhetoric. We argue presidents use more crisis rhetoric because they are aware of the increase in power they receive when one occurs. Using quantitative, time-series analysis for data gathered from 1945-2008, this study tests whether or not the use of crisis rhetoric increases presidential power. We also test whether the president is strategic in his use of crisis rhetoric; choosing to “talk more crisis” when institutional conditions or public opinion are unfavorable, or when he is addressing a non-supportive group.
Research Assistants: Cameron Wilson, Anna Lippert, Ryan Buss, and Brandon Adams
“Making the Most out of Disasters: The Power of Presidential Disaster Declarations”, American Political Science Associations, (August 2013).
The "two presidencies" theory posits foreign policy crises give leverage to the President with regard to unilaterally establishing policies. Prior
quantitative research confirms foreign policy crises increase presidential unilateral power by as much as 70%. Domestic crises, however, resonate much differently with the public since these events often only affect a small subset of the population. Thus, the potential for a domestic crisis to produce a rally effect is minimal. Prior research, however, has only explored the impact of these events at the national level. It is possible domestic crises may offer the president a localized rally effect from which he may draw power.
We argue since presidents are aware of the potential benefit of foreign policy crises, they are also aware the potential exists at a more local
level. Using quantitative, time-series, negative binomial analysis for data gathered from 1945-2011, this study tests whether or not the president will seize on domestic crises to increase his power. Because public opinion is one of the most important determinants of a president's power, we specifically test whether a president will issue more disaster declarations with higher dollar amounts for relief in those areas where his public approval rating is the lowest.
Research Assistants: Simon Uljarevic, Olivia Steele, Nicole Qu, Sara Weaver
“Why Crisis Matters: Foreign Policy Crises and Presidential Power”
Previous work finds foreign policy crises increase the power of the President by as much as 70%. This paper follows up on those findings and explores the relationship of foreign policy crises and presidential power further. Relying on the International Crisis Behavior Dataset (ICB), I account for unique characteristics of different foreign policy crises from 1945-2011. When complete,the results will reveal which foreign policy crises yield the largest windows of opportunity for a president to increase his power.
Research Assistants: Walter Schostak, Dingyuan Duan
"Measuring the Rally 'Round the Flag"
I am currently developing a research design and identifying possible data sources for a project which will examine the 'rally round the flag' effect in more depth. Drawing from Anthony Downs' Issue-Attention Cycle I believe it is possible to calculate the length of time a rally will last as well as its various stages. Whether one argues the media shapes public opinion, helping shift it from one issue to the next or that the media simply follows what the public is interested in, patterns of reporting may help identify if a trend exists regarding the length of rallies. The ICB dataset will provide each instance of a foreign policy crisis that occurred in America. I will collect data on various attributes regarding the news reports, both in print and media, and compare those using several different models to account for various characteristics of each crisis. The results should identify any trends in how long the public will rally, and if certain types of crises cause shorter or longer rallies. In addition, it should also determine how long each stage of the effect will last.