Many, although not all, of my papers are now available for download at Phil Papers: http://philpapers.org/s/Jacqueline%20Mariña .

    I am currently working on a book on Kant and personal identity.  Thus far I have completed four large chapters.  An older prospectus can be found found here.  As the writing has progressed I have realized that this book will only be able to cover the first Critique in regard to this problem; other works will have to be covered in another book. 

    Below is a shortened description of Kant and the Problem of Personal Identity:

This book will offer a rereading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as a response to Hume on the question of personal identity.  Kant’s fundamental answer to Hume is that it would be impossible to make judgments, including Hume’s claim that “there is no such idea” of the self, were it impossible to become self-consciously aware of the self who is making such judgments.  This self-consciousness must include, first,  the capacity to become aware of the identity of the self throughout distinct moments of time.  Second, it must include the capacity to understand this identical I as the subject that is making judgments, that is, the I must grasp itself as active in its grasp and use of concepts.  However, it is not only our capacity to make theoretical judgments that depends on our ability to become conscious of ourselves.   Our capacity to think practically, to make decisions about the course of our lives, even decisions as to how to best satisfy our desires, depends on our ability to become self-consciously aware of ourselves.  The Critique of Pure Reason, in particular the transcendental deduction, offers an account how it is possible for us to think the identity of ourselves over time if judgment is to be possible.   This identity is not, however, the identity of a metaphysical substance.  As Kant argued in his paralogisms, we are not justified in concluding that the self is such a substance.  Nevertheless, I argue, transcendental self-consciousness is more than the mere logical I.  It is, furthermore, different than the empirical self given in inner sense. An important part of the challenge in reading Kant is distinguishing between the different senses of the self as worked out in his system, grasping the relation between them, and understanding the specific role that each notion plays


My other work has focused on Kant and the 19th century, in particular on the effects of Kant's
critical philosophy on issues touching on ethics and religion, for instance, freedom, conceptions of personal identity, and the relations between God, self, and the world. A good bit of my work (appearing in journal articles and book chapters) has been devoted to Kant's ethics and religion, with some attention to Kant's first Critique. I've also done some work in philosophy of religion, focusing on topics such as conceptions of holiness, the relation between religion and ethics, and the problem of religious
pluralism; while this work has been driven by the issues, it has always been carried out in conversation with one or more historical figures such as Kant, Schleiermacher or Rudolph Otto. In the past few years I have devoted a good bit of my time to the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher, a too long neglected philosopher and theologian influenced by Kant, whose work nevertheless moves significantly beyond him, and which is greatly important in its own right. These efforts have yielded two books, an edited volume, The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, and my own book, which came out with Oxford in the spring of 2008, Transformation of the Self in the Thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher.

    

 

Fall 2013

Welcome!

Jacqueline Mariña

Professor of Philosophy

Purdue University

 
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