I am an assistant professor
of industrial
engineering at Purdue
University.
My research interests include: combinatorial
optimization, algorithmic game theory, scheduling, network
design, logistics.
I received a PhD
in operations
research from MIT in
June 2008, under the supervision
of Professor
Andreas Schulz. In June 2002, I received an AB and SM
in applied
mathematics
from Harvard
University.
Research Group
- Sindhura Balireddi (January 2009 - Present)
- Kan Fang (August 2009 - Present)
- Mohan Gopaladesikan (January 2009 - Present)
A note to current and prospective
graduate students looking for research opportunities
Publications and Working Papers
The Maximum Flow Network Interdiction Problem: Valid
Inequalities, Integrality Gaps, and Approximability (with D.
Altner, Ö. Ergun).
Operations Research Letters, to appear,
2009.
[abstract]
[paper]
Abstract: We study the Maximum Flow Network
Interdiction Problem (MFNIP). We present two classes of
polynomially separable valid inequalities for Cardinality
MFNIP. We also prove the integrality gap of the LP relaxation
of Wood's (1993) integer program is not bounded by a constant
factor, even when the LP relaxation is strengthened by our
valid inequalities. Finally, we provide an
approximation-factor-preserving reduction from the simpler
R-Interdiction Covering Problem to MFNIP.
Sharing Supermodular Costs (with A. S. Schulz).
August 2007.
(Extended abstract appeared as "Encouraging
Cooperation in Sharing Supermodular Costs" in M. Charikar et
al., eds., Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial
Optimization: Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX-RANDOM
2007), vol. 4627 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pp. 271-285, 2007, Springer, Berlin.)
[abstract]
[paper]
Abstract: In this work, we apply
ideas from cooperative game theory to study situations
in which a set of agents face supermodular costs.
These situations appear in a variety of scheduling
contexts, as well as in some settings related to
facility location and network design. Intuitively,
cooperation amongst rational agents who face
supermodular costs is unlikely. However, in
circumstances where the failure to cooperate may lead
to negative externalities, one might be interested in
methods of encouraging cooperation. In cooperative
game theory, one indication that cooperation is
achievable is the existence of an efficient and stable
cost allocation. The least core value of a cooperative
game is the minimum penalty we need to charge a
coalition for acting independently that ensures the
existence of an efficient and stable cost allocation.
The set of all such cost allocations is called the
least core. In this paper, we study the computational
complexity and approximability of computing the least
core value of supermodular cost cooperative games. We
show that computing the least core value of
supermodular cost cooperative games is strongly
NP-hard, and build a framework to approximate the
least core value of these games using oracles that
approximately determine maximally violated
constraints. This framework yields a
(3+\epsilon)-approximation algorithm for computing
the least core value of supermodular cost cooperative
games. As a by-product, we show how to compute
accompanying approximate least core cost allocations
for these games. We also apply our approximation
framework to obtain better results for two particular
classes of supermodular cost cooperative games that
arise from scheduling and matroid optimization.
Minimizing the Weighted Sum of Completion Times in
Concurrent Open Shops (with M. Mastrolilli,
M. Queyranne, A. S. Schulz, O. Svensson).
October 2008.
[abstract]
[paper]
Abstract: We study minimizing the sum of
weighted completion times in a concurrent open shop
environment. We show several interesting properties of various
natural linear programming relaxations for this problem,
including that they all have an integrality gap of 2. In
addition, we propose a simple combinatorial 2-approximation
algorithm that can be viewed as a primal-dual algorithm or a
greedy algorithm that starts from the end of the schedule.
Finally, we show that this problem is inapproximable within a
factor of 6/5 - \epsilon (or within a factor 4/3 - \epsilon if
the Unique Games Conjecture is true) for any \epsilon > 0,
unless P = NP.
Near-Optimal Solutions and Integrality Gaps for Almost
All Instances of Single-Machine Precedence-Constrained
Scheduling (with A. S. Schulz).
May 2009.
[abstract]
[paper]
Abstract: We consider the problem of
minimizing the weighted sum of completion times on a single
machine subject to bipartite precedence constraints where all
minimal jobs have unit processing time and zero weight, and all
maximal jobs have zero processing time and unit weight. This
NP-hard scheduling problem can be equivalently viewed as a
graph orientation problem on a mixed complete bipartite graph.
For various probability distributions over these
instances--including the uniform distribution--we show several
"almost all"-type results, including that for almost all
instances, every feasible solution is arbitrarily close to
optimal. To the best of our knowledge, our results are the
first of their kind for scheduling and graph orientation
problems.
The Impact of GPOs on Healthcare-Product
Supply Chains (with Q. Hu, L. B. Schwarz). November
2009.
Algorithmic and Game-Theoretic
Perspectives on Scheduling. PhD Thesis, Operations
Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 2008.
[thesis]
Operations Research Links

Contact Information
Nelson A. Uhan
School of Industrial Engineering
Purdue University
315 N. Grant Street, Grissom Hall 262
West Lafayette, IN 47907
e-mail: nuhan
purdue.edu