Volume IV

Fall 2004

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Explaining the Endurance of the Iranian Regime

Pi Sigma Alpha
Delta Omega Chapter
Purdue University

Clifford C. Pederson
Editor-in-Chief
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Editor’s Preface to the Fall 2004 Edition

I am pleased to present The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics. Since the spring of 2001, Purdue University’s Delta Omega Chapter of Pi Sigma Alpha has published the Journal under the title The American Undergraduate Journal of Politics and Government. Starting with this edition, the Journal is sponsored by Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society. With this support, the Journal will distribute complimentary copies to all 615 Pi Sigma Alpha chapters nationwide. This will allow the Journal to reach a wider audience and gain further recognition for the authors and their research.

The Fall 2004 edition of the Journal features six papers, including two that received awards from Pi Sigma Alpha in 2004. The Journal received papers from a variety of colleges and universities, including Duke University, Malone College, Mercyhurst College, University of North Carolina, Purdue University, Randolph-Macon College, St. Olaf College, University of Wisconsin, and several others. These papers underwent a competitive review process before selection for publication.

There are several people I wish to recognize. First, I would like to thank the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council and the Executive Committee, particularly President Christopher J. Bosso, Executive Director James I. Lengle, and Administrator Nancy McManus. This endeavor would not be possible without these dedicated individuals. Next, the time and hard work put forth by the Journal’s Faculty Advisor, Rosalee A. Clawson, is essential to its success. Furthermore, I appreciate the outstanding work done by the Advisory Board and the Editorial Board members. Finally, I am grateful for the support from Purdue University’s Political Science Department and its head, William Shaffer.

Working on The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics has been a rewarding experience, and I look forward to publishing future editions.

Thank you.

Clifford C. Pederson
Editor-in-Chief
Submission of Manuscripts

The Journal welcomes submissions from undergraduates of any class or major; submissions from Pi Sigma Alpha members are especially encouraged. Our goal is to publish manuscripts of the highest quality. In general, papers selected for publication have been well-written with a well-developed thesis, compelling argument, and original analysis. We typically publish papers 15-35 pages in length that have been written for an upper level course. Manuscripts should include an abstract of roughly 150 words. Citations and references should follow the American Political Science Association Style Manual for Political Science. Please be sure references are complete and accurate. Students may be asked to revise their manuscript before it is accepted for publication. Submissions must be in the form of a Microsoft Word document and should be e-mailed to journal@polsci.purdue.edu. Please include name, university, and contact details (i.e., mailing address, e-mail address, and phone number).
Former Editors-in-Chief

Trevor Kress Truman  Spring 2001
Brian Aaron Snider  Fall 2001
Michelle Ann Fosnaugh  Spring 2002 - Fall 2002
Daniel Patrick Kensinger  Spring 2003 - Fall 2003
Cory Thomas Driver  Spring 2004
After Afghanistan:  
The Future of Al Qaeda in Failed States*

Andrew P. Miller  
Dickinson College

Since the events of September 11, 2001, the architects and analysts of U.S. foreign policy have focused on the role played by Afghanistan in the growth and success of Al Qaeda. Experts believe that failed states, such as Afghanistan, provide ideal conditions for terrorist operations, enabling them to plan, train, and execute attacks beyond the prying eyes of the international community. A safe harbor may be essential to the execution of large-scale terrorist attacks, such as the events of 9/11. With the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in late 2001, Al Qaeda lost its primary preserve, and the organization must now determine whether there is any suitable substitute for its operational base. This prompts the question, “Are all failed states potential safe havens or are there other qualities which a failed state must possess?” To answer this, I will analyze the Afghanistan situation to determine those factors which made it suitable as a base for the operations of Al Qaeda. Two other failed states, Somalia and Yemen, will be evaluated to determine the extent to which they fulfill the criteria present in Afghanistan during its time as the base of the Al Qaeda organization. From this examination, I will draw conclusions about the potential for future terrorist safe havens to be established in the image of Afghanistan.

Characteristics of Failed States

To examine the connection between failed states and terrorism, it is necessary to define the qualities and characteristics of failed states, understand their dynamics and factors, and determine the manner in which they assist and abet terrorism. In the post-Westphalia period, a state exists primarily to provide political goods to a population living within pre-defined and widely-agreed borders (Rotberg 2004, 2). Political goods “encompass expectations, conceivably obligations, inform the local political culture, and together give

*An earlier version of this paper was awarded the 2004 Runner-Up Best Undergraduate Honors Thesis Award by Pi Sigma Alpha, The National Political Science Honor Society.
content to the social contract between ruler and ruled that is at the core of regime/government and citizenry interactions” (Rotberg 2003b, 3). They constitute an array of conditions and realities, which the government is expected to preserve and protect.

The most critical political good is the provision of security. At the very least, a modern state is expected to protect its citizenry from physical threats, both external and internal, and to ensure the sanctity of its borders. Related to this, it is the responsibility of the state to create the mechanisms and conditions, whereby its population can resolve its complaints and grievances in a peaceful and orderly manner (Rotberg 2003b, 3). Security is more a precondition than a good, in that it makes the diffusion of all other goods possible. There can be no open and uninhibited political actions if individuals constantly operate under the fear of bodily injury from opponents (Lyons 2004, 274). Other political goods include a system of schools and other educational institutions, an operational and well-maintained transportation network, and an extensive and all-encompassing collection of legal procedures and laws, which define the obligations of the state and the citizenry to each other (Rotberg 2002, 87).

A state is evaluated by its ability to discharge these responsibilities. No state can endure without a modicum of legitimacy, which is a product of the state’s ability to fulfill its social contract with the people, i.e., the distribution of political goods. Thus, a viable, operational state is one which fulfills these expectations, while a failed state can no longer deliver those goods that its population expects (Rotberg 2003b, 1). While “[s]trong states obviously perform well across these categories,” other states “show a mixed profile, fulfilling expectations in some areas and performing poorly in others” (Rotberg 2003b, 4). In more concrete terms, a state is considered failed when it no longer exercises a monopoly of authority within its borders and fails to secure an adequate standard of living for its people.

The inability to provide a suitable standard of living is outwardly manifested in several characteristics. One factor normally present is significant internal violence, usually the result of myriad internal groups competing for scarce resources. Failed states tend to be overwhelmed by violent, conflicting factions, whose actions interrupt any normalcy the society once enjoyed (Klare 2004, 116-117), resulting in the breakdown of civil governance, and the escalation of ethnic hostility and bloodshed. The ability to exercise authority across the territory is lost, and typically, official government power does not
extend beyond that of the capital city, as in Afghanistan (Rotberg 2004, 6). Related to the rise of internal violence is increasing criminality. The deterioration of state security services invites the use of violence to obtain what the state can no longer offer. Criminality becomes more common on the streets than the official exercise of public order (Kasfir 2004, 59-60).

A constant characteristic of failure and a precipitating factor of declining living standards is the dilapidation of public infrastructure. Roads, railways, telephone lines, and electricity, integral elements of modern society, become victims of neglect as there is no longer the requisite funding or security to ensure their upkeep. In the words of Rotberg (2004), “Metaphorically, the more potholes (or main roads turned to rutted tracks), the more a state will exemplify failure” (7).

Ubiquitous corruption, another element common to failed states, is normally the product of the predatory regimes which precede failure. These regimes view public resources as private trust funds, and corruption becomes the most expeditious manner to gain control of such resources. Some form of bribery or kickback is integral to obtaining even the most basic service from the state (Rose-Ackerman 2004, 182).

Failed states also manifest declining indicators of human welfare, with health care and education functioning poorly at best. Infant mortality rates skyrocket, and both literacy levels and life expectancies fall precipitously. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declines rapidly and there is an accelerating gap between the richest and poorest segments of society (Snodgrass 2004, 256-258). All of these factors interact in a manner disastrous to human standards of living. It is those states incapable of averting these humanitarian disasters, which tend to verge on failure.

No single measure, or set of measures, can determine whether a state is failed. The differences between weak states, failed states, and collapsed states are merely a matter of degree. Weak states are those which feature several of the humanitarian and economic difficulties referred to above, in addition to the presence of increasingly violent opposition groups, which contest the legitimacy of the state (Rotberg 2003a). The balance of power remains in favor of the state, and rebel groups exercise control over only the most peripheral regions. In a failed state, the extent of contestation is far more severe, with the balance of power increasingly favoring rebel groups, and the official government is relegated to the capital city or an ethnically-specific area (Rotberg 2003a).
collapsed state experiences the complete disintegration of the central government, and sub-state actors discharge the duties of the state in all areas, including the capital (Rotberg 2004, 9).

Any state whose control is contested in most of the country beyond the capital and exhibits continual failure to secure adequate standards of living is considered failed. For the purposes of this paper, the security dimension will be emphasized, as it is this quality that is most welcoming to terrorist groups.

The Intersection of Failed States and Terrorism

Before identifying the qualities which render a state a suitable base for terrorism, it is necessary to discuss the ways in which terrorist groups benefit from failed states. Much has been made of the decentralized structure of Al Qaeda and its ability to function in small cells across the globe. As such, why does it need a central location from which to function? To answer this question, Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev (2002) draw a parallel between terrorist groups and multinational corporations (MNCs). While MNCs can delegate much of their duties and tasks to distant countries and operations, they still need to retain a central apparatus to coordinate the actions of subsidiaries, providing direction, training, and resources. Terrorist groups are very similar in this respect. Takeyh and Gvosdev (2002) believe that failed states are the equivalent of a corporate headquarters to terrorist groups, in that they provide fixed, secure locations where training camps, headquarters, weapons depots, and businesses can be based. The absence of central authority provides the opportunity to conduct operations in an environment where internal and external intervention is unlikely. Simultaneously, the remnants of state sovereignty create complications for any external power plotting action against the terrorist group (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002, 97-108).

The most obvious benefit is the availability of extensive space. Failed states “provide the opportunity to acquire territory on a scale much larger than a collection of scattered safe houses—enough to accommodate entire training complexes, arms depots, and communications facilities” (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002, 98). In Afghanistan, bin Laden had an entire complex of training camps and lodgings built for his terrorist organization, which enabled him to train and accommodate hundreds of agents (Gunaratna 2002, 26). This provided Al Qaeda
with an infrastructure few groups could rival, enabling it to develop a worldwide reach.

Failed states also provide terrorists with the opportunity to establish businesses to fund their attacks and activities. The lax laws and enforcement agencies provide the ideal environment for illegal business activities, including smuggling and drug trafficking (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002, 99). According to Al Qaeda expert Rohan Gunaratna (2002), bin Laden and his organization exploited the failed state of Sudan in exactly this manner. Bin Laden established roughly thirty companies, ranging from small illegal operations to extensive legitimate businesses such as genetic research labs (42). These supplemented bin Laden’s personal fortune, enabling him to provide the substantial resources required to operate a global terrorist network.

Failed states also serve as a breeding ground of recruits for terrorist organizations. In the absence of order and authority, it becomes easy for terrorist groups acquire the support of the population at large (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002, 100). Individuals in failed states find themselves with few economic opportunities, and well-financed terrorist groups can supplement their ideological approach to recruitment with economic rewards in excess of any alternatives.

Finally, failed states provide terrorist groups with significant weaponry. Under international law, these states continue to possess the sovereignty to purchase weaponry legally, and this weaponry can easily be transferred to terrorist and other rogue groups (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002, 101). In Afghanistan, much of the billions of dollars of equipment injected into the country by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the Soviet Union was later acquired by Al Qaeda. Failed states, as a result of their characteristic absence of authority, provide valuable opportunities to terrorists for military training, equipment, funding, and recruitment.

Afghanistan: The Model

Any analysis of the interaction between state failure and international terrorism requires consideration of Afghanistan, as it is the apotheosis of a failed state transfigured into a staging ground for terrorist organizations. Apart from a short interregnum in Sudan, Al Qaeda has been based in Afghanistan since its inception in the early 1990s and was chosen by bin Laden for the building of an extensive terrorist infrastructure (Gunaratna 2002, 41). The network of
complexes, facilities, and armories, including the camps of Darunta, Jihad Wal, Khaldan, Sadeek, Khalid ibn Walid, and al-Farouq, exceeded anything a single terrorist organization had ever achieved before (Gunaratna 2002, 27). Al Qaeda expert, Rohan Gunaratna (2002), estimates that 25,000-50,000 Islamist militants passed through these camps, converting angry, disenchanted youths into the soldiers of a global army (28). It was from Afghanistan that bin Laden issued his first fatwa in 1998, in effect a declaration of war against the U.S. Afghanistan’s vital role in Al Qaeda’s development is beyond question, and therefore an analysis of this country for those qualities that rendered it particularly suitable to international terrorists is appropriate. Several conditions present in Afghanistan throughout the past decade made it the ideal terrorist haven. Any country which could potentially succeed Afghanistan in this role will have to possess many of the same qualities.

The first condition is the lack of a central authority capable of exerting rule throughout the land within its borders. Central authority has never been present in Afghanistan for more than a few decades at a time, and even during these periods, order was only obtained through the forced relocation of groups loyal to the state to restless minority regions (Goodson 1998, 273). Throughout the years, Afghanistan has mostly consisted of innumerable autonomous tribes, whose authority seldom transcended a single city or region.

Afghanistan is also completely devoid of the physical infrastructure necessary for the delivery of political goods to the populace. Decades of civil war has eliminated nearly all economic infrastructure, specifically roads, factories, the power network, and water supply facilities (Goodson 2002). Consequently, Afghanistan manifested another quality of a failed state: a stagnant, declining economy. According to the State Department (2004), its GDP has continually fallen over a 23-year period and the country continues to rely on agricultural production even though a mere 12% of the country’s land area is arable and less than 6% is currently being cultivated.

A final indicator of Afghanistan as a failed state is the standard of living. Although standard statistics are rare, it is evident that Afghans suffer high infant mortality rates, low life expectancies, paltry literacy rates, and crippling levels of unemployment. The country ranks near the bottom of nearly every significant human indicator (Rubin 2002, 153).

As a result of the country’s extensive state failure, legitimacy was virtually non-existent. The notion of an Afghan nation has been historically
weak, and as the state failed miserably in providing public goods, individuals extended their loyalty to tribal and other local power structures (Peake 2003, 184). It can be argued that Afghanistan was actually a collapsed state. The Kabul government, which had been confined to the capital city, dissolved after the Soviet withdrawal. As tribal groups and warlords came to dominate the entirety of the country, it met the minimal condition of a collapsed state.

In this climate of prevailing anarchy and absence of state authority, Al Qaeda was able to operate without fear of interference and could focus on training, planning, and preparing. Had a stronger government existed in the country, Al Qaeda would not have been able to operate as freely as it did and attain the level of development and expertise which distinguished it from other such groups. Furthermore, the norms of international sovereignty made it difficult for foreign powers to intervene.

While Afghanistan’s status as a failed state was a necessary precondition for a safe haven for Al Qaeda, it was not sufficient to attract the organization. Although failed states are the most likely locations for terrorist organizations, several other qualities were important to Al Qaeda, and it was the presence of these in Afghanistan which made it the ideal harbor.

**Pre-Existing Military Infrastructure**

One condition which made Afghanistan particularly attractive to Al Qaeda was the presence of significant weaponry and a pre-existing military infrastructure. While loose weapons tend to occur in most failed states, their number varies significantly. In Afghanistan, it was not merely the presence of such weapons which was attractive to Al Qaeda, but the sheer volume of them. Throughout Afghanistan’s long civil war several external powers deluged Afghanistan with billions of dollars of sophisticated arms. From the beginning of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of 1979 until withdrawal in the early 1990s, Moscow supplied the Communist government in Kabul with more than $36-48 billion of military equipment. Similarly, the U.S., China, and Saudi Arabia provided an additional $6-12 billion in military equipment to various Afghan factions (Goodson 1998, 277).

The presence of so much weaponry, along with the lack of security in which they were held, enabled Al Qaeda to seize large arsenals of weapons upon their arrival. Ahmed Rashid, a South Asian expert, believes that Al Qaeda
inherited a vast network of training camps, facilities, and military equipment, including an estimated 300 to 500 Stinger missiles from the mujahideen movements which opposed the Soviets (Rashid 2001, 130). Operating a global organization is an expensive operation, and although the group possessed the ability to build such facilities, by exploiting existing weaponry and facilities, Al Qaeda was able to devote its resources to other concerns. Using the black market, the alternative method for acquisition of weaponry, always risks exposing cells and individuals to intelligence agencies, during the process of purchase. Thus, the opportunity to acquire weaponry and training bases through easier means served as a significant inducement to Al Qaeda.

Rugged and Rough Topography

Afghanistan’s forbidding, isolated terrain, difficult to penetrate by local and external powers alike, was a major attraction to Al Qaeda. The interaction of terrain suitable for hiding, with the absence of a government capable of enforcing order, created an environment in which Al Qaeda could hide with impunity. The Hindu Kush Mountains in central Afghanistan bifurcate the country. These mountains average 17,000-23,000 feet in height with several peaks in excess of 26,000 feet. Moreover, western Afghanistan is dominated by an expansive desert. Transportation is further complicated by a dearth of modern transportation networks. The railroad system is not operational and the road network has been reduced to sand and potholes (U.S. Department of State 2004).

This rugged terrain has isolated communities within Afghanistan, such that some have virtually no relationship with the outside world (Goodson 1998, 273). Communication throughout the country is seriously impaired, and it can be difficult to locate an individual even if they want to be found. While the sovereignty of a country provides any group residing therein with a degree of protection, this is only as secure as the commitment of the nations of the world to the principle of sovereignty. As recent events have illustrated, in the view of some countries, there are conditions that necessitate departure from this principle. Even when this is the case, the terrain of the target country can enable terrorist groups to evade the invading force for a significant period of time, if not indefinitely. The terrain can provide, as in Afghanistan, innumerable locations to safely position complexes, weaponry, and personnel, for extended periods, using the myriad crevices and secluded locations. The failure to capture either Osama
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bin Laden or Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban, testifies to the country’s suitability in this respect.

**Porous Borders**

Another quality which attracted Al Qaeda was Afghanistan’s porous borders, which facilitated the transportation of personnel and resources to cells around the world. As was the case with rugged terrain, it was the porous borders, coupled with an absence of authority, which were so welcoming. As a global network, Al Qaeda needed to remain in contact with its far-flung operations, and Afghanistan would have been of little value if it also served as a prison, precluding agents from communicating with each other. With no functioning government on its side of the border, there was nothing to prevent Al Qaeda from exiting the country at will.

The instability and weakness of the surrounding governments meant that few had the resources to patrol and regulate their own borders. This was particularly true of Pakistan, where the complete absence of authority in the Northwest Frontier Provinces allowed individuals to traverse the border at will. In the Khyber Pass, which separates the two countries, informal, tribal militias were the only forces regulating traffic and crossing the border was solely a matter of paying the tribal “toll.” Newspaper articles are replete with accounts of how easily Al Qaeda fugitives evade U.S. Special Forces by crossing into Pakistan. Similar conditions exist on Afghanistan’s borders with its other neighbors, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Had it been more difficult to cross Afghanistan’s borders, Al Qaeda’s operational efficacy would have been compromised, and it would have been compelled to seek another location.

**Islamicized Population**

The religious ideology of the majority of Afghans was integral to its attractiveness to Al Qaeda, which would only consider seeking haven in a country which exhibited an affinity for their particular interpretation of Islam. While the group out of necessity must establish cells in non-Islamic countries, the standard for a safe harbor is much higher. Only in a sufficiently Islamic country could Al Qaeda trust that the people would not betray its presence and actions. Considering the extent of the personnel and resources the group would
place in its central base, this was no small concern. Members of Al Qaeda are overwhelmingly followers of the Salafi interpretation of Islam, which is related to the Wahhabism of the Persian Gulf states (Gunaratna 2002, 36). The creed to which they subscribe is particularly uncompromising, seeking to return to an idealized conception of Islamic life during the time of the Prophet of Muhammad in 7th century Arabia. Al Qaeda regards Islam as the absolute truth and solution to all of modern society’s ills. Influenced heavily by the Islamist ideologues Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Sayyid Qutb, they regard the Islamic concept of jihad (struggle against oneself and outside forces) as a mandatory obligation of all Muslims (Gunaratna 2002, 115). Al Qaeda believes that jihad is the tool by which it can eliminate the enemies of Islam, most notably Jews and the United States. Of great relevance to the issue of terrorism, this strand of Islam endorses the murder of all those who oppose the achievement of an Islamic state and Islamic principles (Gunaratna 2002, 122).

In Afghanistan, Al Qaeda found a kindred spirit in the Taliban, a movement of young, warmongering, madrassa students who took the country by storm in the mid-1990s. It was in the Saudi-funded, Wahhabi-oriented madrassas that those who would later play a formidable role in the Taliban were indoctrinated in the tenets of the Salafi strand. At these schools, future members of the Taliban learned in great detail about the ideal Islamic society presided over by the Prophet Mohammad, which existed 1,400 years ago on the Arabian Peninsula (Rashid 2001, 23). In Afghanistan, they would come to idealize such a vision and seek to recreate it. Additionally, they adopted the Wahhabi conception of jihad. Beginning in 1996, Mullah Omar assumed the practice of mobilizing forces against his enemies by declaring jihad (Rashid 2001, 42). Taliban practices and ideology were so similar to those of bin Laden and Al Qaeda that they could be fairly certain of being in the company of friends and supporters.

The extremist Islam propounded by the Taliban was an anomaly in Afghan history. According to Ahmed Rashid (2001), Islam in Afghanistan had historically been defined by its tolerance towards other Muslim sects, religions, and modernity (82). Ironically, the austere customs and practices of the Wahhabist-influenced Arab Afghans, bristled much of the population. The penetration of Wahhabi Islam into Afghanistan occurred only over the past two decades, as the Saudi-funded madrassas assumed an ever more important role in the education of the country’s young men. This has significant consequences for
future potential safe havens. A country does not need an extended history of Islamism, or even a majority that subscribes to this particular interpretation of Islam, in order to become attractive to terrorists, who only need to feel comfortable that there is at least a small group of committed locals willing to support and accept their presence. A strong local sponsor, such as the Taliban, can compensate for a population which is less than ideally Islamic. Furthermore, the rapidity with which extremist brands of Islam can pervade a country is stunning. No state should be dismissed on the assumption that the more moderate interpretation of Islam, which dominates in the county, could never be supplanted by a more violent anti-western one.

Local Sponsor

Another quality which attracted Al Qaeda to Afghanistan was the presence of a local group willing to ally with them, namely the Taliban. This alliance provided Al Qaeda with greater legitimacy among the people, making it easier for them to recruit and operate within the country. It also benefited tremendously from the information and assistance the Taliban provided, such as familiarity with local culture, customs, and conditions, and a thorough knowledge of the availability of weapons and associated infrastructure.

Establishing an alliance with locals is the traditional method by which terrorist groups establish a foothold in a failed state. According to Takeyh and Gvosdev (2002), terrorists gain “control over territory in a failed state through a Faustian bargain with authorities, usually by offering its services to the failed state during times of conflict” (99). A corollary of this logic is that a local group incapable of establishing authority over a given country by itself, would be more likely to contract with a foreign terrorist group in order to maximize its chances of success.

In Afghanistan, this is exactly the dynamic that played out. At the time, the country had already dissolved into scores of warlord-controlled city-states (Rashid 2001, 21). In this environment, the Taliban was a small, incipient group with no distinct advantages over any other. When groups encounter such a stalemate, the key to success is often to cultivate an outside impetus to change the balance of the internal dynamic. The reason the Taliban was able to elevate itself from obscurity to a position of control over much of the country was its ability to cultivate ties with the Saudis and Al Qaeda. In this Faustian bargain,
bin Laden sought to rapidly establish stronger ties with the Taliban leadership, and by extending significant financial and military support, he acquired much influence over the group (Rashid 2001, 54). Additionally, Al Qaeda developed a new unit specifically to assist the Taliban, the 055 Brigade, numbering some 1,500 to 2,000. This was fully incorporated into the Taliban army, quickly becoming the vanguard of this force (Gunaratna 2002, 54). In return, the Taliban extended to Al Qaeda sanctuary within the territory it controlled, as well as access to the military equipment and training facilities it had received from Pakistani sponsors and seized from the Afghan army. Thus, Al Qaeda and the Taliban were able to strike a mutually beneficial bargain. Without the Taliban’s local expertise, Al Qaeda would have found it far more difficult to operate in Afghanistan.

The Absence of External Intervention

The last quality which made Afghanistan the ideal terrorist haven was the absence of an American presence in the country and wider region, which may trump all other factors. Even if the other conditions are present, the existence of a sizable military contingent hostile to terrorists can seriously disrupt their functioning and consequently the achievement of their goals. Regardless of how rugged the terrain and porous the borders, a determined power willing to commit the necessary military manpower is capable of locating and destroying the major infrastructure of the terrorist group and scattering threatening concentrations of its personnel. In such an environment, the ability of the terrorist group to train, plan, and execute attacks is significantly compromised.

In Afghanistan, throughout much of the 1990s and into 2001, such a presence was non-existent. Prior to 9/11, the U.S. and other major powers did not comprehend the threat posed by international terrorism. They were pre-occupied with myriad concerns, including genocide and destruction in the former Yugoslavia, managing the dissolution and consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as the expansion of international economic ties. Moreover, after the debacle in Somalia in 1993, the U.S. became very hesitant to engage in military ventures in war-torn, divided third world countries. As a result, the most significant American action against Al Qaeda’s Afghan sanctuary in these years was a cruise missile strike in 1998 in response to the embassy bombings of that year, which had little impact on the terrorist group. Thus, Afghanistan truly
remained a country beyond the reach of any oversight, domestic or external, and Al Qaeda was able to exploit the lawless environment of the country in order to further its aims. Had the U.S. become actively involved in the affairs of Afghanistan, it is most unlikely that the country would have become an incubator of terrorism.

Several factors distinguish themselves as being most instrumental in luring Al Qaeda to Afghanistan: the existence of weaponry, rugged terrain, porous borders, an Islamicized population, a local sponsor, and the lack of external intervention. The manner in which they interacted in this particular case produced the ideal lair. In order to determine where Al Qaeda might establish itself next, it is necessary to determine whether the factors present in Afghanistan occur elsewhere in the world.

Somalia

Subsequent to the U.S. intervention into Afghanistan in November of 2001, speculation about the future destination of Al Qaeda abounded. Commentators, academicians, and strategists concentrated their attention on those states which they felt were the most likely locations of further American military action. The country that most dominated this discourse was Somalia. As a Muslim-majority country, beset by a decade-old civil war, it seemed the perfect location where Al Qaeda could restructure itself. Undoubtedly, it is at least a failed state. Anarchy, the result of the country’s prolonged civil strife, has destroyed all semblance of a functional society and government, such that currently the country exists in name only, being merely a collection of near-autonomous, tribal-regulated city-states. By having no functioning government, Somalia is actually the prototypical collapsed state, with no group having a legitimate claim as a national entity or body.

The civil war which created these conditions was the inevitable outcome of President Mohammed Siad Barre’s predatory governance. During his years in office, he systematically oppressed opponents and ruthlessly plundered state coffers to augment his personal wealth. This was achieved by baldly favoring the Marehan and Ogadeni clans with governmental assistance, creating a loyal pool of supporters dependent on his rule (Clarke and Gosende 2003, 134-136). When he fled the country in 1991, the country was in a shambles. Government ministries had already been abandoned, the water and electricity infrastructure
was no longer operational, food became a rare commodity, and violence and looting became the norm (Clarke and Gosende 2003, 138). This dysfunction has persisted, and perhaps worsened, in the ensuing years. Somalia’s human development indicators are atrocious. Children and adults alike suffer from malnutrition and disease. Rampant poverty and underdevelopment have created a desperate economic environment (Menkhaus 2002b, 210-218). The country’s infant mortality rate is an astonishing 120.34 deaths per thousand children, and the life expectancy is only 47.34 years (CIA 2003a).

There also is some evidence linking Al Qaeda to the region. According to Rohan Gunaratna (2002), the team which implemented Al Qaeda’s embassy bombings in 1998 in Tanzania and Kenya was composed of Somali Islamists, trained in one of many isolated regions of the country (208). There is even speculation that Al Qaeda may have been involved in the 1993 attack on U.S. forces in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, which left 18 Americans dead, although the evidence is spurious (Gunaratna 2002, 206). Regardless of this, the Bush administration appears genuinely concerned about the potential for an Al Qaeda-Somalia alliance. In November 2001, amid allegations of a connection to Al Qaeda, the United States led an effort to freeze the assets of al-Barakaat, the largest financial institution remaining in Somalia. American officials contended that the network played a vital role in Al Qaeda’s financial empire, serving as a conduit for operational funds (CFR 2004a). Moreover, the U.S. has bolstered its military presence in the region, and aircraft carriers and jets have been deployed to monitor activities off the coast of Somalia (Dagne 2002a). While Somalia’s failed state credentials are undeniable and with no shortage of circumstantial evidence indicating Al Qaeda’s presence, a more thorough examination of conditions in the country reveals that it is an imperfect haven for international terrorists.

Pre-Existing Military Infrastructure

While Somalia has a significant legacy of military weaponry and infrastructure, this does not even begin to reach the levels present in Afghanistan. Throughout the Cold War, Somalia attempted to play the superpowers off each other in order to maximize military assistance. Until the late 1970s, Somalia was a client-state of the Soviet Union, receiving substantial quantities of arms and ammunition, as well as much-needed financial assistance. The Soviets then
abandoned their support for the Somalis when a Marxist revolution in Ethiopia in 1974 created a more welcoming candidate for them (Clarke and Gosende 2003, 135). Fortunately for the Siad Barre regime, Somalia was able to attract the attention of the United States, although their military support was ephemeral as well. Continued human rights abuses compelled the administration of George H.W. Bush to terminate support for the regime in 1990 (Clarke and Gosende 2003, 138); however, enough weaponry had entered the country to create difficulties in accounting for it all, especially as much of the small arms had entered the country illegally. With the collapse of civil governance associated with the end of Siad Barre’s regime, guns, ammunition, and other military supplies were pilfered by tribal groups, and weapons became easier to acquire than food, so that Somalia can be considered a “heavily armed” country (Clarke and Gosende 2003, 130).

Recent events, however, have diminished the availability of certain types of military infrastructure. The major camps and training centers controlled by groups friendly to Al Qaeda have been systematically destroyed by Ethiopia. Cognizant of the connection between these groups and terrorist activities within its own borders, it has sought to destroy the havens of such groups, hoping to strike a blow against the various insurrections it has faced (Menkhaus 2002b, 210-218). Somalia, therefore, lacks the infrastructure for Al Qaeda to house and train its members, and these facilities would have to be reconstructed at a serious cost.

The country was less strategically important to powerful countries than Afghanistan. Somalia had the U.S. or the Soviet Union, while Afghanistan had both, as well as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran. As a result, far fewer weapons and much less funding for camps were allocated to Somalia. As Somalia now has no existing camps, something far more difficult to acquire than small arms, Al Qaeda will only seriously consider the country if no other prospective location features a network of bases and centers.

Rugged and Rough Topography

The physical features of Somalia’s terrain are far less conducive to concealment and anonymity than those of Afghanistan. No domestic authority exists to regulate behavior and activities within the country’s borders, but, independent of this transitory condition, Somalia is not an ideal hiding place for
international terrorists. While the country is approximately the size of Afghanistan, Somalia’s terrain is predominately flat, lacking rock formations and caves which serve as excellent hiding places for people and infrastructure (Menkhaus 2002a).

Exacerbating this is a non-physical factor. Most experts, including Ken Menkhaus (2002a), believe that Somali society, which places an emphasis on the transmission of knowledge and transparency, makes it extremely difficult to hide within its borders (109-123). Traditionally, the society of Somalia has been a particularly oral one in which secrets have been rare. According to The Economist (2001), Al Qaeda would not “find it easy to lie low in an oral culture that considers rumour-mongering to be a form of manners.” Inevitably, the non-secretive nature of the peoples of the country would betray the presence of an external organization (Dagne 2002b).

Furthermore, it is not difficult for external actors to locate and destroy elements inimical to their interests, as confirmed by the Ethiopian government having no difficulty neutralizing terrorist infrastructure within the borders of Somalia. There is even some indication that Osama bin Laden rejected Somalia as a haven in the past, precisely because of these factors. According to Christopher Dickey (2001) of Newsweek, reports suggest that bin Laden visited Somalia in 1999 to assess whether he could move the organization’s base to this country, but quickly dismissed it as an option, as he believed he would invariably be betrayed (34). The combination of flat terrain and a gossip-inclined culture make Somalia a poor choice for an organization seeking to operate in secrecy.

Porous Borders

Somalia features some of the most porous borders in the world. Since the fall of Siad Barre’s regime, one of the few viable economic activities in the country has been the shipping of goods (Menkhaus 2002b). An elaborate infrastructure has developed to expedite the transport of material in and out of Kenya and Tanzania (Lyman and Morrison 2004, 75-86). There is no government apparatus on either side of these borders to regulate the flow of goods or people. Moreover, Somalia possesses the longest coastline in Africa, at 1,900 miles long (Masland and Gutman 2002, 30). Isolated coastal areas provide the perfect physical conditions for large scale smuggling and transport. Were Al Qaeda to establish itself in Somalia, it would face little difficulty in either
disseminating messages to its cells throughout the world or transporting goods and people in and out of the country.

Islamicized Population

Al Qaeda is unlikely to establish itself in any country which does not, at the very least, express a token affinity for the Salafi-Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. Somalia is a predominately Muslim country, but is clearly insufficiently Islamic for Al Qaeda. Traditionally, Somalia has been a secular Muslim country, where more fundamentalist, absolute interpretations of Islam are foreign (CFR 2004a). Somalis have never demonstrated undue devotion to the rituals and practices of the religion, women are not compelled to wear a veil, and the application of Sharia law has been circumscribed by clan law, which tends to supersede it. In the words of Ken Menkhaus (2002a), “Islam in Somalia has been a ‘veil lightly worn’” (111). A degree of toleration has normally been exercised, and jihad has not been a rallying point for the population. Moreover, the Wahhabism and Salafism of Al Qaeda have not been particularly popular, because they are viewed as an alien doctrine of Gulf Arabs. Thus, cultural pride has prevented most Somalis from enthusiastically flocking to the mantle of the jihadists (Menkhaus 2002a).

One cannot dismiss the suitability of Somalia as an Al Qaeda haven solely on these grounds without considering the future. Afghans had never been a radicalized people, but in a single decade, fundamentalist Islam permeated and distorted their culture. This possibility cannot be ignored in Somalia. Experts have noted a distinct growth in Islamicization throughout the country over the past few years. Jeffrey Bartholet (1999) of Newsweek has noted the proliferation of Somalis wearing turbans and other articles of clothing consistent with the style of dress in Afghanistan during the reign of the Taliban (50). Islamic courts have rapidly increased in number throughout Somalia, especially in the capital of Mogadishu, with their judgments being enforced by Islamic-oriented militias (Dagne 2002a). Their decisions have been predicated on more rigid interpretations of Islam, more similar to traditional thought on the Arabian Peninsula than in Somalia. Moreover, many cities have witnessed the proliferation of the wearing of veils and prohibition of tobacco and qaat, a narcotic leaf traditionally consumed by all sectors of Somali society (Menkhaus 2002a).
Islamic groups within the country have adopted a strategy akin to that employed by Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan, funding schools which teach their particular brand of Islam in the hope of expanding the Islamist base in the region, a “Trojan horse” approach (Menkhaus 2002a). By providing education in the absence of a functioning government, fundamentalist groups believe Somalis will develop a greater respect and reverence for their ideology, inclining them to accept it. The most active organization on this front, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiyya or Islamic Unity, has constructed a network of 112 schools, which provide educational services to 17 of the country’s 18 regions. The vast majority of these schools use materials originating in the Arabian Gulf, which teach in Arabic both practical and religious lessons, the latter having an undeniable similarity to the absolutist doctrine of that region (Hosenball 2002, 31). This strategy has begun to yield dividends, and while secularism is still the rule in Somalia, Islamic extremism has penetrated more and more homes. At this time, the environment is unsuitable for a massive Al Qaeda presence in terms of religious affinity, but if Islamists continue to gain ground, this could change dramatically. It therefore behooves the international community to increase its surveillance of the growth of extremism.

Local Sponsor

A potential native host for Al Qaeda in Somalia, equivalent to the Taliban in Afghanistan, would be Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiyya, an Islamic group founded in the late 1980s, whose stated objective is to establish an Islamic state in Somalia (Dagne 2002a). Earlier in the 1990s, Al-Ittihad successfully captured several towns in the country, including Kismayo, Merka, and Luuq (Menkhaus 2002a). Moreover, the group has a record of engaging in terrorist actions against the Ethiopian government, which continues to this day; however, the endemic clannism of Somalia complicated their administration, until they were ejected from these cities by the Ethiopian military. Little else about the group is certain. The strength of the group is highly contested. The U.S. has officially labeled it a terrorist group with an alleged relationship with Al Qaeda (CFR 2004a). Al Qaeda expert Rohan Gunaratna believes that Al-Ittihad collaborated with Al Qaeda in the 1998 East African embassy bombings (Gunaratna 2002, 208). Others maintain that both groups were involved in the 2002 hotel bombing and jet attack in Mombassa, Kenya (Hosenball 2002, 31). At one time, the group
administered two terrorist training camps, reportedly visited by Al Qaeda members, although both were subsequently destroyed by the Ethiopians. Today, the organization is only a shell of its former self, having roughly 2000 poorly-armed supporters in addition to less than 100 Al Qaeda members who fled Afghanistan following the U.S. intervention (Korb 2002).

While the group is less than intimidating at this point, they could pose a serious future threat. The Taliban rose from a small, obscure band of fighters to be the dominant authority in Afghanistan in a matter of months. In failed states, such drastic changes are not uncommon. Subsequent to their routing at the hands of the Ethiopians, Al-Ittihad radically altered its strategy. It came to the conclusion that Somali society was not conducive to an overt Islamist presence at this time, and therefore they adopted a longer term strategy to Islamicize the society through education and other services (Menkhaus 2002a). Accordingly, the group has engaged in the founding of schools which profess their brand of Islam. This approach has produced significant benefits for Al Ittihad, winning the hearts and minds of many Somalis. These activities “are resocializing Somali society in directions that may make the country a more welcoming place for radical Islamic movements in years to come” (Menkhaus 2002a, 215). With a larger base resulting from their new approach, this group could reconstitute its military apparatus at anytime, and by being more robust, may attract the attentions of Al Qaeda. With their support, Al Ittihad could very well regain much of the territory it lost, delegating it for use as an incubator for terrorists. The possibility exists that Al Ittihad could undergo a transition similar to the Taliban with the assistance of Al Qaeda, developing from a local Islamist group to a national force in control of significant territory.

The Absence of External Intervention

Many of the factors which attenuate Somalia’s suitability as an Al Qaeda haven could evaporate over the next few years; however, renewed American interest in the region is one condition that will be most difficult to overcome. Subsequent to 9/11, the U.S. became more sensitive to the threat of Al Qaeda, and in response, the Bush administration began to deploy American troops to areas deemed to be of great significance in the War on Terror. In the midst of much speculation about Somalia’s suitability as an Al Qaeda haven, the U.S. commenced a military build-up in the region. A contingent of 1,800 U.S.
soldiers, dubbed the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, was deployed to monitor events primarily in Somalia. Additionally, $100 million was allocated as part of a counterterrorism initiative to improve border and coastal security in Somalia (Lyman and Morrison 2004, 75-86). With a far stronger American presence, it is unlikely that Al Qaeda will be able to engage in significant operations in the country without alerting the U.S. and provoking a military response, and Al Qaeda is likely to perceive its interests better served where the hand of the U.S. has yet to extend.

While Somalia features porous borders and sufficient arms, other qualities are less promising, particularly the country’s flat landscape and oral culture. Al Qaeda is unlikely to move or build significant infrastructure in a country where its enemies would only need to summon the will to seize them. Nevertheless, Somalia cannot be entirely dismissed. Much has been made of the present lack of Islamic fundamentalist thought and the apparent weakness of Al Ittihad, but it would be negligent to ignore the potential for change in both. Regardless of these factors, one factor which may trump all others is the presence of a sizable American naval and air contingent off the coast of Somalia which is very likely to ensure that Al Qaeda will hesitate before settling on this country as its new center.

Yemen

The other country which has dominated speculation about a potential new home for Al Qaeda is Yemen, the intensely tribal country on the southern tip of the Arabian country which is the ancestral homeland of bin Laden. There is little doubt that there continues to be an Al Qaeda presence in Yemen. Throughout the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, a precipitating factor of the birth of Al Qaeda, Yemen served as one of the major staging points for the Arab mujahideen on their way to the war (The Economist 1994, 46). It was second only to Saudi Arabia in the number of individuals it provided. Tens of thousands of Yemenis served in the Afghan war, many of whom later trained in Al Qaeda camps in the region. Furthermore, U.S. officials have determined that the main logistics center for Al Qaeda was located in the capital of Yemen, Sanaa (Beith 2002, 5).

Even more alarming, Yemen has been the site of several Islamist attacks against the U.S. and other western interests. Al Qaeda executed an operation in
the Aden harbor against the USS Cole, an American naval vessel, in 2000, when 17 American sailors were killed and 39 were wounded. A similar attack was perpetrated by a Kuwaiti man with links to Al Qaeda, against the Limburg, a French oil tanker, off the Yemeni coast in October 2002 (CFR 2004b). Finally, in the same year, a local Yemeni radical murdered three American medical workers at a missionary hospital in the hinterland of Yemen (Freedom House 2003). Presently, the U.S. suspects that a large contingent of Al Qaeda operatives are hiding throughout Yemen and estimates that dozens of terrorist agents are located in the country (CFR 2004b). Many experts regard this as merely the tip of the iceberg of Islam in Yemen. In response to the WTC and Pentagon attacks, the U.S. and Yemen have escalated their cooperation in the War on Terror. Approximately 100 American special forces troops have been training and assisting the Yemeni army in its operations against terrorist cells within the country (The Economist 2002a, 67). The major coup of this alliance has been the killing of Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harithi, one of Al Qaeda’s top lieutenants, by an unmanned U.S. predator drone in northwestern Yemen in 2002.

Yemen is also a failed state, as it is little more than an uneasy balance between several competing tribal factions. Over the past 50 years, the country has witnessed two crippling civil wars, one from 1962-1970 and the other in 1994 (U.S. Department of State 2003). Currently, the central government exercises authority over no more than 35% of the country’s territory (Gunaratna 2002, 186), and it is largely confined to the capital. Lawlessness plagues the country, and local tribal leaders are usually responsible for law and order, rather than the central government.

In terms of indicators of human welfare, Yemen’s statistics are either consistent with that of failed states or rapidly heading in that direction. It may be the poorest country in the Middle East with well over one third of the country living below the poverty line. Unofficial estimates of the unemployment rate are a staggering 40% (Freedom House 2003). Recent terrorist events in the country have crippled the tourism industry, one of the few functioning elements of the economy, which is now wholly dependent on remittances from Yemeni nationals working in the Gulf region (U.S. Department of State 2003). The literacy rate is a paltry 50% (CIA 2003b). Yemen’s incomplete state authority and its potential pool of economically-disadvantaged individuals superficially appear to be an
attractive option for Al Qaeda, although the question remains whether it possesses the other qualities that would make it a suitable base.

Pre-Existing Military Infrastructure

Throughout its history, Yemen has been a target for military assistance. During Yemen’s first civil war, 1962 to 1970, Egypt and Saudi Arabia supported their proxies with significant shipments of arms and military expertise. This scenario was repeated during the 1994 civil war in which neighboring Arab countries shipped billions of dollars worth of military equipment to both factions (U.S. Department of State 2003). Without the security provisions necessary to protect this equipment, there is little doubt that rebel factions and smaller groups were able to acquire much of it.

Not only did the Yemeni government and the major opposition movement receive funding during these years, but myriad individual tribal groups also sought and acquired military equipment. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and sub-national groups deluged Yemeni tribes with arms and other equipment (Katz 2003, 40-43). This has created a situation where the tribes, the very groups which are supporting Al Qaeda, are heavily armed, and estimates place the number of Kalashnikov rifles in the country at 60,000. According to Patrick Tyler (2002) of the New York Times, “some tribal chiefs are so heavily armed that they park Soviet-era tanks in their courtyards” (A1). While no country is likely to have the volume of arms of Afghanistan, the equipment present in Yemen is still prodigious on an absolute scale.

Throughout the 1990s, various terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda constructed training camps in north Yemen. Although many have been destroyed by the Yemeni government, experts still believe that smaller ones likely remain (CFR 2004b). With its network of camps, this country is probably a more attractive location to Al Qaeda than Somalia in terms of military infrastructure.

Rugged and Rough Topography

Yemen’s topography is far more similar to Afghanistan than Somalia. Beyond the narrow coastal plain which encircles the country, the terrain becomes increasingly rugged and remote. The Marib area, where many of the restive tribal groups are located, is dominated by isolating mountains reaching 3,000 m
(Katz 2003, 40-43). No Yemeni government has been able to exert its authority in this region, where even personnel with the best equipment have difficulty tracking and monitoring the movement of people. Additionally, the many natural hiding places of the Marib have been availed by bandits and terrorists for centuries. There is another mountainous region in the northeast of the country, which many experts have described as being the most hospitable area for fugitive activities (MacFarquhar 2002, A8).

Yemen’s imperviousness to foreign influence until 1962, is a reflection of its forbidding topographical features (U.S. Department of State 2003). While Yemen is not as large as Afghanistan, it is likely that it would provide no less a formidable challenge in locating terrorists and their infrastructure.

**Porous Borders**

Yemen’s land border and coastline facilitate the transit of personnel, arms, and other goods, an integral task in the maintenance of a terrorist organization. Its extended border with Saudi Arabia of 1,458 km is largely unregulated (Katz 2003, 40-43). Although the two countries are currently negotiating, the border remains undefined, exacerbating the difficulty of monitoring activity along it (U.S. Department of State 2003). For years, Yemeni tribal groups and terrorist agents have crossed into Saudi Arabia at will transporting arms and people. From a base in Yemen, Al Qaeda agents could enter into Saudi Arabia without difficulty to execute a strike against the Al Saud regime. Moreover, this porous border would provide access to the greater Middle East, including Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq. Yemen also features a lengthy coastline of 1,906 km (U.S. Department of State 2003). Its nautical location at the confluence of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden would enable terrorists to enter numerous regions, including the greater Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa.

**Islamicized Population**

The strand of Islam associated with Al Qaeda is familiar to the people of Yemen, with the country having long had a reputation for this type of extremist Islam. Yemenis provided the second largest contingent of mujahideen to the jihad in Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal, as many as 60,000 mujahideen
returned home to Yemen (Tyler 2002, A1). Far from being satisfied, these radicalized elements were determined to Islamicize a new generation of their countrymen. In this effort, they were at times assisted by the government itself, which needed support in the 1994 civil war and other domestic political disputes (Freedom House 2003). The President of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, permitted Islamists to run an extensive network of approximately 1,300 religious schools (Fisher 2003, A14). The curriculum indoctrinated Yemeni youth in the ideology of the Wahhabi movement, including its anti-American sentiment and disdain for the rights of women. Experts believe that approximately 20 percent of the country’s 6 million students during the 1990s attended these institutions and were subjected to the ideas propagated in them (MacFarquhar 2002, A8). These schools became internationally renowned for their fundamentalism attracting many disenchanted youths, most notably John Walker Lindh, the American Taliban member.

These factors have interacted to strengthen Islamic movements within the country. The majority of Yemenis are disenchanted with what they perceive as western, secular governance in their country, viewing bin Laden and his actions with admiration (MacFarquhar 2002, A8). Some of the more outspoken leaders of the religious Al Islah party, the second largest faction in the ruling coalition, have received financial assistance from him (Watkins 1996, 215-225). While Saleh has recently closed down many of the religious schools in the country, there exists within the country a powerful contingent of Islamists willing to support terrorist actions.

Beyond those associated with Al Qaeda, many smaller armed Islamic groups have arisen, such as the organization which most likely perpetrated the attack against American missionaries in 2002 (Fisher 2003, A14). It is clear that Al Qaeda would encounter a comfortable religious environment in Yemen with no shortage of Yemenis ideologically-inclined to support it.

Local Sponsor

An additional condition that requires evaluation is whether there exist native groups willing to support and sponsor an Al Qaeda presence in the country. The international community is definitely aware that various tribal groups have extended assistance and shelter to agents of Al Qaeda, including senior officials such as Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harithi, killed in a CIA Predator
drone attack in 2002 (The Economist 2002a, 67). In Yemen, there are two main tribal groups, the Hashid and the Bakil. As the Hashid are represented in government by one of their own, President Saleh, they have been less inclined to provide aide to rogue groups within the country, favoring greater central authority. On the other hand, the Bakils, who have been isolated from power since the late 1970s, are the primary sponsors of Al Qaeda in Yemen (Katz 2003, 40-43). They are well-armed, virtually autonomous, and control vast swaths of territory, including much of the terrain most conducive to hiding. Despite many attempts, the central government has proved incapable of reigning in the many smaller entities which constitute this tribe. Bakil leaders have been more than willing to exploit the resulting power vacuum, becoming de facto leaders throughout much of the country. It is in this environment that they have been able to shelter and assist Al Qaeda agents in their operations.

Bakil support for terrorists is the most recent manifestation of a long historical process. Over the years, the Bakil and other Yemeni tribal groups have supported virtually any group which could assist them in opposing encroaching central authority (Katz 2003, 40-43). It is very much the case that the enemy of the Bakil’s enemy is the Bakil’s friend. Accordingly, the tribe’s alliance with Al Qaeda is more a pragmatic political strategy than an overarching, ideological affinity. This reality somewhat attenuates the group’s suitability as an Al Qaeda host. While the Bakil may be supporting Al Qaeda now, a better offer from pro-government, or even American forces, could very well reverse their position, making them an anti-terrorist ally.

This is very different from the situation in Afghanistan between Al Qaeda and the Taliban. While there undoubtedly was a degree of pragmatism evident in the latter’s support of the former, the ideological affection the two groups felt for each other effectively precluded a reversal. That the Taliban did not betray Al Qaeda after the 9/11 attacks and resulting U.S. threats is an indication of this phenomenon. When considering where to establish a significant base, Al Qaeda will surely take into account the loyalty of their sponsor. This may work against Yemen as a terrorist haven; however, very few groups possess the level of arms and control over unforgiving territory that the Bakil do. They may not be the Taliban, but they are certainly preferable to many groups in Somalia, thus making Yemen one of the better options for Al Qaeda.
The Absence of External Intervention

Despite possessing numerous qualities consistent with a terrorist haven, recent political developments have mitigated Yemen’s attractiveness as a sanctuary. Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. developed a renewed interest in Yemen, recognizing the qualities which render it an ideal location for Al Qaeda’s next base. In response to this, the Bush administration strengthened the American presence in the region to deter terrorists from flocking to the country. In 2002, the U.S. military deployed a force of 800 Special Forces troops to the Horn of Africa region to monitor events in Yemen and Africa (The Economist 2002a, 67).

The U.S. has also established stronger ties with President Saleh, making the Yemeni government an important ally in the War on Terror. In addition to closing down the fundamentalist religious schools and increasing airport and port security, he has allocated roughly 2,000 troops to combat those tribal groups harboring Al Qaeda (The Economist 2002b, 66). While Saleh has been stronger in his rhetoric than in the actual application of force, these actions have still had an important impact on the status of Al Qaeda in the country, as has the stronger American imprint in the region.

With its rugged terrain, porous borders, Islamicized population, and cooperative tribal groups, Yemen appears to be a more hospitable site for international Islamic terrorists than Somalia. That Al Qaeda operatives have sought refuge there is testament to this reality. While these attractive elements remain in Yemen, Al Qaeda will now have to consider the renewed attention that the U.S. has devoted to the country, making it less likely that Al Qaeda will be able to operate wholly beyond hostile oversight.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This analysis shows that new conditions have altered the dynamics of terrorist havens. Following 9/11, the realization of the threats posed by the interaction of failed states and terrorism has prompted the U.S. to take a far more active approach in areas where the reach of domestic civil authority is incomplete. In Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and the Persian Gulf, American military advisors and troops have been deployed in considerable numbers to monitor and pre-empt the evolving threat of Islamic terrorism.
Greater American scrutiny has created serious obstacles to Al Qaeda’s adoption of an alternative to Afghanistan, and any future endeavors to concentrate its operational, training, and funding mechanisms as it did in Afghanistan would prove to be a folly of monumental proportions. The structure of the organization at the time of the 9/11 attacks, with a conspicuous central base, may no longer be tenable.

Nevertheless, the group is unlikely to abandon its destructive ambitions and can be expected to alter its structure and strategy to best exploit the current circumstances. It is likely to rely on the quality which has distinguished it from all other terrorist organizations, its global reach, with members, supporters, and cells in dozens of countries. Instead of consolidating a high percentage of resources in one country, Al Qaeda can establish a more decentralized network of smaller bases. The probability of the U.S. striking any one would be high, but the likelihood that all would be eliminated simultaneously is nominal, ensuring that at any given moment the organization would retain active elements. While this strategy would compromise the scope and speed at which the organization could operate, it may be necessary for Al Qaeda at this juncture of their jihad.

Reduced effectiveness may be a small price to pay for the perpetuation of the group and its aims. In this endeavor, the organization can profit from the fallout of Iraq. In executing Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. used much political capital in an invasion many countries perceive as illegitimate. The doctrine of pre-emption, on which this campaign was based, has been questioned. With the consequent loss in credibility, current and future U.S. administrations will find it difficult to summon the necessary international support for more interventions without concrete, incontrovertible evidence. In this environment, the strategy of Al Qaeda will be to establish as strong a presence in each individual base as they can, restraining itself in certain respects so as not to provide the U.S. with the clear justification it will need when making its case to the international community.

There are numerous potential sites for this strategy, including Somalia, Yemen, Bosnia, Kenya, Mindanao Island in the Philippines, Indonesia, Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. By establishing bases in several of these locations, Al Qaeda will be able to continue its operations, while severely reducing the cost of the loss of any one base. Already Al Qaeda has begun to use this strategy. Instead of concentrating a presence in Yemen, Al Qaeda has constructed much smaller presences in both Yemen and Somalia.
Members in these two locations have now developed a nexus, collaborating with each other to execute strikes. In the 2002 Israeli hotel bombing in Mombassa, Kenya, evidence indicates that Al Qaeda agents from Yemen crossed into Somalia, met with sympathizers there, and trained the terrorists who later launched the attack (Gunaratna 2002, 208).

The potential for an even more decentralized Al Qaeda is one which the U.S. must confront. It is one thing to marshal enough international support to enter one failed state, as in Afghanistan, it is quite another to gain support for a series of military operations in multiple locations. Even if these were wholly legitimate, the international community would become increasingly hesitant to support violations of sovereignty. While some question the necessity of international support, one needs only look at the impact the war in Iraq has had on the U.S.’s ability to pursue other foreign policy objectives. Were the U.S. to ignore world opinion several more times, states integral to the War on Terror, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, France, and the U.K., are likely to become increasingly less enthusiastic in their cooperation.

Apart from intervening militarily, what other options does the U.S. have to combat terrorism in failed and weak states? The only legitimate alternative is the vigorous pursuit of greater cooperation and collaboration with their governments, and local organizations must be assisted in their attempts to eradicate terrorist cells and their infrastructure. In pursuing these alliances, the U.S. should use its economic and diplomatic power to induce groups and governments to join it in the War on Terror. In the short term, the U.S. will most likely have to rely on these governments to use forceful means to counter these threats, but throughout this engagement, it must not lose sight of the longer-term goals which are necessary to sustainable success in the War on Terror. It must actively engage in the local political disputes and address the lack of freedom and economic hardship, which inevitably predispose populations to the lure of terrorism and terrorist organizations. These root causes of terrorism must be addressed. For without concomitant political and economic reforms, new terrorist cells will continue to appear. Only a U.S. policy which reserves a place for economic and political development alongside militaristic solutions will serve to create a more secure world, both for Americans and for citizens of other nationalities, something to which we are all entitled.
References


Democracy Without Democratic Journalism?  
A Content Analysis of The San Francisco Chronicle During the Policy-Defining Period Prior to the Iraq War *

Andrew J. Bloeser  
University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point

Coverage of foreign policy issues in the mainstream media, especially where war or the possibility of war is concerned, has been criticized in the past for containing an over-abundance of official perspectives and over-emphasizing procedural aspects of policymaking. A content analysis of news articles from The San Francisco Chronicle during the period from August 22 to September 12, 2002 was used to determine whether this criticism is warranted for an important stretch of the newspaper’s pre-war coverage of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Of primary interest was determining whether the newspaper permitted competing voices equal space and prominence. This period was selected because it captures the Bush administration’s initial attempts at making a concentrated public case for war, encapsulating the policy-defining phase of the impending military conflict. Following a model designed by Entman and Page (1994), I examined the voices (both official and non-official) present in the news narrative and also examined the content of mediated policy arguments to determine the extent to which substantive and procedural policy arguments entered the news narrative. I also examined the extent to which arguments supportive and critical of the dominant Bush administration perspective were present. I found that while a variety of perspectives existed in The Chronicle’s news content, much greater prominence was given to the dominant administration perspective. In addition, few non-official voices and little substantive criticism of an invasion of Iraq appeared in the news narrative.

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Democracy Without Democratic Media?

Central to the existence of an effective democracy is the presence of unfettered political discourse. Obvious as this may seem, it remains essential for any society aspiring to the highest of democratic ideals to question the presence of such discourse instead of assuming its existence. Given the historic value of the recent military conflict involving the United States and Iraq, and more specifically the potential significance that this event may take on in the collective national memory, it seems necessary to evaluate the quality of mediated political discourse before conflict on the battlefield began. The hope inherent is that some insight might be gained regarding the content of the information available to the public as its leaders discussed the option of war. Underlying this intent stands the presumption that in an open society, the ability to freely access and exchange ideas is a virtue that only becomes magnified in its importance during times of crisis. Though this in no way implies that a truly democratic exchange of ideas actually happens or that multiple, competing perspectives ever enter the public’s view, it does inherently suggest that an examination into the fuel for public discourse is of value.

This necessitates systematically scrutinizing the news media. Here, that scrutiny will be applied in the form of a case study of *The San Francisco Chronicle’s* news coverage of pre-war discourse regarding the alleged threat posed by Iraq. Of greatest concern are the unique features of American journalistic practice and the influences that shape those practices. One such feature is journalists generally have “little recourse to independent forms of verification” (Lewis 2001, 15). Phrased another way, journalists lack the means to critically evaluate the arguments of the actors they cover, both in terms of form and content. Due to professional norms of “objectivity” and “ideological neutrality,” American journalists face difficulties making distinctions between opinion and fact, instead reporting what various actors claim as facts without the ability to assess the strength and validity of such claims. Thus, with respect to print journalism, the reader is left to decide which set of facts and which actors in the news are most believable. This makes the matter of which facts and which actors appear in the news very consequential. The reader can only assess the believability of what he or she is allowed to see. Moreover, the prominence given to certain facts and to certain actors, once they become visible to the
reader, increase the probability that those facts and actors will be perceived as credible (Terkildsen and Schnell 1997, 880).

Although this dynamic plays out for both domestic and foreign policy matters, there is another dimension to be considered which is unique to foreign policy coverage. As foreign policy is often interrelated with matters of national security, pertinent information is often tightly regulated by a small number of elite political actors, namely those endowed with official power. The president’s administration is central among these actors (Bennett and Paletz 1994, 83). Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the president and his administration typically receive great prominence in foreign affairs coverage. It is this point that Entman and Page examined in their 1994 study of pre-Gulf War coverage—the study upon which this one is patterned. They ascertain the extent to which the media could assert independence from heavy reliance on the administration’s preferred framing of a foreign policy matter.

The primary question I seek to answer is a more basic one. My question in examining pre-war coverage of the most recent U.S.-led invasion of Iraq is simply whether competing policy perspectives receive equal space and prominence in the news narrative of one large-distribution, mainstream publication. The answer to this will indicate how democratic in nature that publication actually is, in turn, providing a snapshot of one portion of the mainstream media. Of related interest is the amount of support and criticism that entered the news narrative along with the type of support and criticism expressed by particular actors. All this, in sum, reveals the content of the pre-war information available to one segment of the American public, the readership of The San Francisco Chronicle. While the limitations on the extent to which we can generalize from these findings must be recognized, it must also be acknowledged that the findings have a different sort of utility. The findings of this study capture the content and quality of information available to one segment of the public as provided by one major information source. Thus, the findings can be thought of as one indicator of the health of American democracy’s substance.
Obstacles to a Democratic Presentation of the News

A simple and universal definition of democracy is a state in which multiple, competing perspectives and interests receive equal opportunity to become actualized. In theory, therefore, “the rule of many” comes about through a process in which many perspectives are advanced, and the one that most successfully captures popular support emerges victorious. In a system of representative democracy, such as the United States, the mainstream media play a vital role in bringing the multiple, competing perspectives of political actors to the public, creating what has been called opinion visibility (Parenti 1993, 23). Thus, for democracy to function properly, it logically follows that the mainstream media must afford equal space and prominence to multiple, competing perspectives. Yet, arguments abound that the media fail in this respect.

Academic literature on the media suggests that the reason for this failure is not due to the endemic presence of a particular political or ideological bias but is instead the result of institutionalized journalistic practices. Where news coverage of foreign affairs issues, and in particular the possibility of war, is concerned, two practices of interest are journalists’ reliance on official information and the proclivity of American journalists to frame foreign policy matters relative to the positions of domestic officials. Each of these practices reflects a dependence upon particular actors and perspectives and can be thought of as obstacles to a democratic presentation of the news. These practices were examined with respect to the Gulf War of 1991 in the comprehensive book, *Taken by Storm* (Bennett and Paletz 1994). *Taken by Storm* suggests areas for further scholarly investigation, and it allows us to compare media output regarding two recent conflicts involving the same nation-states.

Taking first the matter of journalistic reliance on official information, the work of Entman and Page (1994) indicates that one test of an independent media is the extent to which news coverage transmits views that oppose the preference of the U.S. presidential administration. The findings of their study on pre-Gulf War coverage indicate that criticism of the administration was presented less
saliently and most frequently emphasized procedural aspects of policymaking, while the prominence of actors in the news narrative was calibrated to the degree of power they exerted over war policy (Entman and Page 1994, 84). Further, they concluded:

> [E]ven at the highest level, all elite sources are not equal. . . . the higher their power to shape newsworthy events, the more attention they receive. The lower the power, the less attention, even if the substantive information offered might be of great value to a deliberating citizen.

These findings and this conclusion, although also of importance to Entman and Page’s intention to determine the degree of independence in American journalism, can also be thought of more simply as an indication of how democratic the American media are. In theory, all voices and all policy perspectives, regardless of their proximity to power, should receive an equal opportunity to be heard. Thus, even more simply, such findings can also be thought of as one indicator of the health of American democracy in general.

Turning to the proclivity of the American media to “domesticate” foreign affairs “crises,” the work of Timothy E Cook in *Taken by Storm* is also instructive. Cook’s (1994) study of newsbeats during the Gulf War also asserts a test of journalistic independence regarding official sources. The primary finding is that the American system of newsbeats privileges domestic perspectives over their foreign counterparts, allowing domestic officials to almost exclusively frame foreign affairs events for the American public (Cook 1994, 106). Cook concludes that this scenario played out in Gulf War coverage for two reasons: Congress’s reluctance to challenge a president during an international event that was labeled a crisis, and the news media’s chronic dependence upon officialdom to provide the main focus of their work and the sources of their criticism (Cook 1994, 127). As with the findings of Entman and Page, the study contained in this paper utilizes Cook’s assessment not just as a test of journalistic independence, but also as a test of “journalistic democracy.” And it is journalist democracy that drives my scrutiny of *The San Francisco Chronicle.*
Data and Method

Using the policy debate preceding the recent war involving the U.S.-led coalition and Iraq as the focus of examination, a content analysis was used to examine news coverage from *The San Francisco Chronicle* during the twenty-two-day period from August 22 to September 12, 2002. In total, *The Chronicle* ran 30 news stories related to this matter during this time period.

The period of August 22 to September 12 was selected because it captures the Bush administration’s initial attempts at making a concentrated public case for war, encapsulating the policy-defining phase of the impending military conflict. The objective was to examine a time frame where debate among political elites was expected to be more pronounced than usual, given a controversial issue and its accompanying potential for elite polarization. With the implications for public discourse of primary interest, the desire was to find a period when a diversity of positions might have been expressed, therefore allowing for a critique of how adequately the media, or in this case one publication, were able to reflect that diversity. The period was also of theoretical interest given that policy-defining arguments emerging during this time had the potential to influence the direction of future policy arguments regarding Iraq. Editorials in *The Chronicle* during this time were excluded from the analysis on the grounds they did not constitute “objective” reporting, but instead were overtly subjective or ideologically-weighted by nature. The presumption here was that content appearing in the news pages carried a different status of relevancy, although not necessarily a superior one.

The content analysis itself yielded a total of 402 attributions, defined as statements provided by various political actors present in the news narrative. Attributions appeared in the form of both direct quotations and statements that summarized the stated positions of various political actors and were coded to reflect five different characteristics. Of initial interest was the matter of sourcing. Attributions were coded to identify their source, or the specific actor that provided a given statement. This made it possible to determine if attributions from one or more actors appeared more frequently or with greater prominence than other actors. Attributions were then coded to identify whether their sources were official or non-official in nature. Official sources were defined as individuals holding government positions, either elected or appointed, while non-
official sources were defined as individuals not holding government positions. Coding to create this distinction facilitated a test of Entman and Page’s conclusion that the news media maintain a bias toward official information (Entman and Page 1994, 93). As a final consideration regarding sourcing, each attribution was coded to identify whether its source was a domestic or foreign actor to test Cook’s “domestication paradigm” thesis.

Beyond the characteristics of sourcing, the content analysis was also constructed to probe for details that would more fully describe the content of mediated policy debate. To do this, attributions were assessed to see whether they contained procedural or substantive content. This was done because while procedural elements of policy activity are not unworthy of coverage, transmitting the content of the policy positions is necessary to foster public competence. Procedural information was defined as that which focused on the process and politics of decision-making: mentions of the president’s leadership, attributions regarding consultations with other leaders, and comments concerning the manner that policy was being formulated and carried out. Substantive information, meanwhile, was defined as that which focused on policy options: unilateral military action, conducting weapons inspections, opposing the option of war, and other proposals—and the logic used to support them. In looking at how each type of information was evoked and presented, the intent was to draw a conclusion about the characteristics of the information provided to the public.

The final consideration given to the content of attributions concerned the level of support and criticism regarding the administration’s policy preferences. Support and criticism in this period were gauged against the position taken by actors in the Bush administration who supported taking military action in Iraq, unilaterally if necessary, and who also felt seeking congressional authorization was unneeded. These actors included Vice-President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, both frequently cited sources who advanced these preferences even before the president publicly affirmed his own support. For the purpose of brevity, this set of preferences will be referred to as the dominant administration position. Using this label also creates a distinction from members of the administration who criticized the preferences mentioned above, such as Secretary of State Colin Powell.

There are a number of reasons why The San Francisco Chronicle emerged as the most viable choice as a news source for analysis. First, it was desired to examine a news medium that provides a consistent combination of
depth and timeliness. The newspaper format met that criterion. Second, it was desirable to use a publication of some reputation and with a sizable readership. *The Chronicle*, despite being best known for a rather unorthodox period in the 1960’s and early 1970’s, has sought a more serious image in the decades since, especially since it was bought by the Hearst Corporation in 2000. It also enjoys a readership of 512,129 people (*San Francisco Chronicle*). Third, in selecting a specific newspaper for analysis, the primary criterion was a reputation for independent-spirited journalism based on the hope that this would increase the likelihood of finding a wider range of perspectives reflected in print. Since *The Chronicle* maintained its own Washington bureau, a number of staff writers who covered foreign affairs, and a working relationship with the *New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, this criteria seemed to be adequately met. Ideally, the study would have used *The New York Times* or *The Washington Post*, both regarded as prestige newspapers offering the highest standard of journalism in the United States. Unfortunately, the archives for these two publications proved unaffordable, making the free access to *The Chronicle’s* archives an appealing feature. Finally, because the archives had to be accessed via the Internet due to the limited resources available during the time when research was conducted, it was of great importance to use a newspaper archive that was sufficiently detailed to allow for the most precise content analysis possible. To this end, *The San Francisco Chronicle* excelled. Articles found in its online archive displayed the original date of publication and the section and page numbers.

**Evidence of a Domestic Official Bias in the Volume of Sourcing**

Analysis of news content focusing on potential U.S. action toward Iraq during the period of August 22 to September 12 yielded a total of 402 attributions from sources (official and non-official; domestic and foreign). Of these, 76.1% were derived from official sources, with 54.7% of total attributions coming from official sources based in the United States. The Bush administration alone provided 38.6% of all total attributions, with eight per cent coming from the president specifically. When compared to the 21.6% of attributions drawn from domestic and foreign non-official sources, the dominance of an official slant in terms of quantity alone is readily visible. This dominance becomes even more apparent when focusing just on the presence of sources based in the United
States, which accounted for over half of all sources. Among attributions taken from sources in the U.S., a staggering 73% were derived from official sources, with just over half of the attributions again from the Bush administration. Given that slightly over a quarter of all U.S. derived attributions and only a fifth of all total attributions came from non-official sources, it appears that, at least within the news pages of *The San Francisco Chronicle*, the perspectives deemed most relevant by journalists, and thus appearing the most frequently to define the parameters of opinion visibility, came from those who resided within the halls of power. Echoing Entman and Page’s (1994) finding on pre-Gulf War coverage, the greater the power over war policy, the greater the visibility in the news narrative.

An examination of what official sources were saying about the proposed U.S. policies toward Iraq provides more insight. To examine this, I analyzed attributions to determine the volume of support and criticism for the dominant administration position. Again, this position advocated unilateral military action without a definitive commitment to work through the U.N. or seek congressional authorization. Though it should be noted that President Bush did state that he would seek congressional approval and was slated to make a case before the U.N. one week before the end of the period of analysis, the dominant administration position still held that another U.N. resolution regarding Iraq was not an effective option nor was congressional approval legally necessary.

Against that backdrop, the breakdown of support versus criticism attributed to official sources in the United States and abroad indicated that the volume of criticism prevailed by a margin of 55.2% to 44.8%. A more critical breakdown reveals that this margin is somewhat deceptive, given that not all sources appeared in the news narrative with equal frequency. U.S. official sources appeared more often and were more likely to voice support for dominant administration preferences. Thus, while 44.8% of attributions contained support for the dominant administration perspective, it cannot be overlooked that when considering only supportive attributions, 75.4% support came from members of the administration onboard with dominant perspective. Further, attributions to dominant Bush administration sources slightly outnumbered attributions from all official foreign sources combined.

To put this into perspective relative to the quantity of attributions from other sources, nearly 87% of the Bush administration’s own attributions contained support for the dominant administration policy preference. Secretary
of State Colin Powell provided the only consistent dissent among administration sources, arguing the case of weapons inspections before military action and the importance of seeking broad international approval. Alternatively, 93.1% of attributions taken from foreign officials contained criticism of the dominant administration position, mostly pertaining to the preference of military action and the aversion to pursuing U.N. diplomacy for reasons other than facilitating military action. Criticism from official foreign sources, however, comprised 47.7% of all official criticism. Most official criticism came from Congress, and was comprised of a much different sort of argumentative reasoning—a difference that is explained later and that appears to be of great significance.

The volume of attributions from non-official sources is also a telling descriptor, given that attributions supportive of the dominant administration position appeared in The Chronicle’s news pages almost one and a half times more often than critical comments from domestic and foreign non-official sources combined. In a fashion similar to the case with official foreign attributions, the information and opinions provided by non-official sources tended to overwhelmingly reflect opposition to the dominant administration position. When domestic non-official sources appeared, they provided critical commentary 76.6% of the time, while non-official foreign sources, which were comparatively more rare in print, contained criticism in 66.6% of all cases.

In short, official attributions dominated, indicating a bias toward official information and official perspectives; however, all official actors were not equal in this respect, as attributions from administration sources favoring the dominant position appeared much more frequently than attributions from any other official actor. The result of this is that while criticism of the neo-conservative perspective emerged as more prevalent by an 11% margin, the amount of support for dominant administration preferences was disproportionately represented relative to the amount of support that would have appeared if all relevant actors would have been afforded something closer to equal space in the news narrative.

Findings: Evidence of a Domestic Official Bias as Reflected in Placement and Prominence

An examination of the volume with which different sources entered the news narrative and whether sources were supportive or critical of the neo-conservative position only illuminates one part of a larger picture. Just as the
manner in which sourcing is balanced can affect the public perception of the opinion environment, subsequently affecting the basis for public discourse, so too can the context within which attributions appear. To this end, two factors warrant consideration. First, there is the matter of the page number on which a news article begins. Front-page articles are much more likely to be read, and moreover to be deemed important by the reader. Articles appearing shortly after page one are also more likely to be read and considered significant. News items appearing on later pages risk losing prominence in the eye of the reader or may not be read at all, regardless of relevance. Second, there is the matter of what information and opinions are displayed most prominently within the article itself. This is determined in great part by what information is presented in the lead, which typically sets the frame specific to the article. Also of critical weight in this respect is the juxtaposition of competing pieces of information and opinion that determines the most likely interpretation of the narrative (Parenti 1993, 201).

A few observations prove quite telling on this subject. To begin, when taken on the whole, The San Francisco Chronicle worked within Cook’s domestication paradigm. Sixteen of the 30 news articles The Chronicle ran on the debate preceding the war in Iraq during the period of analysis centered the narrative on the actions or opinions of U.S. official sources, with 14 of those 16 constructed around the actions or opinions of the president and his administration. Although this means that only slightly more than half of the articles concentrated on the domestic level, the prominence afforded to these articles was much greater than those focusing on international perspectives. Articles that took the tact of emphasizing domestic aspects of the debate—such as strife within the Bush administration and the conflict between the president and Congress over seeking authorization for military action—appeared over two and half times more frequently on the front page of The Chronicle than did articles that illustrated the debate on an international level by featuring foreign voices, either official or non-official.

A similar finding emerged when specifically comparing articles that centered on the actions and rhetoric of administration sources and articles that concentrated on the actions and rhetoric of actors opposed to this perspective. First, articles relying on attributions from the Bush administration or other conservative foreign policy elites to establish the narrative flow appeared on the front page of The San Francisco Chronicle seven times in twenty-two days, compared to the two front page articles during that same span where the narrative
was primarily driven by fundamental criticism. Second, an analysis of *The Chronicle* that looked at the page numbers articles began on revealed that articles focusing on the actions and opinions of the Bush administration in the lead paragraph and the next two paragraphs were most likely to appear on the first four pages of section A, and half of such articles appeared on page one.

Conversely, articles that focused on the actions and opinions of dissenting non-official actors were most likely to be placed on page eleven or even deeper into the paper. For example an article on a peace festival drawing 10,000 people to Golden Gate Park appeared on page 21. The policy arguments of foreign leaders, despite being more focused in their message than those of dissenting citizens in the United States, were given similar treatment. Six articles that either focused on the opinions of foreign leaders or constructed a narrative around international debate appeared in the twenty-two-day span of analysis, of which four articles appeared on page eight or deeper. While this again supports the notion of a media outlet operating within the “domestication paradigm” and favoring prominent official sources, this type of evidence only becomes readily apparent after a fairly detailed analysis. For the average reader, however, a more overt means to discern the prominence of certain sources existed.

Aside from exposure to the high volume of administration sources that appeared in the news and which played an integral role in shaping the framing of the Iraq issue, readers of *The Chronicle* were also exposed to a number of articles that explicitly relegated policy debate to a domestic level. Two articles in particular stand out. The first, headlined, “Bush camps clash on value of waging war against Iraq,” demonstrates how arguments were given different degrees of exposure just six days into the period of analysis, which began after a speech by the president that called for a democratic successor to Saddam Hussein and left the option for pre-emptive strike on Iraq open. The first three paragraphs of the article pit the objectives and justifications of Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld up against those of Brent Scowcroft, Henry Kissinger and James Baker—each a conservative voice. The reporter who penned the piece, Doyle McManus of the *LA Times*, identifies the two camps as the neo-conservatives and the “realists,” and spends the duration of the article inadvertently but astutely demonstrating the lack of further relevant debate in Washington outside of these two camps by citing only one source beyond this circle of card carrying Republicans. Even in doing so, the quote he uses is from Clinton Secretary of State Madeline Albright,
an argument for containment over a pre-emptive strike, appears 21 paragraphs into the article.

While the article does demonstrate a balance of substantive views between sets of mostly right-leaning policy figures, it also does something far more interesting. It makes light of the fact that very few prominent Democrats were arguing publicly against the administration as the preferences of the dominant administration were first being posed, allowing the narrative to be controlled by conservatives of various preferences. One effect of this was spelt out in the line, “the debate over U.S. intervention in Iraq has whirled into full force. If the answers aren’t clear yet, at least the questions increasingly are.” To paraphrase, the parameters of relevant debate had begun to form. To go a step further, only actors close to the president were shaping those parameters. One fundamental criticism regarding the selection of Iraq as a target in the war on terror was raised by Brent Scowcroft, a former national security advisor, but outside of that, questions debated were not of “should the U.S. go to war with Iraq” but questions of “how” and “when.” Even at that, the elite but non-official attributions to Scowcroft could easily be obscured in the eyes of a less than critical reader amidst the more frequently trumpeted rhetoric that favored war or at least maintained that the option of war should become part of policy in some respect (McManus 2002, 11).

The deduction that can be made from all this comes in two parts. First, *The Chronicle’s* reliance on officialdom and elite dissensus is clear. Second, where the balance of news content is an issue, it appears that as a result of the calibration to domestic power, the opportunity to provide a wider scope of ideological perspectives was undermined, in part due to the lack of opposition from Democrats, which also reflects the reliance on officialdom. This supports Cook’s (1994) conclusion regarding the reason why dissenting opinions were more difficult to find in the mainstream media’s coverage of the Gulf War in 1991.

A second article that demonstrates both domestic and official biases in news content appeared on September 1. Headlined “A war against Iraq? Non, nein, nyet!” and subheadlined, “U.S. talk of attack draws worldwide disapproval,” the piece reads like a testament to the concept of false-balance. Despite opening with a lead paragraph that clearly states the level of opposition present in the opinions of major world leaders, the next three paragraphs focus on the similarities in the rhetoric of British Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S.
President George W. Bush. The only difference presented was Blair’s persistence over seeking international support before acting on Iraq in any fashion. To find more fundamentally harsh criticism of the dominant administration agenda, one must look to the final third of the article, where the nations of Iran, Kuwait, Pakistan, and France sound off their opposition. And to find this article at all, a reader would have had to venture 14 pages into section A (Sciolino 2002, 14).

Contrast this with a piece that appeared nine days later, but that appeared on page one. Headlined, “Pundits already at war on Iraq—Conservatives debate tactics against Hussein,” the narrative detailed the most prominent opinions being espoused by individuals on the American political right, conceptualizing the actors of greatest relevance as domestic and not international in scope. While the narrative does provide clear portrayals of the dominant administration arguments and those posited by domestic conservative opponents (Epstein 2002, 1), what is not clearly demonstrated is the nature of international opinion. Admittedly, the scope of the narrative does need to be limited to retain effectiveness and the point of the “Pundits already at war on Iraq” article was to demonstrate domestic perspectives, but underlying this is a simple pattern of thematic prominence. This pattern holds that the breadth of international opinions was never given the type of exposure that domestic opinion was, especially in terms of appearing on frequently read news pages. Thus, in trying to formulate opinions on the Iraq issue, it is more likely that readers of The San Francisco Chronicle had trouble gauging the composition of the debate outside of the United States, and specifically where reactions to the dominant administration position were involved. For instance, readers may not have realized that although Arab nations stood against a U.S. led invasion, they supported the return of weapons inspectors, the position championed in the United States by Henry Kissinger. Readers may also not have realized that even nations agreeing that some type of action needed to be taken against Iraq favored James Baker’s position of seeking a new U.N. resolution, an effort the proponents of the dominant administration position had felt was unnecessary. Looking beyond officialdom, the content analysis also reveals that the mass opinion of citizens throughout the world did not receive nearly as much attention as did elite opinion, and accordingly, was also not as likely to bear an impact on American public discourse as was elite opinion.
In sum, an analysis of news content from the period reveals not only a bias toward official information, but official information of a particular sort. As defined by its greater prominence and better placement in the news, U.S. officials and particularly administration officials championing the dominant position received the benefit of that bias.

Many possible reasons for this can be derived from what was found in the news. One reason is the fact that officials from the Bush administration, specifically those agreeable to unilateral military action, raised the issue of acting on Iraq. They asserted their rhetoric first, thereby providing the impetus for a narrative and, moreover, placing any potential critics in the position of responding to that rhetoric. Those pushing for military action were also individuals in positions of power, effectively making their actions and comments relevant and allowing them to grasp a prominent role in shaping the news frame. Official criticism from people in similar positions of power was scarcer, however, as few Democratic leaders in Congress engaged the issue from an oppositional angle, leaving conservatives to argue among themselves over how to proceed. The courses taken by political elites were consequently reflected by journalists, who, in aiming to capture the limits of elite political debate, acted in a manner that locked the crux of the news frame around a narrowly defined set of ideas.

Thus, two things happened. By domesticating the Iraq debate to a significant extent, the news content of *The San Francisco Chronicle* failed to represent the international context that surrounded the war. Then, by calibrating the relevance of policy debate to domestic actors either in power or close to power, the debate reflected became skewed. This skew was exacerbated by the fact that prominent Democrats did not vigorously offer a competing perspective, leaving conservatives to dominate the issue. It was in this way that the impetus for public discourse was limited.

**Findings: Evidence of a Bias Toward Procedural Content in the Volume of Sourcing**

As the findings regarding the volume, placement, and prominence of official sources indicate, the mediated discourse reaching the public is defined to a significant degree by how closely it mirrors the discourses of relevant actors in elite debate. For this reason, a look at how these actors chose to make their case
in the news becomes a vital subject for examination. As already mentioned, the two categories devised to measure the content of attributions found in the news were that of the substantive and the procedural, which in turn were examined to determine whether they supported or criticized the dominant administration on the Iraq issue. Most attributions, not factoring in their inherent support or criticism, were procedural in nature, as 54.6% directed their attention toward the politics and processes of policy formation as opposed to the merits of a specific policy. This is noteworthy, for although criticism of the dominant position outweighed support by a margin of 55.2% to 44.8%, procedural and substantive attributions were not evenly distributed in terms of support and criticism. Not all attributions reflected support or criticism either; however, 73.3% of all the attributions counted in the period of analysis did, and it is these 295 attributions that receive attention here.

Examining the volume of support given to the dominant administration position first, what becomes immediately discernible is that the majority of that support, 61.3%, was of a substantive nature. Substantive support for the dominant administration position also constituted 25.9% of all attributions containing support or criticism, of which the administration itself provided the bulk, nearly two thirds, of all substantive support. The weight of these statistics increases when looking exclusively at attributions taken from sources based in the United States, where again the administration dominated. Over a third of all attributions from the U.S. reflecting a position on policy exhibited substantive support for the dominant administration preferences, the volume of which was in excess of twice the volume of substantive criticism. Given that U.S. official sources were more likely to receive prominent placement in the news, the effect rendered was the emergence of support for a policy toward Iraq that sought military action justified by an alleged link to Al-Qaeda, the potential rise of Iraq as a nuclear threat, and the alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction as the most highly visible perspective.

Substantive criticism of such a policy, especially coming from sources in the United States appeared with considerably less volume. As mentioned, substantive criticism was only half as likely to appear in the pages of *The San Francisco Chronicle* as substantive support, but another statistic sheds even more light on this imbalance. An analysis of all sources, foreign and domestic, reveals that 28.2% of all attributions reflecting a policy preference were substantively critical, which is about 1.5 times the volume of criticism found when examining
only domestic sources. On this matter, the difference between the content of official foreign attributions and official domestic attributions is striking. Whereas foreign leaders were almost as likely to criticize the neo-conservative agenda for substantive reasons as on procedural grounds, criticism from U.S. official sources, which came mainly from Congress, was nearly three times as likely to focus on procedural aspects, such as the president’s initial aversion to seeking congressional authorization for war and his failure to offer a persuasive explanation for this position. Yet, while Congress provided 21.7% of attributions coming from U.S. sources, they posited less than an eighth of the total substantive criticism against the case for military action. Though this occurrence could possibly be related to the August recess in Congress that took place during the period of analysis, it is more likely a reflection of the political considerations of congressional representatives, as Representative Dick Army (R-TX) and Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) both found time to often criticize the president on procedural merits.

Procedural opposition to the neo-conservative policy on Iraq was actually the most frequently found type of all attributions reflecting a particular preference, comprising 29.6% of all such attributions. This is not a surprising finding when the opinions of all major actors on the international scene receive consideration, given that even Britain, the most stalwart supporter of U.S. intentions, as time passed, often reiterated the need to build broad international support and work through the U.N. to the greatest degree possible. There were also frequent non-official complaints that Bush had not yet provided a proper justification for acting against Iraq, and as mentioned, criticism derived from Capitol Hill mostly concerned the need for the president to seek congressional authorization. This wide span of procedural criticism far outweighed procedural support, which comprised only 12% of attributions. That disparity was significantly less dramatic when examining attributions from the U.S. only, where procedural opposition still prevailed but only by a margin of 25.9% to 22.2%.

The consequence of these findings is quite significant, bearing in mind the events that would occur both during and after the period of analysis, wherein the Bush administration changed its procedural approach, adopting a stance that allayed domestic and international criticism. On this matter, a conclusion drawn by Entman and Page in their study of pre-Gulf War coverage is of interest: “By focusing the most salient criticism during the crucial issue framing period on
procedure, media coverage, we believe tended to soften the edge of opposition and obscure the major issue before the public: was the policy itself wise (1994, 90)?” Indeed, a similar scenario seemed to play out in the late summer of 2002.

Though an examination of the volume in this case shows that while criticism of the neo-conservative stance appeared slightly more frequently, the finding of greater interest is that the amounts of procedural and substantive support and criticism were quite different. Procedural criticism appeared frequently while little procedural support could be found. Yet, considerably less substantive criticism could be found, despite allusions to the existence of such criticism abroad. As was the case with the prevalence of official attributions however, a measure of volume alone does not tell the entire story.

Findings: Evidence of a Bias Toward Procedural Content as Reflected in Placement and Prominence

A review of the thirty articles printed in The Chronicle between August 22 and September 12 reveals that nearly half of the articles, a total of 14, takes the course of establishing a context for the debate rooted in defining the processes and politics inherent in an atmosphere where at least one major international actor was eyeing the possibility of war. Though such articles often featured an assortment of attributions that were of a substantive nature as well, the narrative appearing in the pages of The Chronicle was most likely to emphasize political motive and policy procedures. This was true when looking at articles stressing domestic and foreign actors and for non-official actors. The Bush administration, however, could be identified as the actor of greatest prominence in eight such articles, creating a form of opinion visibility in which the actions of all other actors were most likely to be gauged relative to the administration. By contrast, 11 articles displayed a narrative that constructed a substantive context for debate, presenting the policy objectives and justifications of various actors most resonantly. Of these 11 articles, six devoted attention primarily to the Bush administration, while only three focused primarily on foreign governments, and only one on views espoused by members of Congress. As with articles emphasizing the procedural, the breakdown of substantively oriented articles suggests that policy preferences from the Bush administration were more likely to receive prominence. That conclusion is further supported by the evidence that emerged with regards to the volume of supportive attributions.
drawn from administration sources. Only five of the articles analyzed did not discernibly favor substantive or procedural aspects of the debate in the narrative.

Shifting attention to matters more specific, a similar finding emerges. While an assessment of articles appearing on page one reveals that a balance between articles emphasizing procedural and substantive aspects of the debate on Iraq existed in *The Chronicle*, a prioritizing of attributions that afforded prominence to the arguments emanating from the Bush administration, which tended to be of a substantive nature, is also evident. Once more, a few illustrations prove illuminating.

A particularly striking example comes in the form of an article on Secretary of State Colin Powell’s dissenting position relative to the presence of the dominant views of the administration. Headlined, “Powell’s BBC quotes highlight administration’s rift,” the September 2 article places the significant event in a procedural context before the reader even glances at the lead. This may be appropriate, but certainly no less distracting from what seems to be of greater public importance: a high ranking official advocating a politically viable policy alternative. For further evidence of the procedural slant one need look no further than the two subheadlines respectively titled, “Powell’s remarks point to divisions on Iraq,” and “President also wants inspections, he says, contradicting VP.” This much mention of “rift,” “divisions,” and “contradiction,” certainly highlights the conflict imperative to any lively news story, but it also constructs a narrative theme that emphasizes Powell’s policy preference to a lesser degree. Assisting the distraction are the only two quotes drawn from policy experts, which appear at the end of the article and serve as summary. Each quote emphasizes discord in the administration, not the pros and cons of Powell’s policy statements favoring the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq before a military response (Kessler 2002, 1).

An article headlined, “Bush to seek U.N. backing on Iraq plan,” also lends help in deciphering some general tendencies found in *The Chronicle*, as again the views attributed to the administration and the procedural take precedence. In this case however, unlike with the article previously discussed, an approach emphasizing a procedural aspect of international debate seems not only unavoidable, but also quite responsible. As a substantial amount of criticism had mounted toward the dominant administration position that U.N. backing was unnecessary, the decision of the president to adopt a different route in pursuing his policy objective stood as a monumental development. Especially under the
circumstances existing on the September 7 date of publication, a change in course of this magnitude by the Bush administration signaled a major change in the landscape of debate.

That concession aside, there was something lacking. Reflecting an endemic deficiency in the coverage of international debate, the perspectives of foreign leaders, of a procedural or substantive nature, were given scant mention. Meanwhile, the article’s subheadline, “He’ll tell Security Council to disarm Hussein or U.S. will act” summarized the gist of the administration’s revised stance, while several paragraphs were also devoted to administration sources expressing that the change in procedure did not affect the original substantive goal and the belief that working through the Security Council would likely still not be effective. Nowhere in the article did a nuanced counterargument against the claim that working through the U.N. would be ineffective appear. Instead, under a heading inside the article marked, “Little Support Abroad,” one paragraph consisting of three sentences is given to denote the Russian, French, and Chinese positions on how the international community should handle Iraq. Though another sentence identifies that “major foreign leaders have said they disapprove of a U.S. invasion of Iraq, and stressed that the United Nations is the proper place to deal with Hussein,” nowhere do attributions to support or explain this position appear.

The result of this is that on matters both substantive and procedural, diversity of opinion and opposition to the Bush administration is demonstrated but with no real depth (DeYoung 2002, 1). Thus the average reader, one could reasonably believe, would probably encounter a significant degree of difficulty in formulating a reasoned opinion contrary to that of the administration, given the lack of support provided in the news for that line of argument. As for a critique more specific to the article, it is only sensible to conclude that while framing a story around a major procedural shift by a vital actor is justifiable, it does not diminish the fact that such a framing de-emphasizes actions and positions of other actors. More bluntly, it stands to reason that taking such an approach limits the visibility of debate at any level of politics, by consequence, restricting the degree of diversity of opinion that can reach the reader.

Placing these findings in a context that accents scrutiny of the news media, the same interpretations already discussed once again surface as most probable. First and foremost, a calibration of news prominence to official power seems difficult to dispute. In articles emphasizing both the procedural and the
substantive, the Bush administration was the actor most frequently stressed, while articles emphasizing the actions and opinions of the administration were also the most highly visible to readers in terms of placement and prominence. Coupled with the findings regarding the amount of substantive support compared to substantive criticism, findings pertaining to the placement and prominence of articles in the news section of The Chronicle indicate that it was difficult to find arguments that challenged the prudence and necessity of a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. As mentioned in the previous section, allusions to substantive criticism in the news from foreign government officials provide evidence that this perspective existed. Yet, this type of criticism simply did not enter into the news narrative with a great degree of frequency or prominence.

The general findings of the content analysis suggest why this might be the case. As the findings pertaining to the placement of attributions within news articles strongly suggest, Cook’s (1994) assertion that the media tend to domesticate international issues rings true. This seems to be more than just a simple mirroring of the strength of the United States in international politics, but rather, an indication of the weight given to domestic official sources. By consequence, this implies that ideological diversity is deemed much less valuable to news content than is the transmission of rhetoric from powerful officials, and specifically those who work in the executive branch. Further, as domestic officials opposed to the dominant administration position vastly preferred to venture procedural criticism, and as The Chronicle’s coverage relied on such officials more so than their foreign counterparts, procedural criticism emerged as more visible than substantive criticism in the news narrative. It should also be noted that prominent Democrats often provided no fundamental alternative for journalists to mediate. As this pertains to the information available for public understanding, the findings indicate that while The Chronicle’s readership could find multiple, competing voices on the issue examined, the attention afforded to those voices was not equal, and not all of the relevant arguments on the issue received balanced attention. Instead, the voices and arguments most relevant to the debate among domestic officials set the tone for the narrative in the policy-defining of coverage.
Conclusions: The Chronicle’s Undemocratic Coverage of Pre-War Discourses

The findings of this content analysis indicate that during the time when policy options for addressing Iraq were first defined, the news coverage of The San Francisco Chronicle established the parameters of that debate in such a way that not all voices and perspectives received equal space and prominence. The actor that emerged as most dominant in the news frame during the policy-defining period between August 22 and September 12, 2002 was clearly the Bush administration, and this revelation, while not surprising, is no small matter. Any policy-defining period is necessarily a window of time when multiple and varying perspectives need to be presented to the public, and while it is perhaps unfair to expect perfection, it is no less the obligation of the news media to strive to inform the public in this manner. Effective public deliberation depends on it.

During the time frame studied, The Chronicle did not adequately meet that challenge. Support for one specific perspective was given disproportionate attention. The dominant position of Bush administration immediately emerged in the news narrative as the policy argument that all other actors would have to respond to, whether in support or in opposition. While it is true that criticism of the dominant administration position on Iraq was slightly more prevalent in volume, it remains important to remember that in terms of prominence and placement, that the dominant position was the most easily visible and also comprised a third of all the attributions counted in this study. All of this limited the scope of opinion visibility, in turn preventing a democratic presentation of political discourse.

The examination of the content of attributions and the context they were presented in reinforces this conclusion. Evidence drawn from the period of analysis revealed that the narrative context supplied by most news articles in The Chronicle was one that emphasized political motive and the processes through which actors wished to work to actualize their desired policies. Moreover, attributions appearing in the news pages of The Chronicle were more likely to reflect substantive support for the dominant administration position than substantive criticism, and also more likely to reflect procedural criticism than procedural support. The result of this, as mentioned earlier, is it would be difficult for a given reader to grasp the substantive criticism of the dominant administration preference of going to war with Iraq, given the lower frequency
and lower degree of prominence that characterized it. Also resulting from this was the appearance that most relevant criticism to the dominant administration position was procedural, or more specifically, criticism pertaining to the initial aversion to seeking congressional authorization or pursuing a new U.N. resolution before acting.

Though both results seem likely to have influenced public perception of political discourse, the effect of the salience given to procedural policy criticism appears to be more profound and far-reaching. History tells us that President Bush did eventually ask for congressional authorization, which was granted on October 10 and 11 by the House and Senate respectively. The administration also sought and procured a U.N. resolution allowing the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq with the option to employ force if inspections failed. Though it has been argued by some critics that weapons inspections were essentially symbolic and that the administration’s objective was never truly compromised, of greater importance to this study is the relationship of these tactical moves to public deliberation. It seems very probable that because most criticism emphasized procedural aspects of policy formulation that could be changed without compromising substantive goals, the foundation for continued opposition to the dominant administration position eroded over time. Once the Bush administration decided to pursue a course seeking congressional authorization and U.N. diplomacy, the most highly visible reasons to oppose the dominant administration goal of launching a pre-emptive strike ceased to exist. This was already beginning to happen during the period of analysis selected.

Based on these observations, it would be easy to misperceive a conservative, or more precisely, a neo-conservative political bias in the news section of *The San Francisco Chronicle*. This certainly would constitute a misperception, as there is a major difference between *a bias existing in the news section*, which would be a commentary on the news writers and reporters, and *a bias reflected in the news section*, which is a commentary on the news construction process. The focus on attributions in this study, for instance, demonstrated that news content is not strictly controlled by journalists, their editors, media owners, or the advertisers that facilitate publication or broadcast. To the contrary, the actors that journalists cover also play a sizable role in determining the nature of a news item by providing the actions and opinions that are transmitted in the news. In the case of this study, the actors supporting the dominant administration position more frequently provided substantive
comments. Opponents and critics, taken on the whole, tended to voice objections that were procedural in nature. Journalists whose work appeared in *The Chronicle*, in turn, reflected what the actors they covered were saying and doing, producing a body of work that in this case favored the dominant administration position. Though this indicates *The Chronicle*’s lack of journalistic independence from domestic official sources, it also indicates that the news-gathering process employed by the newspaper is fundamentally undemocratic in a predictable way.

Where an imbalance in selectivity can be discerned, a calibration to domestic official power cannot be denied upon reviewing the evidence. Voices coming from the administration were heard with great frequency simply because they came from the administration. In this case, they were even greater proportional frequency, due to degree of silence from Democrats. Voices coming farther from domestic official power, including voices from highly relevant foreign officials, were heard with less frequency, even if their perspectives might have been important.

While enacting some means of selectivity cannot possibly be avoided due to human limitations, selectively emphasizing domestic official sources in the United States ensures the transmission of the ideological flavor exuded from those who control key political institutions. The bias thus rendered is a product of a news-gathering process that depends on official domestic sources, and in turn, a process that depends on elite political dissensus in order to provide a diversity of perspectives. This is not a partisan bias but a bias towards defining newsworthiness based upon proximity to officialdom.

The inference to public understanding is plain. Simply put, limited debate transmitted through the news equates to a limited potential for debate among citizens. Tragically, the consequence of this only becomes magnified in crisis situations like the one examined here. Perhaps even more tragically, it is during times of crisis that we should expect the most debate to be present and to be transmitted, even by a news-gathering process such as the one currently in place. The fact that this is not the case—the fact that debate remains largely subdued even in times when an occasion for deliberation exists—does not bode well for the state of American democracy. It also signals that the news-gathering process itself may be in need of renovation. If the output of *The Chronicle* reflects American journalism as a whole, the prospect that only an illusion of substantive democracy exists in the United States is indeed a very real one. The
solution, it would seem, is the adoption of media practices that self-consciously embrace the role of presenting multiple, competing perspectives as opposed to calibrating relevance to official domestic power. Of course, as this solution would require a massive institutional change on the part of mainstream media outlets, there is no serious chance it will be realized.
Articles by Date


References


Place Your Bets: Gauging al Qaeda’s Potential Nuclear Capability

Eric Loflin Smith
Randolph-Macon College

The events of September 11th, 2001 renewed fears of and speculation about mass-casualty terrorism, particularly nuclear terrorism. The recent conflict in Iraq was partially motivated by fears of Saddam Hussein’s potential nuclear capability, and by extension, fears that such a capability would be given to terrorist organizations for use against the United States. The most commonly mentioned executor of such an attack was Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda network. In the Summer 2001 issue of Intelligence and National Security, Dr. Thomas J. Badey, using a method called Actor-Based Threat Assessment, developed a six-point index of necessary requirements a terrorist group would have to meet in order to acquire a nuclear capability. The factors included in this index range from ideological motivations to a clandestine logistical structure that would allow for the construction and transport of a nuclear device. This paper applies the Nuclear Terrorism Index to the al Qaeda network in an effort to determine if, even after the blows dealt to them in Afghanistan and elsewhere, al Qaeda can mount a nuclear attack on a US target.

Defining the Problem

Since the September 11th attacks on the United States, one of the most persistent questions on the minds of scholars of terrorism was whether 9/11 was as horrible a blow as terrorists could deliver to the US. Is something worse on the horizon? Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, government officials, academics, and the media have all discussed the possibility of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-state actors. The fact that one of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world is now guarded by an increasingly demoralized and fragmented security apparatus is one of the most alarming security issues in the 21st century. Even more concerning is the idea that non-state organizations might have the ability to acquire and use nuclear weapons. Several sources have published studies of the breakdown of Pakistani and Russian nuclear security, documenting several incidents where nuclear materials, or even completed
nuclear weapons, have been exposed to possible theft, the most recent case of which is the exposure of Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan as the architect of a nuclear black market.

When government officials, academics, and journalists discuss the prospect of nuclear terrorism, the group they cast as the likely perpetrator is Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda organization. This extensive network of Islamic extremists has long made its desire to acquire nuclear weapons clear, calling it a religious obligation, according to bin Laden biographer Yossef Bodansky (2001). Though many have focused on Iraq’s alleged efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, no one has ever extensively explored whether al Qaeda has such a capability. As a conventional terrorist threat, al Qaeda has been very successful, launching several anti-US attacks in the last ten years, culminating with the devastating attacks of September 11. Since 2001, al Qaeda has been dealt serious blows by the US campaign in Afghanistan, but, according to the former Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet (2001), al Qaeda has grown from a terrorist group to the inspiration behind a global fundamentalist movement, one that is still “intent on obtaining, and using, catastrophic weapons.” (Tenet 2001, 1).

Given the threat that al Qaeda poses, and the horrific implications of a terrorist nuclear attack, a threat assessment of al Qaeda’s potential nuclear capability is needed. Thomas J. Badey (2001) argues that US attempts to counter the nuclear terrorist threat have thus far been composed primarily of export controls targeting the control of nuclear materials Badey argues that focusing threat assessment and government policy on groups which are most likely to seek nuclear weapons will be more likely to reduce the possibility of nuclear terrorism. To that end, Badey developed an index of criteria that terrorist groups would have to meet in order to develop and use nuclear weapons.

This paper applies Badey’s Nuclear Terrorism Index to the al Qaeda organization in order to assess their capability to acquire and use nuclear weapons. The application of the index will indicate that al Qaeda is capable and willing to acquire and use nuclear weapons. We will also discover that al Qaeda’s capability is potent enough to warrant concern at the highest levels of government.
Methodology: Actor Based Threat Assessment

In his article, Badey contends that, because of the extreme difficulty of monitoring and controlling the movements of every bit of nuclear material and technology, it is necessary to focus on the potential nuclear terrorists and design counter-proliferation regimes with those terrorists in mind. This approach, called Actor-Based Threat Assessment, is designed to narrow the focus to specific groups who meet a set of qualifications for a particular method of attack. In simpler terms, Actor-Based Threat Assessment focuses on groups that most likely pose a threat, allowing a more efficient use of resources. This concept is nothing new. For example, the United States Navy typically does not conduct war games with Somalia as a naval adversary for the simple reason that Somalia maintains no naval capability.

Using the Actor Based Threat Assessment principle, Badey (2001, 42) designed a Threat Assessment Scale for Nuclear Terrorism (See Table 1). According to Badey, the presence of several or all of the factors in the index indicates a higher likelihood for acquisition of a nuclear capability.

TABLE 1: Threat Assessment Scale For Nuclear Terrorism

1. Access to Fissile Material
   a. Access to a Nuclear Device
   b. Access to Weapons Grade Nuclear Material
   c. Access to Financial Resources
   d. Access to Transport/Shipping Capability

2. Access to Nuclear Related Technologies
   a. Weapons Components
   b. Delivery Systems or Components thereof
   c. Detonators or Detonation Systems
   d. Processing and Handling Technologies
   e. Measuring and Detection Equipment

3. Access to Skilled Personnel Willing to Work for non-State Actors
   a. Nuclear Technology Skills
   b. Weapons Design Skills
   c. Operational/Planning Skills

4. Organizational Factors
   a. Covert Organization
   b. Significant Infrastructure and Established Logistics Capability
c. Operational Experience

5. Geographic Factors
   a. Extra-Territorial Enemy
   b. Proximity Relative to Source Materials and to Target
   c. Geographic Identity of the Perpetrator

6. Psychological/Ideological Factors
   a. Victimage and Perception of Historic Struggle
   b. Ideological or Psychological Acceptance of Mass Destruction or Self Destruction
   c. Evidence of Ideation

This threat assessment covers a range of necessary requirements for the potential nuclear terrorist, from his motivations to seek a nuclear capability, to his technological ability to construct a nuclear device, to his ability to transport that device safely to the target. This approach has also been acknowledged by several counter-terrorism policy analysis groups, such as RAND Corporation (Ellis 15-16). The index also narrows the focus of our analysis and provides the context in which we can determine al Qaeda’s qualitative and quantitative potential for nuclear capability.

al Qaeda: The Nature of the Threat

Al Qaeda was born out of the Maktab il khidamat (Afghan Service Bureau), established in 1984 by Abdullah Azzam (Gunaratna 2002). This organization drew recruits to the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance, paid for their travel into Pakistan and their room and board while they were training to fight. The Afghan Service Bureau (ASB) also established numerous guerilla training camps. They essentially became a one-stop-shop for the anti-Soviet campaign, a global recruiting network turning out a pool of well trained, religiously motivated combatants. Osama bin Laden emerged in the ASB as an organizer and logistical specialist. Contrary to popular belief, bin Laden was not the principal financier of ASB or its later incarnation, al Qaeda. According to the 9/11 Commission’s Staff Statement 15, bin Laden only received around $1 million of his inheritance each year from 1970-1994. After the withdrawal of the Soviets, when Abdullah Azzam was killed in a car bombing, bin Laden re-assembled many of his associates from ASB to form “the Base,” or al Qaeda.
In 1991, bin Laden moved his headquarters from Peshawar, Pakistan to Khartoum. The Sudan provided terrorist training camps and false documents, as well as other logistical support (Gunaratna 2002, 3). From the Sudan, al Qaeda set about building a global network. It held meetings with Islamic fundamentalist groups in the US, Britain, Egypt, and throughout the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, forming alliances with these groups (Gunaratna 2002). Over the next ten years, as bin Laden’s reputation grew more prestigious with each attack, al Qaeda began to exert more and more control over the groups, such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and Jemaah Islamiyah. When Ayman al-Zawahiri swore allegiance to bin Laden in the mid 1990’s and became his personal physician, he brought a large group from EIJ with him. Indeed, many analysts speculate that Zawahiri became bin Laden’s ideological mentor and al Qaeda’s strategic mastermind (Gunaratna 2002).

In 1996, under mounting US and Saudi pressure, bin Laden relocated his operation to Afghanistan, where al Qaeda exercised a considerable amount of influence over the country through the Taliban. In exchange for the Taliban’s cover and protection, al Qaeda formed some of the fiercest units of the Taliban’s forces in their conflict with the Northern Alliance. In Afghanistan, al Qaeda devised a loose structure to support its operations. While this structure was by no means a concrete chain of command, it served to delegate tasks and coordinate support for al Qaeda’s operations (Staff Statement no. 15). The structure consisted of several committees, including a “Sharia Committee” (for issuing edicts) and a Finance Committee. (Staff Statement no. 15, 2). The most active of these committees was al Qaeda’s Military Committee, responsible for planning and conducting its operations. With its core group of operatives, logistical specialists, and its senior leadership intact and secure in Afghanistan, and its influence over other extremist groups in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, and Eritrea secure, al Qaeda set about planning attacks on American interests worldwide.

Al Qaeda began its war on the United States as an advisor to established Islamic terrorists in Africa and the Middle East. Muhammed Atef, al Qaeda’s military commander, was the mastermind of many of these early operations. After failing to kill any American troops in a hotel bombing in Yemen in 1992, al Qaeda then turned to arming and training Somali militants, some of them under the command of Mohammed Farah Aideed. Aideed’s troops were later responsible for the deaths of 19 American troops and the downing of two
Blackhawk helicopters in October, 1993 (Staff Statement no. 15). Bin Laden and al Qaeda were indirectly connected to Ramzi Yousef and the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (by way of finances and association). Ramzi Yousef’s uncle, Khalid Shiekh Mohammed, was an al Qaeda associate at the time, living in Southeast Asia, where he conspired with the fugitive, Yousef, to simultaneously destroy 11 airliners over the Pacific in the so-called “Bojinka Plot” (Staff Statement no. 15, 3). Mohammed later became a more prominent member of al Qaeda’s military committee, masterminding the 9/11 attacks and replacing Atef as military commander of al Qaeda after Atef was killed in late 2001. Mohammed was captured in 2003.

Al Qaeda continued its campaign of terror with the bombing of the Khobar Towers barracks in 1995, the simultaneous bombings of two east African US embassies in 1998, and the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000. The events of September 11, 2001, turned the full forces of America against al Qaeda and its global network. The loss of their sanctuary in Afghanistan and the death or apprehension of approximately 3000 of its militants has caused al Qaeda to mutate into a more decentralized and covert organization (Gunaranta 2003). Despite the success of Operation Enduring Freedom, al Qaeda still retains a capacity to launch attacks through its affiliate organizations in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Al Qaeda’s attacks in Indonesia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and Madrid have demonstrated that, though they are wounded, al Qaeda retains the ability to strike devastating blows against foreign targets. It appears that their target selection may be changing from high-prestige targets in Western landmarks and major financial centers to housing complexes and other “soft targets” in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.

Al Qaeda is currently in a transitional phase, attacking where it can while it attempts to find new areas of sanctuary, such as the tribal areas of Pakistan or other lawless regions around the world, from which to re-establish itself (Jenkins 2002, 10). As long as it is under relentless pursuit by US and allied forces, it will continue to remain as far underground as possible, attacking where it perceives weakness. The shift to soft targets, however, seems to be a matter of necessity, rather than any lack of desire on al Qaeda’s part to conduct mass-casualty attacks. Terrorism expert and head of RAND Corporation Brian Jenkins (2002, 11) warns that, “The planning for the September 11th attacks was underway for several years, overlapping planning for other major attacks and undetected by the authorities.” There is no evidence to indicate that al Qaeda has any less desire to
employ WMD in an attack. Indeed, some contend that, despite their losses since 9/11, al Qaeda remains the only terrorist group whose capability matches their desire to obtain WMD (Potter 2004).

Access to Fissile Material

The greatest obstacles to al Qaeda’s nuclear ambitions are those posed by the acquisition of nuclear material. Such material, typically either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU), is the most essential component of any nuclear device. Without proper amounts of it, no nuclear explosion occurs, and one is left with a conventional explosive or, at best, a radiological dispersion device or “dirty bomb.” Two scenarios exist for terrorist acquisition of weapons-grade material: either the terrorist group obtains a completed nuclear device or they obtain the proper amount of fissile material for inclusion in a crude homemade device.

Despite the string of Hollywood movies depicting the theft of a completed nuclear device, this scenario seems least likely for a terrorist group to execute for many reasons. The first reason is the existence of safeguards and protection mechanisms within a completed device that are intended to prevent unauthorized detonation. Indeed, even in Russia, intact warheads include safeguards similar to the USA’s technology, according to a former commander of US strategic nuclear forces, Gen. Eugene Habiger (Keller 2002, 4) Intact warheads are a lower risk than tactical nuclear weapons, such as the oft-mentioned “suitcase bombs,” because of the difficulty involved in transporting them. It is easier, according to General Habiger, to “take the fuel and build an entire weapon from scratch than it is to make one of these things (an intact device) go off” (Keller 2002, 4). The limited number of intact nuclear weapons also increases the chances of detection of theft, in which case the entire military, intelligence, and law enforcement apparatus of not only the host country, but the entire world, could be dedicated to re-acquiring the stolen device.

A more likely scenario, then, is that the terrorist group in question would try to acquire fissile material for use in a crude homemade device (Cameron 1998). This device would likely be based on early nuclear technology, the designs and physics of which have been widely available in open literature for over 40 years. There are two such types of devices: an implosion assembly, or a gun-type assembly. Implosion devices work by exerting an equal amount of
explosive pressure around a piece of fissile material. The material used is typically plutonium because a smaller amount (between 6-8 kg) is needed for this type of device (Lee 2003). The problem with an implosion device is the difficulty involved in trying to exert an equal amount of explosive force on the nuclear material. This involves placing an entirely equal amount of high explosive on all sides of the material, typically requiring uniformly molded explosive lenses as explained below (Feman 2005).

**Nuclear Device: Implosion Assembly**

![Diagram of Implosion Assembly](image)

The difficulty of forming such explosive lenses requires a high technical proficiency. If uniform explosive force is not achieved on all sides of the nuclear material, then the device may “fizzle” or fail to achieve its expected yield or any nuclear reaction at all. The odds of failure and the unreliability of a crude implosion design, as well as the difficulty of constructing the explosive lenses, make it a less likely choice for a terrorist group.

The more likely choice for a potential nuclear terrorist is the Gun-Type Assembly. This is the earliest, crudest type of nuclear device, the same design used in the “Little Boy” bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. The gun-type bomb operates exactly as the name suggests: a small projectile of highly enriched uranium is propelled down a tubular shaft by high explosives (C4 or Semtex are adequate) into a larger piece of HEU surrounded by a neutron reflecting material
(typically composed of beryllium or uranium-238), creating an explosive nuclear reaction, as shown below (Feman 2005).

*Nuclear Device: Gun-Type Assembly*

This design is so reliable that the Manhattan Project scientists did not perform a test prior to the Hiroshima attack. The gun-type assembly can only work using HEU because the reaction caused by the projectile method is not fast enough to work with plutonium. The gun-type device would require approximately 50 to 60 kg of HEU for a yield similar to that of Hiroshima (approximately 1 kiloton). A smaller detonation could be achieved with less material, however, as low as 20 kg (Eisler 2003), aided by a larger amount of neutron reflecting material around the HEU, and it would still represent an unprecedented success on the part of the terrorist group. If detonated in a congested metropolitan area at the height of the workday, such as the southern tip of Manhattan, the blast could still kill tens of thousands and cause unprecedented economic loss. The only disadvantage to building a gun-assembly device is the larger amount of HEU that is required in order to construct it. This represents the greatest challenge to al Qaeda’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Indeed, according to a personal conversation with Leonard Spector, the Deputy Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, it would be “a matter of days, if not hours,” after acquisition of the fissile material before al Qaeda could assemble a functioning device. What must then be addressed is al Qaeda’s access to sufficient quantities of HEU.
There are two major possibilities for leakage of material to al Qaeda: the former Soviet Union and Pakistan. Russia, because of the enormous amount of material that is housed within its borders, represents the area of greatest risk of an undetected fissile material leak (Potter 2004). Russia currently possesses the largest stockpile of the nearly 2,100 metric tons of existing weapons-usable HEU, only 41% of which is under adequate security (Keller 2002). It would take only a fraction of this material to build a crude gun-type device. The decrepit condition of the Russian security apparatus and the lack of solid accounting practices accounts for a gap in Russia’s nuclear tracking ability and increases the chances that a well-funded, organized group could obtain enough HEU to construct a nuclear device. Consider the example of Alexander Lebed, the former head of Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s security council, who led an effort to account for over 100 “suitcase” tactical nuclear weapons during the 1990’s. He could only account for the location or existence of half of the reported stockpile, suggesting that, either these dangerous weapons had fallen through the cracks of the Russian nuclear inventory system or that they had slipped into unauthorized hands (Frontline 1999). Another possibility is that the Russian accounting system somehow inflated the number of suitcase bombs and the missing ones never existed.

Though Pakistan does not have the same abundant stocks of HEU that Russia does, it does have several factors that make it an equal if not greater proliferation risk where al Qaeda is concerned. Among these are the ideological sympathies many members of Pakistan’s leadership and nuclear community share with al Qaeda, the proximity of Pakistan to major pockets of al Qaeda operatives and supporters, and a history of proliferation and nuclear insecurity. Numerous insiders from the Pakistani nuclear community have connections with al Qaeda. According to Joanna McGeary (2004), in 2000, two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists met with Osama bin Laden and his senior leadership in Afghanistan, during which they discussed nuclear weapons design, though it is unclear how much assistance the two provided and what the meeting produced.

Al Qaeda’s own history of attempts to acquire fissile material is one of scams and false promises. According to the testimony of former al Qaeda operative Jamal Ahmed al Fadl (US v. Usama bin Laden 2001), al Qaeda attempted to acquire uranium for use in a bomb as early as 1993. al Fadl was dispatched by a senior al Qaeda associate to Khartoum to investigate a possible shipment of uranium that al Qaeda was to bid on. According to the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2002), the uranium was reported to be weapons-grade, and the source was a Sudanese military officer who had been a member of the previous government’s cabinet. After several meetings and negotiations, al Fadl was led to believe the uranium was weapons grade and of South African origin. After that, al Fadl’s al Qaeda contacts took over the deal and subsequent reports indicate that the group was duped into purchasing the extremely low enriched uranium from the Sudanese contact for nearly $1.5 million (9/11 Commission Report, 60). The success of these scams seems to indicate that al Qaeda retains little in-house knowledge of fissile material; however, it is possible that al Qaeda has learned from its mistakes and recruited more knowledgeable personnel to increase its chances of future success.

It is to al Qaeda’s advantage to acquire the fissile material undetected to avoid increased pursuit by opposing law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Therefore, it is even more important that al Qaeda recruit insiders with access to the material. These insiders generally have knowledge of the accounting systems at their sites, as well as their vulnerabilities, and many have proven successful at covertly transporting material out of the nuclear site (Zaitseva and Hand 2003). Such inside jobs, particularly in the former Soviet Union, have been particularly successful, diverting up to 18.5 kg of HEU in one incident in the late 1990’s, almost enough for a small gun-assembly device (Zaitseva and Hand 2003). Fortunately, the HEU was recovered by Russian authorities. These jobs have typically been performed by low-level technicians or security personnel who had little knowledge of fissile material, but consider the implications if someone with experience with such material gained access.

In Pakistan, the world has watched as the ultimate insider, Abdul Qadeer Khan, has been revealed to be the head of the largest covert proliferation network unearthed to date. Khan and his research laboratory sold Pakistani designs, parts for uranium enriching gas centrifuges, and other nuclear technology, none of which was under IAEA safeguards (Atal 2003), helping advance the nuclear agendas of Libya, Iran, and North Korea. While Pakistan’s nuclear insiders sold their technology to the highest bidder, Pakistan’s intelligence chief and a former intelligence chief forwarded funds in the hundreds of thousands of dollars to 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta (Atal 2003). Given this evidence, it is feasible that al Qaeda’s connections with Pakistan’s senior government establishment are secure.
enough that they may provide al Qaeda or its associates with a window through which to acquire fissile material.

Insiders who could acquire fissile material generally appreciate its value. They also appreciate the risk to themselves and everything dear to them if they are caught. As such, they are likely to charge a high fee for their services. When one factors in the likelihood of having to bribe security guards or other concerned personnel at the source of the fissile material, the cost to the buyers increases. Unfortunately, despite the losses it has suffered since 9/11, al Qaeda most likely still retains the financial resources to buy fissile materials and the help of insiders. According to the 9/11 Commission, the core group of al Qaeda, without considering its affiliates, possessed a $30 million annual operating budget for most of its existence. Contrary to popular belief, these resources do not come directly from Osama bin Laden; bin Laden, for most of the last thirty years, has only received about 1 million dollars a year (Staff Statement, 3).

Al Qaeda’s money comes from a more complex web of sources. Among these are several small legitimate businesses established by al Qaeda cells within their areas of operation. These businesses are designed to make al Qaeda cells self-sufficient (Shahar 2002). Another, more abundant source of al Qaeda funding is the web of Islamic charity organizations that funnel some of their money to al Qaeda and its allies. According to David E. Kaplan (2003), these charity organizations, mostly of Saudi origin, were responsible for endowing al Qaeda and its allies with $500 million by 2002. Each year, these Saudi charities distribute $10 billion in funds to a number of Islamic causes, from mosque building to education to relief in war torn Muslim regions like the Balkans. A substantial fraction of this $10 billion finds its way into the hands of al Qaeda and its affiliates. It is thus conceivable that al Qaeda could raise the funds to finance construction of a nuclear device.

Al Qaeda moves its money via a complex web of financial mechanisms. It uses traditional banking routes in the money laundering capitals of the world, for example, Andorra, Western Samoa, and the British Virgin Islands (Shahar 2002). According to the 9-11 Commission Report, Al Qaeda also moves large amounts of hard currency through a system called “hawala (“transfer” or “trust” in Arabic). Under this system, an informal courier network is established to transfer funds without the use of a bank or financial institution (Looney 2003). Ideal for use in remote or underdeveloped regions, the hawala system is almost untraceable. Couriers must be identified, located, and then followed in order to
track a transaction. Few formal records are kept. The system moves hundreds of billions of dollars every year completely through the cracks of international financial systems. If al Qaeda were engaged in a nuclear purchase, hawala would be a perfect method through which to move money to its middlemen, with little possibility of detection.

Al Qaeda’s task once it acquired fissile material would be to move it to its construction site. The proper amounts of fissile material can be transported easily in a container the size of a briefcase. A larger container could be employed to make room for thick metal shielding in order to lessen the chances of detection. As mentioned before, it would be advisable to obtain the material in relatively close proximity to the device construction site.

**Access to Nuclear Technology**

The bright side of fissile material proliferation is that such material is unique. The material required for a gun-assembly bomb must possess a certain level of enrichment, a level which is suitable only for fuel in nuclear reactors and in nuclear weapons. As such, despite the presence of flaws in the system, relatively tight security is maintained on such material. The fact that a relatively large amount of fissile material is required to produce an efficient bomb also increases the difficulties of acquisition for a terrorist. The other components and technologies involved in making a gun-type bomb, however, are far less secured, and far more common. Most of the non-nuclear components are readily available for use in other capacities, reducing safeguards on them.

Badey’s Nuclear Terrorism Index cites five categories of non-nuclear components involved in the production of a bomb: non-nuclear weapons components, delivery systems and their components, detonation systems for the device, handling technologies for the fissile material, and measuring/detection equipment to measure potential yield. The last aspects of this portion of the index, the processing/handling technologies and the measuring and detection equipment, are not necessarily crucial for a terrorist effort. The processing technologies would be necessary in a scenario in which al Qaeda was attempting to develop and enrich its own fissile material. Such an effort requires large scale plants and production facilities, and an infrastructure that defies deniability and secrecy, exactly the type of infrastructure that al Qaeda would wish to avoid in acquiring a device. They would instead opt to acquire their fissile material in a
form already suitable for a gun-type device. The need for measuring and detection equipment is also negligible because the potential nuclear terrorist would most likely be indifferent as to the predicted yield of his bomb, so long as a nuclear reaction was achieved. A nuclear detonation of any type or yield would be an unprecedented success for a terrorist group. Also, even the smallest nuclear detonation, if done in a congested metropolitan area, could cause massive casualties, tremendous economic damage, and intense radiological damage.

The additional weapons components for a gun-type bomb are both few and fairly easy to obtain, especially if one already has the network to obtain fissile material. Apart from its fissile material, a gun assembly device requires a tubular metal shaft, a propellant for the HEU projectile composed of high explosive, and a thick, neutron reflecting shell around the fissile material, usually composed of beryllium or uranium-238 (Feman). The high explosives need not be unique; C-4 plastic explosive or Semtex, which is slightly more unstable, are adequate. Such explosives could be obtained cheaply and with little chance of detection from a number of sources in Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, the Middle East, and even the United States. Al Qaeda has shown that it has no difficulty in acquiring and transporting large quantities of explosives, indicating that acquiring explosives for a gun assembly device would be no great challenge to an experienced al Qaeda operative.

As for the tubular shaft, this can be made from common metals such as aluminum or steel, readily available in countless markets. The neutron-reflecting shell would be the most challenging non-nuclear component, in that it would have to be purchased from a company that specializes in such nuclear supplies, entailing background checks and possible monitoring by law enforcement. Companies such as United Nuclear, General Electric Nuclear Energy, and several foreign companies provide this service. Unfortunately, al Qaeda also possesses a clandestine group of logistics operatives and procurement specialists, as well as the ability to obtain false documents and conceal the identities of its operatives in foreign countries, indicating that al Qaeda could escape the scrutiny of nuclear technology suppliers.

The potential nuclear terrorist does not require, nor are they likely to prefer, a complex delivery system such as a missile. Rather, a terrorist is more likely to seek a design that can be moved into the US undetected. This is likely to be either a truck or a sea freighter. The truck option, however, carries significant disadvantages. Automobiles are inspected at the US/Mexico border with greater
frequency than any other entrance into the US, largely due to drug trafficking from Mexico and South America. Even the US/Canadian border has increased security since 9/11, including the installation of radiation-detection equipment, increasing the likelihood of preventing a bomb from coming into the US from Canada. The more prudent choice of delivery system for an al Qaeda-built bomb would be a cargo container aboard a sea freighter. Less than 3% of such containers are inspected per year as they enter the US from a myriad of nations (Grier and Bowers 2003). Al Qaeda’s possible control or limited control of such inter-coastal freighters (estimates range from 12 to 50 vessels) has long been the subject of scrutiny by the world’s law enforcement and intelligence agencies (Robinson 2003). Such vessels have been used in the past to move al Qaeda operatives and supplies, and, given that the odds of the bomb-carrying cargo container being searched are heavily in al Qaeda’s favor, the use of sea freighters seems a likely method of delivering the bomb. Once in the country, the container carrying the bomb could be offloaded onto a tractor trailer and taken to the heart of a major city to be detonated, or the terrorists could detonate the bomb aboard ship once it was in the harbor, disrupting shipping in addition to causing massive casualties and economic damage.

Detonators are also a relatively easy matter, in that the gun-type device is triggered by the projectile, which is fired by high explosives. Therefore, nothing more than detonating plastic explosives is required in order to make a well-constructed bomb go off. Plastic explosives are detonated by an electric charge, which can be initiated in a number of ways, including by a radio signal, a timer, or by a suicidal nuclear terrorist touching one wire to the other at the site of the attack. Detonators and detonation systems are widely available for use in demolition, and al Qaeda would likely have no trouble procuring manufactured detonators or constructing their own, having demonstrated skills at both in the past.

Access to Skilled Personnel Willing to Work for Non-State Actors

Though the design of a crude gun-type device seems simple, the actual assembly of the device requires some level of skill and knowledge. Al Qaeda will require a small cadre of people with at least rudimentary experience in several fields in order to design and construct a nuclear device. As few as three people
could form the technical and scientific backbone of this cadre (Stober 2003). This conclusion originates from a 1964 US Government experiment, referred to as the “Nth Country Experiment,” in which three post-doctoral physicists designed a nuclear weapon using no classified material or literature (Lawrence Livermore Laboratory 2003). Even more frightening was that the group designed an implosion device. If such a small group could successfully design the most complicated of the two types of crude nuclear bombs, it stands to reason that a more simple gun-type assembly may be even easier to construct.

The Nth Country experiment and subsequent analyses of the problem indicate that the necessary nuclear knowledge for construction of a crude nuclear bomb is openly available. What is unclear is how much, if any, of this necessary knowledge has fallen into the hands of al Qaeda. Captured documents in Afghanistan give investigators mixed messages about the depth of al Qaeda’s nuclear expertise. Out of the hundreds of thousands of pages and megabytes of al Qaeda documents obtained by the news media during Operation Enduring Freedom, only a small fraction of them discussed nuclear weapons design or construction (Albright 2002). We can draw three possible conclusions from this: al Qaeda retained very little material on nuclear weapons, fleeing al Qaeda operatives took the most important documents with them and have not yet been captured, or the military/intelligence community obtained the documents and is keeping them classified. The documents that were left behind indicate a lack of in-house expertise on nuclear weapons within al Qaeda’s Afghan sanctuary, containing flawed or even blatantly false information (Albright 2002). One document even compares plutonium to several non-existent elements, such as Saturium and Jupiterium. What may be gained from studying these documents is that, whether or not al Qaeda does retain more precise nuclear expertise, at least some of its efforts, like its early efforts to acquire fissile material, are amateurish and reflect a lack of scientific knowledge. Just because al Qaeda did not possess the necessary expertise at the time the documents in question were written, one cannot assume that they have not attempted to develop or recruit such expertise.

The most alarming risk of such a nuclear expertise leak is Pakistan. Unlike Russia, there may be a strong ideological link between some Pakistani nuclear scientists and al Qaeda. Such scientists believe that nuclear weapons should be shared with the entire Muslim community in order to raise the geopolitical status of Muslim nations (Albright and Higgins 2003). The most recent and most alarming instance of al Qaeda/Pakistani cooperation was al
Qaeda’s association with Sultan Bashir ud Din Mahmood and Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, two former scientists in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. After resigning from Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in 1999 in protest of Pakistan’s apparent willingness to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Mahmood and Majeed moved to Afghanistan and formed a “relief organization” known as the “Reconstruction of the Muslim Ummah (UTN)” (Albright and Higgins 2003). Mahmood’s specialty during his career had been the enrichment of uranium to weapons-grade status and employing such uranium in nuclear weapons. What is most disturbing about Mahmood’s background, however, is his history with the illicit procurement of nuclear materials and components. As chief designer and director of the Khushab nuclear reactor project in the 1990’s, Mahmood was responsible for obtaining the components and material for the reactor project through black market and illicit contacts (Albright and Higgins 2003). Mahmood’s partner, Majeed, was a specialist in nuclear fuels.

According to Kaushik Kaphistalam (2004), while in Afghanistan operating under UTN cover, Mahmood and Majeed were approached by and met several times with Osama bin Laden and his senior associates, during which they discussed weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and plans for their acquisition. After Pakistan detained them in 2002, Mahmood and Majeed claimed their discussions with bin Laden were merely theoretical, but the exact extent of their assistance to al Qaeda and the Taliban is still being investigated. Mahmood and Majeed were subsequently pardoned by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, and they remain free in Pakistan at this writing. Two other al Qaeda connected Pakistani nuclear scientists, Suleiman Asad and Muhammed Ali Mukthar, whose names turned up in connection with Mahmood and Majeed, were quietly dispatched to Myanmar after 9/11, ostensibly to help design civilian nuclear energy facilities (Atal 2003).

Also of great concern in Pakistan is the recent revelation of the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, as the head of an international nuclear black market, the full extent of which is still being determined. For more than twenty years, Khan masterminded the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology, including bomb designs and uranium enriching centrifuges, to the highest bidders, including the nuclear programs of Iran, North Korea, and Libya. According to some sources, Khan also had connections with individuals or groups who could obtain other nuclear components, such as small quantities of enriched uranium (Hersh 2004). Khan’s network has not been
entirely uncovered (despite the efforts of many intelligence agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency).

Having made more than $100 million off of its Libyan transactions alone, it is reasonable to conclude that the remaining portions of the Khan network have the financial resources to go underground and continue their nuclear profiteering (Ansari 2004). According to Massoud Ansari (2004), Pakistan now finds itself the victim of blackmail in the form of classified documents detailing Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities that Khan copied and has threatened to release to the press and even non-state actors. The documents are in the custody of his daughter, outside of Pakistan, set to be released if Khan is prosecuted for any of his crimes.

Other areas where analysts are concerned al Qaeda could obtain nuclear expertise are the former Soviet Union and Iraq. Worry over possible rogue scientists stem from the same conditions that spark fears over fissile material leaks. Where, during the Cold War, a Russian nuclear scientist was poised at the highest echelons of society, well paid and well provided for, the situation has reversed in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite the best efforts of the US under the Nunn-Lugar initiative and similar programs to employ for Soviet nuclear experts, Russian scientists are underpaid, or not paid at all, and are often taking on other jobs just to get by. The suicide of a nuclear plant director in the late 1990’s was attributed to despair at the inability of the government to pay and feed Russia’s nuclear workers. The prospect of a large sum of money to a displaced nuclear scientist in exchange for his services would be a tempting offer, even for a patriotic citizen of Russia.

The same is true of Iraq in the post-war environment. The destruction of Saddam Hussein’s regime has left a large corps of scientists without work. Combined with rage at the US occupation of Iraq, the possession of nuclear weapons knowledge and skills by a former Iraqi scientist could create a dangerous potential for recruitment by al Qaeda or affiliated Islamic extremists. Iraq is also a dangerous breeding ground for rogue nuclear scientists because of the presence of an Islamic extremist insurgency challenging the interim government and the US occupation, many of them with links to al Qaeda. With little prospect for work under the interim government or any subsequently elected government, Iraqi scientists are left with little choice than to offer their skills elsewhere. It is here that the US must be especially vigilant. A program similar to
efforts to employ former Soviet scientists would be appropriate and necessary to offset the dangers of Iraqi expertise falling into al Qaeda’s hands.

Organizational Factors

Badey’s index highlights several characteristics a potential nuclear terrorist organization must possess in order to conduct an attack. These are a clandestine organizational structure, an established infrastructure and logistics capability, and extensive operational experience. Because the acquisition and employment of a nuclear device requires the highest levels of secrecy, many terrorist organizations with semi-legitimate political wings, open communication networks, and personnel who are easily associated with the group, such as the FARC in Colombia, would not be suitable for an act of nuclear terrorism. Neither would a group of loosely coordinated cells be suitable for what would undoubtedly be an operation of global scope. An organization with large membership, global distribution, and a clandestine structure would be most uniquely suited to such an attack, according to Badey’s index.

Al Qaeda, prior to the September 11th attacks, fit such a description almost perfectly. With Afghanistan as its headquarters and training ground, al Qaeda trained thousands of young militants, who swore allegiance to bin Laden and then returned to their homelands, either to build al Qaeda cells or to bring their training to their own al Qaeda affiliated organization. Al Qaeda (“the Base”) was true to its English translation, attempting to unite several Islamic terrorist organizations into a broader movement to attack the West (9/11 Commission 2004). It essentially became something akin to a holding company for Islamic terrorism. Much of its senior leadership headed other organizations, such as bin Laden deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, who brought his Egyptian Islamic Jihad group under bin Laden’s influence. Al Qaeda, at the time, referred to bin Laden’s own core group of lieutenants who aided him in gathering his alliance and maintaining his training facilities and business fronts. The alliance he built, in its early communiqués, called itself by many names, including the Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites and the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders (Pike). Indeed, the group did not claim its role in any attacks nor did it refer to itself as al Qaeda, until after the 9/11 attacks. Once bin Laden established himself in Afghanistan in the late 1990’s he began to shift his
group from advice and finance to conducting outright attacks on US interests and targets.

Bin Laden, according to his former deputy Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, was a micromanager and stayed heavily involved in the target and personnel selection of al Qaeda’s operations (Raganan 2004). He selected the operatives who would run specific operations, and he was responsible for final approval for all attacks. His network of cells and financial fronts, which extended across the globe, even into Europe and the US, became more and more layered and complex until bin Laden’s hand was concealed from their operations (Bodansky 2001, 313). His covert financial networks allowed operatives who were planning attacks to live under the radar, going undetected even though, in the case of the 9/11 plot, some of them were under CIA and FBI surveillance or maintained contact with informants from those agencies.

All this was prior to 9/11 and the subsequent Operation Enduring Freedom. The destruction of al Qaeda’s strongholds and training camps in Afghanistan has caused the organization to regress to a clandestine cell structure. Under such an arrangement, cells operate without the direct management of bin Laden or his senior lieutenants. However, it now appears that bin Laden and the remaining senior leadership of al Qaeda may have reestablished some of their direct management over their operatives. In a press conference on July 8, 2004, Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge announced that bin Laden himself was directing a plan to launch a major attack on US soil before the November, 2004 presidential elections (CNN Online 2004). This development should not suggest, however, that bin Laden is able to communicate with his cells as frequently as he could before 9/11.

The post-9/11 al Qaeda is a loose coalition of Islamic militants whose binding characteristic is their allegiance to and training by bin Laden’s core group of lieutenants. With over 3200 operatives, logistics specialists, and supporters detained since 9/11, al Qaeda’s ability to coordinate global attacks has diminished (Gunaratna 2003). Its cells focus on “soft” regional targets, as evidenced by the Bali bombings and the recent chain of attacks in Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have contributed to the increase in anti-American sentiment in the Islamic world, drawing in fresh recruits to replenish losses from Operation Enduring Freedom (Tenet 2004). Though al Qaeda lacks the sophisticated training facilities it once had, it can still
train operatives by sending them to gain combat experience in several regional conflicts, including in Africa, the Balkans, Kashmir, and Chechnya.

Though al Qaeda still retains the ability to conduct small-unit attacks on soft targets, the loss of so many operatives, the increased surveillance on suspected terrorists by the global security apparatus, and relentless pursuit by those agencies, have diminished its capacity to execute large scale attacks on US soil (Gunaratna 2003). However, the current state of al Qaeda may be only a temporary lull as the group’s remaining operatives regroup in the lawless regions of South Asia, Africa, and perhaps even South America. Al Qaeda expert Rohan Gunaratna estimates that between 10,000 and 110,000 fighters have been trained by al Qaeda (Byman 2003). Hence, they still have many willing and able bodies to call on for jihad. Once the group does regroup, it may again retain the capacity for spectacular attacks on the US homeland, including a possible WMD strike.

Though its operational organization has changed, al Qaeda retains a logistics network that is only slightly less robust than it was prior to Operation Enduring Freedom. This network’s most valuable resource is its pool of logistics operatives, typically western educated men who mask their radical beliefs and reside within the developed world as fully immersed citizens (Crumley 2002). They are rarely involved in operational planning, and many do not even know which attack they are aiding. They merely move money, supplies, and false documentation to and from al Qaeda’s leadership and operatives. Such logistics operatives make up the cornerstone of al Qaeda’s staying power, in that they remain completely undercover, with little or no visible ties to Islamic extremism. As long as their contact information does not appear in the records of captured operatives, their covers will remain secure until the US-led campaign on terrorism wanes or shifts to South Asia or Africa. The existence of such logistical networks in European cities with large Muslim populations, such as Madrid, London, and Paris, has facilitated the planning and execution of attacks in these areas. The prevented ricin chemical attacks in London and Paris in early 2003 (CNN 2003) and the commuter train attacks in Madrid in March of 2004 demonstrate that al Qaeda is embedded within European society and eager to strike all Western nations, not just the US. The chief logistical assistance and operational planning for the 9/11 attacks came from abroad; Hamburg, Germany, and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia are examples of key planning sites (Miller 2002). All this indicates that, though al Qaeda logistical networks have penetrated Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, they have not established the same
heavy presence within the US. Nevertheless, all al Qaeda requires is the undetected placement of their completed device on a freighter or, worse, a cargo plane headed for the United States. Such a vehicle could conceivably bring the device far enough into US territory to detonate it in a heavily populated area.

The final requirement of the potential nuclear terrorist is operational experience and a history of successful, spectacular attacks. This is the organizational factor that al Qaeda meets most. One needs only to recall al Qaeda’s ten year history of successful attacks on domestic and foreign Western targets, a chain that has netted more American fatalities than any other terrorist group in recent history, to grasp al Qaeda’s level of experience and skill. Al Qaeda, or those with connections to the group, has perpetrated the only two foreign origin attacks on US soil in the last thirty years. Moreover, there are several experienced al Qaeda operatives who have experience orchestrating attacks and are still at large, particularly veterans of the East Africa embassy bombings. The existence of these experienced operatives increases the advantage that al Qaeda will have once it regroups and re-establishes a centralized command structure.

**Geographic Factors**

Al Qaeda, because of its global connections, the diversity of its members’ ethnic backgrounds, and its history of attacks on four continents, has been called the first truly “global” terrorist group (Desker 2003). Al Qaeda’s global nature plays a role in its status as a potential nuclear actor. According to the Nuclear Terrorism Index, the potential nuclear terrorist must meet three geographic requirements in order to make it a likely nuclear actor: the presence of an extra-territorial enemy, close proximity to sources of nuclear materials, and the lack of a geographic identity that would make nuclear retaliation upon the group an impossibility. These three factors are crucial towards both the logistical and motivational aspects of nuclear terrorism, and they distinguish al Qaeda from its peers, helping to further illustrate the motivations for use of nuclear weapons.

Though al Qaeda rails against the regimes of many Arab states with large Muslim populations, it has only recently begun to target those regimes. When the group has targeted these regimes, it has been to punish them for their association with al Qaeda’s main target, the United States. Al Qaeda’s motives for its attacks, as laid down by bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, are focused on the presence
of the US in the Holy Lands of Islam. The US, and all Westerners, in the mind of bin Laden, are unwelcome outsiders akin to the Visigoths of old: parasites in the Holy Land. al Qaeda’s campaign of terror is an attempt to punish America and its allies for their encroachment. As such, the US is an extra-territorial enemy, and a predominately Christian one, increasing its status as a villain in the eyes of al Qaeda’s leaders. If the group were to commit nuclear terrorism on US soil, it could be regarded by al Qaeda and its constituents as repayment for the destruction America has brought the Holy Land. The campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq would undoubtedly be cited by al Qaeda as examples of such destruction. Because of the US’s distance from the Holy Land, and indeed, from al Qaeda’s other major areas of operation, a nuclear blast within its borders would not represent an attack on Muslim lands, decreasing the amount of political blowback that would potentially be aimed at al Qaeda by its constituents. 

In regard to proximity to materials and target, al Qaeda can claim the former, but not the latter. As discussed earlier, the bulk of al Qaeda’s nuclear materials, components, and expertise would come from either the former Soviet Union or from Pakistan. In regards to the Former Soviet Union, many of al Qaeda’s early dealings in nuclear materials occurred with members of the rebel factions or organized crime elements of the breakaway Russian province of Chechnya. Though some of these turned out to be scams, we cannot discount the possibility that al Qaeda maintains numerous connections in the area. Indeed, it was reported that Chechnya and the former Soviet republics of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Georgia, and others were some of the many destinations that al Qaeda’s operatives fled to in the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom. From these locations, al Qaeda operatives could establish contacts with middlemen for nuclear procurement or even directly with insiders at Russian nuclear facilities. Because of the unstable nature of many of these ex-Soviet republics, and the heavy presence of organized crime elements, al Qaeda’s operatives could very likely escape detection.

Similarly, in Pakistan, al Qaeda maintains enough contacts and infrastructure to stay relatively well hidden in the country. Though Pakistani intelligence and law enforcement entities have proven resilient in capturing many high-level al Qaeda operatives, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Bin al Shibh, and Abu Zubaydah, they do not control the tribal regions that border Afghanistan. Long confirmed as bin Laden and al Qaeda’s senior leaderships’
refuge from US operations, this region has the advantage of being both remote and difficult to navigate. The terrain is mountainous and impassable for motorized vehicles. Though the Pakistani military and US Special Operations forces have mounted impressive air-borne search and destroy campaigns in the area, these have been relegated to the outskirts of the region. These operations have netted no major al Qaeda operatives and few low level ones. The closest that the campaign has publicly come to success in these operations was the assault on an alleged stronghold of al Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri in the Spring of 2004. That incident ended with Zawahiri’s escape and disappearance. Given their treacherous, remote nature, the Tribal Regions will serve as a good place for al Qaeda’s leadership to regroup. From here, and from within Pakistan’s cities, al Qaeda’s operatives could conceivably direct nuclear material acquisition efforts inside Pakistan’s borders and maintain contacts with insiders in Pakistan’s nuclear community.

In contrast to its close proximity to potential sources of nuclear material, expertise, and technology, al Qaeda’s concentrations of personnel are farther removed from the likely targets for nuclear attacks. These likely targets are, of course, within the borders of the United States. To get to these targets from the former Soviet Union or Pakistan, the most likely sources of nuclear materials and components, presents great obstacles. Because Pakistan and most of the former Soviet Union both lack major warm-water ports from which to launch a freighter, al Qaeda’s nuclear architects would have to move the device, or its components, down through Syria or Egypt to access the Suez Canal and, thus, the Mediterranean. Perhaps the best way to escape detection while moving the materials is to bring them aboard a transporting vehicle (most likely a freighter), waiting until safely at sea to assemble the device. The materials could be moved to the port of choice separately, by different couriers, and assembled in a cargo container aboard ship. In any event, the chances of detection, even once at sea, are not zero, thanks to recent concerns over commercial ocean shipping’s possible use as a terrorist tool. Such concerns gave birth to the Proliferation Security Initiative, an agreement under which the US and several other nations open ships flying their flag to random inspections at the request by other signatories when they suspect illicit materials are aboard the ship in question. If the al Qaeda cell assembling the device aboard ship did not maintain the strictest secrecy and security, there is a distinct possibility that the efforts could be detected and interdicted.
Psychological/Ideological Factors

Perhaps one of the most important parts of assessing a terrorist group’s ability to acquire nuclear weapons is analyzing its motivations and the justifications it employs to warrant its pursuit of such a destructive weapon. A group’s technical or organizational capabilities mean nothing if it does not have the drive and motivation to use WMD in the first place. Our index cites three psychological and ideological factors that would indicate such intent. The first is the presence of a sense of victimage or the perception of an historic struggle, followed by acceptance of the implications of mass destruction and death, and evidence of ideation, or discussion of nuclear activity and its consequences within the group. When examining these factors, it becomes clear that any doubts about al Qaeda’s nuclear ambitions are to be found in the technical and organizational aspects, rather than any lack of will on its part.

Badey includes the perception of the terrorist as a victim of the target’s impression because “the status derived from being considered a victim serves as the moral justification for even greater violence against others” (Badey 2004, 42). The portrayal of the terrorist’s campaign as part of an historic struggle between the oppressed and the oppressor serves to maximize the suffering of the perpetrator in order to make the use of nuclear weapons seem like an equalizing measure that balances the scales between the oppressed and the oppressor. Victimage and historic struggle are crucial parts of al Qaeda’s ideology. The writings of bin Laden and those who share his brand of jihad are focused on the three-hundred year suffering of Muslims at the hands of Christians and Jews in the aftermath of the collapse of Islam’s “golden age” (Gerecht 2002). An excerpt from bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa, or religious edict, that called for jihad against all Americans serves as an example of the use of victimage to justify attacks on the West:

For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim Peoples. . . .The ruling to kill the Americans
and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.

In other writings throughout his career, bin Laden cites the American use of atomic bombs in World War II as justification for using WMD on America, should the opportunity present itself. At one point, he dubs the acquisition of WMD as a “religious duty” in order to deter American interference in the Middle East or, failing that, in order to inflict massive damage and death upon the American homeland. Bin Laden and his allies, by invoking the suffering of civilians and by manipulating the Koran’s teachings on jihad, are attempting to justify to their audience their attacks on civilians. This indicates that al Qaeda is at least somewhat concerned about the way it is regarded by its constituents (Tucker 2001).

There is no question that al Qaeda is ready and willing to inflict large-scale casualties on the United States. The continuation of its campaign of terror, particularly the attacks of September 11, 2001, indicate that inflicting mass casualties is not only acceptable, but preferable. However, this does not automatically lead to the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Bin Laden and al Qaeda seem to have little preference for the manner in which they kill Americans, so long as they do kill a great many of them. Bin Laden’s worldview is not apocalyptic or dependent on the use of WMD (Parachini 2003). Rather, the acquisition of WMD, especially nuclear weapons, is a goal of al Qaeda’s because the use of such weapons would succeed in both killing a larger amount of Americans than al Qaeda has ever accomplished before, and it would elevate the group to an even greater status among its peers; however, if acquisition proved too difficult, al Qaeda would simply devise another means to kill Americans.

There is ample evidence to suggest that al Qaeda has extensively explored the use of WMD in general and nuclear weapons in particular. Bin Laden’s writings that allude to the acquisition of WMD as a religious duty, his early attempts to purchase uranium, and the numerous documents and diagrams found in Afghanistan that deal with al Qaeda’s nuclear program are clear indicators of this. There has been consensus with this acceptance of the use of nuclear weapons in terrorist attacks among other fundamentalist figures as well. A fatwa attributed to al Qaeda associate Abu Shihab el-Kandahari appeared in December of 2002, in which nuclear warfare was deemed, “The Solution for
Destroying America.” It is clear that al Qaeda possesses the necessary will to acquire and use nuclear weapons. Its ability to do so, however, is somewhat questionable.

Conclusions

Al Qaeda meets several factors in Badey’s Nuclear Terrorism Index almost perfectly, while others are only partially met. The group’s access to fissile material will continue to be constrained by the strict requirements regarding the amount, type, and composition of the material. The efforts to acquire such material will also depend heavily on its access to insiders at nuclear facilities in Pakistan or the former Soviet Union. The group still has ample financial resources to recruit such personnel and pay for fissile material. Transportation of the material to the bomb’s assembly would not present great difficulty given the poor border security in the former Soviet states and the Middle East.

It will be difficult to restrict al Qaeda’s access to non-nuclear components of a bomb because of the common nature of these components. Because they are readily available for use in other applications, they do not trigger any alarms when acquired, as the absence of fissile material from nuclear sites would. The non-nuclear components are also widely available on almost every continent, making it much more difficult to discover any purchases by known al Qaeda associates. The best intelligence agencies could hope to do to track purchases of nuclear technology is to detect patterns where individuals with known al Qaeda connections purchase the necessary components for a bomb in a relatively short time span. This would only work in the remote case that al Qaeda used procurement personnel who had previously been identified as associates of the group.

The same concerns exist for the recruitment of skilled personnel. US Government officials estimate that 5,000 personnel with intimate knowledge of nuclear weapon design and construction live in the former Soviet Union alone (Sciolino 1992). The existence of now-defunct Libyan, Iraqi, and South African programs, plus the existence of some Pakistani (and possibly Iranian) experts with ideological sympathies towards al Qaeda greatly increases this number. The unemployed Iraqi scientists represent an especially grave threat, in that the US occupation of Iraq has given them a cause through which to justify cooperation
with terrorists. Al Qaeda meets the geographic and the psychological and ideological factors of the index perfectly.

The organizational challenges are where al Qaeda’s abilities break down. The damage to al Qaeda’s senior command, which is crucial to any attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, severely inhibits any efforts towards such an acquisition. Indeed, according to a personal interview with Dr. Gavin Cameron, the core leadership of al Qaeda (Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other senior lieutenants) are so crucial to any effort to acquire nuclear weapons that, as long as they remain on the run, the chances of a nuclear-capable al Qaeda are significantly reduced. Cameron also notes that al Qaeda still retains the financial assets to support a nuclear acquisition program. Given its more decentralized command structure and the lack of direct command from the senior leadership, Cameron feels that it is more likely that al Qaeda will attempt an attack using a radiological dispersion bomb or a chemical or biological weapon. Cameron notes that, if the senior leadership were to re-establish itself securely in a new sanctuary, it would likely be able to re-establish the command and control structure necessary for a nuclear acquisition program. This re-establishment will require the waning of the US-led War on Terror, an occurrence that is unlikely to occur in the near future. Given that, the current threat of a nuclear-capable al Qaeda, though potent enough to warrant increased efforts on the part of the US, is less likely than their use of other methods of WMD attack, such as chemical or biological weapons.

**Nuclear Threat Assessment Scale Applied to al Qaeda**

What is concerning is that there is no aspect of the index that can be completely and safely judged to be beyond al Qaeda’s capabilities, even in its post-9/11 condition. Its chief difficulties would most likely be in acquiring the necessary amount of fissile material in the proper form and achieving the organizational and operational security and secrecy necessary to a nuclear project. Since the crackdown on Aum Shurykinyo, the Japanese cult responsible for the Tokyo nerve gas attacks, al Qaeda remains the only group that has ever achieved the scale of operational ability necessary to conduct a nuclear program (Parachini 2003). Given the damage to their operational network since 9/11 and the increased vigilance of security and intelligence agencies worldwide, it would
be extremely difficult for al Qaeda to meet all the necessary requirements for developing a nuclear capability, all while maintaining operational security and secrecy. It is likely that the operation would take several years of planning and execution, as well as a reduced amount of determination on the part of the United States and its allies in the War on Terror.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to Fissile Material</th>
<th>Limited. Most difficult obstacle to overcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to Nuclear Related Technologies</td>
<td>Abundant. Much of the additional technology for a crude nuclear device is used for other non-military applications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Skilled Personnel</td>
<td>Expensive, but otherwise easy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Factors</td>
<td>Temporarily damaged. Core leaders are crucial to the effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical Factors</td>
<td>Mostly Ideal. Group maintains close proximity to likely sources of materials, though not immediately to targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological/Ideological Factors</td>
<td>Ideal for pursuit of nuclear capability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite this optimistic conclusion, the scale of the threat and the implications of a terrorist nuclear attack demand increased preventive efforts. The only silver lining within the dark cloud of the 9/11 attacks was that it called attention to the threat posed by al Qaeda and mass-casualty terrorism. We must now act on that threat. Programs that aim to secure fissile material and employ out-of-work nuclear experts, such as the Nunn-Lugar initiative, should be expanded to include new nuclear nations such as India and Pakistan. We must bolster and increase our efforts to secure highly enriched uranium and plutonium and reduce their use in nuclear reactors. Nonproliferation efforts must be two-fold, focusing on fissile material and likely nuclear actors. Because a nuclear bomb simply cannot go off without the proper nuclear material, securing such material will vastly reduce the likelihood of nuclear terrorism by any group (Allison 2004).
On the other side of the effort against terrorism, global intelligence and law enforcement entities should develop and adopt threat assessment scales such as Badey’s Nuclear Terrorism Index in order to gauge the threat potential of future terrorist organizations. Such threat assessment scales will allow intelligence and law enforcement to target their efforts on the most threatening groups in a particular threat category. Through these steps, we will certainly not eliminate terrorism in all its forms, but we can hope to drastically reduce the chances that terrorists will gain access to the most destructive forces ever conceived.
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The Global AIDS Crisis: How to Ensure Access to Essential Medicines in the Developing World

Jennifer Hainsfurther
Duke University

This paper discusses the problem of limited access to antiretroviral drugs in developing countries, advocating a two-pronged approach in which developed states and the private sector take steps to reduce the price of essential drugs, which can then be distributed by the World Health Organization and non-governmental organizations. The paper details obstacles to lowering drug prices and argues that there are many legal methods that can be employed to reduce the price of drugs without bankrupting the pharmaceutical industry. The paper also addresses the claim of critics that antiretroviral drugs cannot be distributed in developing states because they lack the necessary health care infrastructure and disputes that claim using the case studies of Botswana and the 3x5 initiative.

Introduction

HIV/AIDS is the greatest health crisis the world faces today. An estimated 40 million people are now living with HIV/AIDS, and 95% of those people live in developing countries (World Health Organization 2003). AIDS has a devastating impact on countries, destroying economies, families and communities, and affecting education, health care systems, and even the food supply. The loss of teachers to AIDS contributes to illiteracy and lack of skills. The decimation of civil servants weakens core government functions, threatening security. In high-income states, antiretroviral (ARV) therapy has extended and improved life for large numbers of people living with HIV/AIDS and transformed perceptions of HIV/AIDS from a fatal disease to a manageable, chronic illness (World Health Organization 2003). Of the 6 million people in developing countries who currently urgently need antiretroviral therapy, fewer than 8% are receiving it (World Health Organization 2003). The barriers are numerous: the drugs are expensive and often protected by patents that keep the prices high, many countries have poor health care infrastructures, and, in addition to these structural barriers, many countries (both developed and developing)
demonstrate a lack of political will to tackle HIV/AIDS with the necessary urgency.

What approaches are necessary to ensure access to essential medicines (antiretroviral drugs) in developing countries? This paper will address the need for a multifaceted approach to providing access to antiretroviral drugs in developing countries, led by an international institution such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and supplemented by developed countries’ actions to reduce the price of drugs.

A two-pronged approach must be taken to provide access to antiretroviral drugs. First, the price of ARVs must decline. Developed states and the private sector can and should take action to decrease the price of drugs. Second, drugs must be distributed to developing countries, many of which lack a sound health care infrastructure. The WHO, in partnership with nongovernmental organizations, should lead the effort to distribute ARVs and build a health care infrastructure in developing states whose leaders have shown a commitment to reducing HIV rates.

Legal Background: Patents and TRIPS

The high price of antiretroviral drugs remains a significant barrier to developing states’ access to essential medicines. Until recently, lifesaving HIV/AIDS drug cocktails cost $10,000-$15,000 a year in many African countries (Weissman, 2002). Patents remain one of the key causes of the high price of ARVs. Pharmaceutical companies and others who argue on behalf of a stringent intellectual property rights regime argue that patents are necessary in order for pharmaceuticals to fund further research and development. As Nora Kahn explains, “The logic behind patent protection is that inventors can recoup the development costs of an innovative product only if that product is protected from replication by unauthorized actors” (Kahn 2002).

Global intellectual property rights are primarily governed by the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), a World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement that contains the international rules on intellectual property. In general, TRIPS requires countries to adopt U.S.-style patent systems, applying to both products and processes and lasting for 20 years. Industry, the pharmaceutical sector in particular, exercised heavy influence over the TRIPS negotiations; as a result, TRIPS favors corporations and harms
developing countries (Weissman, 2002). For example, TRIPS requires countries to adopt a patent system similar to that of the United States: patents on both products and processes generally last for 20 years. Developing countries must change their patent laws to conform to this system, even though today’s industrialized countries adopted much weaker patent laws while they were still developing and industrializing.

**Impact on Developed States**

In addition to the TRIPS regime, which favors developed states that hold many of the world’s pharmaceutical patents, developed states have contributed to the global AIDS crisis in other ways. According to Paul Harris and Patricia Siplon (2001): “Developed countries have remained reticent about making meaningful financial contributions to the problem, and they have actively blocked efforts by developing countries’ governments and activists around the globe to provide affordable treatment options for people in low-income countries.”

For example, when South Africa passed the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act in 1998 (aimed at increasing the availability of affordable medicines by permitting the gray market importation of AIDS drugs and the granting of compulsory licenses for the domestic production of AIDS medicines regardless of foreign patents), a group of pharmaceuticals companies brought suit against South Africa for violating TRIPS. The United States put pressure on South Africa by withholding trade benefits and threatening future trade sanctions (’t Hoen 2002).

Developed states have an economic as well as the obvious moral reason for contributing to (rather than harming) developing states’ efforts to provide access to essential medicines. While sub-Saharan Africa may only have a minimal impact on developed state economies, the global AIDS crisis is poised to spread to India, China, and Russia next-- three states with large populations and substantial markets for developed state products. Nicholas Eberstadt (2002) discusses the coming AIDS pandemic in Eurasia:

Eurasia is home to the great majority of the world’s population; five out of every eight people on the planet live there. It has substantial economic weight- its combined GNP in 2000 of $15
trillion exceeded that of either the United States or Europe. Militarily, it is home to four out of five of the world’s million-strong armies, and four of the seven declared nuclear states. Thus, unlike in sub-Saharan Africa, unexpected shocks there—such as the unfolding HIV/AIDS epidemic—will have major worldwide repercussions.

The damaging impact an AIDS epidemic would have on the economy would likely have a powerful effect on the United States and other developed states. The pandemic in Russia, India, and China stands to alter the economic potential of these states, the latter two of which are WTO members. One study estimated that by 2010 AIDS will reduce the growth rate of China’s GDP, causing China to lose between 22.5 to 45 billion (Sabin 2003). Global economic interdependence—accelerated and deepened by WTO trade rounds that further open up markets—ensures that the devastating economic consequences of AIDS will reach far past each country’s borders. When the Thai baht collapsed, markets around the world were affected. An AIDS pandemic in Eurasia will have a similar domino effect on markets around the world.

**Drug Pricing**

The price of drugs will remain a critical factor in determining whether, and how many, people with HIV/AIDS receive treatment (Weissman 2002). Several methods exist for reducing prices, including compulsory licensing, parallel importing, tiered pricing, global bulk purchase, and the creation of a global pricing registry. Compulsory licensing allows a country to issue a license to a third party (i.e., a generic manufacturer) to make a patented product and then pay a small royalty to the owner of the patent. By creating competition in the market for a patented good, prices to consumers are lowered. Robert Weissman estimates that compulsory licensing can lower the price of medicines by 95% or more (Weissman 2002).

Opponents of compulsory licensing argue that such licensing creates the problem of lower quality drugs. Detractors of compulsory licensing also employ the pro-patents argument regarding research and development of new drugs. The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers takes the position that “Compulsory licensing is a threat to good public health by denying patients
around the world the future benefits of R&D capabilities of the research-based industry from which new therapies come” (‘t Hoen 2002).

Until mid-1999 the United States actively opposed developing country efforts to implement compulsory licensing or other measures to make HIV/AIDS drugs more affordable and available in low-income countries. When AIDS activists staged protests that disrupted the beginning of Al Gore’s presidential campaign, the Clinton administration announced it would take health issues as well as commercial concerns into account when considering health-related intellectual property disputes. Towards the end of 1999, President Clinton issued an executive order stipulating that the U.S. would not challenge TRIPS-compliant policy measures to make AIDS medicines available anywhere in Africa (Weissman, 2002).

Despite frequently blocking developing states’ use of compulsory licenses, in the fall of 2001 the United States declared a compulsory license for CIPRO during the anthrax crisis. The United States’ ability to issue a compulsory license to increase its supply of essential medicines reveals the hypocrisy underlying developed states’ actions toward developing countries’ access to essential AIDS medicines. Developed states should stop all efforts to block developing states from issuing compulsory licenses. This would greatly reduce the price of ARVs as well as enable developing states to increase their supply of ARVs by producing generics within their country.

The biggest problem with compulsory licensing lies in the fact that many developing countries, even if they were to issue a compulsory license, do not have the manufacturing capacity to produce ARVs. Parallel importing, which allows a country to buy drugs that are sold more cheaply in another country, would help solve this problem. Parallel imports ensure that generic goods can be imported from countries where a patent has expired or was never issued. Parallel importing is allowed within certain limitations by TRIPS; for example, governments are not allowed to bring legal disputes to the WTO over parallel importing (Harris and Siplon, 2001) Parallel imports have an important role to play in ensuring access to essential medicines, because most sub-Saharan African countries do not have the capacity to manufacture drugs themselves.

Tiered pricing is another way to lower the price of ARVs for developing states. Tiered pricing, a system of established differentiated prices based on a country’s ability to pay, is used for many vaccines administered globally; thus, it already has a proven track record. According to Peter Hammer, “The differential
pricing of AIDS drugs could provide people in developing countries with access to effective therapeutic treatments without necessarily harming either pharmaceutical companies or patients in developed countries” (Hammer 2002, 886). Market demand and the ability to pay for ARVs is much higher in developed countries than in developing ones, so it makes economic sense to charge higher prices in developed countries (where demand and ability to pay is high) and lower prices in developing countries. Pharmaceutical companies could enforce market segmentation by making the same drugs in different colors or using packaging to differentiate between high and low-priced markets. One of the most significant obstacles to a system of differential pricing for drugs is the political will of consumers and governments in developed countries not to demand similar discounts for the low-priced products (Hammer 2002). Thus, in order for tiered pricing to succeed, it must be illegal for developed countries to reimport drugs priced for developing countries (Thomas 2002). The problem of the lack of markets in developing states, even with lower priced drugs, remains; however, governments can help create markets by purchasing drugs and offering universal ARVs to citizens.

Two further methods of reducing the price of ARVs include global bulk purchase and a global pricing registry. Global bulk purchase, in which an international agent could purchase drugs in bulk from the producer offering the lowest bid, corroborates my approach that the WHO should play a significant role in ensuring access to essential medicines. The WHO should negotiate price reductions with pharmaceutical companies, purchase drugs in bulk, and distribute them to developing countries meeting certain conditions, such as demonstrating that the AIDS crisis is a national priority. A global pricing registry, which could also be managed by the WHO, would offer a comparative database of manufacturer prices to developing states looking to purchase drugs at the lowest possible price. Both of these measures would increase competition and lower price. While none of these measures alone is sufficient to effectively lower the price of drugs around the world, together they can significantly reduce the price of essential medicines. Compulsory licensing and parallel importing provide the necessary foundation for developing states to produce and buy drugs cheaply, while a system of tiered pricing would allow AIDS drugs to remain profitable for pharmaceutical companies based in developed states. Global bulk purchase and a global pricing registry provide additional help for developing states and
international institutions to coordinate efforts and reduce the price of drugs further.

Revisiting TRIPS

Many of these methods of price reduction are legal with respect to TRIPS. In June 2001 African countries worked together to put access to health technologies on the agenda at the TRIPS Council. On November 14, 2001 the WTO adopted the Doha Declaration, which states that:

The TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while retaining our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we reaffirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all (Hammer 2002, 891).

The Doha Declaration further affirms that, “each Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted” (Hammer 2002, 892). Compulsory licensing is specified as a legal act. The United States has worked bilaterally to undermine this provision. For example, the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement sharply limits the grounds for compulsory licensing (Weissman 2002). Developed states can and should stop undermining compulsory licensing through bilateral and other multilateral trade agreements that impose separate intellectual property obligations.

There are further measures developed states could take to help ensure access to essential medicines in developing countries. In November 2003, the Canadian government introduced draft legislation that would amend its patent laws to allow drug makers to manufacture and export lower-cost generic medicines to developing countries. The legislation makes Canada the first G8 government to undertake legislative reform in order to implement a pact agreed to in August 2003 by members of the WTO to help developing countries protect public health and ensure access to medicines, including medicines for people living with HIV (UNAIDS 2003b). The United States and the rest of the G8
countries should follow suit, allowing companies within their borders to produce
generic versions of ARVs and export them to developing states that do not have
the capacity to manufacture the medicines themselves. Developed states should
agree to a good-faith implementation of the Doha Declaration and should stop
seeking more expansive intellectual property provisions in other trade
agreements. Additionally, the United States government holds the patent to many
HIV/AIDS drugs that were developed with government funding. The United
States should license to the WHO all of the HIV/AIDS drugs for which it holds
patents (Weissman 2002).

There are clearly many steps that developing states can take to lower the
price of essential medicines. While pharmaceuticals worry about declining profits
and lack of incentive to do research and development, on a moral level this
argument should not be used to deny millions of people access to drugs.
Furthermore, there does not currently appear to be a market for AIDS drugs in
sub-Saharan Africa; at their current price, very few people can afford these drugs.
Compulsory licensing, parallel importing, and a two-tiered pricing system all
have the potential to create a market for AIDS drugs in Africa, particularly if
governments are able to purchase ARVs at a lower price for distribution to their
citizens. Thus, there is potential for profits to increase because with lower prices,
the market size would increase. Furthermore, compulsory licensing does involve
paying a royalty to the owner of the patent. Lastly, it is vitally important to
develop these measures now, in order to head off an AIDS pandemic in India,
China, and Russia, where an AIDS crisis could have devastating impact on their
own economies as well as those of their trading partners.

**Health Care Infrastructure: Botswana Case Study**

While it has been made clear that the price of ARVs ought to be lower
and that there are steps that can be taken to achieve this goal, lower prices alone
do not ensure access to essential medicines. Distribution and a sound health care
infrastructure play an important role in ensuring access to essential medicines.
Many proponents of strict patent laws use the importance of a health care

*Information for my case study on Botswana is primarily taken from the UNAIDS report
(2003), “Stepping back from the Edge: The Pursuit of Antiretroviral Therapy in
Botswana, South Africa, and Uganda.”
infrastructure to argue that pharmaceuticals and developed states do not need to lower prices, because even with lower prices, drugs cannot be distributed when developing countries lack the health care infrastructure to support the widespread dissemination of drugs. In the absence of a sufficiently developed public health infrastructure, the health impact of low-priced drugs will be marginal. It is argued that (Harris and Siplon 2001):

While drugs are an answer to the AIDS plague in North America and Western Europe, they are not the solution for Africa and many other extremely poor nations. The reasons are simple. Drugs designed for people in more developed countries do not work as well for people living in countries that have no hospitals, clinics, clean water, sewers, roads, or doctors.

While Kaplan and others argue that pharmaceutical markets require a system of distribution, roads for efficient transportation, warehouse facilities to store inventory, and trained personnel to dispense medication, many NGOs have proven this argument wrong by effectively dispensing ARVs in developing states with little health infrastructure.

A UNAIDS (2003b) report on accelerating action against AIDS in Africa cites successful AIDS initiatives in Kenya, Uganda, the Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Botswana, to name a few. The example of Botswana will illustrate what is possible to accomplish, even in Sub-Saharan Africa. Botswana has one of the highest HIV prevalence levels in the world; in 2000 the Cabinet declared AIDS a national emergency. The government put considerable extra resources into HIV/AIDS prevention and care activities, particularly preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV. President Festus Mogae then declared his intention to make ARV drugs available to every HIV-infected person who needed them. In 2001 Botswana became the first country in Southern Africa with a national program offering drugs for opportunistic infections as well as ARV treatment.

The new universal ARV program was named Masa (“new dawn”) and received technical and financial assistance from the African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership (ACHAP). Professionals were recruited from abroad with the goal of passing on their skills to build up local capacity. A team of experts conducted a study of Botswana’s situation and launched the Masa program at four test sites across the country. The Masa program was offered through the
public health care system, but Botswana’s health care system suffered from a shortage of staff and almost no expertise in treating HIV/AIDS. The Harvard AIDS Institute developed a training course to train health personnel in providing ARV treatment. By mid-2003 over 700 people across Botswana and at all levels of the health services had completed the training program. A second training program was developed to bring HIV experts from renowned international institutions to work in the clinics with the staff, mentoring them and sharing their expertise.

A computer system was set up to track patients, see what drugs they were given and when, and to monitor adherence. Doctors, pharmacists, laboratory staff, and program administrators all have access to the records, but can only enter data relevant to their own area of concern. When the program was first started, Botswana did not have an AIDS laboratory and samples had to be sent to South Africa for analysis. In December 2001 a new HIV reference laboratory opened in the capital, funded by the government, along with Bristol Myers Squibb and ACHAP. The Botswana-Harvard AIDS Institute Partnership provides technical assistance. A smaller laboratory was opened up in another city with help from the U.S. Center for Disease Control.

Patients are only given a month’s supply of drugs at a time, helping to ensure adherence to the drug regime. When first put on drugs, patients are expected to return to a clinic for monitoring of their CD4 count and viral load every 2 weeks for the first month, monthly for the next three months, and eventually every three months. A buddy program was started by a local NGO, the Coping Center for People Living with HIV/AIDS, helping to ensure that citizens will remember to take their medicine and comply with all the provisions of treatment. The Masa program has expanded to nine additional sites. Reaching people in villages beyond the reach of Botswana’s road presents a challenge, but administrators in Botswana say that one lesson they have learned is that programs should not be put on hold until everything is in place and conditions are ideal before introducing ARVs. Starting small and then expanding the program has had great success in Botswana: by July 2003, 10,415 patients had enrolled in the Masa program and 6,791 were on antiretrovirals.

Botswana’s experience shows that a government committed to combating AIDS, with the help of NGOs providing technical and financial assistance, can create a successful program for the dissemination of free AIDS drugs. NGOs played a critical role in training local doctors and other health care
staff, an important factor in creating a program in Botswana that was both sustainable and eventually capable of being locally run. The ability of the WHO to create sustainable ARV therapy programs by training local health care workers is of critical importance to the ultimate goal of providing universal access to essential medicines in developing countries. Furthermore, training new personnel for various aspects of the ARV program, such as lab work and counseling, will create jobs. Although it is important to note that Botswana is one of the most economically prosperous and politically stable countries in Africa, successful programs are also underway in Cambodia, Cameroon, Mozambique, Thailand and Zambia (UNAIDS & WHO 2004).

The WHO and the 3x5 Initiative

Botswana’s successful program illustrates the importance of NGOs, particularly in funding and providing technical capacity. An international institution can play an important role in coordinating NGO activity. The World Health Organization is the best option for an international institution to coordinate a global AIDS initiative and has already moved in this direction with its 3x5 initiative (developed in conjunction with UNAIDS.) The 3x5 initiative is a joint WHO/UNAIDS initiative to provide 3 million people in developing countries with antiretroviral therapy by the end of 2005. The WHO (2003) states its goal as follows:

The goal of the Initiative is for the WHO and its partners to make the greatest possible contribution to prolonging the survival and restoring the quality of life in individuals with HIV/AIDS, advancing toward the ultimate goal of universal access to antiretroviral therapy to those in need of care, as a human right and within the context of a comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS.

Major new investment in developing countries’ health systems is necessary, and the WHO cites a double-pronged strategy of prevention and treatment.

The 3x5 initiative is based upon five pillars: global leadership, strong partnership and advocacy; urgent, sustained country support; simplified, standardized tools for delivering antiretroviral therapy; effective, reliable supply
of medicines and diagnostics; and rapidly identifying and reapplying new knowledge and successes. The WHO will support all national antiretroviral therapy programs, such as the one previously described in Botswana, while targeting particular efforts on the high-burden countries in greatest need. The WHO will take action in high-risk countries such as recruiting both young and experienced people into health work, increasing community input, initiating large-scale in-service training focused on ARV therapy and expanding pre-service training.

While national and local programs will differ from country to country, the WHO will implement a broad framework across the board by simplifying guidelines for HIV testing and counseling and for the referral of individuals at high risk for HIV diseases. The WHO developed guidelines for maximized use of multiple entry points to identify people who need ARV therapy. The organization will also simplify and standardize clinical protocols for delivering ARV therapy and will publish guidelines on the requirements for laboratory monitoring of ARV therapy.

The 3x5 initiative establishes an AIDS Medicines and Diagnostics Service (AMDS) to ensure an effective, reliable supply of medicines and diagnostics at a sustainable cost. While the AMDS will not directly purchase medicine, the AMDS will provide information on prices, patents, customs, and other regulatory matters. This corresponds with the idea of a global pricing registry, discussed earlier as an important tool for bringing down the cost of drugs. The WHO could probably improve upon this by actually purchasing drugs; bulk purchasing would allow them to be bought more cheaply.

Finally, the WHO hopes to build upon its own success and the achievement of capable national programs, such as the one in Botswana, by documenting successful ARV therapy programs and the lessons learned. The WHO estimates a budget of US$350 million for 2004-2005. Eighty-four percent of this amount will be allocated to fund staffing and activities in countries and regions (WHO 2003). The WHO will work with national and local governments, civil society, bilateral donors, multilateral organizations, foundations, the private sector, trade unions, faith-based organizations, local and international NGOs, and community-based organizations to successfully implement the initiative. This supports my model of a global aids initiative led by an international institution but supplemented by many other partners.
The 3x5 initiative is a particularly important global initiative that can be expanded in order to ensure universal access to essential medicines. The success of the 3x5 program depends on coordinated, scaled-up country action, thus it is important that countries meet certain conditions in order to qualify for WHO aid. On September 22, 2003 the WHO declared a global health emergency. Countries who responded to the declaration demonstrated their demand for active collaboration with the WHO. National leaders must demonstrate a willingness to work to eradicate this problem, first by acknowledging the problem, and second, by committing some of their own resources, as Botswana did. The first countries to receive aid should be those who have committed themselves to universal access to antiretroviral therapy. Developing countries have a desperate need for government programs to provide access to essential medicines, because drugs are too expensive for individuals. The WHO can lead a successful initiative to provide ARV therapy in developing states, but a committed effort by developing state governments is a necessary component for success.

The 3x5 initiative hopes to expand community involvement in planning and delivering antiretroviral therapy programs. This is particularly important because citizens will play an active role in the process, rather than having it forced upon them by an outside agency. Both national leaders and ordinary citizens must have a voice in the process in order for long-term access to ARV therapy to be a success.

Conclusion

Comprehensive AIDS care will have many long-term positive consequences. Creating ARV therapy programs in developing states will help build up a health care infrastructure that eventually may create stronger markets for ARV drugs and other medicines. This could lead to potential profits for the pharmaceuticals that currently fear lowering prices will erode profit so drastically that they will no longer be able to fund research and development.

Another long-term benefit will be a reduction in health care costs. Brazil has offered comprehensive AIDS care since the mid-1990s, including universal access to ARV treatment. Not only has the Brazilian AIDS program reduced AIDS-related mortality by more than 50% between 1996 and 1999, but in two years Brazil saved $472 million in hospital costs and treatment costs for AIDS-related infections (‘t Hoen 2002.) The success of Brazil’s program also
demonstrates the need for lowering the price of drugs, as discussed earlier in this paper. The ability to produce medicines locally lies at the core of the success of Brazil’s AIDS program. Brazilian patent laws allow for compulsory licensing. As a result of generic competition, the price of AIDS drugs in Brazil fell by 82% over five years (‘t Hoen 2002). Incidentally, in another demonstration of developed state efforts to block access to ARV treatment, the United States brought suit against Brazil at the WTO, arguing that Brazil’s compulsory licensing law discriminated against US owners of Brazilian patents and curtailed patent holders’ rights. Under intense pressure from international NGOs, the US dropped the suit (‘t Hoen 2002).

With the right combination of action from NGOs, industry, developed states, and developing states, the WHO can lead a successful initiative to provide access to ARV therapy to citizens in developing states. The ultimate goal of universal access to ARV therapy is possible, but only with a committed endeavor by developing state governments and a concerted effort by developed states to implement policies that will support developing states’ abilities to produce and buy drugs cheaply. Developed states need to act to reduce the price of essential medicines. Then, the WHO and other NGOs can ensure distribution in developing states, creating programs for dissemination of ARV therapy, building up health care infrastructure and training health personnel. ARV therapy has made AIDS a livable disease in the developed world. In the developing world, AIDS remains a death sentence and has devastating consequences for entire nations. Using the approaches described in this paper, AIDS need not remain a crippling pandemic.
References


The Not-So-Golden Straitjacket: How Structural Adjustment has Failed in Sub-Saharan Africa

Daniel McDowell
Malone College

The implementation of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has not resulted in the predicted level of economic growth. Contrary to the claims of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), SAPs have not decreased international debt and poverty or increased foreign direct investment and industrialization rates in SSA. In fact, the analysis presented here shows that in many cases, the reverse has actually occurred. This is partially due to a misinterpretation of Asian economic success that has been used to justify current adjustment programs and has been compared to the present situation in SSA. This paper points out failure and broadens the discourse as it relates to economic development. Instead of continuing to promote and support unsuccessful policies, development programs need to change and adapt to the needs of local populations, focus more on social and human development, allow the state to invest in its economy and redefine how we judge a program’s success.

Introduction

The modern discourse on economic development has grown increasingly one-sided over the past two and a half decades. Dominated by neo-liberal thinkers and such international financial institutions as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the reduction of state economic control and a move toward open markets have been the only real options available to the developing world. Gone are the days of centrally planned economies and socialist regimes. These are no longer viable paths. In their absence, the free market has filled the vacuum, bringing with it promises of wealth and prosperity. This notion is, perhaps, nowhere more evident than in Thomas Friedman’s work, The Lexus and the Olive Tree where he states, “in the end, if you want higher standards of living in a world without walls, the free market is the only ideological alternative left. One road. Different speeds. But one road” (Friedman 2000, 104).
This “road” that Friedman continually refers to is a set of economic steps known as the Washington Consensus. These reforms, to name a few, include the privatization of the public sector, reducing the size and role of bureaucracy, liberalizing trade, and lifting restrictions on foreign investment. Apologists for the Washington Consensus, like Friedman, argue that there is no more effective way for poor nations to create wealth than this model. At the core of their argument is the recent prosperity of the “Asian tigers” who, it is said, experienced unprecedented economic growth primarily because they put on Friedman’s Golden Straitjacket of economic liberalism. In fact, their development so confirmed the rightness of free market policies that in a 1993 publication the World Bank declared the event, and the title of the text, The East Asian Miracle. Since the 1980s, the neo-liberals have taken this supposed model for success and applied it to the rest of the developing world, evidenced by Paul Kennedy’s famous comparison:

Nothing better illustrates the growing differences among developing countries than the fact that in the 1960s, South Korea had a per capita GNP exactly the same as Ghana’s ($230) whereas today it is ten to twelve times more prosperous. Both possessed a predominantly agrarian economy and had endured a half century of more of colonial rule…. however, West African states remain among the most poverty-stricken countries in the world…while Korea is entering the ranks of the high income economies (Kennedy 1993, 193).

Beside the erroneous assumption that the initial conditions in these two distinctly different countries were more or less the same, the conclusion that many draw from Kennedy’s statement is that Korea advanced because, unlike Ghana, it properly implemented Washington Consensus reforms. But is this really the case? Contrary to such claims, historical evidence suggests a different story entirely—a story in which the state plays a significant role in the early stages of Asian development. By carefully examining the policies of several of these “tiger” nations, it is apparent that there has been either a great misinterpretation or a great misrepresentation of Asia’s emergence onto the world economic stage. Once such a fundamental component of an ideology is
undermined, its applicability to other regions, specifically sub-Saharan Africa, must necessarily be questioned—which is precisely what this paper does.

What Really Happened in Asia

Japan, the first of the Asian countries to truly industrialize, was transformed into a market economy in 1949 under the auspices of the American occupation authority. But even as it eliminated many of its economic controls, the state “continued to play a substantial role in the economy” (Okazaki 2001, 331-332). This was done specifically through its Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which was responsible for coordinating the nation’s industrial policy. To achieve its developmental goals, it used a variety of tools including price setting, import and market share quotas, and quality standards. Furthermore, MITI “tried to ensure that ‘excessive’ domestic competition did not erode the strength that Japanese firms needed in order to compete overseas.” (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 162). In a display that runs counter to the Golden Straitjacket, MITI used its power to orchestrate mergers, encourage small and medium-sized companies to specialize, and even went so far as to attempt to hogtie foreign competitors in Japan by using an array of various barriers. In short, “this system was the nexus of daily life for the Japanese economy, and it was out of this nexus that Japan’s extraordinary achievement arose” (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 162).

The development of South Korea, which is so often cited by neo-liberals as the prime example of free market triumph, actually was largely modeled after the Japanese experience. Throughout the 1960s, under the leadership of General Park Chung Hee, Korea’s economy was focused on pushing exports. But because the population was on the whole quite poor, there was little capital available for entrepreneurs. By the 1970s, the Park government decided that if Korea was to compete globally it needed big companies that would be financed largely through state controlled banks (Woo-Cummings 2001, 353). Their strategy to achieve this was the promotion of a group of national champions they deemed chaebols. The government picked firms that were already successful in one arena. These companies were then offered exclusive low-interest government loans, tax incentives, and protection from both foreign and domestic competitors in the Korean market. This process is explained in more detail by
Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw (1998), neither one a supporter of planned economies:

The companies received exclusive licenses for their products, and only one chaebol was allowed to sell in the domestic market during the first phase of a new industry. The government forced the chaebols to attain international competitiveness in their fields according to a strict timetable and across a broad range of their products. If they did not, they suffered economic and political penalties (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 169).

And how did these businesses respond to such unnecessary and stifling government meddling? Their growth was astronomical. In fact, between 1970 and 1975, the three chaebols that expanded the fastest, Hyundai, Daewoo, and Ssangyong, grew at annual rates of 33, 35, and 34 per cent respectively. South Korea developed not because of the free market, but rather because the state subsidized industry—a minor detail the World Bank must have overlooked (Woo-Cummings 2001, 353).

And then there is the case of Singapore, which in the 1960s began its turn around with the establishment of its Economic Development Board (EDB). The EDB established state-owned enterprises and encouraged compliance by tying promotions of executives to the profits of their respective companies. Like Japan and Korea before it, throughout Singapore’s modernization, the government was an “active facilitator. It was the agenda keeper, the long range planner, a strategic player in its own right, and the manager of resources” (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 181). What is important to note about each of these Asian examples is that they did eventually move to adopt Washington Consensus policies—however, this was only after they had raised their standard of living and established themselves as viable economic competitors in the global market. Thus, in contrast to dominant ideology, it was not the free market that brought East Asia out of poverty, but instead the state.

A Flawed Comparison

The reason it is so important that we understand the truth about Asia’s modernization is because its success has so often been applied to the rest of the
developing world and in particular to SSA. Understanding the true nature of Asia’s rise is therefore of paramount importance because interpretation ultimately affects implementation. Moreover, it is important that we question the correctness of a comparison altogether. As was evidenced by Kennedy’s quote concerning Korea and Ghana, “both possessed a predominantly agrarian economy and had endured a half century of more of colonial rule,” it has been widely assumed that East Asia and SSA had relatively similar initial conditions. When examined more closely, it is clear that the comparison is, to say the least, a bit of a stretch.

Geographically, Africa is at an immediate disadvantage. There are more landlocked countries in Africa than on any other continent. Poor transportation infrastructure and traditional colonial patterns of communication that tend to orient African economies away from intercontinental cooperation only compound this problem. The effects of colonialism are also quite different between Asia and Africa. During the fifty years Japan occupied Taiwan, it strongly emphasized the importance of education, so by 1949 half of the population was literate (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 175). Unlike the colonial rule in Taiwan, Korea, and the Philippines, Africans suffered terribly low levels of social and human development. For example, when the Congo finally achieved independence in 1960 from King Leopold’s Belgium, there were fewer than thirty African university graduates in the entire territory. There were no Congolese army officers, engineers, agronomists, or physicians. The colony’s administration had made few other steps toward a Congo run by its own people: of some five thousand management-level positions in the civil service, only three were filled by Africans (Hochschild 1999, 301). SSA nations only in the 1990s reached 1965 Asian levels in areas such as “life expectancy, secondary-school enrollment, infant mortality, and population per physician” and still remain behind in literacy among adults and enrollment in primary schools (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999, 3-5).

Another important distinction between the two regions is the prevalence of Asian states sharing development techniques and the general lack thereof in SSA. The success of Taiwan and South Korea is partially due to Japan “handing down” technology and overseas markets to its neighbors. This process began as Korea and Taiwan were Japanese colonies and has continued to the present day. As Japan moved from one stage of development to the next, it did not protect its first and second stage labor-intensive industries. In the 1930s, Japan transferred
their chemical, electrical generation, iron and steel industries to their colonial neighbors. Today, as Japan has moved toward a technology-based economy, they have aided Taiwan and Korea by giving them financial and technical support. Bruce Cumings put it this way: “Taiwan and Korea have historically been receptacles for declining Japanese industries” (Cumings 1984, 3). The process of handing down has been continued, this time from Korea and Taiwan to Indonesia and Malaysia. In contrast, Africa has not shared in the Asian practice of hand-me-downs. Instead the traditional colonial hierarchy persists as Africa continues to be primary producer for the North (Brown 1996, 45). Yet, regardless of such striking differences, somehow the distinction has not prompted the international financial institutions (IFIs) to significantly alter the present course whereas they continue to apply similar liberalization programs in Africa.

Africa’s Prescription

In 1957, Ghana became the first sub-Saharan African country to achieve independence from a European power and soon the rest of the continent began to follow suit with twenty-three nations gaining independence in the first half of the 1960’s. After suffering for decades under European imperialism, the mood in post-colonial Africa was markedly optimistic. Besides the gains in basic human rights and freedoms, there was also great hope that now, after throwing off their oppressors, African economies would finally be able to take full advantage of their rich endowment of natural resources.

Most nations adopted some form of African socialism where governments guided, and in some cases controlled, their economies. This was done specifically through parastatal agencies that oversaw the production of various cash crops—the same commodities their former colonial lords had once marketed for their own benefit. The parastatals purchased crops directly from farmers at a set low price determined by the state in order to depress production. They would then proceed to sell the given commodity abroad at the higher market price (Khapoya 1998, 260). Many governments also placed heavy tariffs on agriculture and mining exports. The money gained from these practices was used to finance various government projects, specifically supporting industry, favoring it over agriculture in an attempt to stimulate modernization. An import substitution development model was also stressed and was centered on the protection of domestic industry through import tariffs (Sahn, Dorosh, and
Younger 1997, 57). The industrial sector effectively produced for domestic markets and became “exclusively inward oriented” (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999, 13). On the whole, sub-Saharan Africa experienced nearly two decades of post independence growth, however growth would soon turn to stagnation and the need for change.

The cause for the African decline is generally blamed on the oil crisis of the 1970s that pushed the developed world into recession causing interest rates to skyrocket and a decline in demand for raw materials. Between 1973 and 1982, external debt expanded by $500 billion in non-oil least developed countries (LDCs). At its worst, from 1981-1982, the global recession and debt crisis caused international interest rates to rise 6 per cent while export growth from LDCs could not keep pace growing only 1 per cent (Cline 1985). The World Bank addressed SSA’s deteriorating conditions in its 1984 Berg Report (World Bank 1984). It, along with the IMF, was convinced that the rapid decline had nothing to do with drought, political conflict, or any other factors for that matter, but instead was solely a result of poor economic policy (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999, 21). They pointed to the sometimes corrupt, inefficient, and overstaffed agricultural marketing boards along with the import substitution methods as the primary culprits of the crash. The fundamental argument of the Berg Report was that the state should remove itself from the market and implement Washington Consensus reforms (Brown 1996). These reforms were packaged as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and were hailed as the key to African development.¹

SAPs soon became the dominant model for economic change as parastatals were dismantled, tariffs on both imports and exports were drastically reduced, and industry was made to venture into global markets. In return for adopting these macroeconomic reforms, the IFIs offered substantial loans that African nations could put toward furthering such development strategies. This debt would then be paid off with the surplus of capital earned through export sales. The key to this “export led” recovery was Africa’s comparative advantage in agriculture—the most important component of structural adjustment. With new access to the higher prices of foreign markets, it was believed that farmers would now have more incentive to produce cash crops, which would increase

¹ The very nature of the adjustment reforms is contradictory. The intent was to reduce the role of the state, yet the macroeconomic reforms were put into place by the same state they had condemned as inefficient, predatory, and corrupt (Chabal and Daloz 1999).
their income and thus lift them out of poverty (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999, 43). The IFIs were certain that these measures would “build a continent that shows real gains in both development and income in the near future” (World Bank 1984, 2). Struggling African economies, if they accepted the Bank’s prescription, would soon reap the bounteous rewards of free-market capitalism. But now, over twenty years removed from the Berg Report’s analysis, what have these reforms wrought?

The Poor Performance of Adjustment Reforms

Contrary to predictions, Africa has not experienced an economic boom since the implementation of the adjustment programs. In fact, of the fifteen African countries the World Bank labeled “core adjusters” in 1993, only 3 were later identified by the IMF as strong performers (UNCTAD 2002, 5). Because of such disappointing data, the very nature of success had to be redefined in order for the IFIs to claim any sort of victory. Hence, the Bank has branded any nation that has adequately adopted macroeconomic reforms and experienced a 0.4 per cent growth in per capita GDP a “success story” (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999, 781). At this pace, it will take even “success stories” over a century to double their per capita income. Reluctantly, the World Bank now admits that a five to seven year timetable for SAP success was “overoptimistic” (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999, 40). “Overoptimistic” may be an understatement.

One of the IFI’s most important claims was that by adopting export-led strategies, African states would effectively be able to reduce external foreign debt. However, SSA’s international debt has consistently risen over the past 2 decades, from $84 billion in 1980 to $227 billion in 1996, and reaching $292 billion in 2001 (Van de Walle 2001, 6; African Development Bank [ADB] 2004a). Africa’s debt service as a percentage of GDP has also increased from an average of 5.9 per cent between 1992 and 2001 to 6.7 per cent in 2002 (ADB 2005a). Exports have not experienced the boom that was promised by the Bank.

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2 The failure goes beyond Africa as well. In fact, of the twelve nations that received fifteen or more adjustment loans, Argentina, Bangladesh, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Jamaica, Kenya, Morocco, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal and Uganda, the average growth rate between 1980 and 1994 was zero (Easterly 2001).
either. In 1961, Africa’s share of developing country exports was at 12 per cent. In 1990, its contribution fell to a meager 5.8 per cent (Cheru 2002, 13).

Poverty has been on the rise in SSA, also contrary to the claims of the Bank and Fund. Between 1985 and 1990, poverty increased in Ghana, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, the three top countries in terms of adopting SAP policy, at rates of 4.49 per cent, 6.26 per cent, and 10.55 per cent respectively (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999, 71). Across the whole of the continent, the number of Africans living below the poverty line increased from 217 million in 1987 to 291 million in 1998. Income growth since the 1980s has not kept pace with population growth. As we enter the 21st century, per capita income in SSA is 10 per cent below its level 20 years prior and has dropped from $710 in 1995 to $651 in 2002 continent wide (ADB 2005b). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development directly addressed this occurrence in their 2002 report on African economic development:

Slow and erratic growth in SSA has also been accompanied by regressive changes in income distribution. On one hand the poorest segments of the population have experienced steeper declines in their per capita incomes than the economy as a whole…on the other hand, in some countries there has been a process of ‘equalizing downwards’ across much of the personal income distribution as real wages have fallen…pushing a large number of urban workers below the poverty line…. Adjustment policies, including trade and financial liberalization, privatization and retrenchment of the public sector, have played a significant role in the hallowing out of the middle class that has become a prominent feature of income distribution in many developing countries (emphasis added) (UNCTAD 2002, 3).

An overall increase in poverty is not the only problem adjustment has created. The Bank’s advice for African nations to exploit their comparative advantage in agriculture has resulted in negative consequences of its own. The shift toward cash crop production has changed the landscape of African farming. While the rest of the world has diversified its agricultural production, Africa has become overly specialized. Throughout the 1980s, nine major commodities made up 76 per cent of SSA’s exports, up from 70 percent in the 1960s (Cheru
Because most countries in SSA are now dependent on a select few commodities, dramatic price shifts have tremendously adverse effects on their economies. This has occurred recently as cocoa and coffee have both been experiencing rather low market values, throwing nations dependent upon these exports into financial crisis.

Burkina Faso, where the IMF and World Bank pushed for an increase in cotton production for export, has experienced a comparable situation. The government complied by providing more seed varieties and support services to cotton producers, encouraging its cultivation over traditional subsistence farming. Production grew from 117,000 tons in 1993/94 to roughly 400,000 tons in 2001/02. Burkina Faso now has a surplus of cotton, which is suffering from a low market price, in part because their increased production flooded the market, unavoidably lowering its value (Engler 2003, 26). In such circumstances, as prices fall, producers are necessarily forced to produce even more in order to maintain a living wage, which only serves to further depress the price. With the combination of low prices and little demand, income inevitably declines. The loss of profit is intensified because those who were once subsistence farmers are now forced to buy imported food, an expense that absorbs what little money they do have. And if a given country has adhered to SAP protocol and devalued their currency, the price of food imports (and all imports for that matter) increases, putting basic nourishment even further out of reach (Brown 1996, 176).

Also under the advice from the IMF, Zimbabwe encouraged individuals who lived in communal areas to move from subsistence food production to focus on maize as a cash crop for export. This agricultural shift coincided with the reduction of their crop purchasing system. Maize farmers were forced to locate their own markets and in most cases had to sell at lower than market prices to middlemen who had such access (Africa News 2004, 18). They, like many in Burkina Faso, experienced income loss and decreasing purchasing power. Then there is the case of Malawi where the threat of famine has only been worsened because the recommendation from the IFIs, to sell off their strategic grain reserves, was heeded. Payment for the sale, worth $40 million, has largely not been received. Local speculators and international buyers are being blamed for withholding payment (Ramsay and Edge 2004, 135). In both cases, adjustment has only managed to worsen the plight of poor farmers.

Another supposed benefit of structural adjustment was that if African states liberalized their economies, foreign companies would begin to invest
bringing jobs and technology, which would ultimately help industrialize SSA. Unfortunately, in the years since the implementation of the SAPs, foreign direct investment (FDI) has actually shrunk, even while it has risen globally (Brown 1996, 81). Confirming this claim, a 1992 World Bank draft, “Why Structural Adjustment has not Succeeded in Sub-Saharan Africa,” admitted, “World Bank lending has not significantly affected growth and has contributed to a statistically significant drop in investment ratios” (World Bank quoted in Cheru 2002, 21). Like foreign investment, industry on the whole has not grown as was expected. The World Bank explained in its Berg Report that its prescription of an “agricultural-based and export-oriented” development strategy for the 1980s was not a permanent course, but rather a “prelude to industrialization” (World Bank 1984, 6). But here again, their predictions went awry. Overall, the effect of adjustment on urban workers has been a decline in real wages and increased unemployment. In many places, trade liberalization has actually resulted in deindustrialization where underdeveloped companies used to being protected have been unable to compete with international firms. Table 1 below shows the stagnant state of African industry as experienced by the three top adjusters and Africa as a whole.

Table 1: Industry’s Share of GDP (%)

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<th>1995 - 2001</th>
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<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>23.1</td>
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<td>Africa</td>
<td>33.7</td>
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One particular occurrence of deindustrialization has taken place in Mozambique where until 1996 raw cashew exports were heavily taxed in order to discourage exports, guaranteeing local factories a sufficient supply. This practice was changed because the World Bank refused to offer Mozambique a loan unless it removed the tax claiming that subsidizing the factories hurt poor farmers by preventing them from selling crops on the world market. The result of following the Bank’s advice has been that 10 major cashew-processing factories have had to close their doors and nearly 8,000 former employees are now without jobs (Jeter 2000).
And what about the poor farmers? Did they benefit from the ability to freely sell their crops abroad? The Bank claimed that removing the tariff, by driving up the price of cashews, would increase sales from $4 million to $70 million by 2008. The higher prices would then stimulate more production. As the tariff was lessened, prices did rise (from 18 cents a pound in 1994 to 24 cents a pound in 1999), however, poor Mozambican farmers saw very little of the increase. This is because, as happened in Zimbabwe, most of the peasants do not have direct access to foreign markets so they are forced to sell to middlemen at lower than market prices. It is the middlemen who have truly profited from the Bank’s suggestion. One former cashew farmer expressed his discontent saying, “I would like to see us return to the old way of doing business before the World Bank took it upon themselves to change it. Things were better then” (Jeter 2000). A sentiment no doubt shared by many other people throughout Africa.

Ghana: Africa’s Success Story

Perhaps more than any other nation in SSA, Ghana has adopted adjustment programs in whole, not just in part. Often cited by the IFIs as a great success story, the West African nation was issued nineteen adjustment loans between 1980 and 1994 (Easterly 2001, 104). Ghana liberalized its trade laws, devalued its currency to a hundredth of its former high, raised interest rates, and reduced government expenditures by cutting the staff of the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) in half (Brown 1996, 76-79). It also reoriented its economy to focus on cocoa production and exportation. With the weakening of the CMB, farmers were largely free to seek markets of their choosing to sell their crops. Tax incentives and higher cocoa prices encouraged more production. Then, without government support for non-cocoa food production, a “relative price disincentive to grow food was created” (Brown 1996, 77). Like so many African economies before it, Ghana was poised to export its way into development.

At the outset of adjustment, Ghana experienced a modest increase in exports. From 1983 to 1986, exports (in relation to GDP) rose from 6 per cent to 10 per cent, but much of the increase can be attributed to an expansion in timber

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3 This praise has not come from the World Bank and IMF alone whereas in a 8 January 2001 op-ed piece titled “An African Success Story,” the New York Times lauded Ghana as “a welcome African example of legitimate democracy and successful economic reform” and a “model for free-market innovations.”
sales. Then, after 1987, export growth stalled due to a collapse in the world price of cocoa. Market prices of Ghana’s other primary products dropped significantly in 1989 as well (Brown 1996, 79). This collapse was no doubt aggravated by Ghana’s increase in cash crop production, augmenting the supply of these commodities in relation to demand.

Despite its title of success story, Ghana was classified by a 1997 IMF report as a country exhibiting “weak growth” (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999, 80). In the past 20 years, its average economic growth has been a disappointing 4 per cent, despite “huge transfers of resources from the developed world.” Development assistance increased from $10 per capita in the 1960s to an average of $30 per capita through the 1980s and 1990s. The contribution of Ghana’s manufacturing sector (in relation to GDP) has shrunk 40 per cent from its high of 15 per cent in the 1970s to a low of 9 per cent in 2000 (UNECA 2003, 181). Manufacturing employment was as high as 78,700 in 1987 and fell to 28,000 by 1993 (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999, 59). A major reason industry has not succeeded is because its primary engine for growth has largely been public sources of capital and not the private sector. Potential investors, both internationally and domestically, have remained reluctant to risk their capital in Ghana.

Ghana’s situation in relation to external debt and poverty has also worsened since its adoption of adjustment programs. As Business Day put it, “Ghana, which 10 years ago was the darling of the IMF for having vigorously implemented its structural adjustment programme, [is] now one of the most highly indebted poor countries in the world” (Business Day 2002). Contrary to the IFIs’ assertion that it would reduce its external debt with an economy fueled by export-led growth, Ghana’s international debt (in relation to GNP) rose from 30 per cent in the early 1980s to 60 per cent by the end of the decade. The proportion of exports needed to service its debt rose from 7 per cent to 50 per cent during the same time frame (Brown 1996, 78). This trend has continued, whereas today, Ghana’s debt (in relation to GDP) is a massive 132.5 per cent (ADB 2004a). And while its debt continued to increase, Ghana’s nominal per capita income fell from $380 in 1985 to $276 in 2001 (Langerbein 2000; ADB 2004b). Even William Easterly, a senior advisor to the World Bank’s Development Research Group confessed, “the sad reality is that Ghana is about

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4 In terms of real numbers, Ghana’s external debt increased from $1.4 billion in 1980 to $4.2 billion in 1996 to $7 billion in 2001 according to the African Development Bank.
as poor today as it was...at independence” (Easterly 2001, 44). In May 2001, Ghana’s then Minister for Works and Housing, Kwamena Bartels, speaking on behalf of President John Agyekum Kufor, expressed his nation’s disappointment with adjustment results:

After 20 years of implementing structural-adjustment programmes, our economy has remained weak and vulnerable and not sufficiently transformed to sustain accelerated growth and development. Poverty has become widespread, unemployment very high, manufacturing and agriculture in decline and our external and domestic debts much too heavy a burden to bear (Amenga-Etego 2003, 20-21).

If Ghana’s experience with adjustment is to be considered a success, one must truly pity those who are judged as failures.

**Recommendations**

So if SAPs have failed Africa, where should development plans go from here? To start, a glaring weakness of adjustment programs has been their inability to be flexible. SAPs, because they are externally imposed, show little interest in the advice or suggestions of locals. The IFIs have developed one formula for growth that until recently could not be altered or adapted to fit the distinct characteristics of different countries. This is because, as Friedman suggests, “this Golden Straitjacket is pretty much ‘one size fits all’... and it’s the only model on the rack this season” (Friedman 2000, 105). It is clear, however, that those who are being forced to wear the Golden Straitjacket would prefer a few more options. Jose Antonio Justino Nhalungo, Mozambique’s Foreign Ministry Director, recognized this problem addressing the negative effects of liberalizing the cashew trade:

We agree that liberalization is generally a good idea. But this was a complicated issue, and the bank believed they knew better than us how to deal with this issue, and we never had a real dialogue on the matter. They just did not want to listen to us. We did not go to Harvard, I suppose (Jeter 2000).
This sentiment is echoed in a 1998 IMF draft report, which stated, “The external evaluation noted a perception among national authorities of inflexibility in the Fund’s negotiating positions and suggested that greater flexibility be afforded to missions to agree on programs that could command broader national support” (IMF 1998). For development to work, governments and the public alike must take ownership of the programs. They ought to adjust to local culture, work with local organizations and meet specific local needs. Focusing solely on macroeconomic fundamentals leaves the vast majority of people out of the process. A flexible, grassroots approach would certainly have a greater impact than traditional externally imposed strategies that have “de facto usurped the national sovereignty of African countries” (Cheru 2002, 19).

Because of its contracted focus on the macroeconomic level, adjustment has caused a devastating shift in funding away from human development projects, specifically in education and healthcare. In 1980, SSA’s average per capita spending on education was $41. This shrank drastically to $26 in 1985 and remained steady at $25 in 1995. Moreover, foreign aid has also been reallocated away from education. In 1975, 17 per cent of aid was invested in education; in 1994, this number had dropped to 10.7 per cent. As a result of these shifts, teacher salaries have plummeted and access to books and instruction materials have shrank dramatically (Cheru 2002, 6). The graph below shows the trend in secondary school enrollment among the top three adjusters, making it clear that education has not been a priority. At best, improvement has been minimal and in Ghana’s case, the numbers were worse in 2000 than in 1985 as shown in figure 1.

Health care expenditures are also suffering overall. The average proportion of GDP dedicated to health care in SSA nations rarely goes above 5 per cent and since 1990 has dropped from 3.5 per cent continent wide to 3.3 per cent on average between 1995 and 1999 (ADB 2004c). This lack of spending manifests itself in the form of one doctor per 18,000 Africans—a grossly disproportionate ratio that becomes more so in rural areas where health care is even further out of reach (Cheru 2002, 6). Clearly if Africa is to develop, the IFIs must be willing to allow—and even encourage—more investment in these

\[ \text{5 Compare this to Latin America and the Caribbean where the ration is 1:1000.} \]
two vital areas. Perhaps more than any other factors, building a healthy and educated society needs to be central in any development plan.

**Figure 1: Secondary School Enrollment Ratio %**

It is also important that the developed world understand how its trade practices, besides fundamentally contradicting their push for global liberalization, significantly worsen the plight of millions in the developing world. Agricultural subsidies are particularly harmful to the agrarian based nations in SSA. For instance, the average European cow is subsidized at a rate of $3 a day—Japanese cows at a rate of nearly $8. In fact, the $300 billion in agricultural subsidies is six times the amount of total aid given to the developing world. As K. Y. Amoako, the executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa explained, “With a level playing field, trade can be a much greater force than aid in reducing poverty” (Amoako 2003). In a similar vein, the European Union has restricted market access to African agricultural products through their Common Agricultural Policy (Cheru 2002, 14). Perhaps if the developed world truly believed in such things as comparative advantage and specialization, it would eliminate farm subsidies and liberalize its markets.

Another avenue that needs to be examined closely is that of microfinance and microlending. Championed by individuals such as Mohammad Yunus, who in 1977 established Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, microfinance gives credit access to the poorest of the poor by lending them small sums of money and setting up a flexible repayment plan. As explained by Marguerite S. Robinson in *The Microfinance Revolution*, lending services can “help low-income people
reduce risk, improve management, raise productivity, obtain higher returns on investments, increase their incomes, and improve the quality of their lives and those of their dependents” (Robinson 2001, 9). This claim is supported by the Grameen housing program, which for 12 years loaned nearly $180 million to borrowers and has resulted in 482,000 houses being built, “with near perfect repayment in weekly installments” (Yunus 1999, 130). In addition, it is important to understand that there is a real demand for microlending and that it is not another program to be externally imposed. It is not common knowledge only because the poor lack influence and are unable to make their credit-worthiness known. The predicament is that “those who hold the power do not understand the demand; those who understand the demand do not hold the power” (Robinson 2001, 9). The strongest benefit of microfinance is that it directly assaults poverty. Simply increasing a nation’s GDP, as has long been the major development goal, does not guarantee the poor will share in the improvement. The foremost goal of development needs to be poverty reduction, and microlending programs are effective ways to address this issue.

And finally, although in the past the state has been part of the problem in Africa, it is a serious mistake to underestimate the critical role it can, and should, play in development strategies. Like the rest of the developing world, capital is the most needed resource. Unfortunately it is also many times the scarcest. If used efficiently, capital is the most effective engine of growth. But without it, business has an almost impossible time expanding, let alone developing to begin with. Microfinance can address this to a degree, but its role is primarily in poverty reduction, not overall economic development. Since neither foreign nor domestic investors have responded to adjustment in Africa, this leaves the state as the lone source of significant investment capital. Alexander Gerschenkron observed the same scenario over fifty years ago when he noted in his essay, “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective,” that poor countries had managed to develop because of such state investment, whether through the financing of investment banks or “by direct subvention” (Landes 1999, 275). Current adjustment, however, suppresses the state’s ability to invest in domestic business and industry. But as I addressed earlier, the intervention of the state is the very thing that sparked growth in Asia, so why not in Africa?

While the private sector is ultimately the best place for the ownership and control of enterprise, SSA simply does not have the wealth needed to create significant growth. Thus, as is suggested by Yingyi Qian, a professor of
economics at the University of Maryland, government investment and control ought to be considered as a “second best” response when a nation is in the primitive stages of development. Qian argues, “government ownership and control may have comparative advantages over private control in an imperfect institutional environment” (Qian 2001, 298). I do not propose, however, that African states adopt a Korean model that is intent on creating a few large firms. Rather, I suggest that state investment should model itself after Chinese “township-village enterprises” (TVEs). Different from the Korean chaebol, a TVE is not a nationwide enterprise, but rather a locally run business that emphasizes community. They are small, locally controlled collective corporations. It is the attributes of community and collectiveness that I believe makes TVEs a great fit for African culture that has deep-seated collectivist traditions. Furthermore, it addresses the investment void while avoiding a truly centrally planned economy. By allowing local communities to access government capital through loans, essentially allowing them to operate as independent firms, you lessen the likelihood of corruption through decentralization. If development programs do not address the lack of capital and investment, Africa will almost certainly stay at the margins of the globalized economy.

Before I close, it is important to note that the IFI’s have begun to acknowledge that development programs in SSA have not resulted in their envisioned success and are implementing new programs that are similar to the recommendations I have outlined above. The World Bank, for instance, has created a more organic approach called Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) that “takes as its starting point the country’s own vision for development” (World Bank 2005). This plan intends to consult and work directly with national authorities, civil society organizations, private sector representatives, and other development partners. The hope is that a given country will experience a sense of ownership toward its development project instead of feeling constrained by rigid, externally imposed adjustment schemes of the past. In Sierra Leone’s CAS Consultations Concept Note, the stated overall objective is “promoting sustainable growth and significantly reducing poverty” with these three pillars: “promoting good governance, peace and security; promoting pro-poor sustainable economic growth; promoting human development” (ABD 2004b). The rhetorical emphasis on “pro-poor” and “human development” is encouraging and a welcome change from the last two decades of “macroeconomic
fundamentals.” But while I am certain that the intentions of the IFI’s are good, it remains to be seen whether this new approach is just rhetoric or whether this signifies a real shift in policy.

I am hopeful that the latter is true, but good intentions and good results are two different things altogether. After a quarter decade of weak development strategies, the stakes could not be higher for the people of SSA. Thousands of lives hang in the balance, and they cannot afford another twenty-five years of economic experimentation. If development is to succeed, we must move beyond the Washington Consensus, discard the notion that the Golden Straitjacket is the only path to wealth, and enter into a truly inclusive discussion on development that allows for state intervention when necessary and focuses on poverty reduction, education, and healthcare. Until then, we, along with millions of Africans, may wish to continue keeping our expectations low.
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Explaining the Endurance of the Iranian Regime

Daniel Beben
Indiana University

The success of Iran’s violent regime change from the world’s oldest monarchy to a theocracy has puzzled observers for years. The theocratic regime has survived for 25 years despite the historical legitimacy of a monarchy, an eight-year war with Iraq, and Iran’s international isolation. In this paper, I discuss the 1979 revolution and examine two theories which explain the regime’s survival. One theory argues that the Iranian regime has persisted because it is strongly rooted in the Persian tradition of Shi’ite Islam, while the other asserts that the regime has established legitimacy through crisis management and co-opting and eliminating the potential opposition. Next, I argue that the regime has become particularly vulnerable in recent years, but has survived because the opposition has been ineffective at mobilizing mass support. I close with the argument that a liberal democratic opposition holds great promise for political change in Iran.

In 1979 Iran underwent a violent and dramatic process of regime change. This revolution overthrew a 2,500 year-old tradition of monarchy in Iran, the oldest existing on earth, and replaced it with a theocracy, a form of government which has not been in operation since medieval times. Before its demise, the monarchy was considered one of the most stable regimes in the region, one which received abundant foreign aid and military assistance from the U.S. and many other Western states. This instance of revolution took many by surprise, both inside and outside Iran, and continues to baffle many today.

What is perhaps more surprising, however, is the fact that the new regime has survived for over 25 years. This is a surprise for a number of reasons. The first is that the sheer weight and strength of the regime which was replaced, and the historical legitimacy attached to it, should have almost assured that any newcomer would be virtually crushed by the weight of history. Any attempt to replace such a long-standing tradition should have surely failed, at least in its first attempt. Despite this, the regime has endured and carried its people successfully
through a series of crises while presenting a significant degree of political stability.

The second reason which should have predicted the theocracy’s failure was the long and devastating eight-year war it fought with Iraq almost immediately following the revolution. This war cost over half a million lives and cost the equivalent of a century’s worth of oil exports. At its end, the two sides ended up almost exactly where they started, with little or no gain for either (Hiro 1989). The fact that Iran even survived the war is amazing, given the odds against them. The state was in disarray after the revolution. The central government was weak, and there was still a great deal of conflict between competing revolutionary factions. A great portion of the top military leadership had either been purged or gone into exile with the Shah, leaving the Iranian military without the leadership or expertise to fight a war (Hiro 1989, 48). And the opposing side received support from both of the world’s superpowers, while Iran received almost no outside aid.

The third reason why the regime should have failed was its international isolation. One of the stated goals of Khomeini during the revolution was to export the ideals of the revolution to neighboring Islamic states, an idea which was met with great hostility by the leadership of those states. It was also fiercely opposed by the U.S., which aided in the destruction of Iran during its war with Iraq and then imposed devastating sanctions on it in 1993. These sanctions severely restrict Iran’s ability to sell its oil on the international market. Since oil sales make up 85% of its economy, it would reason that this restriction would have either forced the regime into capitulation or caused economic collapse (CIA 2003). But as of yet, neither has happened.

Therefore, given all these reasons which should have accounted for the failure of the regime, it is of great wonder that the regime still continues to stand. However, this may not be the case forever. There is a growing movement for reform and change today in Iran, and the international pressure on the regime continues to mount. It seems increasingly likely that some sort of fundamental change will undertake the regime in the coming years, if not necessarily a complete regime change. For these reasons, I believe it would be very interesting to explore what has helped the regime to remain in power all this time and to see if these same factors will continue to support its existence in coming years.
The Roots of Revolution in Iran

Until 1979, Iran held the record for the longest enduring monarchical tradition in the world, going back over 2,500 years. The institution of the Shah, or king of Iran, dates back to the 6th century B.C.E., when Cyrus the Great unified the Persian tribes and founded the Persian Empire, proclaiming himself the Shahanshah, or King of Kings. Although various upheavals and changes of dynasty have taken place over the centuries, the role of the Shahanshah has always remained central to the governance of Iran.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Iran, which was still called Persia at the time, was under the leadership of the Qajar dynasty. The Qajars descended from Turkish tribal forces which invaded and occupied Persia in the 18th century, and were widely considered to be incompetent and corrupt rulers. Beginning in the late 18th century, the British and Russian empires began taking a strong interest in Persia. Iran then found itself a pawn played by Russia and Great Britain for control over Central Asia. What began as a process of trade gradually developed into a system of economic exploitation of Persia by the great powers. In exchange for loans of gold which were wasted on lavish spending and trips to Europe, the Qajar shahs granted almost unlimited rights to British and Russian companies to develop the natural resources of Persia, which included oil, tobacco, and natural gas (Keddie 2003, 54).

By the early 20th century, this process of economic colonialism had generated massive unrest throughout the country. Protests and boycotts of British tobacco began in the late 19th century, mostly led by the bazaaris, or the traditional merchant class in Persia. Students and European-educated intellectuals became involved as well, and in 1905 a serious movement began in support of a constitution and the establishment of an elected parliament and prime minister (Keddie 2003, 67). This process underwent a number of stops and starts, with compromises on the part of the Shah followed by brutal and violent repression of the protestors. Finally, by 1911, Persia had become a true constitutional monarchy, and for the first time in its history, the Shahanshah found his power limited from within the government (Keddie 2003, 71).

Following World War I, Persia found itself in a precarious economic and geopolitical environment. The constitutional revolution had largely failed to settle the issue of the massive debt and economic problems faced by the country. In addition, Persia increasingly found itself at the mercy of resurgent and
territory-hungry foreign powers at its borders, with British-occupied Mesopotamia and India to the west and east respectively, and the newly-established Soviet Union to its north (Keddie 2003, 75-80). These conditions, coupled with a weakening central government, created an environment which was ripe for change. In 1921 a successful coup was launched by officers from the Persian Cossack brigade, many of whom were motivated by the fear of Persia’s division by the British and the Soviet Union (Keddie 2003, 80-81). The coup was jointly led by the Cossack brigade commander, Colonel Reza Khan, and a group of nationalist politicians. Reza Khan eventually assumed the position of Prime Minister and proclaimed himself Shah in 1925, taking the name Pahlavi for his new dynasty. The name Pahlavi was significant because it was of ancient Iranian origin. This showed Reza Khan’s desire to glorify Iran’s pre-Islamic imperial history (Keddie 2003, 86).

Reza Shah Pahlavi (1961) took his country on a crash program of modernization, industrialization, and secularization; modeled after neighboring Turkey and its modern founder, Kemal Ataturk. Traditional forms of dress were outlawed and replaced with western-style clothing. The public role of religion was severely limited. New factories, railroads, and oil refineries were built, with the goal of making Persia into a modern, economically-independent country. Reza Shah also tried to develop a sense of secular nationalism within the country, drawing heavily upon pre-Islamic traditions and images to instill a sense of national pride and unity. In 1935 the country’s name was changed to Iran, a title derived from the land of the Aryan tribes which settled the Iranian plateau in ancient times (Keddie 1998). This program succeeded in rescuing Iran from its dire economic situation and protected it from the malign intentions of the great powers. It also set the stage for an intense and enduring social conflict: the modern vs. the traditional, the religious vs. the secular, and the general division of Iran into conflicting cultural segments (Keddie 1998).

When World War II began, Reza Shah, who was suspected by many of holding pro-fascist and pro-Nazi sentiments, declared Iran neutral in the conflict (Keddie 2003, 105). During the war, the Allies hoped to use the territory of northern Iran and the southern Caspian Sea as a supply route to the Soviet Union, which was suffering heavily on the eastern front of the German attack (Keddie 2003). Reza Shah denied the Allies’ request. Faced with no other option, in September of 1941 British and Soviet troops jointly invaded and rapidly occupied Iran. Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favor of his young son,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was much more amiable to the Allies’ wishes (Keddie 2003).

After the war, the British quickly withdrew their troops as agreed. The Soviets, however, initially refused to budge and only did so after the threat of a British invasion and after they created political havoc in the north of the country. This led to intensified fears regarding Soviet intentions for Iran on the part of both Iran and the West, leading the new Shah to seek a closer alliance with Great Britain and the U.S. Mohammad Reza Shah continued on his father’s path of modernization, seeking to capitalize on the burgeoning post-war oil market. He struck a particularly favorable deal with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which was largely owned by the British government and a small group of British shareholders. As part of this deal, the British invested heavily in the industrial and oil-producing infrastructure of Iran in exchange for a large portion of the profits from oil sales (Keddie 2003).

This arrangement with AIOC, while bringing great progress to the Shah’s vision of a modern Iran, also brought great resentment from large portions of the Iranian populace, who despised the idea of their country’s national resources being used for the profit of foreigners. Many observers have classified this period as marking the roots of anti-Western sentiment among the masses in Iran, first directed against the UK and later the US (Kinzer 2003). A strong nationalist and anti-British movement arose, which manifested itself in the National Front party, led by veteran parliamentarian Mohammed Mossadeq. A chief demand of the party was the nationalization of Iran’s oil resources. During the 1940’s the National Front party rapidly grew in strength, which led to the election of Mossadeq as Prime Minister and head of the Majlis, or parliament, in 1951. One of Mossadeq’s first acts was to officially nationalize the AIOC, bringing all the production facilities and infrastructure under Iranian control. This was met with severe condemnation by the British, which eventually led to a severing of diplomatic ties between the two countries and the threat of war.

The British suspected Mossadeq of having ties to the Iranian Communist Party, the Tudeh, and of holding sympathies toward the Soviet Union. There was great fear among many that Iran would be the next “domino” to fall to the communist bloc, which would give the Soviet Union access to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and to Iran’s vast oil resources, possibly turning the tide of the Cold War. It was with this fear in mind that the British approached the Eisenhower administration for the CIA’s help in removing Mossadeq. In 1953 a
CIA operation was led by Kermit Roosevelt, resulting in a military coup which removed Mossadeq, imprisoned him, and replaced him with a prime minister loyal to the Shah (Roosevelt 1979). For a time, all opposition to the Shah was effectively neutralized, allowing him to further consolidate his rule over the nation. This blatant intervention in the democratic process, however, would come to have disastrous effects years later.

This operation led to a long period of strong relations and cooperation between the U.S. and Iran. The Shah’s avowed support for Israel and control over many of the vast oil-fields of the Persian Gulf led the U.S. to view Iran as an essential pillar of support in the Middle East. In addition, Iran’s geographical proximity to the Soviet Union, coupled with the Shah’s stringent anti-communism and his almost paranoid fear of the KGB, earned Iran the status of being a firm bulwark against Soviet expansion (Pahlavi 1980). Mohammad Reza Shah continued on his plan of modernizing Iran and purchased vast amounts of American military hardware in order to modernize the Iranian military. In 1963 the Shah launched the White Revolution, the chief aims of which were land reform, education, and greater social equality. He sought to modernize Iran’s system of agricultural production, which still largely operated under feudal-like conditions. He sought to create a more equal distribution of land in the country, improve the dismal literacy rate, and bring greater access to health care.

The Shah’s efforts, while successful in many ways, also succeeded in alienating many elements of Iranian society. This time, however, the protests were led not by secular nationalists, but by leaders from the religious class. They opposed many of the Shah’s policies, such as his strong relations with Israel and his dealings with the secular and hedonistic West. They viewed many of his programs, such as the banning of Islamic headscarves in public buildings, as a direct assault upon Iran’s traditional religious values. This movement began to form around the leadership of a fiery Shiite Ayatollah, or high cleric, named Ruhollah Khomeini, who was imprisoned and then eventually exiled in the 1960’s.

From his exile in neighboring Iraq, Khomeini began exporting tapes of his sermons, which brought an intense condemnation of Israel, America, and the West and called for Islamic unity and Islamic government. Eventually, Khomeini began calling for revolution in Iran and the overthrow of the Shah. His sermons found particular appeal among the bazaaris, who suffered under an economic climate increasing dominated by large, foreign corporations, as well as
among the generally more traditional and religious rural agricultural-based population. He also found strong appeal among young students, who were later to become the most radical actors in the revolution. Eventually, all sorts of groups opposed to the Shah’s rule, from communists and secular nationalists to traditionalist and Islamist parties, began to rally around Khomeini as the leader of a popular movement against the Shah.

In February of 1979, the Shah was forced to flee Iran, allowing Khomeini to return from exile and begin forming a new government. Later that year, a new constitution was drafted, and Iran was officially declared an Islamic Republic. The Majlis and Prime Minister position was retained, and the position of a popularly-elected president was added. (The Prime Minister post was removed under a later revision of the constitution.) The biggest change, however, came with the formation of the Guardian Council, which was a body of 12 men, half mullahs and half laymen, who oversaw all aspects of the government, and retained the right to overrule or modify any legislation passed by the elected bodies, and could also veto or disqualify any potential candidate from office. At the head of this council, which was unelected and held no public accountability, was the Supreme Leader, the real ruler of the Islamic Republic of Iran. From 1979 to 1988, this position was held by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Since his death in 1988, it has been held by the Ayatollah Khamenei.

Regime Survival: Some Competing Theories

There are generally two hypotheses which provide an explanation for the survival of the post-revolutionary regime in Iran. The first hypothesis is predominantly cultural in nature and is the explanation provided by the regime itself and its supporters. This explanation states that the current Iranian regime has persisted because it is strongly rooted in the Persian tradition of Shi’ite Islam. In this scenario, the revolution of 1979 reflected a popular sentiment in support of a new government which was founded upon the ideals of Shi’a Islam. This foundation has provided the regime with a sense of cultural and political legitimacy. While this explanation continues to be widely propagated by the Iranian state, it is likely that few outside the regime give it much credence.

A second hypothesis argues that the current regime has established a sense of political legitimacy through a strategy of crisis management, coupled with a domestic policy which co-opts and eliminates potential opposition. This is
the explanation which has been offered by the majority of scholars and outside observers, and in many ways challenges the case presented by the regime itself. Under this scenario, a series of crises, including the American hostage crisis and the Iraqi invasion, created a situation where the new regime was able to demand loyalty and foster national unity. Iran’s continued international isolation today perpetuates this situation. In addition, the regime has, over the years, pursued a successful strategy of variously co-opting and discrediting opposition. As a result, the Iranian regime has achieved legitimacy, not only because it has proven itself a worthy defender of the nation and has weathered the onslaught of Western imperialism, but also because it has successfully filled many of the political gaps which could be otherwise filled by opposition parties.

From these two explanations, the second generally provides the most realistic appraisal of the regime’s continuing endurance. While both approaches outline why the regime continues to be legitimate, they are still insufficient in fully explaining why the regime has persisted at times of vulnerability. In order to fully understand the continuing endurance of the regime, an additional point of examination is required, one which examines not only the regime itself, but its opposition as well. I argue that the reason the Iranian regime has persisted is not necessarily due to its own strengths and characteristics as a regime, but rather because of the lack of an effective opposition. Therefore, in order to fully account for the regime’s continued survival, it is necessary to develop a theory which offers a structural analysis not only of the regime itself, but also of its opposition.

The current regime in Iran holds many weaknesses which could render it vulnerable to opposition; however, no group or party either outside or inside Iran has organized effectively in a manner which would allow it to challenge and replace the regime. This is due in part to the weak organizational structure and lack of strategic focus of many opposition groups. It is also a result of the failure of opposition groups to establish a sense of legitimacy which would allow them to develop a wide base of support for their platform, as the opposition against the Shah did in the late 1970’s. In this absence, the current regime has maintained itself as the only party capable of ruling the state.
A Cultural Explanation for Regime Endurance

The first explanation assumes certain cultural and political preferences on the part of the Iranian population as a result of their collective history and experiences. The primary adherents to this understanding of the Iranian regime are those who are close to the regime itself, and it is the position which is generally promoted through the state information organs. This theory sees that the focal point of the regime is Shi’a Islam, and it is assumed that the majority of the Iranian population holds a preference for a government which is founded upon the Shi’á tradition and which incorporates at least some elements of Shi’a doctrine within its legal framework. The primary support for this approach to understanding the Iranian political scene is the long collective history of Shi’a Islam shared by the majority of Iranians, which has at many times served as a foundation for national unity and the construction of a national consciousness.

Shi’a Islam has been an integral part of Iranian culture since the 8th century, when descendants of the Imam Ali, the nephew of the Prophet Muhammad whom Shi’ites revere as the founder of their partisan community, inter-married with members of the Persian royal family, thereby establishing an important connection between the Persian court and the Shi’a community (Momem 1985, 61). The importance of Shi’ism within Iran continued to grow slowly through the years, until the early 16th century, when it was established as the official religion of the state by the Safavid Empire (Momem 1985, 86). With that ruling, the vast majority of Iranian converted to Shi’ism within a few generations, and a vast system of clerical hierarchies and Shi’a religious institutions was established under state patronage, which has persisted to this day. This created the framework for a situation where religion in Iran is integrated with the state and the nation to an extent which has not been seen in the West since Medieval Europe.

In addition, this line of argument holds that the Shi’ite faith possesses inherent qualities which place a greater emphasis on the political role than other faiths, including many forms of Sunni Islam. The Shi’ites have historically been a persecuted minority community, dating back to the early days of the schism within the Islamic community following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. This historical consciousness has become a defining element for the Shi’ite community and informs many of their beliefs and practices. An example of this is the Shi’ite festival of Muharram, which commemorates the slaughter of the
Imam Husayn and his followers at the battle of Karbala in Iraq. In modern times this historical consciousness has been invoked in the struggle against colonialisim and neo-colonialist powers and can be seen reflected in the writings of 20th century Iranian writers such as Dr. Ali Shariarti, who merged elements of Marxism and anti-colonialist theory with Shi’ite theology (Boroujerdi 1996, 105).

This process reached its zenith with the Islamic revolution in 1979, spearheaded by the Shi’ite cleric Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini clearly and repeatedly invoked the historical consciousness of the Iranian people and the Shi’ite faith in his sermons. He outlined the struggle against the Shah and Western imperialism not simply as a modern-day political liberation movement, but rather as the latest manifestation of what has been for the Shi’a community a centuries-long struggle against injustice, a battle in the eternal war between the forces of good and evil, and an important step toward the stated goal of establishing God’s law on earth (Khomeini 1981). This invocation clearly resonated with the Iranian people, who showed their support through massive protests against the Shah during the revolution and rallied around Khomeini as the leader and father-figure of their revolution.

**Crisis Management as the Key to Survival**

The second explanation for the survival of the current regime does not rest solely upon the importance of religious belief and historical consciousness in decision making. Rather, the assumption is that individuals and groups will pursue various approaches and apply different lines of thought to problems, depending on the situation and the applicability of their beliefs towards a given situation. For example, economic interests may play a role in preferences alongside religious beliefs and tradition. According to this explanation, religious piety and historical consciousness alone cannot explain the appeal of the regime. While ideological devotion may be sufficient to explain the actions of a small inner-circle of followers, for the purpose of understanding the actions of the broader masses, a more complex approach must be taken.

Many of the leading scholars on the Iranian revolution, such as Mohsen Milani, Nikki Keddie, and Mansoor Moaddel, espouse this theory in their writings. There is a diverse set of evidence which supports this approach. First, we can look at the examples of other political movements which have occurred in Iran in modern times and examine the role that Shi’ite doctrine played in them. In
most political developments prior to the early 1970’s, religion did not play a strong outward role in the political process. This is despite the fact that clerics often played a leading role in organizing political activity. For example, the tobacco boycotts organized by the bazaar merchants in the 1880’s, despite the integral involvement of the leading cleric of Shi’a Islam, hardly invoked religious provocation at all (Keddie 1998, 58). Another example is the rise of the National Front Party led by Mohammad Mossadeq in the 1940’s, which ultimately challenged the authority of the Shah. The National Front Party was predominately a secular nationalist party, whose platform involved mostly economic and political grievances which largely failed to translate into religiously-inspired rhetoric. Once again, despite the support given to Mossadeq by many leading clerics of the day, the debate did not take the form of a religious crusade (Moaddel, 1993).

According to the proponents of this theory, the revolution of 1979 did not reflect a popular preference in support of a Shi’a Islamic government, but rather indicated widespread opposition to the Pahlavi regime originating from a variety of sources (Milani, 1994). In order to understand the nature of this opposition, one can examine the actors and groups that were involved in the revolution and analyze their political and ideological preferences. Even a brief examination of this evidence demonstrates that there was a very diverse group of actors and who were operational during the revolution, many if not most of whom were not affiliated with the religious establishment. Among the many groups involved in the revolution were the Soviet-backed Iranian Communist Party or the Tudeh, the pseudo-Marxist Mojahedin and Fada’iyun organizations, various trade unions and bazaari associations, student groups, social democrats, and many others (Milani 1994, 75).

For various reasons, many of these groups found it both convenient and useful to align themselves with Khomeini and the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) in order to advance their own case for legitimacy and prestige. The hope for many was that Khomeini could be used as a rallying point against the Shah and then used as a springboard from which they could launch their own initiatives and advance their own interests after the removal of the Shah. The aging Ayatollah and his followers were considered powerful public symbols but ultimately weak and inexperienced political actors whose relevance would fade after the revolution, when more experienced and streetwise political actors would
take the lead. This perception was aided by the centuries-old perception in Iran of the clerics as apolitical and world-weary.

Ultimately, however, this strategy backfired, as Khomeini used the broad base of support gained by the IRP during the revolution to advance his own case for Islamic government. Opposition to his goals was crushed and given the prohibitive label of being “counter-revolutionary.” Many observers claim that Khomeini used the apolitical image of the cleric to his own benefit during the revolution, effectively concealing his political ambitions and lulling his opponents into false security. Even many of his closest followers claimed later to be unaware of his plans for the establishment of Islamic government after the revolution. The vision adhered to by many was that of a government established on Islamic principles of justice, but not one directly run by the clerics. This was considered to be an affront to the democratic principles which formed the basis of the revolution. Many former close supporters of Khomeini, such as the first president of the Islamic Republic Abol-Hassan Bani Sadr (1991), later withdrew their support from the regime for these very reasons.

Despite this widespread opposition to the idea of theocracy, a series of crises which occurred shortly after the revolution effectively quashed internal debate about the nature of government and instead forced many into showing their support for the regime in the face of external threats. The first crisis came with the American hostage crisis, which began as a small student protest at the American embassy in Tehran over American support for the Shah, but escalated into a takeover and hostage situation. The Embassy crisis brought an abrupt end to relations between Iran and the U.S. and the threat of war. The aftermath of this incident has polarized relations between Iran and U.S. ever since.

The second crisis was an actual war. In September of 1980, troops from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Iran, capturing large swaths of territory and presenting the threat of imminent destruction. This event rallied millions of Iranians to the defense of the homeland, and thousands of young people volunteered to join suicide brigades to assault Iraqi positions in human wave attacks. As the House Speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani remarked: “We have been able to use the war to awaken the people and to fight the problems that threaten the revolution” (Hiro 1989, 257). Ultimately, Iran repelled the Iraqi attack, and after eight long years of war a ceasefire was finally declared, with virtually no gain for either side and the loss of over half a million lives and hundred of billions of dollars in economic and infrastructure loss (Hiro 1989).
During the war, the Iraqi side received aid and support from both world superpowers, while Iran received virtually no outside aid. In addition, after the war, in 1993, Iran was further isolated by Clinton administration oil sanctions imposed due to Iran’s support for anti-Israeli militants (U.S. State Department 2003). This international isolation creates a situation where the Iranian regime is able to continue to demand loyalty on the part of its citizenry in the face of external threats. Furthermore, the hostility of the U.S. and the West toward Iran today continues to hamper the cause of those who idealize Western democratic principles.

A Different Approach to Understanding the Iranian Regime

The preceding arguments are sufficient for explaining the source of strength for the current regime in Iran and the means by which it enjoys a sense of legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian people. Both arguments present different cases for how that legitimacy has been attained. One argues that the regime is strong because it is founded upon the powerful cultural and historical tradition of Shi’a Islam, while the other argues that the regime has gained legitimacy as a result of its management of external threats and crises, as well as through its domestic policy of co-option.

Recent political developments within Iran have demonstrated that the regime’s claim to legitimacy, despite the means by which it was attained, is slipping and has become weak in some areas in recent years. In order to understand the regime’s endurance in its current state, we must examine not only the case of the regime itself, but also that of its opponents. This examination is also required in order to understand why the regime has endured in previous periods of vulnerability, particularly during the crises it faced in the early 1980’s. There is certainly no lack of such opponents, but one must ask the question of why until now none of them has been able to effectively challenge the regime if in fact the regime itself is in such a vulnerable position.

The primary reason no other organization has effectively challenged the current regime is because no other organization has effectively mobilized mass support. That is to say, no other organization has established a case for legitimacy which is stronger than that proposed by the current regime. While the public legitimacy of the regime has become weak in recent years, the legitimacy
of its opposition is even weaker in many respects. Many of these groups have been able to gain strong and dedicated followings, yet none has been able to gain the mass support which would be necessary for another regime change. In addition, many of these groups lack a consensus among themselves regarding their political ideals, which prevents the formation of coalitions that could challenge the regime. They also lack an effective umbrella organization or person that could unite ideologically diverse groups, such as Khomeini did during the revolution.

Until fairly recently, most groups challenging the current regime came from one of two ideological perspectives: Monarchist and Marxist, with different variations therein. Both of these ideological paradigms have been discredited over the last 25 years, as a result of events within Iran and on the international stage. While some of these organizations have, in recent years, attempted to modify or disguise their original political orientation, their reputation still precedes them. As a result, it is unlikely that any of these opposition organizations, or combination thereof, will be able to mount an effective campaign. Interestingly, many of these parties have recently begun to modify their propaganda to espouse support for liberal democratic ideals, which for many run contrary to their original ideological objectives. While it is unlikely that this move represents a true paradigm shift in the thinking of these organizers, I would argue that it does represent recognition of what is becoming the true political alternative in Iran, and the only one which is likely to gain mass support both within and outside Iran.

A Weakened Regime?

As with many other post-revolutionary regimes, the current regime in Iran portrays itself as the true, legitimate government of the Iranian people, one which continues to operate under the public mandate given to it during the course of the Islamic revolution. Many of the traditional sectors of civil society, such as the mosques, the religious schools and institutions, and the bazaar unions, which historically have operated outside the realm of state control, have since 1979 been brought within the control of the state. As a result, these sectors, which have enormous influence over a significant segment of the population and which traditionally have been sources of political opposition, are now subject to the state-imposed standards of political and doctrinal orthodoxy. As expected, this
widespread penetration of Iranian society by the state allows for almost totalitarian control over the public discourse and as such severely limits the possibilities for dissent.

Despite these severe controls on the press and freedom of expression within Iran, in recent years an increasing number of parties and authors have begun to openly criticize the government. Since the year 2000 over 100 newspapers have been shut down or declared illegal by the state (U.S. State Department, 2004). Some of these papers are run by individuals who participated in the revolution and who were once vigilant supporters of the regime. One such example is the Tehran-based paper Salam, published by Mohammad Khoeiniha, who was a leader of the radical student group which occupied the U.S. embassy in 1979. Salam was shut down in June of 2000 in response to its publication of opinion pieces criticizing the supreme leader Khamenei, an act which spurned days of massive protests on the streets of Tehran and resulted in thousands of arrests (Keddie 2003, 276). This repressive behavior and fear of public expression, as expressed by the ruling regime in Iran, does not indicate a government which is strong and legitimate in the eyes of its citizens.

In addition to severe limits on speech and political expression, the Iranian regime has also pursued much more drastic measures to silence and intimidate its critics. Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International have implicated the regime in tens of thousands of politically-motivated arrests and executions (U.S. State Department 2004). The widespread use of torture by the regime is widely documented as well (U.S. State Department 2004). Until recently, the regime pursued an acknowledged policy of assassinating its opponents abroad. This policy was only publicly renounced in 2001, when EU nations launched official protests against Iran after it became known that assassinations had been carried out on their soil (Karega 2002, 39). Some observers believe that these assassinations are still carried out in secret today.

Perhaps the strongest sign of weakness, however, can be seen in the manner in which the regime manages the election process for the parliament and the presidency. The unelected Guardian Council, which is accountable only to the Supreme Leader, reserves the right to declare any candidate ineligible for election, according to its own standards (Buchta 2000). In recent years, a large majority of candidates have been declared ineligible for election. As a result, only those candidates which are considered by the Guardian Council to be
politically and ideologically orthodox enough are permitted to run, thereby ensuring that no major threat will emerge from within the elected government.

Despite these rigid controls, which make a mockery of the very concept of popular elections, the people of Iran have still managed to express their opposition to the ruling regime through these elections. In the 1997 presidential election, nearly two thirds of the possible candidates were prevented from running by the Guardian Council, including nearly every liberal or pro-reform candidate (Menashri 2001, 78). Realizing that at least some semblance of opposition would be necessary in order to maintain the façade of a democratic election, the Council declared one moderate pro-reform candidate eligible: Muhammad Khatami.

A cleric himself, Khatami was a well-recognized supporter of the Islamic revolution and a close companion of Ayatollah Khomeini. While in recent years he had begun to espouse support for reform, including greater freedom of the press, his ideas were considered far from radical or threatening. In addition, he was a figure largely unknown to the public, with his last public post being the head of the National Library. In short, he was a figure the regime believed would represent a symbolic concession to the pro-reform parties, without standing any serious chance of being elected or upsetting the status quo.

In contrast, the conservative establishment threw its full weight behind its preferred candidate, the Speaker of the House Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri. Nateq-Nuri received many times the financial support as Khatami, as well as the official endorsement of the Supreme Leader and many conservative leaders. Khatami, for his part, was forced to conduct his campaign on a shoe-string budget and without the backing of any major supporters in government. Despite these seemingly insurmountable obstacles, Khatami won the election by a landslide, securing 67% of the vote (Menashri 2001). This victory is even more impressive given that 29 out of 31 million eligible voters participated, a turnout rate of 91% (Menashri 2001). This is an enormous increase over the turnout of 57% in the previous election, in which no major liberal or pro-reform candidates ran (Menashri 2001).

These results symbolized a massive slap in the face to the ruling regime and were only topped by Khatami’s reelection four years later, in 2001, when he won by 77% of the vote. These elections sent a clear message to the regime, and to the world, that major change was in demand. The conservatives responded with a flurry of increased arrests, newspaper closures, and heightened restrictions.
on civil liberties. Khatami saw nearly all his efforts at reform blocked by the Guardian Council, who has the power to veto any parliamentary legislation (*The Economist* 2004b). Instead of greater civil liberties and freedom of speech, as promised during the election, the Iranian people were greeted with a level of state repression virtually unseen since the early days of the revolution.

This repression reached its zenith recently with the parliamentary elections of February 20th, 2004. Over 2,500 candidates, including the president’s brother, Muhammad Reza Khatami, were barred from election (*The Economist* 2004a). The regime had learned from the 1997 election of the dangers of allowing even a token representation of the reform movement to participate in the election. Voices throughout Iran and the world called for a boycott of the elections, resulting in a dismal turnout of fewer than 50% (*The Economist* 2004c). This is nearly half the number which had participated in the presidential election just 3 years prior. Many observers within Iran and much of the world community rightly condemned these elections as illegitimate. For now, the regime has lost the support of many of its people and no longer enjoys the same sense of legitimacy and support it held in its early days following the revolution (Hiro 1999).

**The Marxist Opposition**

Besides the clerical opposition movement, which began in earnest with the jailing of Ayatollah Khomeini by the Shah in 1963, one of the major sources of political opposition in Iran in modern times has been from organizations espousing communist, Marxist, and socialist agendas. The oldest among these is the Iranian Communist Party, the Tudeh. The Tudeh originated in Iran in the 1930’s under the inspiration and guidance of the Soviet Union (Milani 1994, 76-77). At critical points, such as the 1953 coup and the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Tudeh has played a very vocal and visible role; however, their organization, which espouses a secular, communist agenda, has never enjoyed any widespread appeal in Iran and was often highly criticized by other opposition groups as being essentially a patsy of the USSR. Shortly after the overthrow of the Shah, the Tudeh saw their opportunity to create a secular, communist state in Iran; but, the party was brutally repressed by Khomeini, and most of its members were either killed or sent into exile by 1981. With the collapse of its major benefactor in
1991, the Tudeh, along with most other communist parties throughout the world, has ceased to have any relevance.

Another group with a Marxist orientation but with more indigenous roots is the Fada’iyan-e Khulq organization, formed in the late 1960s from the synthesis of two older organizations: the Jangal and the Ahmadzadeh (Milani 1994). The Fada’iyan espoused the traditional Marxist rhetoric of class warfare but also infused elements of more native Iranian Shi’a Islam into its agenda (www.fadaian.org). This element, in contrast with the strict secularism of the Tudeh, allowed the Fada’iyan to command a larger degree of support, particularly among the Bazaaris and the rural classes. By the early 1970’s, the Fada’iyan had declared their militant opposition to the Shah and began forming training camps to support military action against the regime (Milani 1994, 77). The organization maintained a high level of activity during the 1970’s, and its members were at the forefront of the clashes with the royalist military forces which occurred in early 1979, during the later phase of the Islamic revolution.

An organization similar to the Fada’iyan, but with a more outward Islamist orientation, emerged in the early 1960’s called the Mojahedin-e Khulq-e Iran (www.iran.mojahedin.org). The Mojahedin quickly grew to be one of the most popular and most powerful opposition organizations within Iran. Like the Fada’iyan, the Mojahedin derived their inspiration from other third-world Marxist movements, such as the Cuban revolution, and declared their goal to be armed struggle against the Shah’s regime (Abrahamian 1989). The Mojahedin made contacts with other Middle Eastern militant organizations, such as the PLO, and began to organize its own underground army and terrorist cells. The Mojahedin, like the Fada’iyan, formed a tactical alliance with Khomeini’s IRP during the revolution, and its members stood on the frontlines during the conflicts with the Shah’s forces. Many of the “martyrs” claimed by the IRP during the revolution were in fact members of the Fada’iyan and the Mojahedin.

In the late 1970’s the Mojahedin encountered a split within its ranks. A faction within the group with more Marxist leanings splintered off and renamed itself the Peykar, while those who retained the more traditional Islamist orientation continued to operate under the name of the Mojahedin (Abrahamian 1989). Despite their sectarian differences, however, the Mojahedin, the Peykar, and the Fada’iyan all continued to cooperate under the umbrella of Khomeini in united opposition to the Shah. Very few at the time likely believed that the IRP would emerge as a powerful political player after the fall of the Shah. Instead,
each group saw the collapse of the Shah’s regime as an opportunity to pursue its own political agenda within Iran. For the purpose of these organizations, that agenda included the development of a socialist state with little, if any, political role for the clergy.

As history attests, these actors were clearly wrong on this account. Immediately following the revolution, Khomeini began moving conservative clerics into key positions of power in the new government. Non-clerical groups, such as the Fada’iyun and the Mojahedin, originally did not protest these moves, afraid of challenging the charismatic leadership of Khomeini (Abrahamian 1989). It was not long, however, before these organizations found themselves on the receiving end of an IRP-led purge of all non-clerical political opposition.

The former allies in the revolution now found themselves at war with one another. By this time, however, it was too late for it to be an even match. By 1981 the IRP had assumed control over all of Iran’s armed forces, and the Iraqi invasion forced the population to rally its support around the new government. The Mojahedin, along with the Fada’iyun and the Peykar and many other smaller non-clerical organizations, were forced into exile, with many of their leaders killed or jailed. Abol-Hassan Bani Sadr, the first president of the Islamic Republic who vocally decried the treatment of the Mojahedin, was deposed by the Majles in June of 1981 and soon after was forced into hiding (Abrahamian 1989). He, along with Mojahedin leader Massud Rajavi, emerged as the leaders of a militant movement against the new theocracy.

In September of 1981 Rajavi and Bani-Sadr, along with a host of other organizations including the Fada’iyun, formed a new umbrella organization to combat Khomeini’s regime, titled the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). To date, the NCRI remains the leading opposition force against the Iranian regime. Initially the Mojahedin, by far the leading member of the anti-Khomeini coalition, based its activities out of France, while receiving the bulk of its financial and military support from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Later, as a step toward improving Franco-Iranian ties, France exiled the Mojahedin, who subsequently assumed a full-time presence in Iraq, where it has remained since (Abrahamian 1989).

During the Iran-Iraq war the Mojahedin allied itself with Iraq and conducted a campaign of terrorism, including bombings and assassination of government officials. Initially, the stated goal of the Mojahedin was to spark a popular revolt against the theocracy through a strategy of “propaganda by deed.”
As time wore on, and as the government continued to rally support as a result of the Iraqi invasion, it became clear that the Mojahedin’s mission was little more than a campaign of retribution and protracted guerilla warfare, with no clear end in sight. As a result, the Mojahedin saw its support dwindle, especially after the turn of events in the war following 1982 when it became clear the regime was not facing an imminent collapse.

The Mojahedin’s ill-fated alliance with Saddam Hussein has also cost them dearly in terms of support within Iran. Despite widespread opposition to the regime in Iran, very few are likely to be drawn to an organization which aligned itself with a foreign invader, particularly one as brutal and blood-thirsty as Saddam Hussein. In addition, the organization has suffered from Iraq’s international isolation following its invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990. While initially some U.S. policymakers contemplated support for the Mojahedin, since the late 1980’s the group has been blacklisted by the State Department as a foreign terrorist organization.

The Mojahedin today is still a very powerful network and continues to mount terrorist operations inside Iran on a regular basis. The organization operates offices in most European capitals and receives a large amount of support from some elements within the Iranian exile community. Its support within Iran itself is extremely low however, especially among the large youth population for whom the group’s traditional Marxist dogma has little reception. In addition, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 deprived the Mojahedin of their critical base of support and operations. While the Mojahedin today continues to be the most vocal and most visible Iranian opposition organization, it is unlikely they will play any significant role in political events within Iran in the near future.

In response to these developments in recent years and most likely in realization of the futility of their position, opposition leaders in the early 1990’s began to construct a larger role for the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). In contrast to the Mojahedin’s image as a militant, Marxist, terrorist organization, the NCRI cultivated the image of a Western, secular, democratic, and liberal political party, which united a diverse array of Iranian opposition parties. The NCRI according to their website at www.iran-e-azad.org, has established the goal of constructing a new government-in-exile, which will eventually one day replace the current regime in Iran. This new government was to be founded on liberal, democratic principles, including respect for religious diversity and human rights, freedom of speech, and the rights of women. As a
symbol of this commitment, in August of 1993 NCRI chose as its president Maryam Rajavi, wife of Mojahedin leader Massud Rajavi. The election of Mrs. Rajavi as the future president of Iran was intended to demonstrate NCRI’s dedication to Western, liberal ideals, with the hope that the U.S. and the West would respond with generous support.

The election of Massud Rajavi’s wife as president of the NCRI, far from demonstrating a new commitment to liberal democratic ideals, instead only demonstrated a more sinister truth: that the Mojahedin was effectively attempting to resurrect itself by using the NCRI as a front organization through which to gain Western funds and support to carry out its terrorist campaigns against Iran. Initially, the ploy was somewhat successful; in 1993 a bill was sent to the U.S. House of Representatives to provide support to the NCRI for the purpose of replacing the Iranian regime (U.S. State Department 2004). Soon after, however, the State Department issued an intelligence report which confirmed that the NCRI was essentially a front organization for the Mojahedin. In 1995 the NCRI was added to the executive order which branded it a foreign terrorist organization along with the Mojahedin (U.S. State Department 2004).

The Dying Voice of Monarchy

No account of Iranian opposition groups would be complete without mention of a much smaller but equally voracious faction: the monarchists. As indicated by their description, these opponents wish to see Iran return to the ancient Persian tradition of rule by the Shahanshah. Prior to the revolution of 1979, the Persian monarchy was the oldest existing on the planet, extending back over 2,500 years and predating the advent of Islam by over a thousand years. While most in the West today would consider the concept of monarchical government to be an anachronism, it is not surprising that such an ancient tradition, with a relatively recent past, would continue to find a place among the political aspirations of some Iranians today.

While some smaller organizations, such as the Iranian Nationalist Socialist Party, rally in support of the institution of monarchy in general, without vocalizing support for a specific monarch, the majority of Iranian monarchists give their support to the Pahlavi dynasty, which was deposed in the course of the Islamic revolution in 1979. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the last Iranian Shahanshah, died a year after going into exile in 1979. His son, Reza Pahlavi,
born in 1960, carries on the family dynasty. Not surprisingly, most supporters of the monarchy are Iranian exiles, who fled Iran along with the Pahlavis in the wake of the Islamic revolution. These include many of the military officers, business leaders, government officials, and other individuals who stood more to lose than to gain from the deposition of the Iranian monarchy.

Immediately following the revolution of 1979, many of these individuals settled in the United States and Western Europe and began pressuring their host countries to help overthrow Khomeini’s regime and reinstall the Shah. Initially, had Khomeini’s regime collapsed, a re-installation of the Pahlavi dynasty would have been the most likely course of action by the U.S. After several years, however, following the consolidation of Khomeini’s regime in Iran and the withdrawal of the Pahlavis from public life, this option clearly became much less realistic.

In the 1990’s, with the new increased interest in the issue of regime change in Iran by the Clinton administration, voices in support of the monarchy began to re-emerge in the West. The rallying point of this movement was Reza Pahlavi himself. Following a long break from public life, Reza Pahlavi (2002) reemerged to establish a network from his headquarters in Maryland and began to speak and publish widely in support of regime change in Iran (www.rezapahlavi.com). Rather than a direct re-institution of the Pahlavi throne, he advocated a grassroots democratic movement which he could lead as a figurehead. His 2000 book, Wings of Change: The Future of Democracy in Iran, spells out in detail his prescription for regime change in Iran. While he personally believes that a constitutional monarchy, with him as monarch, would be the best choice for Iran, he states that he would also accept a purely democratically elected government, without a role for the monarchy.

The Reza Pahlavi network according to its website also operates offices out of Southern California, which holds the largest Iranian population outside of Iran and most Western European capitals. He no doubt enjoys a strong standing among many members of the Iranian exile community, if for no other reason than because of his name (Sterngold 2001); however, his familiarity with the situation in Iran, a country he has not set foot in for over 26 years, is questionable at best. The same could be said for many of his fellow exiles. Also questionable is his commitment to democratic ideals, as witnessed through his expressed desire to become the new monarch of Iran. He has also been widely criticized for his
failure to acknowledge or repent for any of the abuses or excesses witnessed during the course of his father’s reign.

While the power and prestige of the Pahlavi name and the Persian tradition of monarchy cannot be overlooked, one must give seriously question the relevance of this tradition to Iran today. While there may be some measure of support for the monarchy among the Iranian exile community, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest any level of support for such among the people of Iran itself. Despite the unpopularity of the current regime, this should not lead to an assumption that the principles of the revolution itself have become discredited or that history has somehow absolved the Pahlavi regime of its guilt. Iran’s demographic statistics give further reason to question the future of monarchy in that country. In Iran today, 70% of the population is under the age of 30 (CIA 2003). This is a generation that is too young to remember life before the revolution and which has no reason to lament the passing of the monarchy or to long for its return.

The only hope that such pro-monarchist forces could have for success in Iran would be to form an alliance with other anti-regime forces, such as the Mojahedins. This possibility, however, is as remote as the idea of a return to monarchy itself. Many of the organizations which today are so bitterly opposed to the current regime had pointed their rifles against the Pahlavi regime long before they turned them against the ayatollahs. Lacking such a possibility for cooperation, there is virtually no chance that any of these organizations, or combination thereof, has the potential for affecting future political events in Iran in a significant fashion. It is this reality which explains the persistence of the Iranian regime.

The Growth of the Democratic Alternative

In the preceding pages, I have argued that the two major traditional sources of opposition to the current regime in Iran, Marxist and Monarchist, have failed and have ceased to be of relevance to political development in Iran. Out of these failures, however, a new alternative has emerged, one which holds the greatest promise for real political change in Iran. That alternative is one of liberal democracy. While this development is still in its rather early stages of development under the current regime in Iran, I believe it has already been established as the only legitimate path of political development in that country. I
argue that the evidence for this development comes from five primary sources: developments within the existing opposition groups mentioned above, developments within the government itself tendencies within Iranian political history, recent developments on the international stage, and, finally, developments within the intellectual and cultural trends of Iran.

As mentioned above, the long-term Iranian opposition movements currently are attached to ideologies considered outdated and irrelevant by most of the world today. As a result, in order to sustain their operations, these organizations have been forced to overhaul their image and their rhetoric to keep current with political trends. For both forces, this change has meant paying greater lip-service to the ideals of democracy and liberalism. The Mojahedin and the Fada’iyun were forced to revamp themselves through the organization of the National Council of Resistance of Iran in order to regain support from Western governments.

The monarchists, for their part, as represented by Reza Pahlavi, have come out in support of a grassroots democratic movement modeled on the East European model, rather than the reinstitution of the monarchy (New Prospect Quarterly 2003). For both of these sides, one could state that their ideological transformation is for show and that their true commitment to liberal democratic ideals is questionable. This, however, is not the point. What is significant about this development is that apparently all sides have realized that liberal democracy is the only means by which they may achieve legitimacy today, thereby implicitly acknowledging its importance in a future Iran.

The second source of evidence is the recent political developments in Iran itself, which have seen powerful election mandates given to pro-reform candidates. Although the power of elected officials in Iran is very weak, and the possibility for change from within the system is rather limited, it does at the very least provide a strong indication of the preferences of the population today. The extraordinary voter turnout and support provided to Khatami and reformist politicians demonstrates the preference of a large number of Iranians for parliamentary politics and indicates wide-spread support for the democratic process.

For any further development to occur in this area, however, greater power must be placed in the hands of elected officials. This of course would require a weakening or removal of the authority of the Guardian Council. Currently, no political figure within Iran who values his or her life would dare
suggest such a thing. It is entirely possible that, in the future, should the demand for reform continue to grow, a candidate may venture to run on such a platform. Such a move, especially accompanied by large-scale, nonviolent protests, would surely be a decisive moment for the future of democracy in Iran.

Third, the concept of democracy and democratic politics has a long and established precedent in modern Iranian political history. During past periods when agitation occurred for political change in Iran, the majority of organizers and activists preferred that such change come through democratic reform and the development of democratic institutions. Of the three major political upheavals to occur in Iran in the 20th century (the Constitutional Revolution, the Nationalist Movement, and the Islamic Revolution), two represented a direct demand for the development and strengthening of democratic institutions in Iran. The Islamic Revolution also represented a hope for many that Iran would become a democratic state, and this hope was partially reflected in the maintenance of the parliament and the presidency in the new constitution. The authoritarian regime which emerged from that revolution likely did not represent the hopes and aspirations of the majority of the revolution’s participants, for whom the dream of a democratic Iran remains.

The fourth indicator for the role of democracy in the Iran’s future is the pattern of recent developments on the world stage. Since the late 1980’s the world has witnessed the emergence of a flurry of new democratic states, most coming from the formerly Soviet-controlled communist bloc. This development, which the political scientist Samuel Huntington terms the “third wave of democracy,” represents one of the largest increases in the number of democratic states in history. Authoritarian states across the world today find themselves increasingly forced to construct and maintain the façade of democratic institutions in order to maintain their legitimacy in the international system. In recent years international pressure for democratic reform, spearheaded by the U.S., has focused particularly on the Middle East, resulting in a number of democratic developments in the region, including the holding of national elections in Iraq, democratic reforms in the Palestinian territories, and municipal elections in Saudi Arabia. While these international developments in no way guarantee the course of developments within Iran, they do provide an indication of what developments are most likely to gain international backing and support, which will be a crucial element for any successful political change.
The final and perhaps most important source which indicates the growing importance of liberal democracy in Iran today is the large and eclectic body of artists, writers, philosophers, scholars, and other such individuals who, each in his or her own way, has contributed to the demand for liberalization and greater democracy in Iran. There are many examples of this: the Islamic philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush, the judicial activist and Nobel Prize winner Shirin Ebadi, the award-winning writer Azar Nafisi (author of *Reading Lolita in Tehran*), and the dissident cleric Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. These are just a few of the many who represent all elements of Iranian society and who are working to bring change in their corner. While these individuals do not represent a unified mass or collective organization, they do represent a growing, grassroots movement in support of change and democracy within Iran. The history of revolutions is filled with stories of such individuals who inspire unprecedented political action and change within their societies.
References


