Andreas Meyer *University of Southern California*
The 2004 Presidential Election: An Exercise in Ritual?

B. Jason Barlow *Randolph-Macon College*
The Influence of Broadcast Industry PACs on Congressional Behavior: A Quantitative Study of the Relationship Between Campaign Contributions and Roll Call Votes

Munjot Sahu *Oberlin College*
Globalization and its Impact on the Poor in India

Lee Sherman *University of Southern California*
US Policy and Darfur

Contents

Editor's Preface to the Fall 2005 Edition

I am pleased to present the Fall 2005 edition of *The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics*. For a year now Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society, has sponsored the *Journal*. With this support, the *Journal* has achieved national recognition and has become the premier outlet for undergraduate research.

I would like to encourage you to share this *Journal* with your friends and colleagues. Word of mouth is the best method of promotion for an endeavor such as this, and I hope that you will support the *Journal* in this way. Please also share this *Journal* with the librarians at your university so that they will consider purchasing a copy for their collection.

There are several people I wish to recognize. First, I would like to thank the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council and the Executive Committee, particularly President Christopher J. Bosso, Executive Director James I. Lengle, and Administrator Nancy McManus. The *Journal* would not be possible without these dedicated individuals. Next, the time and hard work put forth by the *Journal's* Faculty Advisor, Rosalee A. Clawson, is essential to its success. Furthermore, I appreciate the outstanding work done by the Advisory Board and the Editorial Board members. Finally, I am grateful for the support from Purdue University's Political Science Department and its head, Bert A. Rockman.

This is my third and final edition as Editor-in-Chief; I will be leaving the *Journal* in the hands of my very capable assistant Allison O. Rahrig. During my time as Editor-in-Chief the *Journal* began its transformation into the nationally recognized publication that it is today. This is a process that Ms. Rahrig will be sure to continue. It has been rewarding to work on the *Journal*, but equally rewarding has been working with the various people associated with the *Journal*, especially its faculty advisor, Dr. Rosalee Clawson. I will always remember the time that I have devoted to working on the *Journal* fondly, and I look forward to reading future editions of the *Journal*.

Thank you.

Clifford C. Pederson
Editor-in-Chief

Submission of Manuscripts

The *Journal* welcomes submissions from undergraduates of any class or major; submissions from Pi Sigma Alpha members are especially encouraged. Our goal is to publish manuscripts of the highest quality. In general, papers selected for publication have been well-written with a well-developed thesis, compelling argument, and original analysis. We typically publish papers 15-35 pages in length that have been written for an upper level course. Manuscripts should include an abstract of roughly 150 words. Citations and references should follow the American Political Science Association *Style Manual for Political Science*. Please be sure references are complete and accurate. Students may be asked to revise their manuscript before it is accepted for publication. Submissions must be in the form of a Microsoft Word document and should be e-mailed to **journal@polsci.purdue.edu**. Please include name, university, and contact details (i.e., mailing address, e-mail address, and phone number).

Former Editors-in-Chief

Trevor Kress Truman	Spring 2001
Brian Aaron Snider	Fall 2001
Michelle Ann Fosnaugh	Spring 2002 - Fall 2002
Daniel Patrick Kensinger	Spring 2003 - Fall 2003
Cory Thomas Driver	Spring 2004
Clifford C. Pederson	Fall 2004 - Fall 2005

THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:
AN EXERCISE IN RITUAL?

Andreas Meyer
University of Southern California

My research project attempts to answer the question: was the 2004 presidential election a ritual? By adapting a five-prong definition of ritual developed by anthropologist Roy Rappaport (1999), I designed a research model that analyzes key features of the ritual form: encoding, formality, invariance, performance, and efficacy. I reviewed specific evidence from the 2004 election, ranging from interviews with campaign staffers to an advertising survey, from election codes to campaign strategies. My analysis suggests that the 2004 election can, indeed, be characterized as ritual.

Introduction

Clifford Geertz coined the term "theatre state" to describe the politics of the 19th century Balinese, a Southeast Asian people whose social status was largely, if not entirely, determined by displays of extravagance. Geertz, in his 1980 text, described a royal funeral procession in which three women threw themselves into fire in honor of the deceased king. This ritualistic human sacrifice symbolized the power of the monarch and also served to raise the families of the brave women to higher social status. Moreover, and more importantly, the degree of pomp in the king's funeral rites directly correlated to the title and amount of power his son inherited (Geertz 1980).

Bali might seem like an unusual case in light of the seemingly obvious inference that rituals affect, but do not determine, public decision-making. Indeed, Bali, where even pre-modern water sources could be easily controlled because of the mountainous terrain (Geertz 1980), presents a conundrum. Why should ritual and spectacle play any role in determining power when a vital natural resource could be restricted?

The significance of political rituals seems even greater upon consideration of a thesis posited by a number of scholars over the past sixty years: modern American elections are rituals, too. In light of recent developments in elections, however, it seems important to renew that study. This paper attempts to answer the question: was the 2004 election an exercise in

ritual? Data collected concerning five criteria, encoding, formality, invariance, performance, and efficacy, suggest that the 2004 election can be characterized as ritual. Even though the evidence collected could not be entirely conclusive, that conclusion was not undermined by any evidence to the contrary. A number of important implications were drawn from the findings of this research.

Literature Review: The Politics of Ritual

The Role of Rituals in Constructing Reality

David Kertzer defines ritual as "symbolic behavior that is socially standardized and repetitive" (Kertzer 1988). Key to this definition, he argues, is the symbolism of the action, which gives ritual both meaning and the power to affect popular beliefs. These beliefs, and the way in which they are symbolized, are manifested in the form of myth, "truths about society that are taken for granted" (Bennett 1980, 167). Both Bennett and Doty maintain that myths ultimately define the boundaries of "common sense," and provide a standard against which we can evaluate our actions (Doty 2000; Bennett 1980). Roy Rappaport identifies five features of ritual that confirm this conclusion. These are: *(1) encoding by other than performers* – the acts and utterances in a ritual are determined by "orders established or taken to have been established by others," not by the performers themselves (32); *(2) formality as decorum* – to distinguish ritual from simply routine action, it is important to note that ritual involves independent, not incidental, adherence to form; *(3) invariance* – while ritual is not just routine, it must involve more or less unvaried repetition, or else it is just a single, formal act; *(4) performance* – ritual must involve both participants and audiences, not just content, or else it is no different from myth; *(5) gratuitous formality* – ritual is not designed to deliver a practical or efficacious result (Rappaport 1999). The last criterion is particularly relevant, Rappaport notes, because it stresses that it is not the actual ritual that is compelling; rather, it is the aura surrounding the ritual that plays a significant role. By the same token, rituals are therefore extremely potent because they serve not only to display the beliefs we presume to be true, but to even change them (Doty 2000).

Anthropologists, too, suggest that ritual has more than just reflective properties (Doty 2000; Moore 1977; Rappaport 1999). Sally Falk Moore's study of Chagga community hierarchy at Kilimanjaro concluded that "whether…old

and legitimated by tradition, or newly forged and legitimated by a revolutionary social source, constitute the explicit cultural framework through which the attempt is made to fix social life, to keep it from slipping into a sea of indeterminacy" (1975; 221, 222). Lisa Lucero's 2003 paper on Mayan power relationships suggests that ritual even "advances political agendas" by allowing "ambitious people to modify the worldviews and codes of behavior that explain 'why specific rights and obligations exist'" (524). That is, by its very nature the ritual form legitimizes an expansion of fundamental beliefs to include novel but not far-fetched ideas.

Studies of other historical examples, including the Aztecs, Australian aboriginals, and even early 20th century Britain, have produced similar conclusions about ritual's determinative qualities (Kertzer 1988; Doty 2000; Bentley 1978; Goodin 1978; Moore and Myerhoff 1977). As visible, continuous applications of myth, rituals provide clever politicians the opportunity to outline policy issues in the context of social principles. And, by presenting issues in a time-honored setting, ritual gives those politicians a chance to integrate their own agendas without setting off many alarms. This is because, as Lucero points out, "rituals have both a conservative bias and innovating potential" (2003). Michelle Weinroth notes that this was evident in the Canadian anti-deficit campaign during the mid-1990s (2004). A group of liberal politicians abandoned their traditional Keynesian loyalties in favor of a monetarist policy that conflicted with both conservatives and members of their own party. And while it at first seemed unlikely, these renegade liberals were able to achieve considerable political success by implementing a fundamental feature of the Canadian nationalist ritual: sacrifice. They chose debt rhetoric that portrayed their anti-deficit campaign as "an aesthetic ideal, a blandishment with which to soften the impact of draconian cuts" (Weinroth 2004, 66). Further, by treating budget cuts as a communal sacrifice, this rhetoric created a "heightened moment of Canadian sovereignty" (Weinroth 2004, 12), which drew on core nationalistic concepts and engaged the ritual itself.

One of the more troubling conclusions of Geertz's study of the Bali Negara is that ritual does not depend on coercion to command power. Instead, rituals invite more people to incorrectly perceive that they are participating in the political process (Bennett 1980). By presenting contemporary issues and concerns through traditional lens, "as habitual, ceremonial, and physical manifestations of a worldview", rituals draw people together (Lucero 2003, 523).

But as Moore points out, political rituals also, "by dint of repetition, deny the passage of time, the nature of change, and the implicit extent of indeterminacy in social relations" (1975, 221). In other words, by seeming to involve a variety of participants, rituals conceal the reality that that participation is little more than a deceptive, routine feature of ritual itself. The effect of what Antonio Gramsci calls "constructed consent" (1991, 169) is pronounced if the widespread assumption that politics is about policy-making is dismissed, as some scholars have done (Edelman 1964, 1988; Weinroth 2004; Bennett 1980). For example, Bennett suggests that policy is neither the goal nor the result of politics. He writes in "Myth, Ritual, and Political Control" that "such a perspective offers a more modest view of policy as a means of reinforcing images of society that serve to perpetuate social and economic arrangements" (1980). Bennett continues, interpreting policy as a "political input," rather than as an "output," resolves the need to justify or explain inefficient and unproductive policy action (Bennett 1980). Politics is about power and power is not a function of sincere representation of one's constituents, but rather of pomp and ritual.

Some scholars have suggested that societies empower political leaders in order to understand a confusing social world and also to alleviate the individual burden of having to make decisions for oneself (Edelman 1988; Kertzer 1988). Citizens eagerly follow leaders in order to assuage anxiety about unforeseeable consequences. Murray Edelman contends that rituals, then, give leaders the opportunity to "reflect dominant ideology and reinforce it" (1988, 40). The irony, of course, is that those rituals often renew the concerns that citizens had in the first place, thus perpetuating the need for particular leaders (Edelman 1964). A clever, successful politician, Edelman notes, will be the one who diverts public concern from "well-being to constructed happenings" (1988, 42). Rituals play a critical role in building such a façade, because they allow leaders to deliver messages via a medium that is trusted and accepted on face value.

The Role of Ritual in Constructing Legitimacy

Throughout the ages, Kertzer writes, people have "sacralized" their societies in order to give them meaning. After all, the admission that one's society could be the "arbitrary product of cultural history, environmental adaptation, and political struggle" (Kertzer 1988) would require some enormous humility unknown to politicians. Great empires and nomadic tribes alike came

up with reasons to explain why they are special and divinely guided. This self-proclaimed sanctity is represented and verified through numerous modern rituals, ranging from the "invocation of divine guidance" which starts every session of the U.S. Congress (Kertzer 1988) to the inauguration of a president or the coronation of a queen (Goodin 1978).

Divine national inspiration must have popularly inspired leaders to guide the nation and to create historical icons that verify the nation's stature (Edelman, 1988). Scholars argued that this notation further legitimizes the power granted to political elites (Kertzer 1988; Edelman 1988). And while it may not necessarily legitimize one particular individual, it certainly validates the office, and the decisions that come out of it. Frances Fox Piven wrote in *Politics and Society* in 1976 that "however hard their lot may be, people usually remain acquiescent, conforming to the accustomed patterns of daily life in their community, and believing those patterns to be both inevitable and just." Kertzer explained that those elites who have benefited from the established system will promote the legitimacy of the institutions (1988). That legitimacy is further enhanced by those rituals that codify the principles upon which the institutions are based. For example, the presidential inauguration reifies the presidency and symbolically places significant power in the hands of a single individual (Goodin 1978). It can also provide a transition between different presidents, along with their ideas and advocacies, in a traditional context that legitimizes the new leader. As Lucero writes, "New political systems borrow legitimacy from the old by nurturing the old ritual forms, redirected to new purposes" (2003, 6). To imply that the authority of a regime is grounded in ritual, or even that *all* regimes to date have been grounded in ritual (a radical claim that would require enormous research), is not to say, however, that political authority *must* be founded on and perpetuated through ritual. The first step in breaking downing ritualistic foundations of authority and replacing them with truly democratic ones is a popular realization of the power of ritual and the foundation of authority in the regime.

Elections as Ritual

Rose and Mossawir, Edelman, and Bennett each conclude that elections serve little more than a ritualistic purpose (respectively 1967; 1964, 1988; 1980). Edelman even goes so far as to say that "voting may be the most fundamental of all devices for reassuring masses that they are participants in the making of

public policy" (1964, 190). That is, elections highlight the common bonds that form a community and also legitimize policies that are implemented by characterizing them as popular and reasonable (Edelman 1964). Similarly, Bennett identifies two common critiques of elections, including that they fail to live up "to their potential as broad-based policy forums," and that elections "do not offer the public meaningful choices" (1980). Bennett then proceeds to dismiss these complaints. He contends, "in light of the absence of any policymaking process, it might make more sense to regard presidential elections as rituals that function to promote the myth that elections are arenas for specifying and resolving issues" (1980).

In fact, theoretical abstractions about the influence of elections on policy-making are supported by research conducted by some political economists and statisticians, most famously Anthony Downs. His 1957 text theorizes that citizens employ a basic cost-benefit analysis in order to decide if they should vote or not. Downs's more controversial conclusion suggests that voting is irrational, since the statistical likelihood of having a significant impact on any given election is slim.

Several scholars have taken issue with the implications of Downs's conclusion, however (Foster 1984; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Riker and Ordeshook point out the paradox of a theory that purports to be descriptive and yet it is unable to describe those irrational acts of voting that so many citizens engage in. They suggest an alternative model, which attempts to explain both voting and abstaining as rational choices (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Carroll Foster notes that in order to secure a significant advantage by voting, individual voters would have to be convinced that their ballot would play a crucial, even tie-breaking, role in the contest (1984). Unlike Downs, however, Foster is not satisfied simply dismissing the millions of citizens that do vote as irrational. In direct challenge to Downs's theory, Foster cites data that all but rejects any correlation between voter turnout and the predicted closeness of an election (Foster 1984). Another group of academics, on the other hand, dispute similar evidence, and, by applying a statistical curve, account for the variance that later led Foster to discredit Downs's conclusion (Frohlich et al. 1978). Regardless, most theorists seem to agree that the individual act of voting itself is only marginally significant to political power.

In spite of the theoretical and statistical evidence that elections are only symbolically important, recent developments in campaign finance reform,

advertising technology, and grassroots activism seem to undermine the certainty of these conclusions. Consequently, the question remains, was the 2004 presidential election yet another exercise in political ritual? Or have modern changes in election and campaign procedure brought decision-making closer to the people?

Significance

Political ritual theory provides a powerful set of descriptive and predictive tools that can effectively explain many puzzling issues. Indeed, the politics of ritual solve the Balinese riddle: Balinese elites understood that while coercion can have its uses, pairing it with an incentive-based system of consent ensures far greater power (Geertz 1980; Doty 2000). By exploiting the unapparent paradox of the situation (he who has the power is also the one that can gain more power by displaying the grandest, most compelling ritual), skillful politicians were able to perpetuate their authority. More recent research into contemporary instances of ritual suggests that the significance of ritual may be more than we think, at the expense of other institutions we may have taken for granted. As a result, the import of this issue cannot be understated, and requires a study that can account for each of the issues raised by past anthropological, political, and statistical studies.

Moreover, the decreases in voter turnout over the past thirty years suggest that more and more people have been enlightened about the insignificance of their votes. In that case, the ritual model seems to explain why people would vote, and the statistical evidence explains why others would not. After all, the modern parties' wish to "cross the aisle" or attract moderate, centrist voters could have left partisan rituals seemingly undirected or even misdirected, thus failing to extend persuasive voting invitations to various citizens. The 2004 contest between President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry, however, saw the greatest turnout of voters since 1968 (Gans 2004). This discrepancy in trends challenges us to question the ritual form, individual rationales for voting, and even the nature of representative government in the United States. For a country with such a celebrated democratic tradition, the implications for voting, campaigning, decision-making, and accountability are staggering. If this research finds, for example, that the ritual model can no longer apply to elections, then we might expect recent rises in campaign spending to continue, an increase in the number of registered voters, and even a dramatic

shift in the character of elected politicians. On the other hand, if it seems that elections can still be characterized as rituals, then discussions of campaigns wasting inordinate amounts of money, time, and manpower may seem even more relevant.   Either way, the significance of and need for this research is tremendous.

Research Model

In designing a method for pursuing this research, it seemed prudent to review a variety of the definitions of "ritual." While a number of scholars have discussed ritual in-depth, most have limited their definitions to short, imprecise statements that express the importance of myths and symbolism but little more. The strongest exception, however, is Roy Rappaport's five-prong definition (1999). It therefore seems appropriate to use his criteria as the general model for determining if elections can be accurately characterized as ritual. Those five are: *(1) encoding by other than performers*, *(2) formality as decorum*, *(3) invariance*, *(4) performance*, and *(5) gratuitous, non-efficacious formality* (1999, 32-50).

In order to determine if elections exhibit all five of these features, I have designed individual sub-criteria for each. Of the five, the second and third criteria are the least difficult to apply; elections clearly feature a certain degree of formality and vary little each cycle. The first and fifth criteria, conversely, are the most nebulous and will require the hardest evidence to warrant attainment by elections. The fourth criterion, while not self-evident in the way (2) and (3) are, is still fairly straightforward. In the event that elections meet some, but not all, of these criteria, I will draw two sets of conclusions, first to characterize the ultimate nature of elections, and second to draw the implications from that characterization.

(1) Encoding By Other Than Performers

This first criterion requires that the ritual form and content be determined to a considerable degree by either an institution or players other than those performing the ritual. In the case of elections, that means that candidates cannot be the sole determinants of the events and topics discussed during their campaigns for office. This seems like a good opportunity to apply media agenda-setting theory as recently described by Semetko (1996), McCombs (1994), or

Hollihan (2001). The theory posits that the public interest, and therefore the issues politicians choose to discuss in their campaigns, is largely determined by what topics the news media choose to focus on in their coverage. Clearly, verification of this hypothesis would demonstrate that the performers in the election ritual do not unilaterally determine the content of their performances. This is an admittedly unconventional method for confirming an independent encoding mechanism, since the criterion seems to ask for a discussion of institutional encoding, but approaching the first criterion from this particular angle will allow some interesting and significant conclusions. Moreover, the second criterion supplies an adequate opportunity to discuss electoral institutions, which clearly have an encoding effect by virtue of mandating adherence to a particular form.

I plan to interview campaign staffers and news reporters in order to evaluate this first criterion. Even though direct verification of agenda-setting theory would have to involve a time-order content analysis, in this case, insight from both the campaign and the press will be sufficient to demonstrate that elections at least involve multiple encoders.

(2) Formality As Decorum

Ritual requires adherence to an institutional form in order to make it recognizable as ritual at all. Furthermore, the form needs to involve an explicit denotation, such as the needs to have rules, tradition, and standards. As noted before, elections are clearly governed by such an institution. A simple discussion of some markedly formal election components, such as party conventions, party platforms, and the Electoral College, will effectively demonstrate how relevant formality is applicable to elections.

(3) Invariance

In the same way that ritual requires adherence to a particular form, it has to be repetitive in order to be distinguished from myth or ceremony. Likewise, as formality is obvious in elections, so is invariance from one election to another. The institutions generally remain the same, and traditions are recurrent, and certain common rules exist. For example, even in the face of supposedly significant reform, campaign finance remains the same. I will examine two

major campaign finance reform acts, the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), and show how elections were largely unaffected by those attempts to change the institution itself.

(4) Performance

Rappaport aptly points out that performance is a more fastidious criterion than it appears to be on face. He makes a subtle distinction between congregations and audiences, and underscores that ritual involves the latter, not simply the former (1999, 37-38). That is, someone has to perform and someone has to watch; there has to be a hierarchy of some form present in the ritual. A presidential campaign, film director Brian Flemming points out, is very much like a "Hollywood movie" (2003). As in a movie, "you need a hero with both an admirable quality and a flaw, an antagonist with a deep flaw and on good quality, and a story rigged to present these qualities in the best way for your hero" (Flemming 2003). In order to accomplish that, campaign staffers have to write a convincing "script" for the campaign, and, more importantly, the candidates have to play their parts. In order to evaluate the 2004 election in terms of this criterion, I will analyze the Bush campaign's effectiveness at meeting the "movie" model.

(5) Gratuitous Formality vs. Physical Efficacy

The final criterion is by far the most difficult to describe and to demonstrate fulfillment of it. The bottom line of this feature is that the physical action in a ritual is not done to deliver the practical result that would logically follow the action; instead, the action of the ritual functions to give the ritual its independent capacity to convey power. Ultimately, the most noteworthy conclusions to be drawn from this research will come from the fulfillment (or not) of this criterion.

In order to pare down the complexity of this highly nebulous feature, I have decided to limit my discussion of efficacy in elections to the candidate advertisements. This can be accomplished by distinguishing between two general types of campaign ads: "negative" or "attack" ads directly reference the opposing candidate, whereas "positive" or "advocacy" ads highlight the strengths

of the candidate without mentioning her opponent. A number of scholars have noted a correlation between the type of ads predominantly employed by candidates and the effect they have on the overall utility of the campaign (Jamieson 1992, 1996, 2000; Hollihan 2001). A recent survey of 236 college students verified that hypothesis. Participants in the study found that negative ads are "less useful for political decision making" than positive ads (Pinkleton, Um, and Austin 2002, 13).

I plan to examine thirty-four television ads approved by President Bush and Senator Kerry in the 2004 campaign and characterize each as a "positive" ad or a "negative" ad. Finding a majority of negative ads would imply a lack of efficacy in this aspect of elections, whereas a predominance of positive ads would suggest otherwise. Moreover, since campaign ads represent and serve a function of publicizing candidates' intentions in the election, data on this topic will be especially revealing. In other words, finding that the 2004 campaign had more negative ads than positive ads will provide evidence that campaigns adhere to an institutional form (in this case, through their advertising scheme) gratuitously. This will get to the heart of the question, "are elections meant to be forums for policy-making?"

Analysis

(1) Elections Involve Multiple Encoders

Agenda-setting theory suggests that the news media are at the top of the content food chain in that the issues that seem to matter to candidates are formed as responses to the stories the news media choose to cover (Semetko 1996). Interviews with three campaign workers and a news producer suggested that the process of choosing which issues are important is much more complicated than that, however. The relationship between the news media and a political campaign is by no means a one-way street. While the press does play a substantial role in the formation of campaign agendas, it does not have unfettered determinative powers. The bottom line is that news media and the performers (candidates) are not the only encoders in the election ritual. Indeed, the content and form of elections are influenced by a countless number of institutions, factors, individuals, and interests.

Individual campaigns take a variety of factors into account when choosing issues and positions to either emphasize or discount. Robert Traynham, who worked last year on the presidential campaign as a senior advisor to the Republican National Committee, described the complex process of developing a daily campaign message: "Reaction to the press, reaction to public opinion polls, issues important to the campaign, and assessments of how strong or vulnerable Senator Kerry was on particular issues all played a part in choosing which issue the campaign focused on," Traynham explained (personal communication, 14 April 2005). Each of those four factors represents an individual encoder in the election ritual: the press, public opinion, candidates, and reactive strategies all play a part in determining the content of the ritual.

The news media play a unique and significant encoding role throughout an election cycle. Amos Gelb, an experienced reporter for CNN, noted that campaigns and the press are in perpetual contact with each other every day (personal communication, 22 April 2005). That communication is significant in developing the dynamic relationship between these two encoders. Both the news media and political campaigns are forced to react to each other in deciding what to focus on. Campaigns, for example, scrutinize news stories in order to determine what they have to respond to.

Traynham affirmed this in describing the campaign "war room." Staffers for the Bush campaign continuously monitored the news and alerted senior staff to important headlines and unexpected breaking stories (personal communication, 14 April 2005). Staff would then meet to determine what response, if any, was necessary for that particular headline. "Sometimes," Traynham explained, "the campaign would have no response, other times they would send out talking points to surrogates, and other times a campaign spokesperson would be sent out to make an official statement or to set the record straight. In some specific cases, the president would speak on the issue" (personal communication, 14 April 2005). Democratic campaigns had similar practices. Stephanie Arnold, a campaign worker for Grassroots Campaigns, Inc., observed the same reactive techniques while canvassing for money in Ohio. "About once every 2 or 3 weeks we would have different 'raps' to use," which "would change because of current events," Arnold explained (personal communication, 12 April 2005).

Campaigns are forced to employ a partially reactive strategy in dealing with the press because they are unable to decide what issues the news media will

cover. And while, as both Traynham and Amy Cardell, who worked for the Kerry campaign in Pennsylvania, pointed out, campaigns can use rallies and visual images in order to influence the press (personal communications, 14 April 2005 and 21 April 2005, respectively), ultimately the news media form an autonomous institution with its own agenda. Gelb explained that that agenda, too, is shaped by a number of factors, including polls, events, business, internal politics and the editors' personal judgments. For example, Gelb described a series of anti-Kerry documentary ads rele ased by a news source as a business decision. The news company feared that "should Kerry win, the policy shifts that would come would force that media outlet into bankruptcy" (personal communication, 22 April 2005). As independent organizations with independent motives, news companies play an important role in encoding the content of an election.

Moreover, it may well have been the Bush campaign's skills at responding to and manipulating news coverage and integrating public opinion into its message that led to its success. Both Gelb and Cardell complimented the "brilliance" of the Bush campaign strategy (Amos Gelb, personal communication, 22 April 2005). Kerry's campaign, on the other hand, was largely ineffective at delivering a controlled message (Amy Cardell, personal communication, 21 April 2005). Regardless, it is clear that the performers in an election are not alone in encoding the ritual.

(2) Elections Adhere to a Regulated, Decorous Form.

It seems difficult to suggest that elections do not conform to a set of rules, standards, and traditions that engender formality. Among the most formal components in the 2004 election were the parties' national conventions, the announcement of party platforms, and the Electoral College vote. Conventions, in particular, represent the culmination of months of party primaries, caucuses, candidate-selection, and platform-building. They feature elaborate displays, large crowds, and drawn-out procedure. The start of the convention features speeches and introductions by the party chair(s) and the mayor of the host city. And, more importantly, the first day of the convention is devoted to business: calling roll, electing a convention chair, ratifying committee appointments, and adopting credentials and rules (Hoffmann 2005; Convention History 2004).

On the second day, the convention serves an even more formal function: as the forum in which the parties adopt and announce their platforms (Convention History 2004). Platforms are particularly formalized because they provide a decorous representation of the party's stances and policies. This is emphasized by the obvious fact that, particularly with instantaneous communication and media technology at hand, the parties could simply respond to specific issues as they arose, or state positions individually. Instead, they adhere to the time-honored procedure of drafting and filing formal party platforms (Nelson and Thurber 1995). This is important for two reasons. Platforms, as formal representations of party positions, allow the party to set an agenda for the rank-and-file membership and avoid confusion or contradiction. Similarly, the platform gives more moderate allied groups and fringe party members the opportunity to formally object to the party's stance on issues, and to decide whether to formally support or oppose the party's candidates (Mair 1996, 83-133). A brief review of the Republican Party platform from last year verifies each of these points.

Even though there were few issues in the 2004 Republican Party platform that were not supported by the party's 2000 platform, the 2004 program explicitly stated far more conservative stances on key issues than before. For example, while the 2000 platform certainly did not support homosexuals, and while it maintained the core Republican belief that marriage is the union of a man and a woman, the 2004 platform unequivocally championed a constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex marriage and maintained the belief that the military and homosexuality are "incompatible" (Republican National Party 2004). The formal announcement of this position allowed the party to make a statement, even though the issue was not of immediate or urgent concern.

Besides gay rights, the 2004 platform also included strong support for government funding for faith-based charities and initiatives, another highly controversial, partisan issue. This was paired with support for a constitutional amendment to protect the rights of unborn children, a broad anti-abortion stance, and defense of the death penalty (Republican National Party 2004). Each of these issues, by virtue of being explicitly included in the party platform, represented a fundamental, and *formal*, shift, not in ideology, but in the appeal of the Republican Party. This is clear, for example, in the response of the Log Cabin Republicans, a group of gay party members, to the platform. Patrick Guerriero, the executive director of the LCR, condemned the platform's

treatment of gay issues as "radically extreme language that goes even further than calling for a ban on same-sex marriage" (Kirkpatrick 2004). And, indeed, the LCR, a strong example of a more moderate faction of the party, refused to endorse President Bush.

Another remarkably formal aspect of elections is the process through which citizens' votes are translated into a certified victory. The act of voting itself is highly formalized through ballot boxes and "I voted" stickers. It fails to compare to the casting of votes by the Electoral College, however. Electors in each state meet at the capitol to vote for president and vice president for what most observers describe as an honorary, and yet pointless, procedure. Those votes are certified and then opened and counted by the president of the Senate in a ceremony that officially designates the winning candidate as President-elect (Berns 1983). This process is not repeated every four years because politicians are stuck in a rut; the Electoral College vote represents the formal announcement of the election's victor. Because so many components of elections have both practical and formal counterparts, it seems safe to state that elections in general adhere to an institutional form dictated by rules and traditions.

(3) Elections Are Markedly Invariant.

Certain fundamental features of elections obviously do not vary from year to year. Citizens casting their votes, candidates campaigning for office, and the Electoral College convening to formally cast their ballots are all events that do not vary from election to election. What is more interesting, however, is how the impact of campaign financing has remained largely unaffected, in spite of direct attempts to limit candidate spending during campaigns. Two major attempts to limit campaign spending included the FECA of 1974 and BCRA of 2002.

FECA primarily targeted "hard money," or direct, donations to candidates and parties. The act led to four significant developments in campaign regulation. It established a series of disclosure requirements for donations made to directly affect a specific campaign and set caps on the size of such "hard money" donations. It also created a system of public financing of presidential elections that set limits on the amount of money campaigns can accept if they want matching federal funds. And, finally, FECA ordered the creation of the

Federal Election Commission (FEC) to enforce campaign finance laws (The Washington Post 1998).

In spite of FECA's seemingly precise restrictions on campaign donations, the law ultimately had only a temporary, nominal effect on the amount of money donated to campaigns. According to "opensecrets.org," spending by presidential candidates has increased with every election since 1976 except in the 1992 contest between Bill Clinton and George Bush. Furthermore, the overall trend in both campaign receipts and spending has increased dramatically since 1976. Whereas the 1976 election saw total donations to presidential candidates of $162 million, by 2000 that figure had reached $425 million. Similarly, total spending by presidential candidates was nearly four times as great in 2000 as in 1976 (Center for Responsive Politics n.d.a). Loop holes in the reform laws allowed contributors to make unlimited "soft money" donations to the general party fund to fund voter turnout and registration drives, issue ads, and the like. That effectively limited the effectiveness of FECA.

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 was designed to limit general donations and thus close the "soft money" loop in the election code. The BCRA banned "soft money" contributions altogether, but raised the limit on individual donor's "hard money" contributions. This, policy-makers suggested, would limit campaign spending significantly and close the loophole that was undermining FECA. The 2004 election, however, denied that argument.

The candidates in the 2004 presidential election raised and spent the most money ever seen in such a forum. While the BCRA succeeded in closing the "soft money" loophole, it failed to foresee the impact of raising the 'hard money" limits or of 527 committees on campaign spending. The 2004 presidential campaigns received and spent a full $100 million more than in 2000. Only $150 million of the $529 million received were federal funds (Center for Responsive Politics n.d.a). Moreover, the discovery of a new loophole, in the form of 527 advocacy committees, undermined the BCRA in the same way "soft money" limited the effectiveness of FECA. These 527 committees can accept unlimited "soft money" donations and are only restricted to using those funds without the candidates' names and without advice from the presidential campaigns or parties. That high degree of latitude allowed 527s to finance enormous voter registration and turnout drives, advertise opinions on critical issues, and imply which candidate voters should choose. In the 2004 election, "opensecrets.org" estimates that 527s spent some $550 million in a variety of

ways (Center for Responsive Politics n.d.b). With that kind of spending, the BCRA "soft money" ban is effectively dead in the water.

Clearly, elections are withstanding the attempts politicians are making to change the institution. Historically, money has played a larger and larger role in the nature and outcome of elections; the financing of elections could even be said to have become engrained in the election institution itself. Regardless, it is a highly significant factor in elections that has resisted direct attempts at changing. Since the most obvious features of elections have been invariant over the years, and one important factor has remained largely invariant in spite of changes to election codes, it seems reasonable to conclude that elections as a whole are, indeed, invariant.

(4) An Election Is a Performance.

The 2004 election made extremely clear how presentation and performance can be just as important as message content. New technology allowed almost immediate ad turnaround: brief sound bites were converted into TV ads in the blink of an eye. Of course, fifteen-second blurbs about "waffling," the President skipping out on his National Guard duty, or the disrespectful dismissal of the First Lady's teaching experience fail to provide voters with substantive information, and yet they proved to be highly consequential. Even television news, as Thomas Hollihan writes in his text, *Uncivil Wars*, is "more likely to focus on the candidates' personalities, less likely to cover policy topics, and more likely to be superficial" (Hollihan 2001). As a result of this, candidates are forced to deliver their messages carefully and as planned. President Bush's campaign effectively employed a simple, straightforward delivery strategy that appealed to a lot of voters. The reelection campaign effectively cast President Bush as the hero, John Kerry as the antagonist, and framed relevant issues to tell a convincing story. More importantly, both Bush and Kerry ultimately performed their parts as scripted by the Bush campaign team.

Framing the Hero: "Dubya"

One of the more popular critiques of the president among largely youthful, bandwagon liberals referred to his inarticulate speaking style and his occasional slips of the tongue (see WhywehateBush.com). But while these opponents mocked President Bush, they were really just reinforcing the character his campaign promoted. The president's campaign chose to portray President Bush as a simple, honest man of Christian values and conviction. And, in developing that persona, Karl Rove and other campaign advisors manipulated the president's poor public speaking style into a flaw that people almost couldn't help but forgive. Further, it makes President Bush's character seem more authentic and convinces voters of the "human touch" (Saletan 2004) that makes him more appealing. Bottom line: "Dubya" was framed as "A plain-spoken straight shooter, [who] has a little trouble articulating his ideas, but that's just because he's not a slick politician" (Flemming 2003). The campaign did not just take advantage of Bush's seeming flaw. Indeed, some academics, including Crigler and Hollihan, have suggested that some of the president's slip-ups may even have been planned (2004). Robert Traynham underscored that point. "In a presidential campaign," Traynham stressed, "everything is scripted" (personal communication, 14 April 2005).

Framing the Antagonist: The "Flip-Flopper"

The second task of political storytelling is to frame your opponent as the antagonist. On this the Bush campaign did a particularly remarkable job of exploiting John Kerry's weaknesses and using those to make the President appear stronger. The Bush campaign decided to cast Senator Kerry as a New England liberal that was indecisive and unclear about his stances on issues. In promoting this character, the campaign employed countless sound bites and video clips to create a likely, and even inescapable, persona for Senator Kerry. One political ad, for example, showed the senator flipping back and forth while windsurfing and ended with the catchy line, "John Kerry: whichever way the wind blows"

(Windsurfing, Sept. 23, 2004, Bush). As Wilson Carey McWilliams wrote last fall in *Commonweal*, those ads in conjunction with Kerry's style made him appeared "weak or evasive – an image that is further strengthened, to the delight of Republicans, by the necessary complexities and compromises of Kerry's years in the Senate. In his campaign mode, it [was] also an image cultivated by George W. Bush" (2004). Once Senator Kerry was established to be indecisive, President Bush almost automatically became viewed as a man of steadfast conviction. The impact of this was significant. As one blogger wrote:

> Every American who hasn't been living in a bubble knows that the "flip-flop" is more than a shoe this year. Sticking the phrase to John Kerry has been a genius political move. It is a cute, good-natured-sounding term that successfully undermines his credibility. After all, calling someone a flip-flopper is not a far leap from liar. While the latter sounds harsher, both words equally taint Kerry's image (Gierco).

Painting Senator Kerry as a flip-flopper not only served to degrade the Senator's leadership qualities, but to strengthen the public perception of President Bush as a leader as well. Similarly, by characterizing Senator Kerry as a snobbish northeastern intellectual, the Bush campaign enhanced the president's image as a regular guy and created a sharper contrast between the two candidates than actually existed. Again, it seems that the Bush campaign just knew how to do it. William Saletan of "Slate.com" explained this point perfectly: "You don't need [people with preparation, stature, expertise and nuance] to be president. You just need somebody to win the White House and appoint them to his administration. And that will require…simplicity, salesmanship, and easygoing humanity" (Saletan, 2004). Not only did the Bush campaign force Senator Kerry into their mold, but in some ways he performed the part they picked for him to play. Gregg Hoffmann, writing in *et Cetera*, described one example of this in his January 2005 article "Political Conventions, Images, and Spin:"

> Kerry, primarily known as a liberal during his long tenure in the Senate, [tried to use] his military background, and all the imagery the DNC experts could spin, to appeal to more conservative groups that supported the military. The imagery

> didn't really match up with Kerry's voting record in the Senate. He often has opposed increased spending for the military, and in fact has a mixed voting pattern on funding for the War on Terror. He has questioned the wisdom of "going it alone" in Iraq.

The Republican campaign was effective at discrediting Kerry's attempts to develop a likeable persona, and that problem was stuck on Kerry throughout the campaign.

Framing the Issues

The final task in constructing a campaign's political narrative is to frame the relevant issues in a way that jives with the rest of the story. To this end, language plays a critical role. In the case of issues, George Lakoff of UC Berkeley explains that, "Frames are usually relatively small conceptual structures that characterize what something means" (Gilson 2004). In other words, the rhetoric overshadows the issue. President Bush's campaign skillfully framed issues throughout his first term as president and during the last months of the campaign as well. Most notable of these were his stance on "tax *relief*," a term that implies that taxes are a burden, his position on late-term abortions, which the party has characterized as "partial birth" abortions, and the president's various environmental initiatives, such as "Clean Skies," which actually loosened pollution regulations, and "Healthy Forests," which permitted increased logging (Gilson 2004).

Besides the conventional domestic strategies, President Bush's staff also managed to frame foreign policy issues in ways that underscored a specific message. For example, by associating Saddam Hussein and Iraq with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the president was able to justify his war efforts on the basis of American defense (Isaacs 2003). Likewise, developing the color-coded homeland security alerts provided the Bush administration with the ability to control the apparent terrorism situation and frame response efforts accordingly. During the campaign, President Bush and his team were careful to characterize the gay marriage issue as the "protection of marriage." Each of these framings represented the campaign's effort to build a cohesive, convincing narrative. And, on a whole, they fit into the president's general story: principled defense of values, tradition, and our nation's security.

Conveying the Message

These messages are expressed to voters via carefully planned speeches, rallies, and announcements. The performances are scripted, and represent an opportunity for the performers to fit into the roles their campaign strategists have designed for them, and to represent issues via dramatic oratory and symbolism. Traynham explained that performances such as rallies are much more effective in grabbing the news media's attention than speaking with individual reporters because they force the issues and candidate to be covered in a "visually appealing way" (personal communication, 14 April 2005). Stephanie Arnold described a Howard Dean rally she helped organized for GOTV in Ohio. Not only were Dean's remarks prepared, but the audience was planned as well. "We, [the staffers,] were required to recruit a certain number of people [for the rally]," Arnold recounted, "and most of the people [at the rally] were already working with us" (personal communication, 12 April 2005). As a result, rally performances may involve not only the conventional performers (the candidates), but the audience as performers as well.

(5) Elections Fail in at Least One Respect to be Efficacious.

I reviewed thirty-four different television campaign ads, seventeen Bush-Cheney ads and seventeen Kerry-Edwards ads. I disregarded the distinctions some authors have drawn between "attack" ads, "pure attack" ads, and "mudslinging." For this analysis, all ads that referred explicitly to the opposing candidate were characterized as "negative" ads. Eleven, or 64.7 percent, of the seventeen Bush-Cheney ads negatively referred to Senator Kerry and ten, or 58.8 percent, of the seventeen Kerry-Edwards ads negatively referred to President Bush. In sum, twenty-one – almost two-thirds – of the ads reviewed could be accurately characterized as negative ads.[1] Closer examination of six of the ads will make the impact of this clear.

One of the most controversial and noted ads run last year was the Bush campaign's September 23 "Windsurfing" ad, as discussed earlier. The commercial depicted Senator Kerry windsurfing and changing direction back and

---

[1] Retrieved from the American Museum of the Moving Image:
http://livingroomcandidate.movingimage.us.

forth. The narration described Kerry's allegedly inconsistent voting record on the Iraq war, funding for American troops, education reform, and Medicare premiums. The narrator concluded the ad with the quip, "John Kerry: whichever way the wind blows" (Windsurfing, 23 September 2004, Bush). The "Windsurfing" ad was completely personal; it did not make a single statement on policy or decision-making. Instead, it focused on Kerry's voting record and represented him as a politician who has trouble making up his mind. The ad did not stop at attacking Kerry's ability to make tough decisions; by depicting him windsurfing, an expensive sport, the campaign made a subtle reference to his privileged background and unwillingness to get his hands dirty. Moreover, without any affirmative statement about President Bush, that ad only served to deter voters from voting for Kerry.

Another popular Bush campaign ad featured a mother driving to the grocery store and listening to the radio. The radio announcer described Kerry's voting record on taxes while the mother's thoughts are expressed in a voiceover. For example, the announcer said that "John Kerry and the liberals in Congress voted to raise gas taxes 10 times," and the mother responded "10 times? Gas prices are high enough already" (Thinking Mom, 4 October 2004, Bush). The announcer also listed Kerry's votes to "raise taxes" on Social Security benefits and "middle class parents." This ad also failed to make references to policy issues or decision-making. Like the "Windsurfing" ad, the purpose of "Thinking Mom" was to characterize John Kerry, not to make substantive statements about policy issues. Not only did it paint him as a politician determined to raise taxes, but it repeatedly associated him with the "liberals in Congress" in contrast to the average, "middle class" citizens who would suffer from the tax increases (Thinking Mom, 4 October 2004, Bush).

The fourth Bush campaign ad worth noting was perhaps the most personal of the lot. The crux of the ad was the announcer's response to Kerry's assertion that "a lot of people don't really know who [he is]," which was that "actually, a lot of people do" (Doublespeak, 21 April 2004, Bush). The announcer then listed five citations from print news sources, including Kerry's "hometown paper," which effectively pigeonholed the senator as "the most liberal member of the Senate" who has "waffled" on important issues and engages in "doublespeak" (Doublespeak, 21 April 2004, Bush). As in "Windsurfing" and "Thinking Mom," Kerry was the sole topic in the

"Doublespeak" ad. The Bush campaign team only intended the ad to disparage Kerry, rather then advocating Bush for president.

Of the seventeen candidate-endorsed ads reviewed for each side, it is important to observe that the Bush campaign not only used one more negative ad than the Kerry campaign, but that the content of the negative ads run by the Kerry campaign was considerably more moderated than those run by the Bush campaign. This could be, as Hollihan has pointed out, because liberal candidates are more likely to suffer backlash among their voting base if they use negative ad techniques (2001). Regardless, the Kerry team was clearly more careful in designing their ads than the Bush team. That is not to say, however, that the Democrats failed to attack the president. The following three ads underscore that point.

In response to the president's allegations that Senator Kerry was a "flip-flopper" and "waffler," the Kerry campaign released a series of ads that likewise attacked the president's record on important issues, especially healthcare. The September 5 "Immediate Help" ad, for example, began by quoting a speech in which President Bush ensured "immediate help" for senior citizens. The quote was followed by the voice-over narration which pointed out Bush's Medicare premium increase, "the biggest ever,…the wrong direction for America" (Immediate Help, 5 September 2004, Kerry). Like Bush's "Windsurfing" and "Doublespeak" ads, Kerry's "Immediate Help" functioned to highlight inconsistencies in the president's standpoints. The ad did not make a substantive argument about healthcare policy; instead, it was designed to refute the president's stated commitment to senior citizens and to create skepticism about the president's sincerity. At the end of "Immediate Help," the ad exhibited the minor difference between the Kerry and Bush ad strategies. The narrator concluded the ad by proffering John Kerry's plan to "lower the cost of healthcare" (Immediate Help, 5 September 2004, Kerry) as an alternative to rising healthcare costs under the president's plan. While Kerry's ad could not be characterized as a "pure attack ad," it was nonetheless negative and reflected a tactical move by the campaign team, not an attempt to make the ads more useful or issue-oriented.

The Kerry ad released on September 16 engaged a similar strategy to Bush's "Thinking Mom" ad. In "Not True," the narrator described the president's healthcare plan as a "$139 billion giveaway to the drug companies," which led to "a record 17 percent increase in Medicare premiums" and "five

million more Americans without health insurance" (Not True, 16 September 2004, Kerry). "George W. Bush," the ad concluded, "wrong on healthcare," "wrong for America" (Not True, 16 September 2004, Kerry). Like the Bush campaign's "Thinking Mom," the "Not True" ad not only depicted the president's particular plan as costly and ineffective, but also served an association function. In the same way that "Thinking Mom" grouped Kerry with the "liberals in Congress," "Not True" made Bush an accomplice to the "big drug companies." The ad was both personal and negative. The same observation must be made about "Not True" as was made about "Immediate Help," however: while "Not True" attacked the president, it also advocated, albeit briefly, for Senator Kerry.

The final Kerry ad example was also the most vicious of those reviewed here. "He's Lost, He's Desperate" began by explicitly calling Bush "a liar." It then cited a *New York Times* article that suggested the president "skewed intelligence on Iraq" in making the decision to go to war "so he could overstate the threat Iraq posed" (He's Lost, He's Desperate, 2 October 2004, Kerry). The ad continued with a simple, almost eerie, snapshot of American soldiers, paired with voiceover and text accusing the president of "rush[ing] us into war," for which we are now "paying the price" (He's Lost, He's Desperate, 2 October 2004, Kerry). Like Bush's "Doublespeak," Kerry's October 2 ad did not hesitate in attacking the president, and, unlike "Immediate Help" and "Not True," did not advocate for Kerry.

It is striking to note that two-thirds of the ads reviewed were negative in content. In light of the substantial majority of negative ads that pervaded candidate-endorsed television commercials, it seems fair to conclude that ads feature a severe lack of efficacy. Moreover, since ads represent a key method through which candidates communicate with voters, for ads to serve a largely gratuitous function is to suggest that a considerable part of elections in general lacks efficacy as well.

Conclusions

The evidence suggests that elections meet all five criteria in Rappaport's definition of ritual. First, interviews with three campaign staffers and a CNN reporter all confirmed that the news media play an independent, though not isolated, role in encoding the ritual separate from the performers. Moreover, Robert Traynham and Amos Gelb both suggested that other factors, including the

public, interest groups, and strategy, may play a substantial encoding role as well. Second, a review of party conventions, platforms, and the Electoral College demonstrated the high degree of decorous formality involved in elections. The third criterion, invariance, was clearly met, as evidenced by campaigns' remarkable ability to remain largely unchanged by significant reform acts. Fourth, the discussion of framing and presentation in a campaign underscored the amount of performance the election ritual entails. And, finally, quantitative and qualitative examinations of thirty-four campaign ads led to the conclusion that at least some features of elections are without efficacy.

Throughout my research, I did not come across evidence to suggest that elections do not meet the necessary criteria to be characterized as rituals. Nonetheless, elections are enormous institutions that involve many more features than I could possibly examine. At this point, broad conclusions about the electoral institution would still have to be made tentatively. A more extensive survey of all five criteria is needed, especially the fifth. While it seems highly likely that elections involve multiple encoders, formality, invariance, and performance, it is more difficult to conclude that they adhere to form without efficacy. Indeed, that fifth criterion strikes at the heart of these implications. The fifth criterion is both the most difficult and most important issue to examine.

That said, I believe the review of campaign ads can provide a serious foundation for discussing the role of that particular forum for discussing issues. The fact that two-thirds of the ads reviewed are negative tells us something about the approach campaigns take to elections.

The implications of determining that elections adhere to the ritual form are both positive and negative. Being able to draw conclusions about elections through a broader theory of ritual may prove useful. Perhaps the greatest strength of the political ritual theory is that it explains individual experiences in a context that jives with critical examination and honest self-reflection. By acknowledging the ability of rituals to unite, ritual theory also recognizes how important it is for people to find things in common with their neighbors. By explaining unity, it also allows us to explain social and institutional stability and to predict the future welfare of a given regime.

In addition to its predictive power, political ritual theory provides an implicit set of criteria for objectively evaluating the performance of a politician. By examining how well politicians engage ceremonial, rhetorical, and media-based rituals, we can draw some revealing conclusions about their potential. For

example, in his study of spectacle and presidential politics, Douglas Kellner concluded that Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency ended after his first elected term in large part due to his inability to identify and incorporate the spectacular rituals that have developed in that office. Because he was "a bad actor, a poor media presence, and not at all cinematic" (Kellner, 2002), Johnson could not "justify" (Lucero, 2003) either himself or his agenda, particularly in Vietnam. Being able to draw general conclusions from the ritual form about a particular example, elections, may allow campaigns to develop more sound strategies.

On the other hand, concluding that elections fail to accomplish what they set out to do is troubling. History suggests that rituals can be a source of power by legitimizing a leader through tradition and ceremony. But, since elections are not popularly understood to serve as solely a ritual, then it is the electoral institution that empowers politicians, not our votes. In light of that, it may be time for our citizens to reevaluate our system of democracy. This research must not be misunderstood to implicitly silence the discussion on what elections could be, in favor of discussion about what elections are. While the evidence certainly suggests that rituals are both powerful and descriptive, that does not mean we should opt out of developing something better. Just because elections, due to their current nature, are unable to provide a public arena for debating real issues and policies, that does not mean that the nature of elections cannot be changed. In applying this theory it is important that we do not ignore the dynamic nature of democracy, and its potential to change itself.

References

Bennett, W. Lance. 1980. "Myth, Ritual, and Political Control." *Journal of Communication* 30: 166-179.

Bentley, James. 1978. *Ritualism and Politics in Victorian Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Berns, Walter, ed. 1983. *After the People Vote: Steps in Choosing the President.* Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Center for Responsive Politics. *2004 Presidential Election.* http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/index.asp?graph=spending (18 April 2005).

Center for Responsive Politics. *527s: 527 Committee Activity*. http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtes.asp?level=E&cycle=2004&format (18 April 2005).

Crigler, Ann, and Thomas A. Hollihan. 2004. 30 September. "Presidential Debates." Lecture at the University of Southern California, Annenberg School for Communication.

Doty, William G. 2000. *Mythography: The Study of Myths and Rituals.* Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper & Row.

Edelman, Murray. 1964. *The Symbolic Uses of Politics.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Edelman, Murray. 1998. "Language, Myths and Rhetoric." *Society* 35 (2): 131-139.

Federal Elections Commission. *How the Electoral College Works.* http://www.fec.gov/pages/ecworks.htm. (26 April 2005).

Flemming, Brian. 2003. *The Death of George W. Bush, Honest Man.* http://blogcritics.org/archives/2003/05/13/180158.php (31 March 2005).

Foster, Carroll B. 1984. "The Performance of Rational Voter Models in Recent Presidential Elections." *American Political Science Review* 78 (3): 678-690.

Frolich, Norman, Joe A. Oppenheimer, Jeffrey Smith, and Oran R. Young. 1978. "A Test of Downsian Voter Rationality: 1964 Presidential Voting." *American Political Science Review* 72 (1): 178-197.

Gans, Curtis. 2004. *2004 Election Report*. http://www.fairvote.org/reports/CSAE2004electionreport.pdf (28 Feb. 2005).

Geertz, Clifford. 1980. *Negara: The Theatre State in 19ᵗʰ Century Bali*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gierco, Nicole. *Election 2004: Think on These Things*. http://www.tcnj.edu/~unbound/elections/wordassociation (15 April 2005).

Gilson, Dave. 2004. October 18. *How to Talk Like a Conservative (If You Must) – interview with George Lakoff*. http://www.motherjones.com/news/qa/200 410/10_401.html (12 April 2005).

Goodin, Robert E. 1978. "Rites of Rulers." *The British Journal of Sociology* 29 (3): 281-299.

Gramsci, Antonio. 1991. *Prison Notebooks*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hoffmann, Gregg. 2005. "Political Conventions, Images, and Spin." *Et Cetera* 62: 67-70.

Hollihan, Thomas A. 2001. *Uncivil Wars: Political Campaigns in a Media Age.* New York: St. Martin's.

Isaacs, John. 2003. "War on Terror Wins." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 59 (1): 18-20.

Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. 1992. *Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. 1996. *Packaging the Presidency: A History and Criticism of Presidential Campaign Advertising.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. 2000. *Everything You Think You Know About Politics...And Why You're Wrong*. New York: Basic Books.

Kellner, Douglas. 2002. "Presidential Politics: The Movie." *The American Behavioral Scientist* 46: 467-487.

Kertzer, David I. 1988. *Ritual, Politics, and Power*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Kirkpatrick, David D. 2004. "Committee Adopts Draft; Some Grumble." *New York Times*, August 27. http://www.theocracywatch.org/bushplatform _ times_aug.27.htm (8 January 2006).

Lucero, Lisa. 2003. "The Politics of Ritual: The Emergence of Classic Maya Rulers." *Current Anthropology* 44 (4): 523-558.

Mair, Peter. 1996. "Party Systems and Structures of Competition." In Lawrence LeDuc, et al. eds., *Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc..

McWilliams, Wilson Carey. 2004. "Campaign 2004." *Commonweal* 131 (17): 10-12.

Moore, Sally, and Barbara Myerhoff, eds. 1975. *Symbol and Politics in Communal Ideology*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Moore, Sally, and Barbara Myerhoff, eds. 1977. *Secular Ritual.* Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum.

Nelson, Candice J., and James A. Thurber, eds. 1995. *Campaigns and Elections American Style*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc.

Pinkleton, Bruce E., Nam-Hyn Um, and Erica Weintraub Austin. 2002. "An Exploration of the Effects of Negative Political Advertising on Political Decision Making." *Journal of Advertising* 31: 13-25.

Rappaport, Roy. 1999. *Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Republican National Party. 2004. *2004 Republican Party Platform.* http://www.issues2000.org/2004_GOP_Platform.htm (12 April 2005).

Riker, William H., and Peter Ordeshook. 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting." *American Political Science Review* 62: 25-42.

Rose, Richard and Harve Mossawir. 1967. Voting and Elections: A Functional Analysis. *Political Studies* 15: 73-201.

Saletan, William. 2004. *Simple but Effective*. http://slate.msn.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2109079 (1 April 2005).

The Washington Post. 1998. "Campaign Finance Special Report." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/special/campfin/campfin.htm (8 January 2006).

Weinroth, Michelle. 2004. "Rituals of Rhetoric and Nationhood: The Liberal Anti-Deficit Campaign (1994-1998)." *Journal of Canadian Studies* 38 (2): 44-80.

WhywehateBush.com. "Welcome." http://www.whywehatebush.com (1 April 2005).

The Influence of Broadcast Industry PACs on Congressional Behavior: A Quantitative Study of the Relationship Between Campaign Contributions and Roll Call Votes

B. Jason Barlow
Randolph-Macon College

This paper examines the relationship between congressional voting behavior and broadcast industry political action committee (PAC) contributions to congressional campaigns. This study, which considers the 105th through the 108th Congresses, uses difference of means testing and ordinary least squares regression to demonstrate a statistically significant relationship between the dollar amount of contributions members receive and the percentage of votes that they cast in favor of the industry. PACs appear to contribute money to those members of Congress who are in a position to assist them with achieving their legislative goals, and they appear to provide these contributions both as incentives and as rewards. Using H.R. 3717, the Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, as a case study, this study further demonstrates that broadcast industry PACs time their contributions to coincide with significant legislative milestones, with substantial increases in contributions in the weeks prior to committee markup and the vote on final passage.

Introduction

The broadcast communication industry is heavily regulated by the U.S. government. In light of recent technological developments and continuing conflicts between broadcasters and conservative audiences over the content of public broadcasts (such as occurred after the 2004 Super Bowl Halftime Show), it would appear that this regulation is likely a permanent fixture. Beginning in the 1970s, this extensive regulation, along with changes in campaign finance law, contributed to the emergence of Political Action Committees (PACs) that represent various companies and organizations within the broadcast industry.

Two of the more prominent PACs include one that represents Clear Channel Communications – the company that has recently been subject to large fines for airing indecency during the Howard Stern Show – and one that represents the National Association of Broadcasters, known as the Television and

Radio Political Action Committee (TARPAC). Both of these groups share a common goal: ensuring that the interests and desires of their parent organizations are fully represented in the political arena. These and other PACs achieve this objective through a variety of political activities, such as lobbying and campaign contributions. In this paper, I explore the effects of PAC activities on congressional voting behavior on bills regulating the broadcast industry. My findings contradict a large volume of existing literature and suggest that there is a more significant relationship between PAC contributions and congressional voting behavior than many scholars believe, at least in the area of broadcast communication regulation.

The Effect of PACs

Scholars are divided regarding both the impact of campaign contributions on voting behavior and the factors that affect the amount of contributions candidates receive. A majority of scholars argue that there is no clear causal relationship between contributions and member voting behavior (for example, Grenzke 1989; Wawro 2001; Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Smith 2000; Vesenka 1989). Other scholars suggest that there is a relationship (see, for example, Stratmann 1995, 1998, 2002; Brooks, Cameron, and Carter 1998; Roscoe and Jenkins 2005[1]). Both groups of literature have compelling statistical data to support their respective arguments.

Grenzke's (1989) study, which looks at 10 PACs from different industries and their contributions to 172 members of Congress from 1973 to 1982, concludes there is no relationship between contributions and voting behavior. Grenzke uses a two-stage least squares regression model, supplemented with personal interviews, to determine that once the incumbent's ideology and party, and the political leaning of the district are controlled for, the relationship between contributions and members' votes disappears (Grenzke 1989).

In contrast, however, Strattman's (1998, 1995) studies look at congressional votes on agriculture bills, such as the 1985 Farm Bill, and determine that in many cases, PAC contributions influence the vote outcome. Stratmann uses a model which tracks weekly contributions to candidates during

---

[1] Roscoe and Jenkins do not actually perform an analysis themselves, but instead studied the models of more than 30 studies, implementing more than 350 tests, and conclude that one-third of roll call votes studies were affected by campaign contributions.

the weeks surrounding the passage of legislation that interests the PACs under study. His results demonstrate that contributions increase in the weeks following the introduction of a piece of legislation, peak at the vote, and quickly recede thereafter (Strattman 1995, 1998).

Brooks, Cameron, and Carter (1998) also demonstrate a relationship between PAC contributions and congressional voting on sugar legislation. Their study, which looked at PAC contributions and three amendments relating to the sugar and sweetener-user industry, was not able to demonstrate a relationship between committee membership and voting behavior. These scholars attribute this finding to the fact that many non-committee members also vote similarly to members.

It should be noted that a majority of the studies that find a direct relationship between PAC contributions and congressional behavior seem to be studies that look at one particular industry or piece of legislation. The studies that attempt to look at a variety of industries and policy areas have a much more difficult time achieving statistically significant results. For example, Stratmann (1995, 1998, 2002) looks individually at the agriculture industry and financial services industry and Brooks et al. (1998) looks at sugar legislation. These scholars are able to demonstrate a relationship, while the Grenzke study (1989), which looks at PACs from 10 different industries, is not. Since my study looks at only one industry – the broadcast industry – I would expect to reach similar conclusions as the Stratmann (1995, 1998, 2002) and Brooks et al. (1998) studies.

Data and Methods

To explore the behavior of broadcast industry PACs and to test for a relationship between contributions and congressional voting behavior, I began by collecting data from a variety of sources. First, using the Congressional Directory from the Secretary of the House of Representatives, I compiled a list of all incumbent members of Congress for the 105th-108th Congresses. This period of study was selected because data from the past four election cycles is easily accessible online. Obtaining data before these four cycles would have been difficult and would have caused inconsistencies in my methodology. I also compiled information about members' home state, party affiliation, and district number.

Next, using FEC data from opensecrets.org[2], I collected data on which congressional incumbents received contributions from broadcast industry political action committees in the 2004, 2002, 2000, and 1998 election cycles. I included all PACs registered with the FEC that represent broadcast media organizations. These PACs were Clear Channel Communications, the National Association of Broadcasters, Paxson Communications, Pappas Telecasting Company, Salem Communications, and Sinclair Broadcast Group. All of these PACs were listed in the "television and radio" sector of the broadcast industry on Opensecrets.org.[3] After I identified the PACs for the study, I used opensecrets.org to obtain a list of the groups' contributions to federal candidates for each election cycle of the study. It should be noted that not all groups were registered for the entire duration of the study, and they contributed varying amounts during each cycle.

---

[2] Opensecrets.org is the website of the Center for Responsive Politics, a non-profit, non-partisan research group that follows the money in politics. This data is computer based, and is gathered from FEC sources.

[3] Two others PACs were listed in this sector, the Missouri Broadcasters Association and XM Satellite Radio; however, I did not include them in my study. I did not include the Missouri Broadcasters Assocation because they only contributed two hundred and fifty dollars in one of the four election cycles of my study. Also, I wanted to look at the PAC phenomena nationally and the Missouri group would not allow me to effectively do this. The second group, XM Satellite Radio, was not included because they do not use federally-regulated broadcast airwaves, thus they are subject to a different type of regulation than the rest of the PACs in my study.

Table 1: PAC Contributions per Election Cycle*

PAC Name	1998 Contributions	2000 Contributions	2002 Contributions	2004 Contributions	Total Repub.	Total Demo.	Total
Clear Channel			$113,550	$329,000	$276,050	$166,500	$442,550
National Assn. of Broadcasters	$456,671	$543,324	$548,578	$511,055	$1,358,391	$701,237	$2,059,628
Paxson Communications			$19,000	$500	$10,000	$9,500	$19,500
Pappas Telecasting Co.				$30,000	$17,000	$13,000	$30,000
Salem Communications	$38,500	$39,000	$49,750	$59,000	$186,250	$0	$186,250
Sinclair Broadcast Group	$9,700	$14,600	$11,000	$500	$33,200	$2,600	$35,800
Total to Republicans	$335,004	$426,858	$489,758	$611,571			
Total to Democrats	$149,867	$170,316	$252,120	$321,534			
Total	$504,871	$597,174	$741,848	$933,105			

* Data collected from Opensecrets.org. Blanks indicate the PAC was not registered with the FEC.

After the contribution data were gathered, I collected data on committee assignments, specifically assignment to the Energy and Commerce committee during the period of study. From the House Secretary, I obtained a list of the members of the Energy and Commerce Committee (known as the Commerce Committee during the 105th and 106th Congresses) and the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet (known as the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection during the 105th and 106th Congresses) for each of the congresses in my study.

Lastly, I gathered data on congressional voting behavior. Using the indices in Congressional Quarterly's *Congressional Roll Call*, I compiled a list of House votes that had an impact on the broadcast industry. These votes were listed in the index under the category of "Communications and Telecommunications." I disregarded votes that did not deal specifically with the broadcast media, such as regulations on satellites and cellular phones. After compiling the list of votes, I

determined whether or not a "yes" vote on each bill was a vote favorable to the broadcast industry based upon a reading of the testimony of broadcast industry leaders before the committee(s) of jurisdiction for the legislation. In all cases, a representative of the National Association of Broadcasters or a specific broadcast company was on record either supporting or opposing the passage of the proposed bill. With the list of bills for my study compiled, I used the Library of Congress website (thomas.loc.gov) to collect the data on how each member voted on the roll call votes.

With all of the data collected, I used the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) to analyze the data. First, I used difference of means testing to further explore the relationship between campaign contributions and voting behavior. I created a dummy variable to look at the differences in means of members' voting behaviors and the amounts of money they received; if the member voted in favor of the broadcast industry in more than fifty percent of cases, I coded them as a one. If they voted in favor of the industry less than fifty percent of the time, then I coded them as a zero. Once I had the candidates divided into these two categories, I looked at the mean contributions received by each category from broadcast industry PACs throughout the entire study period.

After my difference of means testing, I created various Ordinary Least Squares regression models to test for a relationship between roll call votes and PAC contributions. I coded each vote as follows: 0 for "nay," 1 for "other," and 2 for "yea." Zero meant that the member of Congress voted against the legislation, while 1 meant the member was absent or did not vote for some other reason, and 2 meant the member voted in support of the legislation. I decided to use 1 for "other," the middle number numerically, since the absence of a vote neither hurt nor helped the broadcast industry.

My initial regression models used individual members' votes as dependent variables and the amount of contributions in the preceding election cycle as the independent variable.[4] These first models allowed me to explore the

---

[4] Prior to conducting the regression analyses, I submitted all my independent and dependent variables to a Pearson correlation analysis, in order to ensure that no independent variable was a perfect predictor of any of my dependent variables. In particular, I wanted to ensure that all the variation in my results was not because of a member's party identification. Party identification correlates most strongly (Pearson r value of .721) with the vote on H.R. 4201, a bill concerning obtaining broadcast licenses; it was less highly correlated with all the other individual votes in the study. Party

effect of PAC contributions on members of Congress's votes on each individual piece of legislation included in my study. These models were limited, because I could not use them to develop a theory of the more general relationship between PAC contributions and a member of Congress's vote. In order to explore this relationship I created new variables that could be used in additional regression models. Using the roll call votes, I created a variable that represented the cumulative number of times each member voted in favor of the industry. Then, using this data, I created a variable using this formula: total votes for the broadcast industry, divided by the number of votes in which the member was eligible to vote. This variable gave me the percentage of instances where each member voted in favor of the industry.[5] I then created a regression model that used this percentage of favorable votes as my dependent variable, and the total amount of contributions received from PACs over the study period as my independent variable. I used this model to test the hypothesis that PAC contributions will affect the way in which a member of Congress votes on legislation of interest to the PAC.

        After running them each individually, I created a regression model that used a member's role on the Energy and Commerce and Sub-Committee on Telecommunications and the Internet, their party identification, and the percentage of times they voted in favor of the broadcast industry as independent variables and the total amount of contributions the member received over the study period as the dependent variable. The member's role on the committee was represented numerically as follows: 0 = non-member; 1 = committee member; 2 = sub-committee member; 3 = subcommittee leader; and 4 = committee leader. This model was used to test the theory that PACs contribute to those members that they believe will be most likely to support their preferred position.

        My final regression model was constructed much like the model used in the Strattmann (1998) study—looking at the timing of contributions in relation to congressional activities on a particular piece of legislation. For my study, I chose to use H.R. 3717, the Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, for two

---

identification correlated with the total number of times a member voted in favor of the broadcast industry at only -.211 (Pearson r value), and with the total dollar amount of contributions a member received at -.096 (Pearson r value).

[5] While not all votes are equal—that is, some votes are perceived to be more important than others—for the purposes of this analysis, I weighted all votes the same because it is impossible to know members' opinions regarding the importance of each individual vote.

reasons: One, it was an issue that was of great importance to the broadcast industry; and two, a complete list of PAC expenditures, including dates, is available on opensecrets.org for the 2002 and 2004 election cycles. I decided to recreate the Stratmann model here because his work previously demonstrated that it is the timing of PAC contributions that matters. Thus, including this model in my analysis allows me not only to consider whether PAC contributions matter in general, but whether broadcast industry PACs time their contributions for maximum effectiveness.

Using Lexis-Nexis Congressional, I obtained the dates on which the legislation was introduced, markup occurred, testimony was heard or a hearing took place, and the date the proposed bill was voted on, and in this case, passed. I then gathered the expenditures of all of the PAC used in my study (i.e., Clear Channel, National Association of Broadcasters, Pappas Telecasting Company, Paxson Communications, and Salem Communications) for six months surrounding the roll call vote. I used the vote as the midpoint and obtained expenditures for the three months preceding and following the vote. I divided this six month period into weeks and calculated each PAC's contribution for each week. I than ran ordinary least squares regression using a two week period surrounding the bills' introduction, hearing, and vote dates as my independent variables and the sum of all of the PACs' weekly contributions as my dependent variable. I also ran the same test using each individual PAC's contributions over the same two week time frame to look for trends specific to each PAC.

Results

First, my difference of means test provided statistically significant results. As shown in Table 2, the average contributions to a candidate who voted in favor of the broadcast industry more than 50 percent of the time was $4,131.46, as compared to $1,383.39 for those who voted in favor of the industry less than 50 percent of the time. This result was strongly significant, with a p-value of .000. Also, the average contribution to a Republican candidate is $3281.64, while the average contributions to a Democrat candidate is $2174.22. This result was again very significant with a p-value of .002.

Table 2: Difference of Means Data

	Voted Pro-Industry > 50%	Voted Pro-Industry < 50%	Significance
Total Contributions	$4131.46	$1383.39	.000**
	Republican	Democrat	Significance
Total Contributions	$3281.64	$2174.22	.002*

*P<.01
**P<.001

My regression analyses demonstrated several statistically significant relationships. As illustrated in Table 3, party identification, a member's role on the Energy and Commerce Committee, and the total amount of broadcast industry PAC contributions were all able to predict with statistical significance the percentage of votes the member would cast in favor of the industry.[6] This prospective model suggests that broadcast industry PACs may make contributions in an attempt to influence members' votes. At the very least, it shows that there is an association between PAC contributions and members' voting behaviors.

---

[6] The relationships also held significance when the independent variables were run in individual bivariate models.

Table 3: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining Total Vote*

Variables	Estimate (Beta)	Standard Error	P-Value
Party ID	-.105	.02	.000***
Total Contributions	5.57E-006	.00	.012**
Role On Committee	-.041	.02	.038**

 Adjusted R-Squared = .051

*Calculated using the formula totalvote=(number of votes in favor of industry)/(number of votes eligible to vote in)

** = p <.05

*** = p <.001

In addition, as Table 4 illustrates, a member of Congress's role on the Energy and Commerce Committee and the percentage of votes he or she casts in favor of the industry were statistically significant predictors of the amount of contributions members received from broadcast industry PACs over the study period, although in this model, party identification was not. This retrospective model tested the idea that contributions are a reward for a voting record that is favorable to the industry. It appears that members who had a proven record of voting in favor of the broadcast industry received more contributions during the study period than those who did not have such a favorable record.

Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining Total Amount of Contributions Over Study Period

Variables	Estimate (Beta)	Standard Error	P-value
Role on Committee	5382.78	282.86	.000**
Total Vote[1]	1902.81	756.19	.012*
Party ID	-480.13	389.52	.218

Adjusted R-Square = .393
[1] - Calculated using the formula totalvote=(number of votes in favor of industry)/(number of votes eligible to vote in)
* $P < .05$
**$P < .001$

Since the previous two regression models demonstrated evidence that PACs both give money to members of Congress to encourage and reward voting in a particular way, I refined my model to look at the timing of contributions. What I discovered is that in the case of the broadcast industry the PACs appear to be contributing in order to encourage votes. My regression model that explored the relationship between PAC contributions and the weeks surrounding the roll call vote of H.R. 3717 also achieved statistically significant results. As illustrated by Table 5, when all of the study's PACs are combined, contributions increased over $9,000 the week that the bill was marked up and more than $18,000 the week of the vote on H.R. 3717.

Table 5: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining Sum of Weekly Contributions

Variables	Estimate (Beta)	Standard Error	P-Value
Bill Introduction	-1621.00	4468.05	.721
Testimony	-1496.00	4468.05	.742
Mark Up	9279.00	4468.05	.053*
Vote	18179.00	4468.05	.001**

Adjusted R-Square = .448
* P approaches < .10
** P < .05

To explain these results in greater detail, Clear Channel's PAC contributed nearly $98,000 more the week of the vote, and TARPAC, the PAC of the National Association of Broadcasters, contributed over $613,000 more. This relationship is demonstrated in Table 6.

Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares Regression on PAC's Weekly Campaign Contributions

Variables	Clear Channel Contributions Adjusted R Square = .485			National Assoc. of Broadcasters Adjusted R Square = .109			Pappas Telecasting Company Adjusted R Square = -.203148		
	Estimate (Beta)	Standard Error	P-Value	Estimate (Beta)	Standard Error	P-Value	Estimate (Beta)	Standard Error	P-Value
Testimony	-2089.29	2065.49	.326	-1478.14	3620.50	.688	-428.57	899.18	.641
Bill Intro.	-1089.29	2065.49	.605	-2853.14	3620.50	.442	-178.57	899.18	.846
Mark	4060.71	2065.49	.066*	5646.86	3620.50	.137	-428.57	899.18	.641

UpVote								
Vote	8660.71	2065.49	.001**	6196.86	3620.50	.105*	71.43	899.18	.938

* Approaches significance level of p < .10
     ** p < .05

Anal ysis and Concl usions

My first two regression models demonstrate that broadcast industry PACs give both prospectively and retrospectively; statistically significant relationships were present to support both the idea that they contribute to members of Congress in order to affect their vote on broadcast legislation and the idea that members who vote in favor of the industry will receive contributions as a reward. My third regression model, which looks at the timing of contributions, and illustrates a significant jump in contributions during critical weeks along the bill's road to passage, seems to clarify the relationship between contributions and votes, and provides additional evidence that PACs are contributing to members of Congress prospectively.

My results indicate that several variables are statistically significant predictors of the way a candidate will vote on broadcast industry legislation. Party identification, role on committee, and total PAC contributions all were significant during the period of study, even though only a weak relationship (Adjusted R Square = .051) was demonstrated. It was difficult to find a relationship between PAC contributions and votes on individual pieces of legislation. The relationship between contributions and total vote was demonstrated by both difference of means and ordinary least squares regression testing.

My findings with regards to role on committee are consistent with the literature and demonstrate that PACs give more money to Energy and Commerce Committee members, and even more money to the members and leaders of the Sub-Committee on Telecommunications and the Internet. In a model that only includes party identification as a predictor of total contributions, significant results are achieved; however, when other variables, such as role on committee are controlled for, the party effects lose statistical significance.

Even though my research identified some important statistically significant relationships, there were unavoidable limitations to my data. First, not

all of the PACs in the study were active during all of the election cycles in my study. For example, Clear Channel's PAC has only been active in the last two election cycles, as compared with the National Association of Broadcasters PAC, which was active for the entire study period. Also, changes in broadcast legislation that result in a roll call vote are rare. During the four election cycles of my study, there were only seven roll call votes available to study. More roll call votes would likely affect the strength and statistical significance of my identified relationships. Lastly, my study looked strictly at broadcast industry PACs and roll call votes on broadcast legislation. Therefore, the effects I identify can not be assumed to hold for the thousands of additional issues that Congress considers each year.

Despite these limitations, this study still makes a contribution to the existing literature on political action committees. First, my study is congruent with those of scholars who believe that there is a relationship between PAC contributions and congressional voting behavior, and is especially relevant to the literature on the timing of PAC contributions, (see, for example, Stratmann, 1998; Stratmann, 1995; Stratmann, 2002; Brooks et al., 1998; Roscoe and Jenkins, 2005). This study also challenges the studies of scholars that argue there is no relationship (for example, Grenzke, 1989; Wawro, 2001; Ansolabehere et al., 2003; Smith, 2000; Vesenka, 1989).

This study leaves several questions unanswered, and thus paves the way for additional research in this area. First, since timing clearly matters, a future study may look at PAC contributions to members of the House Rules Committee to determine whether PAC contributions again increase as that committee deliberates the rules for debate that will be used for a particular piece of legislation. Additionally, new election cycles are constantly beginning, and PACs continue to grow, receiving larger and larger contributions. Future election cycles could show interesting PAC contributions strategy. Lastly, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 is still a relatively new piece of legislation. It will be interesting to see if the expenditure limits for PACs affects their contribution strategies.

References

Ansolabehere, Stephen, John de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder Jr. 2003. "Why is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17 (Winter): 105-130.

Brooks, Jonathan C., A. Colin Cameron, and Colin A. Carter. 1998. "Political Action Committee Contributions and U.S. Congressional Voting on Sugar Legislation." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 80 (August): 441-455.

Federal Election Commission. 2005. "Appendix 4: The Federal Election Campaign Laws: A Short History." http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (June 8, 2005).

Grenzke, Janet M. 1989. "PACs and the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency is Complex." *American Journal of Political Science*   33 (February): 1-24.

Roscoe, Douglas D., and Shannon Jenkins. 2005. "A Meta-Analysis of Campaign Contributions' Impact   on Roll Call Voting." *Social Science Quarterly* 86 (March): 52-69.

Rozell, Mark J., and Clyde Wilcox. 1999. *Interest Groups in American Campaigns: The New Face of   Electioneering*. Washington: CQ Press.

Stratmann, Thomas. 1995. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?" *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 77 (February): 127-137.

Stratmann, Thomas. 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?" *Journal of Law and Economics* 41 (April) 85-113.

Stratmann, Thomas. 2002. "Can Special Interest Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation." *The Journal of Law and Economics* 45 (October): 345-373.

Vesenka, Mary H. 1989. "Economic Interests and Ideological Conviction: A Note on PACs and Agricultural Acts." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 12 (March): 259-264.

Wawro, Gregory. 2001. "A Panel Probit Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Roll-Call Votes." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (July): 563.

Globalization and its Impact on the Poor in India

Munjot Sahu
Oberlin College

In 1991, the Indian government changed its inward-looking economic strategy to one that emphasized exporting to other countries. This globalization strategy was imposed because government officials believed it would bring a higher rate of economic growth and that the higher growth would bring benefits to the poor who make up a large percentage of the country's population. Though economic growth increased slightly under the new strategy, the benefits to the poor did not come about, and in many cases, globalization resulted in the poor becoming poorer. This paper will discuss why the strategy toward globalization has negatively affected the poor in India and will continue to do so unless policy changes are made by the Indian government that can help the poor benefit from globalization. The first section of the paper will discuss both why the poor have not benefited from globalization and the impacts of the lack of benefits specifically for the poor and generally for the entire country. The second part describes policy changes that should be initiated in order for the poor to benefit from globalization. This paper will show that in order for the poor in India to benefit from globalization, outdated policies need to be adapted to the country's new economic strategy.

Introduction

Some proponents of globalization, such as economist Martin Wolf, have claimed that globalization has allowed India and several other developing countries to attain a higher rate of economic growth, which has helped reduce the level of poverty in the countries. Wolf states that participation in the global market allowed India's real GDP per capita to more than double between 1980 and 2000 (Wolf 2004, 141). He believes that this rapid economic growth under globalization has helped the poor in India (Wolf 2004, 142). Yet the increase in India's economic growth in recent years has not brought about the benefits for the poor that the government predicted would take place. Not only does the number of poverty-stricken individuals in the country remain high, but globalization has also severely disadvantaged many of the poor in the country. It

has also been argued that if globalization does not help the poor as expected, the country's overall economic condition could worsen.

In this paper, I will argue that globalization has negatively affected the poor in India and will continue to do so unless policy changes are made by the Indian government that can help the poor benefit from globalization. In the first section of this paper, I will discuss why the poor have not benefited significantly from globalization. I will begin by describing the history of economic reforms to help the poor and will then explain how the negative effects of globalization on the poor can have adverse effects on the country's overall economic state. I will also discuss the negative impact that globalization has had on the agricultural and non-farm sectors in India. In the second part of the paper, I will describe policy changes that should be initiated in order for the poor to benefit from globalization. I will first describe policy reforms to help the poor that were implemented in the past and explain why they have not been successful. I will then describe policy reforms that can be introduced now to allow globalization to help the poor, including reforms related to small-scale industries, employment and education, and infrastructure and agriculture. In addition, I will explain how changes in labor laws can help the poor in India. This paper will show that in order for the poor in India to benefit from globalization, outdated policies need to be adapted to the country's new economic strategy.

The History of Economic Reforms to Help the Poor in India

Until 1991, India practiced import-substitution industrialization (ISI), an "inward-looking" economic strategy, in order to be self-reliant and attain economic growth (Mehta and Purohit 2001, 5). Indian government officials believed that a higher rate of economic growth would automatically alleviate poverty in the country. ISI did not bring about the expected growth, and as the country became "close to technical default" on its foreign debts, the government's domestic debt rose to 56 percent of its GDP (Maitra 1996, 171). In addition, the expected benefits for the poor did not result.

To achieve a higher rate of growth, reduce poverty, and improve "human development indicators" such as education and life expectancy, India adopted a policy of export-led development, as suggested by the IMF (Mehta and Purohit 2001, 5). The policy change has allowed India to attain its goal of a higher rate of economic growth, as economic growth increased from the "Hindu rate of

growth" of approximately 3.5 percent per year between the 1950s and 1970s (Hardgrave and Kochanek 1993, 367-68) and the slightly higher rate of about 5 percent in the 1980s, to over 6 percent during most of the 1990s (IndianChild 2000). Yet the expected benefits for the poor did not result from the higher rate of growth, as will be discussed in the next section.

The effects of globalization on the Indian Poor

Even before India liberalized its economy in 1991, it realized that in order to achieve sustainable economic growth its economic policies needed to benefit the poor, a group to which 114.8 million Indians (30 percent of the workforce) belonged in the 1990s (Sundaram and Tendulkar 2004). As stated earlier, when India's economic policy focused on ISI, it was assumed that a higher rate of economic growth would automatically benefit the poor (Jreisat 2002, 114). While India did not achieve the expected growth through ISI, experts still believed that export-led development would immediately better the standard of living for the poor; in other words, while the policy changed, the belief in economic growth alleviating poverty did not.

Yet the expected benefits did not result, even after the shift away from ISI in India as was expected. According to data released by the National Sample Survey, the most widely-used source in literature on poverty in India, there was no significant reduction of rural poverty in the 1990s (Dreze and Sen 2002, 324). Since most poverty-stricken people in India reside in rural areas, the data show that there have been few achievements in reducing poverty in the country. In 1993-94, the poverty rate in India was 39 percent, while in 1999-2000 it dropped to 34 percent, a reduction which is considered "on track with historical trend but lower than expected given the aggregate growth" (Datt and Ravallion 1998).

The lack of benefits for the poor through globalization not only hurts the chances of poverty reduction but could also hurt the Indian economy. Though many years have passed since India implemented its economic policy changes, poverty remains a widespread problem in the country. India remains "home to the world's largest concentration of poor, where some 350 million people sill live on less than a dollar a day" (Waldman 2005). The continuation of widespread poverty in the country could be problematic to sustaining the increased rate of economic growth that India has experienced over the past fourteen years. Leading economists warned the Indian government in early 2005 that the economic growth India has seen over the past few years would not be sustainable

unless "the benefits of globalization reach all sections of its population" (AFX News Limited 2005). This belief stems from the fact that economic growth in other developing countries, such as China and countries in Southeast Asia, was not sustainable until the benefits of globalization reached the poor (Asian Development Bank 2004).

The issue of globalization hurting the poor has become increasingly important in India, especially within the last year. Anti-globalization sentiment was high enough during the May 2004 election to cause the poor, who were disadvantaged by globalization, to be able to influence the election enough that the ruling Bharitya Janata Party (BJP) was defeated by the left-wing Congress party (Nichols 2004). The BJP made economic liberalization, privatization, and the promotion of information technology its priorities, making the party popular with the middle class, who would benefit from the proposed policy changes made in these areas. The poor had not benefited from past BJP policies that focused on economic reform without considering the situation of the poor or aiding people in rural areas. This caused them to believe that globalization was not in their best interest (Singh 2004). The Congress party took advantage of the anti-globalization sentiment among the poor, and "campaigned on a fairly simple message—that the economic reforms promoted by the BJP-led government had not reached everyone, especially those in the villages and the poor" (Singh and Chaurushiya 2004). It stated in its campaign that if elected, it would stop the sale of state-owned companies to foreign companies, force corporations to pay more taxes, and spread wealth more equitably (Nichols 2004). Because the poor believed that the Congress party would create policies that would benefit them, and because the poor vote in high numbers in India, the party was able to win (Nichols 2004).

Globalization's Effects on the Agricultural Sector

While employees in the service sector have benefited from globalization in India, those who hold jobs in the agricultural sector have been disadvantaged. Agricultural workers, who make up 65 percent of India's population, are also some of the most economically disadvantaged people in the country (Hindustan Times 2005). In 1993-94, agriculture, excluding fishing and forestry, contributed 28 percent of India's GDP. In 1999-2000, it dropped to 25 percent. In recent years, it has continued to fall, and in addition, recent years have shown a negative growth of agricultural production (Bigman 2002, 105). India's agricultural

productivity is currently behind other developing countries in Asia – including China, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka – and the country's agricultural productivity growth rate dropped from 3.5 percent per year in the 1980s to 1.7 percent in the 1990s (Bigman 2002, 105). In the 1990s the growth of agricultural wages declined as well, as wage growth dropped from over 5 percent during the 1980s to 2.5 percent in the 1990s (Basu 2002, 156). The drop in wages is problematic because there is a close association between agricultural wages and rural poverty. The drop has also significantly contributed to the rising urban-rural disparity (Dreze and Sen 2002, 328-29).

Many factors have contributed to the decline of the agricultural industry. For instance, when India was in the process of reforming its economic policy in 1991, it was pressured by the IMF to lower public spending, especially in agriculture. It decided to do so, and as a result, spending in agricultural research and extension, as well as rural development was significantly reduced (Virmani 2004, 34-35). Recently, agricultural research spending in India has amounted to about 0.3 percent of the agricultural GDP in the country, compared to the 0.7 percent average in developing countries and 2-3 percent in developed countries (Bigman 2002, 115). Agricultural spending is important to the overall state of the Indian economy, as it "raises agricultural productivity, acts as a stimulant to a rural economy, brings down poverty, and enables the government to reduce over time expenditure on food or fertilizer subsidies and poverty alleviation measures" (Basu 2004, 105). Significantly cutting agricultural spending has reduced the government's ability to alleviate poverty and improve the standard of living for rural agricultural farmers.

The 1991 reforms also called for the removal of many restrictions on agricultural trade. When the IMF suggested that India remove trade barriers in agriculture, it believed that doing so would allow transnational corporations (TNCs) to "invest, produce and trade in agricultural commodities without restriction, regulation or responsibility," and this would allow price distortions set by the government to be removed, since the government would not be a part of agricultural trade (Hovden and Keene 2002, 246). The IMF stated that "setting prices right sets everything else right," meaning that if the prices of agricultural products became undistorted, then India would see an increase in agricultural trade (Hovden and Keene 2002, 246). Yet, eliminating the government's role in agricultural trade did not allow the prices of agricultural products to become undistorted and did not lead to an increase in agricultural trade for the country,

since prices are "not determined by…demand and supply alone, but by the power of very few transnational trading companies. Their resources, marketing techniques, networks, and brand names determine or 'rig' prices internationally… " (Hovden and Keene 2002, 246).

Even in selling agricultural products within India, farmers have been left at a disadvantage due to free trade. It has been observed that "it is cheaper in South India to import wheat from Australia than from Punjab" (Basu 2004, 51). Before 1991, Indian agricultural prices were lower than international prices. Since developed countries heavily subsidize their agricultural exports, causing international agricultural prices to become less than domestic agricultural prices, many farmers have become unemployed (Frankel 2005, 606). This has also lead to an extremely high rate of suicides among farmers in India, and growing unrest in several agriculturally-dominated states (Bigman 2002, 104).

When trade restrictions were removed, Indian government officials believed that removing the restrictions would increase private investment in agriculture. Yet private agricultural companies invest in the crops with "significant commercial prospects," meaning that only farmers who grow crops that are profitable are able to benefit from the reform. Typically, these farmers are not among those who are suffering from poverty (Bardhan 2003, 4-5). The farmers who have benefited so far from the removal of trade barriers are "resource-rich farmers that can increase their investments and have access to credit" (Bigman 2002, 104). Since these farmers are not among those who are poverty-stricken, the poor have not been able to benefit from a policy that was implemented to help them. It is therefore expected that if current policies that promote privatization through removing trade barriers continue, then "subsistence farmers in remote areas with less access to the markets and new technology may become increasingly marginalized" (Bigman 2002, 105).

The Indian government insists that though its previous five year plans have virtually ignored workers in the agricultural sector, as they have focused mainly on industrialization, the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2002-2007) addresses the struggles that farmers face, which will result in policies that will help farmers benefit from globalization (Tenth Five-Year Plan 2003, 149). Yet, the sections in the Plan that specifically discuss agriculture and agricultural development focus mainly on reducing subsidies to farmers to eliminate unnecessary governmental costs. Though the Plan does describe the need for improved infrastructure and a greater focus on agricultural research and development (Tenth Five-Year Plan

2003, 14-15), no significant policy initiatives have been taken so far to bring about the needed improvements (Vision 2004).

Effects of Globalization on Non-Farm Employment

Typically, the non-farm sector in which low-skilled workers are most likely to be employed is manufacturing, since a large number of low-skilled jobs are available in this sector. Yet unlike countries such as China, in which globalization caused a shift in the employment of low-skilled workers from agricultural to manufacturing jobs, India does not have enough manufacturing jobs available to allow such as shift to occur. Despite the increase in technology brought about through globalization, there has been no "structural change in terms of the employment of labor," which has kept the number of jobs available to low-skilled workers in secondary industries at 9 to 10 percent of the available jobs, leaving "70 to 75 percent…eking out a living from subsistence peasant [farming]" (Maitra 1996, 214). Despite the industrial growth that has taken place in India due to globalization, manufacturing companies employ only 7 million people in the country (Lancaster 2004). The low number of manufacturing jobs in the country is largely due to the continued existence of labor laws that have not been updated in many years and remained unchanged after India underwent economic liberalization in 1991. An increase in the creation of manufacturing jobs cannot occur until changes in labor laws are made, which will be discussed in the second part of this paper.

In recent years, the media have publicized the fact that globalization has brought more jobs to India, especially in the information technology (IT) sector, which has caused many to believe that the poor in India are benefiting from globalization through an increase in job opportunities. The jobs created, such as those in the IT sector, have had little effect on increasing employment in the country, however (Joshi 2004). Though more jobs have been created in the IT sector, the number of people employed in the sector is less than 1 million people, while the entire workforce consists of over 400 million people (Joshi 2004). In addition, the jobs usually require skilled workers who have at least a college degree. As a result, the poor have not benefited from the creation of such jobs.

Implemented Policy Reforms

Though many have argued that policies promoting globalization should not be undertaken in India, as such policies typically make the rich more wealthy and the poor even poorer, the Indian government is unlikely to adopt an anti-globalization position in the future. Because of this, policy changes should be made to protect the poor from the negative effects of globalization that have hurt them in the past and ensure that they can benefit from globalization as well. The next part of the paper will discuss policy changes the Indian government has undertaken to help the poor benefit from globalization and why the policies have been ineffective. In addition, it will discuss policy changes that should be made in order to allow the poor in India to benefit more from globalization. I will propose in this section that the government's role in aiding the poor needs to change because of globalization. In order for the poor to benefit fully from globalization, the role of the government should shift away from regulating industries and increasing welfare program funding. Instead, the government should focus on efforts to increase economic growth, including improvements that would indirectly benefit the poor. Though economic growth alone is not of great benefit to the poor, as stated earlier, it is still a necessary component of any strategy to alleviate the negative effects of globalization on the poor (World Bank 2000, 102). The improvements that would indirectly benefit the poor include including improvements to the small-scale industry sector, employment, education, infrastructure, agriculture, and labor laws.

After liberalizing the economy, the Indian government redesigned its existing programs that assisted the poor to help them overcome the disadvantages of globalization. Programs were redesigned to generate self-employment and wage employment in rural areas and were "restructured to improve their efficacy and impact on the poor" (Jreisat 2002, 119). Some of the restructuring involved changing rural development programs into self-employment training programs. In addition, existing self-employment training programs were streamlined. The government increased spending on existing programs from Rs. 9345 crores (about $1,988,297,872) in 1998-99 to Rs. 9650 crores (about $2,053,191,489) in 1999-2000 to allow for the restructuring (Jreisat 2002, 119).

Yet the reforms were "regarded by many as being merely cosmetic," as not all poverty-stricken people were being helped by such reforms. It was believed that "…the roots of reforms [should be made] deeper by bringing under [the government's] purview the millions of underdogs who have been bypassed

by five years of reform," which was not achieved through the government's restructuring (Jreisat 2002, 119). Changing policies to allow the poor to gain employment in foreign industries was, and is still, the most effective way to allow the poor to benefit from globalization. Allowing the poor to obtain such jobs is seen as an effective way to alleviate rural poverty, as agricultural jobs are becoming more scarce, less stable, and less profitable (Bardhan 2003, 5). In the sections that follow, I will explain why the poor have not been employed in large numbers in foreign industries so far and how the government can help the poor to be find employment in foreign industries in India.

Small-Scale Industry Employment

After agriculture, small scale industries (SSIs) employ the greatest number of poverty-stricken people in India (Tisdell and Sen 2004, 118). SSIs consist of "traditional village industries," such as the small rural industries that produce items such as handicrafts and handloom products (India Mart 2001). People employed in the SSI sector have also been severely disadvantaged by globalization, due to the competition they face from cheap foreign imports. As a result, many SSIs have been forced to close down, causing a significant amount of the Indian workforce to find themselves unemployed (Tisdell and Sen 2004, 118). The elimination of many SSIs has been detrimental to India, as they "are generally more employment intensive per unit than large scale industry. They are also a source of [*sic*] the much needed employment avenues" (Tenth Five-Year Plan 2003, 16). Since most of the SSIs were protected by the government prior to 1991, they did not face any domestic or global competition. SSIs received such benefits from the government as excise tax concessions, preferred access to government contracts, and subsidized priority credit from national commercial banks. In addition, the production of certain products was reserved solely for SSIs (Srinivasan and Tendulkar 2003, 127). Because they were not prepared for dealing with competition when globalization became prevalent in India, most either became extremely inefficient or closed down (Mehta and Purohit 2001, 18).

One problem that SSIs face is a lack of short- and long-term credit to allow for modernization and technological upgrades. It is expected that if the government takes steps to allow SSIs to have access to more credit, they will be able to be more competitive and would be likely to produce goods that conform to international standards, which will make them more profitable (India Mart

2001). The government can implement policies that allow SSIs to collaborate with large domestic industries or foreign industries to help the SSIs become more productive and profitable or create policies that "enable [SSIs] to produce quality products with their unrivaled skill and craftsmanship," which can allow them to compete with cheaply-made goods in other Third World countries (Mehta and Purohit 2001, 18).

Policy Changes to Increase Employment Among the Poor

In order to improve the quality of life for the poor in India, education, health care, and nutrition need to be improved. One of the fastest ways to improve the quality of life in these areas is to increase employment (Jreisat 2002, 122). Therefore, making an increase in employment opportunities a priority in a development strategy is necessary. Though the Indian government was able to make some progress in increasing employment in 1995-96, the reduced growth rate that followed, and continues to persist, prevented such efforts from continuing (Frankel 2005, 599).

Increasing employment in India will be a challenge, as it is predicted that the Indian population will grow to 1.39 billion by the year 2025—a growth rate of 65 percent over 35 years (Banerjee and Jurgen Richter 2003, 277). While the standards of living for the poor already need to be improved, the situation is expected to worsen as the population increases. Not only is "the Indian economy ill-placed to support a current population growth of around 2 percent per annum," but the rapid increase of population will also mean that more jobs will need to be created. It is expected that by 2025, 68.1 percent of the population in India will be in the 15-64 age group—the group in need of employment—compared to 60.2 percent in 1991(Banerjee and Jurgen Richter 2003, 277). Though more jobs will be needed in the near future, the number of jobs available in the country is declining. Despite the fact that the rate of labor growth decreased in the 1990s, India's unemployment rate increased from 6.03 percent in 1993-94 to 7.32 percent in 1999-2000. The increase was mainly due to a large loss of jobs in the agricultural sector, which experienced -0.34 percent growth from 1994-2000 (Tisdell and Sen 2004, 115).

In response to criticism for the lack of efforts put forth to help the poor overcome the growing unemployment situation in the country, a bill is currently being considered in the Indian parliament to guarantee one member of every poor rural household 100 days of minimum-wage employment on a public works

project (Waldman 2005). Yet if the plan is passed, it may not bring about the expected alleviation in India's poverty rate. Indian Finance Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram stated that the employment guarantee will help the rural poor, but it is unlikely that they will be able to escape poverty through the guaranteed work. It has also been predicted that corruption and waste could become problems in implementing the program, as some argue that "a nationwide employment program would funnel money not to the poor but rather to corrupt politicians, bureaucrats, and local power brokers" (Waldman 2005). The finance minister and prominent Indian economist Surjit Bhalla argue that the only way to improve the poverty rate in India is through an increase in what the finance minister referred to as "real jobs"—a reference to full-time, continuing employment (Waldman 2005). Thus, increasing employment in India, especially in low-skill sectors where there has not been much job creation in recent years, is an important part of improving the quality of life for the poor.

Policy Changes to Improve Education

Improving education in India is becoming increasingly important due to the growth of non-farm employment, which currently makes up 40 percent of rural jobs and is expected to increase significantly over time (Basu 2004, 172). The government itself has argued that because agricultural jobs will not be as prevalent in the future, skill level and education need to increase (Tenth Five-Year Plan 2003, 4). Currently, however, India has a lower literacy rate than several Asian countries, including China, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka (Basu 2004, 171). It also has a significantly lower rate of literacy compared with other Asian countries in the first decade in which they liberalized their economies. For example, in 1960, South Korea's literacy rate was 71 percent, and in 1980 China's literacy rate was 69 percent, while India's literacy rate in 1999 was 56 percent (Dreze and Sen 2002, 76). Adult literacy in the country is also extremely low. In South Korea, Hong Kong, and Thailand, adult literacy in 1990 was almost universal. In 1960, it was almost 100 percent in the three countries. In contrast, about 25 percent of Indians in the 15-19 year age group in 2002 were illiterate, and of that group less than one-half had attended school for eight years (Dreze and Sen 2002, 76).

One of the main reasons why literacy rates in India remain low is because the government has not given much attention to the problem. The shares of government expenditures devoted to education and health are considered low

by international standards (World Bank 2000, 21). Economists Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen write that there has been too little government action in expanding elementary and secondary education in India, and this has been the most significant failure in Indian educational planning. For example, forty years ago, the government of India promised to allocate 6 percent of the national income to education, as recommended by the Kothari Commission, but the amount has significantly decreased in subsequent years. The government stated in the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2001) that it was committed to allocating 6 percent, though the amount decreased from 4.5 percent in 1989-90 to 3.6 percent in 1996-97 (Banerjee and Jurgen Richter 2003, 301). Though there was a slight increase (under 1 percent) in the subsequent years of the Ninth Five-Year Plan and part of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, India was not capable of attaining the 6 percent goal (Banerjee and Jurgen Richter 2003, 301). The lack of attention is significant to the low literacy rate because in all "high-performing Asian economies" the state has played a major role in improving education through ensuring that a vast majority of the population can "read, write, communicate, and interact in a way that prepared them to participate in a modern economy" (Dreze and Sen 2002, 77). The lack of attention paid to literacy could be problematic in the future if it continues, as

> …globalization is likely to bring prices of the weaker economies into alignment with prices in the industrialized nations. Given that the price of illiterate labor is close to zero in industrialized nations, this means that the illiterate population of developing nations will tend to become extremely impoverished if there is globalization without complementary government intervention. In a country like India where 35 percent of the people are illiterate, globalization can contribute to increasing poverty and inequality (Basu 2002, 17).

Infrastructural Improvements

One of the greatest hindrances to India's economic progress is poor infrastructure. In fact, "sustained rapid growth and rapid poverty eradication are unlikely without dramatic improvements in the efficiency, quality, and reliability of infrastructure" (Srinivasan and Tendulkar 2003, 110). Poor infrastructure also

"constrains growth and expansion into international markets" (Srinivasan and Tendulkar 2003, 112).

One way in which economic growth has been hindered by poor infrastructure is the deterrence of the creation of foreign factories in the country. A significant reason why foreign companies are not inclined to relocate factories to India is because of the lack of power supply in the country. In fact, problems with power supply are considered the greatest problem to investment and growth of the non-farm sector in India. Most manufacturers consider access to reliable power at a reasonable cost to be "a prime concern," and other businesses find that it is necessary to increase productivity (Basu 2002, 167). Currently, most manufacturing firms have to buy and run their own generators because of the poor power supply. For all manufacturers, especially small- and medium-size firms, the cost to maintain power is high. In addition, India maintains some of the highest industrial power tariffs in the world (about Rs. 4-5 per kWh) (Basu 2002, 167). Improving the likelihood that foreign companies will invest in India is important, as "there is increasing evidence from rapidly-growing economies that long-term foreign investment capital inflows help expand exports and stimulate growth through technological spillovers as well as supplement domestic savings efforts" (Srinivasan and Tendulkar 2003, 110). If more foreign manufacturing companies open factories in India, the creation of low-skill jobs that would result can help alleviate poverty in the country.

Improvements in infrastructure affecting the agricultural sector are also necessary to improving agricultural growth and employment in India. Before 1991, agricultural policies focused mainly on prices and virtually ignored infrastructural and technological changes that were necessary to attain higher levels of growth. Even after liberalization took place, little attention has been paid to improving agricultural infrastructure (The World Bank 2000, 62). The lack of development in irrigation systems is the most crucial factor in constraining long-term agricultural growth in the country so far. Currently only 38 percent of cultivated land is irrigated, which has largely contributed to the fact that agricultural growth decreased from an average of 7.8 percent from 1992-1996 to 1.2 percent form 1996-2001 (Basu 2004, 95). Thus, improving infrastructural systems in rural and urban areas can greatly help in increasing agricultural and manufacturing growth in India.

Additional Agricultural Policy Changes

As mentioned earlier, increasing research and development in agriculture is an important part of creating polices to benefit the poor in India. Government investment in agricultural research has the second greatest impact on rural poverty (Fan Hazell and Thorat). It is expected that increasing funds for agricultural research and the new technologies that develop from the research can increase agricultural production, employment, and incomes (The World Bank 2000, 86-87).

"[T]here are various ways of encouraging private efforts in agricultural R&D [research and development], the most important of which are the protection of intellectual property and plant variety rights. Other incentives…include tax breaks, direct subsidies, and grants" (Bigman 2002, 117). If the Indian government were to invest more in agricultural research, each additional Rs. 1 million (about $21,277) would allow 91 people to rise above the poverty line. If the government invested an additional Rs. 100 billion (about $2,127,659,574), then agricultural productivity growth would increase by 6.98 percent, and the incidence of rural poverty would decrease by 0.48 percent (Fan, Hazell, and Thorat 1999).

Labor Law Changes

Current labor policies are considered too archaic to allow companies to be competitive, as they do not allow companies to increase productivity and reduce the cost of production (Financial Times 2004). As a result, foreign companies are less likely to relocate factories to India, because doing so is not profitable to them. According to the spokesperson for the All-India Manufacturers' Association, M. Sowundarapandian, companies in India need the same rights as those in industrialized nations in order to be competitive. For example, government permission should not be necessary for layoffs, retrenchment, or closure. Current laws hinder employment because they make it difficult to eliminate employees once they are hired (Joshi 2004). Requiring permission can also cause companies to avoid establishing factories in India (Financial Times 2004). "Unless the labor laws are changed, higher manufacturing and economic growth will not automatically translate into higher levels of employment" (Banerjee and Jurgen Richter 2003, 285.)

Though it is widely known that labor laws are a hindrance to increasing the benefits of globalization in India, not much has been done to reform the laws. The reformation of labor laws has been on the Indian government's agenda since 1991, yet the only action that has taken place to reform the laws has been a proposal made by the Finance Minister in his 2001-02 budget, which has called for increased compensation to retrenched workers and the elimination of requiring government permission for layoffs, retrenchments, and closure of large-scale industries. This proposal was not passed in Parliament, due to strong opposition from the Congress Party and other left-wing parties (Srinivasan and Tendulkar 2003, 138). Successful changes to labor laws, nevertheless, could result in the creation of as many as 30 million jobs in manufacturing by the year 2015, according to a study conducted by the consulting firm McKinsey & Co. and the Confederation of Indian Industry (Lancaster 2004). Thus, changing labor laws can alleviate poverty in India by providing more jobs for the poor through an increase in foreign manufacturing factories in the country.

Conclusion

Contrary to what Wolf (2004) and many other proponents of globalization believe, the economic growth that came about through the shift from ISI to globalization has not automatically benefited the poor. Without changes to existing policies, the poor cannot fully benefit from globalization, and in some cases they continue to suffer because of globalization without the policy changes. Those working in the sector with the greatest number of poor people, the agricultural sector, have been severely disadvantaged by the IMF's recommendation that the Indian government make significant cuts to agricultural research and development. The cuts have caused poor farmers to be unable to compete with international farmers due to a lack of technology that would make them more efficient. In addition, the benefits for poor farmers that were expected to come about through globalization actually went to the non-poor farmers. Since labor laws were not updated to make it easier for foreign companies to relocate factories to India, the number of manufacturing jobs in the country remains small. As a result, many of the poor farmers were not able to make a shift from farming to jobs in manufacturing, as was the case in China.

For the poor to benefit from globalization, the role of the government needs to change from regulating industries and increasing funds for welfare programs to increasing spending to create improvements that can indirectly

benefit the poor. Welfare programs to benefit the rural poor have mainly consisted of programs to promote self-employment and have generally been unsuccessful. Making policy changes to better the SSI sector can help the poor, as SSIs employ the second greatest number of poor people in India. Since SSIs never faced competition before globalization, the government should provide them with credit to make technological upgrades that will allow them to be competitive in the international market. The government will also have to work to increase employment, as the population in India is expected to rise and the number of people in the workforce increases. Job creation, especially in non-skilled labor, will be necessary to avoid increasing poverty in the future. Because there will likely be a shift in non-skilled jobs from being primarily concentrated in farming to non-farm sectors in the future, the government needs to form a strategy to improve education, as more skills will be required for employment in non-farm sectors. Improving infrastructure in India will allow more foreign companies to relocate factories in the country and will allow poor farmers to be more competitive. Increasing research and development in agriculture can also help poor farmers escape poverty by helping them become more competitive, both domestically and internationally. To promote the relocation of foreign factories, which will increase the number of jobs available for the poor, the government needs to change labor laws such as those that hinder new employment and the establishment of factories. This paper has shown that though increased economic growth alone cannot significantly decrease poverty, making policy changes to adapt to globalization can greatly help in alleviating poverty in India.

References

AFX News Limited. 2005. "India's Growth at Risk Unless Benefits Trickle Down to the Poor—Economists." February 4. http://www.lexisnexis.com (18 February 2005).

Asian Development Bank. 2004. "Benefits of High Growth Must Reach Poor in South Asia, Says ADB Vice-President." www.adb.org/documents/news/INRM/inrm200402.asp (24 April 2005).

Banerjee, Parthasarathi, and Frank Jurgen Richter, eds. 2003. *Economic Institutions in India: Sustainability under Liberalization and Globalization.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bardhan, Pranab. 2003. *Poverty, Agrarian Structure, and Political Economy in India: Selected Essays.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Basu, Inderjeet. 2004. "Faces of Globalization: Textile Boom." *United Press International,* May 20.

Basu, Kaushik, ed. 2004. *India's Emerging Economy: Performance and Prospects in the 1990s and Beyond.* Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Bigman, David, ed. 2002. *Globalization and the Developing Countries, Emerging Strategies for Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation.* The Hague: CABI Publishing.

Datt, Gaurav, and Martin Ravallion. 1998. "Farm Productivity and Rural Poverty in India." www.ifpri.org/divs/fcnd/dp/papers/dp42.pdf (8 May 2005).

Dreze, Jean, and Amartya Sen. 2002. *India: Development and Participation.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hardgrave, Robert, and Stanley Kochanek, eds. 1993. *India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation.* 5th ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich.

Fan, Shenggen, Peter Hazell, and Sukhadeo Thorat. 1999. "Linkages Between Government Spending, Growth and Poverty in Rural India." www.ifpri.org/pubs/abstract/abstr110.htm (9 May 2005).

Financial Times. 2004. "Archaic Labour Laws Will Not Help in Competitive Economy." October 17. http://www.lexisnexis.com (18 February 2005).

Frankel, Francine. 2005. *India's Political Economy 1947-2004.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

"Globalization Must Bring Benefits to all Indians: Finance Minister." 2004. *Hindustan Times*, 7 January. http://www.lexisnexis.com (18 February 2005).

Hovden, Evind, and Edward Keene, eds. 2002. *The Globalization of Liberalism.* New York: Palgrave Publishers, Ltd.

Indian Child. 2000. "India Economy Growth." http://www.indianchild.com/india_economy_growth.htm (8 May 2005).

India Mart. 2001. "Indian Export-Import Portal." http://exim.indiamart.com/cgi/print-text.cgi (8 May 2005).

Joshi, Vijay. 2004. "The Myth of India's Outsourcing Boom." *The Financial Times*, November 16. http://www.lexisnexis.com (18 February 2005).

Jreisat, Jamil. 2002. *Governance and Developing Countries.* Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers.

Kentor, Jeffrey. 2001. "The Long Term Effects of Globalization on Income Inequality, Population Growth, and Economic Development." *Social Problems*, November. http://www.lexisnexis.com (18 February 2005).

Lancaster, John. 2004. "Indian Economy Leaves Workers Behind." *The Washington Post,* November 3. http://www.lexisnexis.com (18 February 2005).

Maitra, Priyatosh. 1996. *The Globalization of Capitalism in Third World Countries.* Westport: Praeger Publishers.

Mehta, Pradeep S., and Purnima Purohit. 2001. *Globalization and India: Myths and Realities.* Jaipur: Center for International Trade, Economics and Environment.

Mehta, Pratap Bhanu. 2004. "Lessons on Globalization from India." *YaleGlobal,* June. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4_101 (27 April 2005).

Mehta, Pratap Bhanu. 2004. "India's Kinder and Gentler Globalization." *Global Envision.* http://www.globalenvision.org/library/3/667/ (27April 2005).

Muppidi, Himadeep. 2004. *The Politics of the Global,* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Nichols, John. 2004. "Voters in India Say No to Globalization." *Capital Times*, May 18. http://www.lexisnex is.com (18 February 2005).

Round, Jeffery, and John Whalley. 2002. "Globalization and Poverty: Implications for South Asia and the Wider Debate." http://www.gapresearch.org/production/JJoverview.pdf (18 March 2005).

Sen Gupta, Bhabani. 1997. "India in the Twenty-First Century." *International Affairs* 73: 297-314.

Singh, Sonal, and Radha Chaurushiya. 2004. "The Promise of India: The Challenges Ahead." www.americanprogre ss.org/site/pp.asp?c=bij r8ovf&b=99571&printmode=1 (24 April 2005).

Singh, S. Nihal. 2004. "Indian Election: Of Computer Mice and Men." *YaleGlobal,* May 17. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id= 3887 (27 April 2005).

Srinivasan, T.N., and Suresh D. Tendulkar. 2003. *Reintegrating India with the World Economy*. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

Sundaram, K., and S.D. Tendulkar. 2004. "The Poor in the Labour Force in the 1990s." http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC15508.htm (29 May 2005).

Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007). 2003. New Delhi: Academic Foundation.

Tisdell, Clem, and Raj Kumar Sen. 2004. *Economic Globalisation.* Northampton: Elgar Publishing.

Virmani, Arvind. 2004. *Accelerating Growth and Poverty Reduction: A Policy Framework for India's Development.* New Delhi: Academic Foundation.

Vision. 2004. "Impact of Rural-Urban Migration on the Sustainability of Cities." http://www.wscsd.org/ejournal/article.php3?id_article+109 (8 May 2005).

Waldman, Amy. 2005. "Mystery of India's Poverty: Can the State Break its Grip?" *The New York Times*, April 29. http://www.lexisnexis.com. (10 May 2005).

Wolf, Martin. 2004. *Why Globalization Works.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

The World Bank. 2000. *India: Reducing Poverty, Accelerating Development.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

US Policy and Darfur

Lee Sherman
University of Southern California

Genocide has ravaged the Sudan providence of Darfur since February of 2003. Though the situation has started to progress as peace talks between northern and southern Sudan has eased the crisis, the issue of Darfur has not been completely resolved and a solution will only come after an estimated hundreds of thousands have died and over two million people have been displaced from their homes. The United States has taken the lead on the issue becoming the first nation to call the situation in Darfur genocide, but has been unable to take the necessary steps and muster the political will to ensure action and seek international cooperation toward ending the genocide. In this paper, I analyze the diplomatic and political factors that limit the United States's intervention in humanitarian crises. Given these limitations, I analyze the options the United States has at its disposal to expedite the end of the genocide in Darfur.

Introduction

In 2004, Samantha Power, a leading scholar on issues of genocide, wrote about the situation in Darfur, a providence in the western region of Sudan, through the story of Amida Abaker Mohammed. Amida used to live in Darfur as part of the Zaghawa tribe with her husband and six children. In January 2004 while Amina's husband was away a group of Sudanese soldiers called the *Janjaweed*, or bandits, approached on camels and horses. While Amina hurried herself and some of the animals to a hill, one of her sons remained at a well in the Janjaweed's path to protect some of the other animals. After a day of gunfire, Amina went back to the wells and found them filled with corpses with many beheaded, including that of her son. A week later, Amina left with her five remaining children to Chad, with none of the family's animals surviving the fighting and relocation (Power 2004).

As gruesome as Amina's story appears, this is not an atypical tale of some of the millions who live or have lived in Darfur. The conflict started in February 2003 when rebel groups in the South like the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) began protesting the

Muslim government in northern Sudan. In response, the government started a terror campaign against the civilians of Darfur through its allied militia Janjaweed (Dagne 2005). The ensuing conflict has led to an approximately two million people displaced to neighboring countries, most notably Chad, and estimates ranging from 180,000 to 400,000 people killed (Goldberg 2005).

The United States Congress declared the atrocities in Darfur genocide in July 2004 with the Bush administration following in September 2004 (Dagne 2005). According to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, any nation that declares a genocide occurring is obligated to take action to stop the genocide (Power 2002, 62-63). While calling Darfur a genocide was historic in marking the first time that genocide was recognized while it was still occurring, the United States and world response to Darfur has since been limited. The United States agreed to some humanitarian aid and has been a leader in trying to get international support for helping African Union peacekeepers, but the Untied States is more preoccupied by its other military operations and did not consider any direct military involvement. The rest of the world took even less action as the United Nations has yet to consider the actions in Darfur as genocide and only recently passed resolutions threatening sanctions.

In the first declared case of genocide of the 21st century, the United States is being tested in how it bases its policy of intervention in a humanitarian crisis. Only if the United States makes ending the genocide a priority in its diplomatic negotiations will it be able to actively lead an international commitment to stopping the genocide. In this analysis, I examine the diplomatic and political factors that influence U.S. intervention in humanitarian crises. I also discuss the current policy options available to the United States regarding the crisis in Darfur.

U.S. Response in Darfur

The response of the United States in Darfur has been more pro-active than in previous genocides, such as the 1994 slaughter of Tutsis in Rwanda. At the same time, the United States has not devoted the same resources to Darfur as it did during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) campaign in Kosovo. While the first country to call the situation genocide, the United States constructed a policy toward Sudan with economic sanctions against the offending government and humanitarian aid meant to assist the millions displaced from

Darfur. Also, the United States focused on peace talks that were meant to solve the civil war in Sudan, but left Darfur out of those talks until this year. While the United States assisted in the region, it is uncertain how effective the policy has been in lessening the crisis in Darfur.

Summary of Conflict

The situation in Darfur is rooted in Sudan's 21-year civil war in southern Sudan, in which approximately 2.5 million people have died. One of the contributing factors for the start of the civil war was the government of Sudan imposing the Islamic Sharia in 1983 throughout the southern region, which has a large Christian population (House International Relations Committee 2005). Out of the civil war, Muslim African ethnic groups believed that the National Islamic Front (NIF) government was marginalizing African communities in Darfur while also supporting Arab militias to suppress non-Arabs, whom the government considered a threat against its power (Dagne 2005). Rebel groups such as the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) formed in Darfur to challenge the NIF. In response, the government of Sudan and its allied militia began a campaign of terror against civilians- beginning in early 2003- to end the rebellion and punish the core constituencies who are more prone to join rebel activities (Dagne 2005). The result in Darfur includes a large-scale loss of life estimated as high as 300,000 to 400,000 people; widespread rape and destruction of villages; over two million people forced from their homelands; and violence carried out by government forces, the Arab militia (Janjaweed), and the rebel groups (House International Relations Committee 2005).

Calling Darfur Genocide

The actions of the United States in Darfur range from being both critical of the Sudanese government and diplomatically working toward a peace agreement. Probably the most significant step was Congress's decision to pass a resolution labeling the attacks in Darfur as genocide in July 2004. Then Secretary of State Colin Powell and President George W. Bush also labeled activities in Darfur as genocide several weeks later (Straus 2005). This marked the first time since the Genocide Convention that a genocide was declared while it was

currently taking place. This is clearly a step forward from America's reluctance to call other acts of violence, such as the massacre of 800,000 people in Rwanda, a genocide (Glazer 2004).

Despite this progress, many believe that declaring genocide, as stated by the Genocide Convention Treaty, would require the United States to "undertake to prevent and to punish" genocide and that relevant parties may call on the U.N. to "take such action for the prevention and suppression" of genocide (Straus 2005). In the past, like the situation in Rwanda, the United States was hesitant about this declaration of genocide because of the political implications entailed (Power 2002, 335). In that case the Clinton administration felt that by calling Rwanda a genocide, the United States would be forced to do everything in its power to end the genocide, which it was not prepared to do politically after United States troops were killed in the 1993 humanitarian intervention in Somalia. After Secretary of State Colin Powell called Darfur a genocide in 2004, he further insisted that the genocide determination did not bind the United States to intervene directly to prevent genocide if the U.N. did not act (Goldberg 2005). The Bush administration instead claimed that its policy of diplomatically pressuring Khartoum to stop the acts of genocide and supplying humanitarian relief were sufficient for the United States to abide by the Convention. In doing so, the Bush administration took a politically safe road in claiming genocide is occurring, but stating that it is not required to fully devote resources toward ending the genocide.

Economic Sanctions

In addition to calling the conflict genocide, economic sanctions have played an important role in holding the Sudan government accountable and in pressing the government to act toward ending the genocide. Sudan has been denied U.S. foreign aid since 1988, when it defaulted on servicing its external debts. Furthermore, events such as the overthrow of a democratically elected government in 1989 and a U.S. determination that Sudan supported acts of international terrorism has strengthened these economic sanctions to include ineligibility for foreign assistance within all authorization and appropriations legislation (Rennack 2004). Currently, no funds will be available to the government of Sudan unless the government disarms the militia groups in Darfur and a solution is in place. The effect current sanctions have on Sudan remains

unclear. Prior to the United States recognizing Darfur as genocide, Sudan had already faced 12 sets of sanctions from the United States alone. When the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) threatened to leave during the 1990s, the Sudanese government did not respond (Fessenden 2004). Hannah Royal, Foreign Policy Legislative Assistant for Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), one of the leading Senators in requesting more United States involvement in Darfur, said that the only sanctions that Sudan may respond to are arms and oil sanctions, with which the United States already took action. As Sudan has customers for oil in other parts of the world (such as in France) and the Janjaweed are still receiving arms from China, Sudan still possesses the resources to remain in power despite U.S. sanctions (Royal 2005). Thus, even as the United States places sanctions on Sudan, unless the rest of the world follows, the sanctions do not have the same bite.

Humanitarian Aid

The United States also complemented economic sanctions with humanitarian aid. Humanitarian aid is crucial for Darfur in order to help the refugees who have either crossed into camps in Chad or are living within the estimated 130 displacement camps in Darfur (Sibbald 2004). As of fall of last year, the World Health Organization said that 23.6% of the internally displaced persons were malnourished, people were barely receiving the necessary water amounts, and the outbreaks of severe diseases were common (Sibbald 2004). United States contributions to Darfur have increased throughout the past decade starting with $93.7 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 to $162.9 million in FY 2003. Since February 2003, USAID has provided an estimated $615 million in humanitarian assistance for Darfur (Dagne 2005). At the end of the 108th Congress, the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act was passed that provided $300 million of aid for Darfur with $200 million providing humanitarian assistance immediately and another $100 million available after another agreement to end the civil war (Stevens 2004). This adds to the total of $357.6 million in United States assistance to Darfur in the FY 2005 budget. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, a chief State Department official acting as a U.S. representative in Darfur was optimistic, recently saying the "food is now flowing" in Darfur thanks to USAID and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the United States. Zoellick estimated that 86% of the food delivered to Darfur is from the

United States (House International Relations Committee 2005). In addition, over $120 million has been provided for regional peacekeeping logistical support, which includes setting up camps, training, or providing air lift capabilities (House International Relations Committee 2005).

Peace Talks

The United States has also approached the process by trying to be a peace broker within the region. The Bush administration has focused on achieving a multilateral peace process. President Bush appointed former Senator John Danforth as the administration's special envoy for the peace agreement in Sudan (Power 2004). After years of negotiation, the Sudanese rebels signed the North-South Accord with the government of Sudan in January 2005. The North-South Accord focused on power sharing between the North and South with former rebel leader John Garang elevated to the level of vice president. It calls for national elections in four years and the development of a constitution, which was recently passed by the National Assembly in July of 2005. This constitution gave the South the option of secession in six years (Dagne 2005).

While the emphasis on peace agreements has begun to pull Sudan in the right direction, there are some who believe that the United States sacrificed a solution to Darfur for the sake of completing the peace agreement to the Civil War (Goldberg 2005). Robert Zoellick stated that the peace within all of Sudan is crucial to what happens in Darfur. As the new government emerges, it will be easier to then focus on reconciliation in Darfur within the political framework of the North and South working together toward a solution (House International Relations Committee 2005). The peace agreement did receive its first test this past summer when Vice-President Garang died in a helicopter crash, followed by several days of rioting with a death count of 130 persons (Wax 2005). The government of Sudan still claims to be committed to fulfilling the peace process and appointed another former rebel leader, Salva Kiir, as Garang's successor (Wax 2005). The rebel groups in Darfur and the government also had signed a declaration of principles in their negotiations, which called for the return of refugees forced from their homes, increased security arrangements, respect for ethnic and religious groups, and a more equitable distribution of national wealth (Dagne 2005). Despite the commitment to the peace process on all sides, the

rioting by the public following Garang's death shows the possibility for instability if the situation is not closely monitored.

Limitations for Action

The United States has been one of the most active nations in its response to Darfur. The situation in Darfur, while slightly improving, has not reached a definite conclusion. The United States's resources at home remain limited, and the United States has not been extremely effective in bringing the rest of the world on board to take action against the genocide in Darfur. While there are some signs of hope in recent developments, limitations have affected the process from the beginning and without these inhibiting conditions, action might have happened before thousands died and were displaced.

Domestic Limitations

In a Congress where bipartisanship is rare, the issue of Darfur has been able to find a consensus. Senator Jon Corzine (D-NJ), a liberal voice in the Senate and a former head of the partisan Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), and Senator Sam Brownback, a conservative Republican from Kansas, who is a potential candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 2008, have actively worked together on several legislative packages and resolutions on Darfur. In the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief Act of 2005 passed in the 109th Congress, Senators Corzine and Brownback were able to pass an amendment on Darfur into the legislation. In the original amendment, $53 million was set aside for peacekeeping operations to support the African Union efforts to halt genocide and other atrocities in Darfur. In addition, $40.5 million was to be used for international disaster and famine assistance specifically for Darfur (Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 2005). When the legislation went to conference committee between the House and Senate conferees, the $53 million for peacekeeping troops in Darfur remained, but the humanitarian aid did not remain in the final piece of legislation. Instead, $90 million was agreed upon to cover all of the crises in Africa, none specifically earmarked for Darfur (Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 2005). Ninety million dollars might seem like a great deal, but as Hannah Royal said, "There is disaster within all of Africa; there is a situation in the Congo where

30,000 die by the day" (Royal 2005). Nevertheless, in comparison, in the same piece of legislation, Congress approved $592 million for the construction of a U.S. embassy in Iraq (Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 2005).

Military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan and the large budget shortfalls are particularly significant limitations preventing United States involvement in Darfur. Liz Brinkerhoff, the legislative correspondent for Senator Jon Corzine, said that there is not as much money to go around with these other impending conflicts. "Republicans and other Senators are willing to support it (Darfur legislation) and co-sponsor legislation" Brinkerhoff says, "but when it comes down to voting on it, it doesn't come through" (Brinkerhoff 2005). In addition, Brinkerhoff suggests that the current foreign policy situation in Iraq and Afghanistan leave the U.S. military overextended which inhibits action in Sudan. Dr. Evelyn Farkas on the Senate Armed Services Committee, a specialist in issues of United States intervention, concurs in saying, "Given the strain on our military, there will not be support for our military going in" (Farkas 2005). As the United States views options for intervention in Sudan, it appears that military intervention does not come up as an option, and instead the focus has turned to supporting other countries to intervene, such as providing support to African Union troops. Even NATO troops are not being considered for anything more than providing airlift or other logistical support for the operations in Sudan (House International Relations Committee 2005). As the United States shows the lack of ability or willingness to provide military support given its involvement in Iraq and other areas, it is difficult for the United States to pass resolutions or sanctions that carry much weight.

Many suggest that the problem may not be financial or military limitations but rather a lack of interest for the United States to be involved in situations in Africa. Samantha Power writes that the reason American leaders do not intervene in a crisis is because they do not have the political will to do so. American leaders wish to avoid engagements that have little ties with American interests and instead take a moderate road in avoiding any political costs. Thus, the government will not be criticized for sitting completely idle while allowing genocide to occur, but would not risk political costs by taking any meaningful action, as evident with the Clinton administration's lack of action in Rwanda (Power 2002, 508). The Bush administration took an extra step in recognizing genocide, but has followed the same path as the Clinton administration by encouraging peace talks, which until the North-South accord earlier this year,

completely disregarded the situation in Darfur (Goldberg 2005). One government official familiar with the formation of government policy at the time said, "The singular task was to get the peace deal done. Some State Department officials key on Sudan matters were slow to engage on Darfur because it would goof up the North-South negotiations" (Goldberg 2005). Thus, the peace process might have costs lives in Darfur for the sake of reaching an agreement for the whole country. The United States decided to act not by engagement, but by putting "kid gloves" on the situation in order to prevent any military involvement (Goldberg 2005).

Dr. Evelyn Farkas adds that it is not merely a resources issue of whether the United States intervenes, but a debate on how much attention the situation should receive. Since the United States engaged in Kosovo, some of the issue may depend more on the location of the genocide being in Africa. Following Samantha Power's assessment, if the United States has little of its own interest at stake in a situation, then it is less likely to intervene. Thus, the United States generally does not see any interests in Africa, and therefore it does not intervene (Glazer 2005). Security interests do exist as Sudan once harbored al Qaeda (including Osama Bin Laden) and other terrorists (Power 2005). Yet Dr. Farkas says that preventing states from breeding terrorists who may not directly threaten the United States's homeland security is not a first order strategic interest (Farkas 2005). Hannah Royal agrees that these interests alone are not strong enough for us to act. "Africa is not a priority for people. Africa doesn't have the voice other nations have in Europe that has the support. Had we other interests in Sudan, we would have gone in a long time ago" (Royal 2005).

Nevertheless, terrorism forming in such states could have the effect of creating "bad neighborhoods" in a whole region which will present direct threats to our national interests. Thus, even if Africa is not critical to national security interests as of now, by disregarding countries like Sudan, the United States may be inadvertently creating "bad neighborhoods" that could one day be more dangerous to national security (Ignatieff 2002, 237). Michael Walzer argues that in general, states should be expected to consider their own interests when deciding how and whether to intervene, and states have an obligation to consider the interests of their own people when deciding to intervene (Walzer 2002, 26). The United States government attempted to balance these interests carefully, as it looks toward Sudan as an ally in the war on terrorism. In 2004 the State Department even removed the government of Sudan from a list of countries

considered "non-cooperative" on terrorism (Dagne 2005). Martha Heinemann of the Save Darfur Coalition questions Sudan's commitment to fight terrorism by describing its history of state sponsored terrorism and killing of USAID personnel in their missions to Sudan (Heinemann 2005). Just recently, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice demanded an apology from the government of Sudan for harassing reporters and dignitaries who followed Rice on her trip to Sudan (Kessler 2005). Heinemann says, "Sudan is one of the most ruthless governments in the world. If you consider American values, intervention in Sudan is in American interests" (Heinemann 2005).

International Limitations

Even more influential than the domestic factors that limit the involvement of the United States in Darfur are the international components that prevent meaningful action. Samantha Power writes that leaders get away with genocide or mass murders because they believe that the world will not take action. Power observes "Rwandan gunmen deliberately targeted Belgian peacekeepers at the start of their genocide because they knew from the U.S. reaction to the deaths of eighteen of their soldiers in Somalia that the number of Western troops would precipitate their withdrawal" (Power 2002, 507). When the United States and Western forces did act, as they did in establishing a safe haven for Kurds in the northern part of Iraq during Saddam Hussein's rule, they made a positive impact (Power 2002, 507). The United States led these actions and thus used its influence to carry out the missions. As the United States has been the most outspoken nation condemning the genocide in Darfur, it is questionable whether the United States influence carries the same weight as it once has in the international community.

In most intervention cases there is always the option of acting unilaterally and as Michael Walzer suggests, that unilateralism is justifiable for an intervention and is often the only means of intervening. Walzer compares international intervention to a block fire, "Imagine a case where the shock doesn't have anything to do with human evildoing: a fire in a neighbor's house in a new town where there is no fire department. It wouldn't make much sense to call a meeting of the block association, while the house is burning, and vote on whether or not to help" (Walzer 2002, 23). As the United States has carried out its foreign policy in the war against terrorism by invading Iraq under the original

claim of weapons of mass destruction, the rest of the world has been left alienated by what they perceive as the United States's unilateralism. As a result, Iraq has contributed to the United States's difficulty to influence allies to become involved in Darfur. In April of 2004 the United States aimed for resolutions strongly condemning the atrocities in the Sudan at the U.N. Human Rights Commission (Power 2004). European diplomats were very skeptic al of the American requests; they reduced the harshness of the resolution so much that it was welcomed by Sudan. This lack of international involvement is evident in the amount of humanitarian aid provided worldwide as of the summer of 2004: the United States had given $28 million to Darfur's relief program, while Germany had given $1 million, and France had given nothing (Power 2004).

Hannah Royal emphasizes that the rest of the world is hurting the process by continuing to support the Sudanese government through importing their oil. "Oil is a huge part of the resources. France has the power to stop importing oil" (Royal 2005). While Royal credits Bush for taking some proactive steps on Darfur, she "would like the Bush administration to do more" (Royal 2005). Yet, Royal admits that in Darfur, the United States is in a delicate position of either allowing the genocide to occur or acting unilaterally. "We will get blasted if we take the lead and get blasted if we do nothing. Damned if you, damned if you don't" (Royal 2005). Thus, Royal suggests that it would require international cooperation in order to take action in Darfur. As the United States military remains thin, other countries such as France, Germany, and Spain who are not engaged in Iraq could help in Darfur (Glazer 2005). Samantha Power suggests that instead of leading the world to the cause of stopping the genocide in Darfur, the United States has given countries like Russia and France an excuse for not intervening by allowing them to exploit the United States's lack of credibility in the rest of the world (Power 2004).

The difference of opinions between the United States and the United Nations that was apparent during Iraq has also been a struggle within the context of Darfur. While the United States declared the acts in Darfur as genocide, the United Nations gave it the title of "crimes against humanity" (House International Relations Committee 2005). Moreover, the United Nations also responded to the crisis with weakened sanctions. The original U.N. Resolution in July of 2004 threatened sanctions on Sudan if it did not disarm the Janjaweed militia. Instead that resolution was impeded by Jan Pronk, the special representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, and re-written, requesting only that

the government of Sudan ask the militia groups to stand down, which the government of Sudan would not do (Fowler 2004). Jerry Fowler writes, "Soon U.N. workers reported renewed air attacks on civilians by Sudanese forces. The council passed a new resolution on September 18, 2004 after a renewed threat of sanctions had been watered down. Months are slipping by as the situation deteriorates" (Fowler 2004).

The unwillingness of the United Nations to act was evident in Rwanda when the council responded to the 1994 ethnic killings by reducing its peacekeeping force to just 270 soldiers, one-tenth the original amount (Glazer 2004). After Rwanda, Secretary-General Kofi Annan has made preventing genocide a priority and is looking to start a warning system that recognizes and acts on potential genocide before it becomes genocide. Annan has also called for the possibility of using military force to prevent future genocides by noting the need to back up sanctions with force if necessary (Glazer 2004). Regardless, it is still difficult for the United Nations to take action as part of an international organization (Walzer 2002, 24). Though the United States recently succeeded in leading a U.N. resolution on economic sanctions that imposed an asset freeze and travel ban on people who defy peace efforts in Darfur and limited the flow of weapons into the region, the United Nations lack of action thus far mirrors the frustration the United States had with the U.N. in regards to Iraq (Wadhams 2005). Dr. Evelyn Farkas says that though the United States gains legitimacy by acting through the United Nations, it slows the process down as in Iraq, where the United Nations did not act though Hussein violated sixteen of its resolutions (Farkas 2005). Hannah Royal agrees, saying that the United Nations has not effectively learned from Rwanda the importance of putting diplomatic pressure on countries early. "The U.N. was created because of the atrocities of the Holocaust. Unlike then, there is a Genocide Convention to stop them," Royal said in urging the U.N. to live up to its role (Royal 2005). Despite Annan's intentions to learn from Rwanda and change the system in the U.N. to be more responsive to dealing with genocide, the system has not worked effectively in the case of Sudan, which has left the United States with its hands tied in encouraging international cooperation.

International cooperation is further limited by the shadows of European colonization still in existence in Africa. Deputy Secretary Robert Zoellick addressed these concerns in his testimony before the House International Relations Committee as some members asked whether NATO was considering

sending troops. Zoellick said, "One last aspect and one I think we need to think about with this, with sort of NATO forces, we didn't have colonies in Africa, but the Europeans did. And so I think one of the challenges here…is whether outside non-African forces to the degree—and the first order, it may seem like they're expanding security.   But that can degrade very, very quickly" (House International Relations Committee 2005). Thus, the focus has been more toward strengthening the African Union's capabilities to handle the situation, so Africans are dealing with their own security. Even if troops are eventually needed through other forces, such as NATO, at least the United States would have a key ally in the region through the African Union, which as Evelyn Farkas says, is essential to any intervention (Farkas 2005). In addition, NATO and the United States are supporting the African Union (A.U.) through training and logistical support that is intended to help them carry out similar missions in other parts of Africa (House International Relations Committee 2005).

Still, some of the perception in Africa is that only Western troops could effectively stabilize the situation in Darfur. Samantha Power writes, "Almost all the displaced Africans I spoke with in Darfur said they would trust only Western forces to bring peace. African troops were too susceptible to bribes, they said, and African governments would end up siding with Khartoum, as they had in the past" (Power 2004). Martha Heinemann, from the Save Darfur Coalition, says that there are some perception problems with the African Union troops, with reported cases of sexual abuse and corruption (Heinemann 2005). In addition, in a recent survey conducted with 10,809 Africans from eight countries, 65 percent said the U.N. Security Council "should have the right to authorize the use of military force to prevent severe human rights violations such as genocide" (Altmann 2005). Regardless of the effectiveness of the African Union troops, the perception that they are not effective can hinder the ability to secure the region so displaced individuals feel safe to go back to their homes.   Also, it might embolden the Janjaweed to continue to attack knowing that Western forces will never show. Still, Heinemann suspects that the A.U. has taken proactive steps to deal with the corruption and it is important to give them the resources and the opportunity to succeed in this mission. She says, "There is always the perception that the west can solve all the problems. This is the A.U.'s first test run. Hopefully, they have worked out all the kinks" (Heinemann 2005). In the end, an organization such as the African Union could gain "local legitimacy" in the

region by accommodating the local political culture and by not having a "colonizing" presence (Walzer 2002, 31).

U.S. Policy Options

Despite all the limitations affecting U.S. policy in Darfur and the limited response that ensued, some progress has been made. Not only had a declaration of principles been decided upon in peace talks between the rebel groups and the government of Sudan, but the U.N. reported in 2005 that the death rates in Darfur are declining below crisis levels thanks to an influx of aid (House International Relations Committee 2005). Furthermore, the United States has been more effective in getting the rest of the world to respond to the crisis in Darfur, and NATO has contributed logistical and operational support for the African Union troops. This complements the African Union's decision to increase its troop level to 7,700 by the end of 2005, with a possibility of that number increasing if necessary (House International Relations Committee 2005). International support of the African Union's attempts to bring stability to Darfur remains an important part of the process and one that seems to have just begun to take hold.

While the future looks promising, the United States should implement a more ambitious strategy in the event the situation falters and Sudan is not stabilized. The North-South Peace Accords, while following through with putting a new government in place, are still in their initial phases. There is no absolute certainty that the rebels will stop fighting in Darfur and the Janjaweed will stop attacking civilians. Some policy debates about whether the International Criminal Court should prosecute the war criminals in Darfur and whether the United States should officially appoint a special envoy to Sudan muddles the important issues in the process and just politicizes the situation. On the contrary, the United States has a potential to regain its credibility in the world by leading a coalition that is willing to back up its rhetoric against genocide. The public (and Congress) is starting to fill a void in the United States's foreign policy as Congress pushes for legislation like the Darfur Accountability Act and groups like the Save Darfur Coalition aim to influence the president. While public opinion is starting to sway toward a more proactive policy in Darfur, it is unclear whether the United States will decide to get entangled with less effective political debates rather than taking the actions necessary to end the genocide.

International Criminal Court

In addition to passing a resolution to send military personnel to Darfur, the United Nations also responded in U.N. Resolution 1593 in March 2005 by deciding to send war criminals to the International Criminal Court (United Nations Security Council 2005). The International Criminal Court (ICC) was set up in The Hague, Netherlands in 1998 to try crimes against humanity (Glazer 2005). The United Nations believes that the ICC is one of the most effective ways to assure accountability and force the government of Sudan to comply with efforts to secure the peace in Darfur (Williams 2005). On the contrary, critics are skeptical that those leaders will stop committing crimes simply out of fear of prosecution. The Bush administration has been among the critics of the ICC and has expressed concerns that American peacekeepers could be brought into the ICC on "politically motivated war-crimes charges" (Glazer 2004). Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman said that the ICC treaty creates an institution of "unchecked powers" and "threatens the sovereignty of the United States" (Glazer 2004). Supporters of the court say that it is unlikely a country like the United States would be brought up on war crimes before the court because their jurisdiction is over those countries with an ineffective court system that would not hold perpetrators accountable for their actions (Glazer 2004).

Despite these reassurances, the Bush administration has not ratified the treaty, but took a neutral route on the issue of Darfur by not voting or vetoing the March U.N. resolution before the U.N. Security Council that would try those responsible for the Darfur genocide as war criminals (Williams 2005). Thus, the Resolution passed and those who committed war crimes in Darfur will be sent to the ICC, but critics have once again tried to use the United States's position in showing evidence that it remains isolated from the rest of the world in terms of foreign policy (Williams 2005). Both sides are still using this issue for political posturing rather than trying to effectively end the genocide. France has been one of the leaders in instituting the ICC to put war criminals from Sudan on trial by trying to attach a description in support of the ICC to a U.N. resolution supporting economic sanctions to force the United States to take a politically damaging vote (Wadhams 2005). Hannah Royal stated that, "So much political capital has been put into the ICC, but little toward humanitarian efforts, putting troops on the ground, or sanctions. If we put this much capital into stopping

genocide, then we might have been able to help by now. The ICC might be a good thing, but it is doing little to stop the genocide" (Royal 2005). Both sides of the issue should try to find compromise language and move on to other more pressing issues that will alleviate the problems in Darfur.

Special Envoy

In her dream scenario, Hannah Royal said that former Secretary of State Colin Powell would be named a special envoy to Sudan from the United States. Royal says that it is important to have a high-profile individual in Darfur to highlight the importance of the issue to the United States and follow in the footsteps of Senator John Danforth, who held the title of Special Envoy for the North-South Peace Accords (Royal 2005). Currently, Deputy Secretary Robert Zoellick is primarily responsible for handling the situation in Darfur, but he also deals with issues related to the entire world. Royal said, "We need someone who, like Danforth, brought attention to the issue. Zoellick has too much going on and it is unsure if he could fully be committed to handling the situation in Darfur by himself" (Royal 2005). Also, critics say that by not sending a special envoy, we are sending the message that there is nothing currently wrong with the situation in Darfur.

As of yet, no envoy has been selected, but Zoellick says that by being the United States representative to Sudan, he is in a better position to openly speak for the United States State Department and negotiate and obtain support for peacekeeping efforts (House International Relations Committee 2005). In addition, Zoellick says that sending a special envoy might also show that the United States is stepping back from the issue by sending a lower representative instead of one of the top secretaries in the State Department. Zoellick explained the issue to the House International Relations Committee, "I've got a lot of other things to do. So I'm trying to figure out actually what combination of special representative, envoy or support. But…my caution on this is I don't want to suggest actually any lessening of interest. It says something to the world, frankly, that I've been doing what I've been doing on this. And I want to keep doing it" (House International Relations Committee 2005). Overall, while the policy initiative striving for a special envoy has not been successful, the issue might be another political issue that is of more symbolic importance rather than

anything that will drastically change negotiations to ending genocide. Just as with the ICC, everyone should keep the eye on the ball.

The Darfur Accountability Act

The Darfur Accountability Act (S. 495) was introduced in March 2005 as the primary piece of legislation to outline the various policy options that the United States has at its disposal. Introduced by Senator Jon Corzine (D-NJ) and Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), S. 495 attracted a bipartisan group of co-sponsors and some of the key facets of the legislation have actually been implemented, though the bill itself did not pass (Darfur Accountability Act 2005). The legislation called for a U.N. Security Council resolution with sanctions, which was successful in the U.N. Resolution in March which froze the assets, imposed a travel ban, and limited the flow of weapons for those who hinder peace efforts in Darfur (Wadhams 2005). The act also called for accelerated assistance to the African Union mission in Darfur, which started to take effect in July of 2005 (Darfur Accountability Act 2005). The United States along with NATO have helped with the airlifting and training of African Union troops, who do not have the capability to perform these operations, to carry out their mission in Darfur (House International Relations Committee 2005). Thus, though the Darfur Accountability Act did not pass, Congress's initiative helped spark efforts to address important issues related to stopping the genocide.

Some of the tenets in the original Darfur Accountability Act were not successfully instituted. The sanctions passed by the United Nations in March were a helpful beginning, but only began to address the problem of the flow of weapons and failed to place sanctions on oil supplies in Sudan, two areas known to prop up the Sudanese government (Royal 2005). Taking into account recent developments, the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (S. 1462) was reintroduced in July of 2005. Just like the previous legislation, the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act also calls for the appointment of a Presidential Envoy for Sudan, the institution of a military no-fly zone in Darfur to prevent the government of Sudan from providing planes and helicopter gun ships to the Janjaweed for attacking civilians, and an arms embargo against the government of Sudan (Darfur Peace and Accountability Act 2005). Finally, the legislation supports extending current sanctions against Sudan, while simultaneously extending humanitarian aid to the South to implement the current peace

agreement (Darfur Peace and Accountability Act 2005). The reduced humanitarian aid as part of the Emergency Supplemental Defense Appropriations Act in May of 2005 fell short of the expectations of senators most dedicated to supporting the African Union. While the A.U.'s decision to send more troops to Sudan is a positive sign, it might be necessary to send even more, which will require more assistance from the United States and NATO. Liz Brinkerhoff estimates that more troops ranging from 12,000 to 40,000 could be needed to stabilize the situation in Darfur (Brinkerhoff 2005). While Deputy Secretary Zoellick says that the A.U. might consider raising its troop levels near the end of 2005 with NATO and the United States ready to support them, the United States needs to be prepared for more assistance if conflict ensues and even more troops are needed (House International Relations Committee 2005). While the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act has passed in the Senate, it has not received any action in the House as the 2005 legislation season ended (Darfur Peace and Accountability Act 2005).

Public Opinion as a Policy Option

Public support is key to any strategy of intervention in another country and serves not as a means of directly ending the genocide, but as an important tactic to push the government to take action. As was seen in Rwanda, the lack of public interest and media focus on Rwanda led to the issue being completely ignored by the Clinton administration, out of the fear of a political backlash (Glazer 2004). Therefore, legislators on Capital Hill and outside groups have focused on keeping the public aware of the situation in hopes that public interest will spark the Bush administration and other world leaders to respond. Liz Brinkerhoff says that public opinion remains a primary strategic means of advancing the United States policy in Darfur. She says, "We have to call attention, acknowledge the genocide, gain visibility…it's important we keep reminding people what is going on" (Brinkerhoff 2005). Dr. Evelyn Farkas, of the Senate Armed Services Committee, similarly feels that there is an opening for public opinion swayed by interest groups and Congress to influence its policy. "Usually special interest groups and Congress have no effect on interventions….But the longer the President waits to act, the more of a role interest groups or the public can have in the process" (Farkas 2005).

Nevertheless, Congress has taken some steps toward action, with support crossing party lines. The original Darfur Accountability Act received bi-

partisan support – including 26 Democrats, 10 Republicans, and one Independent – ranging from the most conservative to the most liberal members of the Senate (Darfur Peace and Accountability Act 2005). Hannah Royal describes the coalition as combining Christians and Evangelicals, who are championing religious freedom in Darfur since Christians are being persecuted, and the Democratic Black Caucus who oppose the killing of Africans in Sudan (Royal 2005). Royal says, "It has really brought together people from all backgrounds, religions, and race….In a culture where everyone sees Congress as polarized, we have to be unified on something important like this" (Royal 2005).

Religious groups can play an effective role in influencing U.S. policy in Darfur, especially considering President Bush's close ties to the Evangelical base who is vocal on this issue (Power 2004). Therefore, it is not surprising that legislators and interest groups have begun targeting religious groups by organizing an International Week of Prayer during the weekend of July 15-17. The Weekend of Prayer was intended to encourage the country to pray and reflect for the weekend for those suffering in Darfur and to send a strong message to leaders to take action (Royal 2005). Senators Corzine and Brownback even introduced a bipartisan resolution on the matter, but there was never a vote (S. Res. 172 2005). Legislators continue to aim for religious groups as an important part of the coalition toward influencing policy as Liz Brinkerhoff said that the Corzine office continuously contacted church groups and synagogues to outreach to its membership (Brinkerhoff 2005).

In addition, there have been efforts by outside organizations to form coalitions to raise awareness in the public and lobby the Congress and the president to take action in Darfur. Most notably, the Save Darfur Coalition has formed to cover 120 diverse faith-based, humanitarian, and human rights organizations "to raise public awareness and to mobilize efforts to help end the atrocities and reduce the suffering in Darfur" (Power 2004). The Coalition emphasizes donations and also organization at college campuses and faith based communities to increase public knowledge of the atrocities in Darfur (Save Darfur 2005). Recently, green bracelets that say "Not on my watch" have been distributed on campuses and throughout Capitol Hill in efforts to raise awareness. The Coalition has been successful in organizing a vast array of groups, even getting the U.S. Catholic Church involved in a coalition for only the second time in its history. Martha Heinemann, who originally was a student organizer in another Darfur coalition called Students Taking Action Now in Darfur (STAND),

is now an outreach coordinator in the Save Darfur Coalition. She says that while the Save Darfur Coalition does not advocate specific policy because there are so many different groups within the coalition, the main goal of the organization is to take the policy advocated by such groups as the International Crisis Group and influence the government to take steps in Darfur. Among other things, the Save Darfur Coalition is advocating for an increased mandate for African Union troops, a safe return for refugees who have been displaced, and for a special envoy to be appointed by the United States for Darfur (Heinemann 2005).

Heinemann emphasizes the importance of public advocacy and education to pressure the government because of the lack of attention given toward Darfur. There are no television cameras in Darfur showing the brutality imposed by the Sudan government. Even if there were, people find it more difficult to connect with those in refugee camps in Sudan than in refugee camps during the Kosovo conflict. "People watch and say 'people are happy in the refugee camp; they shouldn't go home. There is a gap of connection and understanding to Africa" (Heinemann 2005). Public interest has increased over time and senators and members of Congress have started to understand the importance of this issue to their constituents. Yet Heinemann says that the Bush administration should be its number one target. The president is ultimately the one who decides on the United States's foreign policy, so the president becomes the most important person to lobby. "Congress is important in communicating what the American people want, but it doesn't have teeth. When the administration puts its mind to do something, it can get it done. Finding the people who can get an ear to the president becomes the most important thing" (Heinemann 2005).

As the Bush administration has not taken an extremely public voice on the issue, Dr. Farkas's prediction came true and interest groups have filled the void. This is reflected in recent poll numbers on people's view on intervention. Out of 812 respondents in the United States, 61 percent felt "the best solution for the crisis in Darfur is for the United Nations to step in with military force to stop the violence in Darfur" with a majority of Americans also favoring contributions from U.S. and NATO forces to such an operation (Altmann 2005). Furthermore, in an era where polarization defines national politics, there was bipartisan support for sending U.N. and U.S. troops (Altmann 2005). Apparently, public relations efforts are working in increasing awareness and could influence the United States's foreign policy in Darfur. As Liz Brinkerhoff says, "We have to back people against the wall and put pressure on them" (Brinkerhoff 2005). Right

now, it seems Congress and outside groups are starting to expedite this process politically.

Conclusion

The United States has been out front in the call to action in Darfur. The United States was the first to call Darfur a genocide, led in implementing sanctions and providing humanitarian assistance, and was mainly responsible for directing the North and South peace accords in Sudan. Despite the U.S. activism, the humanitarian crisis in Darfur has continued with hundreds of thousands dead and two million people displaced from their homes who do not feel comfortable returning to Darfur. In the process, the United States has shown its lack of capability and will to act unilaterally in Darfur. After the diplomatic failures in Iraq, the United States currently lacks the international credibility to effectively lead a coalition to intervene or even support the African Union troops in Darfur. Iraq has done more than just stop U.S. troops from engaging in a humanitarian operation, it has also limited the U.S. ability to engage in diplomatic measures that could halt the Sudanese government's support of the Janjaweed.

Even with these limitations, the United States should reconsider its foreign policy strategy toward genocide, specifically in Africa. The United States has made drastic efforts since the conflict in Rwanda, yet has not treated Darfur with the same urgency as our intervention in Kosovo. If the United States continues to ignore Africa, it could potentially foster a "bad neighborhood." That will undermine the United States's security interests in a region that was once home to Osama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda camps (Ignatieff 2002, 237). Instead of letting these threats breed from the instability rooted in genocide, the United States should help assure that stability thrives in Africa.

As Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick recently said while testifying before the House International Relations Committee, "there is obviously a complex amount of multilateral diplomacy" that is necessary for the United States to encourage action in Darfur (House International Relations Committee 2005). Though there have been political efforts to involve the United Nations, NATO, and allies to help in logistical efforts, little has been done to show the rest of the world that stopping the genocide in Africa is significant to the United States. Martha Heinemann of the Save Darfur Coalition agrees saying that the United States has not pressured countries like China or Russia, who thrive on sanctioned regimes like Sudan to get cheaper oil (Heinemann 2005).

Heinemann says, "The United States has been a huge leader, but still has not shown in their bilateral talks that this is an important priority for us. We have not made this a part of our relations with our allies" (Heinemann 2005). If countries still deal with Sudan, sanctions implemented by the United States or the United Nations will not have any effect in changing the minds of the Sudanese government. Hannah Royal advocates that we lead a "coalition of the conscience" in which willing nations are dedicated to taking the action to assure this genocide stops (Royal 2005). Only then will the United States be showing real leadership in bringing countries together toward one humanitarian cause.

In the darkness of genocide, there might be a window of opportunity for the United States to renew its leadership in the world on the issue of Darfur, where it might have an easier time finding a global consensus than with Iraq. The United States needs to pressure its allies to work together for humanitarian gains, not out of solely American interests. By pressing the world for humanitarian action, the United States might be able to reduce its world isolation. Even if its credibility is low now, Evelyn Farkas on the Senate Armed Services Committee says, "There is every reason for the U.S. to be out in front on this. We have the ability to help people, incumbent upon ourselves to be involved in the Darfur situation" (Farkas 2005). Martha Heinemann says, "We need a change in our foreign policy to deal with these situations" (Heinemann 2005). As a vast coalition of Americans is appalled at the situation in Darfur and asks its government to take action, responding to Darfur is a perfect opportunity to heighten the United States reputation and protect the hundreds of thousands of lives that are still endangered in the region. By doing so, the United States would be strengthening stability in a region of the world that has been neglected for too long while also showing the rest of the world that what happens in Darfur will not happen again.

References

Altmann, Aviva, and Bruce Greenberg. 2005. "Surveys Show Broad Support for U.N. Intervention in Darfur." *US Fed News,* 30 June.

Brinkerhoff, Liz. 2005. Foreign Policy Legislative Correspondent in the Office of Senator Jon Corzine. *Personal Interview,* 17 June.

Dagne, Ted. 2005. "Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy." *Congressional Research Service,* 8 July.

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005. 2005. *Pub.L 109-13* 11 May. Stat. 119.231.

Farkas, Evelyn. 2005. Aide in the Senate Armed Services Committee. *Personal Interview*, 5 July.

Fessenden, Helen. 2004. "Lawmakers Seek Viable Solutions to Sudan's Humanitarian Crisis." Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 3 July: 1638.

Folwer, Jerry. 2004. "Beyond Humanitarian Bandages - Confronting Genocide in Sudan." The New England Journal of Medicine 351 (December): 2574-2576.

Glazer, Sarah. 2004. "Should the U.S. and U.N. Take Action in Sudan?" Congressional Quarterly Researcher Online, 14 August. http://library 2.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre (23 June 2005).

Goldberg, Mark Leon. 2005. "Khartoum Characters." *The American Prospect* 16 (July): 14.

Heinemann, Martha. 2005. Outreach Coordinator for the Save Darfur Coalition. *Personal Interview,* 22 July.

House International Relations Committee on Sudan Hearing. 2005. *United States House Congressional Hearing*. 109th Congress, 1st session 22 June. http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m18455_10d66_e3c_80 847 (27 June 2005).

Ignatieff, Michael. 2002. "Intervention and State Failure." In *The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention*, ed. Kira Brunner and Nicolaus Mills. New York: Basic Books, 231-248.

Kessler, Glenn. 2005. "Police Block Rice Aides, Reporters in Khartoum." *Washington Post,* 22 July: A19.

Power, Samantha. 2004. "Dying in Darfur: Can the Ethnic Cleansing in Sudan be Stopped" *The New Yorker,* 30 August: 58.

Power, Samantha.   2002.   *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide.*   New York: Basic Books.

Rennack, Dianne.   2004.   "Sudan: Economic Sanctions."   *Congressional Research Service,* 23 September.

Royal, Hannah. 2005.   Foreign Policy Legislative Assistant in the Office of Senator Sam Brownback.   *Personal Interview,* 27 June.

S. 495. Darfur Accountability Act, 2005.   2005.   *United States Congressional Senate.* 109th Congress, 1st Session 2 March.   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi- bin/bdquery/z?d109:s.00495 (15 June 2005).

S. 1462. Darfur Peace and Accountability Act.   2005.   *United States Congressional Senate.* 109th Congress, 1st Session 21 July. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.1462 (5 September 2005)

S. Res. 172. 2005.   *United States Congressional Senate.*   109th Congress, 1st Session 6 June.   http://www.congress.gov/cgi-lis/bdquery (24 June 2005).

"Save Darfur."   2005.   *Save Darfur Coalition.* www.savedarfur.org (24 June 2005).

Sibbald, Barbara.   2004.   "Massive Aid Mobilization Needed in Darfur: MSF."   *Canadian Medical Association Journal* 171 (October): 1029.

Steidle, Brian.   2005.   "Ceasefire, Sudan Style: A Photographic Essay on Darfur."   *World Policy Journal* 22 (Spring): 1-8.

Stevens, Allison.   2004.   "Congress OKs $300 Million Aid for Darfur."   *CQ Weekly,* 11 December: 2944.

Straus, Scott.   2005.   "Darfur and the Genocide Debate."   *Foreign Affairs* 84 (January/February): 123.

United Nations Security Council. 2005.   U.N. Resolution 1593 31 March.   http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2005/pkgres1593.htm (1 July 2005).

Wadhams, Nick. 2005.   "New U.N. Darfur Sanctions Passed."   *Washington Post,* 30 March: A10.

Walzer, Michael.   2002.   "Arguing for Humanitarian Intervention."   In *The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention*, ed. Kira Brunner and Nicolaus Mills.   New York: Basic Books, 19-36.

Wax, Emily.   2005.   "Southern Sudan Prepares an Icon's Farewell."   *The Washington Post,* 6 August: A15.

Williams, Ian.   2005.   "U.S. Opposition to International Criminal Court May Preclude a Hearing on Darfur."   *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 24 (April): 28-29.