GENERAL TRENDS OF THE EARLY 4TH
CENTURY BC: THE DECLINE OF THE GREEK POLIS
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images: Alcibiades, Leuctra
Monument, Messenian Gate
Broader Trends in
Greek history: Particularism vs. Panhellenism
Particularism: Identity with
one’s local community (polis) vs. identity with Greece as a whole
Panhellenism: Recognition of wider Greek common cultural
attributes (language, religion, gymnastic educational system)
Persian Wars
499-478 BC – The Hellenic League (Sparta was hegemon – commander in chief of allied military
campaign), the city states of Greece
banded together to resist the threat of conquest by Xerxes I, King of Persia.
Persian expedition was defeated on sea at the Battle
of Salamis (480) and on land at the Battle of Plataea
(479). Spartan unwillingness to lead a crusade to liberate the rest of the
Greek world from Persian Domination led to the formation of the Delian League (478 BC), with Athens
as hegemon, but still member of Sparta’s
Hellenic League. Overlapping jurisdictions inevitably led to tension. Delian League was a joint voluntary military alliance in
which each state contributed military contributions (phoros)
according to its means.
Congress Decree 448 BC, Pericles announced
that the Delian League must continue, as well as its phoros (cash contributions) despite cessation of hostilities
with Persia.
At this point the Delian League became an Athenian
Empire. See External
Conflict in the Greek World lecture for Athenian Tribute Lists
Peloponnesian War
431-404 BC – Sparta
and its allies called on the subject states of Athens
to rise up and join the liberation of the Greek world from the tyranny of Athens.
Alcibiades of Athens
Athens and Delian League v. Sparta and the Peloponnesian League (Sparta
Argos, Corinth, Thebes). First half of
the war (431-421 BC, Archidamian War) ended in a draw
with the Peace of Nicias obtaining the “status quo” for 6 years. In 415 BC, the
Athenian leader, Alcibiades (ward of Pericles, student of Socrates) convinced
the democracy to attempt to conquer Syracuse in Sicily. He was soon
indicted for sacrilege prior to the departure of the fleet but he escaped and
fled to Sparta where he was welcome as a guest friend of the Spartan king and
advised the Spartans to defeat Athens: 1. by assisting with the defense of
Syracuse, 2. by invading Attica and remaining there throughout the year (Decelean War, 415-404 BC), and 3, by dispatching an embassy
to the Persian King to demand financial assistance with which to build a fleet
to compete with Athens at sea. This brought success including the annihilation
of the Athenian expeditionary force at Syracuse (412 BC); however, Alcibiades’
affair with the queen of Sparta in her husband’s absence led again to flight,
this time to the palace of the Persian satrap (governor)_in Sardis (Lydia).
Again, he wisely advised the Persians to support both Sparta
and Athens to wear both parties down so that Persia could
benefit from their mutual destruction. His support of Athens led to his recall (409) and
exoneration from past charges. He actually led the Athenian naval retaliation
vs. Sparta in
the waning years of the war. However, the resurgence of Athens
and reorganization of the Persian hierarchy in the Aegean
(King Artaxerxes II send his brother Cyrus II to
assume command of Persian interests in the region), resulted in a renewed
understanding between Cyrus and the Spartan general Lysander. A secret deal was
struck by which Cyrus would fund Lysander at sea and defeat Athens;
in exchange, the Spartans would cede all previous Persian possessions in the
region (the cities of Ionia) back to Persia. Mismanagement of the
Athenian navy soon led to Alcibiades further indictment, flight and abandonment
of the Athenian cause. He was later killed by the Persian satrap of Bithynia on
Cyrus’ orders. The Spartan-Persian alliance ultimately led to Lysander’s defeat
of the last remaining Athenian fleet at the Battle
of Aegospotami (404 BC), the naval blockade and siege of Athens and Athenian surrender (401). A
pro-Spartan hierarchy was imposed on Athens (the
30 tyrants, led by Socrates’ student Critias) who
purged hundreds of leaders of the democracy, and the Long Walls that defended
the Piraeus
were brought down.
Early Fourth
Century Politics in Greece: Greek
warfare continued unabated following the Peloponnesian War. As destructive as the Peloponnesian War proved, the
level of violence in Greece
continued to rise in the following era. Conflict remained incessant during the
fourth century as city states continued to realign themselves into shifting
alliances in order to combat the threatening military ascendancy first of
Sparta (404-371), then Thebes (371-362), and then Athens (362-357). The
bewildering rotation of alliances appears to reflect the innate tendency of
Greek city-states to restore particularism, city-state autonomy, by weakening whatever power
appeared to be on the verge of asserting political ascendancy over others. The
result was to leave the Greek mainland divided and resentful of one another at
the very moment that outside powers were again threatening to exert their
influence over Greece
as a whole.
Era of Spartan
Hegemony, 401-371 BC – Sparta
attempted to assume control of the member states of the Athenian Empire
following the defeat of Athens
in 404-401 BC. It had secretly colluded with Persia
to raise the money to defeat Athens
at sea. It had agreed to surrender the Greek states of Ionia to Persia in
exchange. Sparta’s allies became alarmed at the
growing ascendancy of Sparta
and mounted a conflict against it.
(Alliance structure at this
time: Sparta vs. Corinth, Argos, Thebes, and Athens)
King Agesilaus of
Sparta, a great king who nonetheless witnessed the dismantling of the Spartan
hegemony on his watch
– growing evidence of manpower shortages in Sparta (for the
Spartan hoplite aristocracy, see Archaic
Greece and the Rise of Tyranny.
Xenophon, the March of the
10000, and Cyrus II – 401-399 BC. Cyrus II, brother to Persian King Artaxerxes II and favorite son of the dowager queen, was
assigned to the Persian command of the Aegean as military satrap to resolve Persia’s role
in the Peloponnesian War. He forged an alliance with the Spartan “admiral”
Lysander that successfully brought Athens
to surrender. His ulterior motive was to recruit Greek mercenary support for
his bid to overthrow his brother as king. Some 10,000 Greek mercenaries, many
of them exiles, joined his expedition, including Xenophon, an Athenian
aristocrat and student of Socrates. At the Battle
of Cunaxa outside Babylon,
Cyrus and his combined Persian-Greek force defeated the arm of his brother on
the battlefield. He himself was killed, leaving the Greek contingent stranded, deep
in Persian territory. Devoid of its leader Cyrus and soon deprived of its Greek
mercenary generals, this Greek army marched over a 1-year period and fought its
way out of “Persia” by heading north to the Black Sea. Most of the warriors
successfully made their way back to Greek territory, Byzantium, by which time Artaxerxes
and the Spartans were at war, led by King Agesilaus.
Xenophon reports that many of the survivors reenlisted for this new conflict.
This expedition demonstrated the inferior state of readiness of the Persian
military establishment, vis-à-vis Greek hoplite warfare, and inspired many
military and political thinkers in Greece
to conceive of the day when Greek armies would conquer Persia.
Spartan weakness, the helot
situation in Messenia (see Archaic
Greece and the Rise of Tyranny). Messenia – helots – serfs, Messenian (Greek)
farmers tied to the land to support the families of Spartan full-blooded
hoplite warriors and their families. The presence of this suppressed population
limited the range of Spartan military ventures. The Spartan Council of Elders (Gerousia) never wanted the army too far from the Peloponnesus in the event of a helot uprising.
Peace of Antalcidas
387 – Brought the temporary end to hostilities following the Corinthian War (Sparta vs. Greece).
The Peace was imposed by the Persian King Artaxerxes
II and “enforced” by King Agesilaus of Sparta. It lasted
briefly.
Boeotian League of Thebes – Thebes became hegemon to a
military empire based on its native region of Boeotia.
Ignored by Greece since the
Persian Wars, Thebes had avoided participation
in the Peloponnesian Wars and had grown in population and power in its home
region of Boeotia at the end of the Fifth
Century BC. It was still vulnerable to Spartan assault, but its leadership was
determined to establish the city state as a leading force in Greece.
Seizure of the Cadmeia 382 BC – Spartan army seized the acropolis of Thebes and imposed a
garrison. This insult led to the emergence of generals Epaminondas and
Pelopidas in Thebes.
Hatred of Sparta
led to the expulsion of the Spartan garrison by Theban patriots led by young
Pelopidas (378 BC), soon to be commander of the Theban Sacred Band in 378. The
Theban Sacred Band was an elite force of 600
young aristocrats sworn to sacrifice themselves for the good of Thebes. Rushing out ahead
of the Theban oblique phalanx at the Battle of Leuctra, the Sacred Band caught the Spartan right flank
in lateral motion and broke the line of the Peloponnesian League Army.
Homosexual relationships among their ranks bonded the warriors of the Sacred
Band emotionally as well as patriotically.
Era of Theban
Hegemony 371-362 BC – By defeating Sparta
at the Battle of Leuctra, Thebes assumed the hegemony of combined Greek forces
(these at first included Athens, Corinth, and Argos) to weaken Sparta both in
the Aegean but most particularly in the Peloponnesus, where repeated invasions
by Epaminondas led to the dismantling of Sparta’s Peloponnesian League.
Epaminondas successfully liberated Messenia and the helots and created the
fortified settlement of Messene.
Battle of Leuctra Diagrams Showing Use of the Oblique
Phalanx by Placing Deep Ranks of Theban Hoplites on the Left Flank to Attack
the Exposed Right Flank of the Spartan Army.
Victory Monument erected by Epaminondas of
Thebes at Leuctra
Battle of Leuctra 371 – Using
the Oblique Phalanx and ‘Joint Force Operations’
of cavalry, peltasts, slingers and archers, the
Theban generals Epaminondas and Pelopidas outmaneuvered the Spartans on the
battlefield and decimated the Spartan hoplite army. The Spartan army suffered
an irreversible setback (loss of elite troops), and Spartan hegemony over the
Peloponnesian league was undone. Sparta was
suddenly exposed to repeated (4) invasions of Laconia
by Thebes,
supported by many former Peloponnesian League allies. Epaminondas liberated
states such as Messenia and Mantinea
from Spartan domination and helped to construct urban defenses.
Megalopolitan Gate at Messene
While Epaminondas dismantled
the Spartan hegemony in the Peloponnesus, Pelopidas exerted Theban hegemony to
the north, to Thessaly and Macedonia.
During one expedition, ca 368 BC, Pelopidas took the Macedonian prince, Philip
II, hostage as leverage toward the good behavior by his older brother Perdiccas, the king. As a teenager Philip observed and
participated in Theban military operations and learned the advantages of “joint
force operations” and the “oblique phalanx”. Pelopidas died soon afterward in a
campaign in the Thessaly (Battle of Cynoscephalae 364 BC).
Battle of Mantinea 362 –
Epaminondas again relied on the tactical flexibility of the oblique phalanx to
outmaneuver Sparta, Mantinea, and Athens outside
the walls of the Peloponnesian state of Mantinea.
Though victorious on the field, Epaminondas was wounded in battle and died at
the moment of victory on the field. This followed Pelopidas’ demise in northern
Greece
2 years earlier. For all their success and brilliance, Epaminondas and
Pelopidas had no successors capable of sustaining the Theban military
supremacy. Thebes reigned in its influence and
interests to the immediate vicinity of Boeotia.
(Alliance structure at this
time: Thebes vs. Sparta, Athens, Corinth)
2nd
Athenian Naval Confederacy 378 – 357
(Social War) – While all this was going on, Athenians had been attempting to
reconstitute the Delian League alliance of the 5th
century BC, without resorting to tribute collections. Without guaranteed funds
the alliance was doomed. When Athens
finally attempted to impose force contributions, the allies rebelled (Social
War, 357 BC) and the alliance collapsed. The Social War 357 BC, demonstrated
the inherent weakness of the Athenian naval position: the financial
impossibilities of the confederacy and the collapse of Athenian naval power.
Emerging Trends of
4th Century BC Greek warfare:
Ø MERCENARIES - Xenophon, March of the 10000 (Anabasis) 401-399 BC; Evolving
professionalism of hoplite tactics: Oblique phalanx, Epaminondas and Pelopidas
of Thebes, Battle of Leuctra 371 BC Professional skirmishers – peltasts, slingers, archers; large cavalry formation used
as an offensive weapon; Coordination of complementary units on the battlefield:
‘Joint Force Operations’
Ø 2. Individualism
– disengagement (disenchantment) of elite members of society from their
respective city states. A growing tendency to see themselves as men of the
world, not the polis.
Ø 3. Political
Apathy – withdrawal from political life at the local level; Example: Athenian
liturgies – voluntary philanthropy, from wealthy individuals maintaining
triremes during the 5th century BC to avoidance of such
responsibilities during the 4th.
Ø 4. DECLINE IN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POLIS – emerging
elements of mercenaries, financiers and dignitaries who saw themselves as
existing in a world that transcended the polis.