Battle of the Granicus River May-June 334 BC:

Arrian 1.13-15; Plut. 16; Diod. 17.19.1-3

Macedonian forces: 32000 infantry, 5100 cavalry, plus navy and allied forces = 90000 total. Persian forces 20000 cavalry and approximately the same number of infantry. His siege train also included haulers, engineers, surveyors, camp planners, a secretariat, court officials, medical staff, grooms for the cavalry and muleteers for the baggage. Some 182 war ships and supply vessels supported his force, 160 allied warships. Alexander arrived in Bithynia with 70 talents in bullion and sufficient supplies for 30 days’ campaign. Memnon, a Greek mercenary commander serving with the Persians, recommended a strategy of calculated retreat with scorched earth, but Persian commanders, many closely related to King Darius III, insisted on a confrontation and chose the Granicus River. Alexander left 12000 infantry, 1500 horse with Antipater in Macedonia.

Recorded force components: 12000 Macedonian Pezhetairoi; 7000 allied infantry; 5000 mercenary infantry all under Parmenio; Odrysians Triballians, Illyrians = 7000; archers and Agrianians 1000 = 3200; cavalry 1800 hetairoi under Philotas; 1800 Thessalians, under Callas son of Harpalus; 600 Greek cavalry under Erigyius; 900 Thracians and Paeaonian scouts under Cassander, equaling a sum total of 5100 cavalry. Parmenio recommended a delayed night crossing down river, but Alexander overruled him. He ordered a direct assault on the Persian formation arranged on the opposite bank of the river.

Plut: Alexander immediately plunged down the bank and into the water with 13 squadrons into swiftly flowing water that surged about them and swept men off their feet. Despite this he pressed forward and with a tremendous effort attained the opposite bank which was a wet treacherous slope covered with mud. There he was immediately forced to engage the enemy in a confused hand to hand struggle, before the troops who were crossing behind him could be organized into any formation. The moment his men set foot on land the enemy attacked them with loud shouts matching horse against horse, thrusting with their lances and fighting with the sword when their lances broke. Many of them charged against Alexander himself, for he was easily recognizable by his shield and by the tall white plume which was fixed on either side of his helmet. His breast plate was pierced by a javelin. Spithradates (a Persian noble) rode at him, and hit him on head with a battle axe, splitting the crest of his helmet. Cleitus the Black, the brother of Alexander’s wet nurse, ran him through and saved Alexander’s life. While Alexander’s cavalry was engaged in this furious and dangerous action, the Macedonian phalanx crossed the river and the infantry of both sides joined the battle. The Persians offered little resistance but quickly broke and fled, and it was only the Greek mercenaries who held their ground. The latter fought to the death. The Persians lost 20000 infantry and 2500 horse; Alexander lost 34 cavalry, 9 in the infantry. Captured shields were sent to Athens to decorate the Parthenon.

Arrian 1.13-15: the cavalry charged in a wedged formation. [The Persian cavalry was arranged in a line 16 deep; the Macedonian phalanx was arranged 8 deep; Alexander’s cavalry unit was arranged 10 deep.] Alexander led the cavalry in an oblique attack across the water so that the army would not get flanked: oblique to the current. This enabled him to prevent a flank attack as he emerged from the water and to engage the enemy with a front as solid as he could make it. The Persians were arranged with mounted troops in front and infantry to the rear…it was a cavalry battle with, as it were, infantry tactics: horse against horse, man against man, locked together. The Macedonians did their utmost to thrust the enemy once and for all back from the river bank and to force him into open ground; whereas, the Persians fought to prevent the landings or to hurl their opponents back into the water.

The Greek mercenaries fight to the death because of Philip II’s warning that all Greeks who supported the Persians would be executed. Some 2000 were enslaved and sent to Macedonia.

Alexander in Asia Minor:

Greek cities paid taxes to him as their “liberator”; non Greek peoples paid tribute. He freed Lydia (taxes).

He suppressed internal conflicts in cities and won the respect of native peoples. He was adopted by Ada, the widow of Mausolus of Caria. He employed the Persian system of administration but improved it by dividing civil, military and financial authority into separate satrapies. In Caria, Ada was civil satrap, a Macedonian general was strategos, and a third person was financial administrator – all dependent on Alexander.

The Strategic Threat: Persian army could invade from the Anatolian Plateau; the Persian Navy from along the coast. Alexander’s solution, to seize the “rail heads” of the interior (Dascylium, Sardis) and to deny the Persian fleet any coastal safe harbors.

Siege of Miletus, he brought his fleet of 160 warships to Lade, 3 days later a Persian fleet of 400 arrived. Alexander avoided a sea battle and concentrated on a siege of the city with his fleet blocking the harbor. The Persian garrison surrendered. Alexander now had Persian granaries to feed his army, so he dismissed his fleet (he could not afford to keep it in any event; though he kept 20 Athenian triremes for good behavior). Tribute and contributions now arrived from various parties. The Persian fleet were left with no port facilities in the Aegean.

Situated on a peninsula south of Miletus, Halicarnassus was a crucial port to take, controlling passage to much of the rest of Persia. The city was also the best defended, boasting a naturally strong position, along the edge of rolling hills on all sides, and three inner fortresses, rather than a single acropolis. Bringing siege engines close to the walls would be difficult, and invite a barrage of missile fire with each assault. In addition to the city’s natural defenses, preparation for Alexander’s attack had contributed to make the port near impenetrable. The walls were surrounded by a moat, 13m deep, which would prevent siege engines from reaching the walls, and further serve to delay and deter attackers. In addition, the full Persian fleet waited in and around the harbor, some 400 warships keeping hold of the city’s connections over sea. While this placement was largely unnecessary, due to the Macedonian fleet’s dismissal, the warships maintained the largest advantage for Halicarnassus: a supply route that Alexander could not hope to halt. Any assault on Halicarnassus without a navy would have to be made against a fully stocked and prepared defense. Perhaps the greatest threat at the Halicarnassians’ disposal was their leader: the Greek mercenary general Memnon. One of the most experienced mercenaries in service to Persia, Memnon had served Artabazus in 353, in a rebellion against Artaxerxes III, king of Persia. After this failed, Memnon, and his brother Mentor, were exiled from Persia, and the two found their way to the young King Philip’s court in Macedonia, where they learned of Philip’s arching plan to take Greece, and move into Persia. Armed with this information, the two were soon pardoned by Artaxerxes, and welcomed back. Memnon’s advice was ignored by the Persian hierarchy at the Battle of the Granicus R.

Though the Persian navy, sent by Darius, had arrived too late to save the town of Miletus, which fell to Alexander’s onslaught with ease, the fleet regrouped with Memnon, who had made a point of gathering mercenaries from Alexander’s fallen cities, at Halicarnassus. Memnon, around this time, sent his family to live with Darius, to earn the King’s trust. With hostages, of sorts, held over the mercenary, Darius felt safe in naming Memnon supreme commander of the west, though perhaps at too late a time. Memnon took over operations at Halicarnassus, and quickly set to work reinforcing walls, fixing any point at which he found weakness. The Macedonians, meanwhile, had arrived on the outskirts of the city, setting up camp around a kilometer away from the eastern gate, facing Mylasa. This gate would prove to bear the brunt of the attack. With his siege engines still in Miletus, Alexander decided to send them by sea to Halicarnassus. Given the presence of Persian warships, this move was a risk, but, for Alexander to be victorious, the city would have to fall quickly.

Speed was key to Alexander’s assault, as any time granted could allow the Persians to regroup and set up a plan to stop the Macedonian rush along the coast. Memnon, conversely, knew that, while he could not hold the city against Alexander’s superior forces, he could delay, forcing a long siege and taxing the Macedonian supplies. This would both give an opportunity for the defenders to escape and grant the Persians a much-needed break in the Macedonian onslaught. Memnon’s plan to force a lengthy battle was begun shortly after the Macedonians had set up camp. A group of missile troops issued out of the Mylasa gate, struck from the hills down to Alexander’s camp, and quickly retreated within the walls. While this early encounter led to little in the way of casualties, it was very representative of what Memnon’s tactics would be: quick, missile-heavy skirmishes, to harass the besiegers, and retreat before a full-scale fight began, in which the heavy infantry of Alexander would have a clear upper hand. After dealing with the skirmish, Alexander began to set his own plans for the siege in motion. He lost precious time attacking nearby Myndos, and then attempted an assault on the Halicarnassus defenses without the benefit of siege weaponry. Eventually, his siege weaponry arrived from Miletus and the siege began in earnest.

Halicarnassos, walls reportedly 150 ft high, Alexander assaulted the defenses with siege weaponry and 20 Athenian triremes. He was able to take the lower city but not the acropolis which guarded the harbor (Memnon was commanding the resistance; he was now in command of the Persian fleet and lower Asia Minor), so Alexander isolated the garrison and moved on. He sent newly married Macedonian troops home for the winter with Coenus and Meleager in an effort to recruit fresh troops.

Parmenio was dispatched into the plateau from Sardis with the siege train in Spring 333; Winter 334 Alexander marched along the south coast to seize Pamphylia to prevent Persian forces from landing there. Hard fighting in Lycia, he by-passed Cnidus and Caunus (isolated harbors), and appointed Nearchus satrap of Lycia. The cities of Xanthus and Phaselis surrendered. In Pamphylia Perge, Aspendos, and Side surrendered, but Syllium and Termessos resisted (Aristander of Termessos, Alexander’s seer). From Pamphylia he turned north through the mountains to link with Parmenio at Gordium. He marched past Sagalassos and Celenae to Gordium. New levies of troops arrived. Antigonus was made satrap of Phrygia. Alexander quickly overran the plateau (Cappadocia in April 333) and moved down to the Cilician Gates. Had Darius taken the field sooner he might have blocked Alexander’s passage through the gates, but as it was the pass was left abandoned by Arsames, the local Persian satrap. Alexander becomes ill, his doctor Philip of Acarnania. Parmenio seized the Syrian Gates; Alexander advanced toward Syria; at this time he learned of the victory of Ptolemy and Asander over Orontobatos at Halicarnassos.

During the winter 334/3 BC, a Persian agent named Sisenes was arrested by Parmenio with a plan to kill Alexander. Allegedly he was caught while communicating with Alexander the Lyncestrian and Amyntas. Amyntas was the former friend of Amyntas the prince (nephew to Philip II) who fled to the Persian side at the time of the assassination. He was captured while infiltrating the camp, allegedly communicating with Alexander the Lyncestrian. Alexander had Parmenio arrest the Lyncestrian (who was then commanding the Thessalian cavalry); Amyntas was executed. Olympias had written Alexander warning of this plot. Parmenio was in Phrygia; Alexander at Phaselis at the time.

Winter 334/3 Memnon sailed with 700 warships from Phoenicia to Chios and Lesbos. Alexander ordered the securing of the Hellespont. The Greek League dispatched a fleet there. In the fighting Memnon died. Darius III sent Pharnabazas to continue the operations in the Aegean. Antipater was compelled to send a small naval force to neutralize their successes. The Persian naval squadrons found few harbors willing to furnish supplies to their forces. Nothing came of the Persian naval offensive in the Aegean and by 332 BC, remnants of the Persian fleet (Phoenician squadrons) returned to Phoenicia to join Alexander in the siege of Tyre.