Lecture 25: Roman Imperialism

Within approximately 200 years the city state of Rome expanded militarily to become the dominant power on the peninsula of Italy; in the following 200 years the same military establishment rose to assume authority over the entire Mediterranean world. The success of Roman armies was recognized by contemporaries and marveled at by modern historians. In this chapter we will briefly identify the unique traits of Roman military society that enabled it to transform itself into a Mediterranean-wide empire.

The history of the Roman Republic is largely told through its wars. These can be divided into four categories.

1. Wars for survival and local supremacy within Italy:

Wars against the Expelled Kings and neighboring Etruscans, 510-410 BC

Wars against the Gauls and neighboring Italians 390-380

Revolt of the Latin League 340-338

3 Samnite Wars 342-290

2. Wars of Defensive Imperialism

War with King Pyrrhus of Epirus, 281-275

First Punic War, 364-241 (Rome gains its first overseas provinces, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica)

Hannibalic War 218-201 (2 provinces of Spain)

(numerous frontier campaigns in Cisalpine Gaul)

3. Wars of Conquest

War with King Philip V of Macedonia, 200-197

War with King Antiochus III of Syria, 191-189

War with King Perseus of Macedonia, 172-167 (reorganization of Greece into a form of protectorate)

148-146 Reduction of Macedonia, Achaia, and Carthage (destruction of Carthage and Corinth, province of Macedonia)

(numerous native rebellions and frontier conflicts in Transalpine Gaul, Spain, Lusitania, Sardinia, Illyria, and Thrace)

Wars of the Late Republic

133-129, War with Aristonicus (province of Asia)

Sicilian Slave Rebellion 136-130 BC

Conquest of Gallia Narbonensis 126-105

War with King Jugurtha of Numidia 109-105 (Numidia)

War with Invading German Tribes, Cimbri and Teutones, 105-101

Second Slave Rebellion 105-100

War against the Cilician Pirates, 102-67 (Cilicia, Crete)

Social War against Italian Allies 90-82

Mithradatic Wars (4), 88-63 (Bithynia and Pontus, Syria)

Civil War between Marius and Sulla, 88-82

War with Q. Sertorius, rebellious general in Spain, 80-72

Slave Rebellion of Spartacus, 73-71

War with Cataline, internal Roman conspiracy and rebellion, 63

Caesar's Conquest of Gaul 58-52

War against Parthia, 54-53

Civil War between Pompey and Caesar, 49-46 (Mauretania)

Civil War between Antony/Octavian and Brutus and Cassius 43-41

War with Sex. Pompey, 42-36

War between Octavian and Antony/Cleopatra, 32-31 (Egypt)

(End of the Republic 27 BC)

Initially, Roman conflicts were simply struggles for survival. Rome drew on the support of an alliance system - the Latin League, originally created by its kings - to repel the threat of Etruscan and other neighbors. Eventually, the strength of this alliance enabled Rome to expand its network of friendships beyond its home region of Latium by offering security to neighbors in the Apennine Mts. and southward along the western coast. The process of incorporating new member states into the Roman confederacy resulted however in Rome having to accept the “baggage” that accompanied each new state. This typically included a new ally’s lingering animosities with other neighboring states. Conflict erupted with the bellicose Samnites, for example, when Rome welcomed Capua and the Campanian states into the confederacy in 342 BC. The Samnites had long regarded central Italy as their immediate sphere of influence. Despite repeated attempts at negotiation Rome was compelled to engage in a series of hard-fought conflicts (342-290 BC) to secure Samnite cooperation. Similar intervention in southern Italy (the Bay of Tarentum) resulted in the outbreak of conflict with Tarentum whose citizens turned for assistance to King Pyrrhus of Epirus (281-275 BC), a relative of Alexander the Great. This conflict was followed by the outbreak of the First Punic War (264-241 BC). In this last instance Rome had to make a choice between its friendship with Carthage, which had cooperated militarily against Pyrrhus in Sicily, and the strategic needs of Italian commercial states that were leery of Carthaginian control of the straits of Messana (through which all maritime trade between Italy and the Hellenistic East had to pass). In each instance the Roman Senate attempted to negotiate an alternative to conflict; however, with each step forward Rome found itself dragged increasingly into conflict by the interests of its burgeoning network of allies. Some scholars have identified this process as one of defensive imperialism, because Rome expanded its hegemony through warfare but only as a result of the liabilities it thus inherited. According to this interpretation, Rome had no interest in conquest (particularly overseas conquest) and was concerned only with securing peace and stability on the Italian peninsula. Regardless of the correctness of this interpretation, the first conflict with Carthage resulted in Roman acquisition of territories beyond the Italian peninsula (Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica) and challenged the strategic outlook of the Roman hierarchy. Some factions of the Roman aristocracy preferred to adhere to an isolationist policy of maintaining the peace in Italy while avoiding entangling alliances overseas. Others saw the need to protect wider Italian interests, particularly commercial interests, by projecting Roman force overseas. Roman senators were still entrenched in this debate when renewed conflict with the Carthaginians erupted in Spain (218 BC), this time commanded by a formidable general, Hannibal. For 18 years (the Hannibalic or Second Punic War, 218-201 BC) Rome found itself embroiled in a deadly struggle against a brilliant general and a well trained army. Hannibal’s forces crossed the Alps, annihilated four Roman armies, and roved undefeated throughout the Italian peninsula for fifteen years. Despite repeated setbacks the network of the Roman confederacy in Italy held. By defeating Hannibal at the Battle of Zama (201 BC) near Carthage, Rome emerged as the undisputed authority of the entire western Mediterranean seas. Most of the region (Spain, southern Gaul, the western Mediterranean islands) was tribal and non-urbanized. Although Republican authorities would endure centuries of native resistance, the populations of the region gradually assimilated a Roman way of life (Romanization).

The destruction wrought by Hannibal’s army in Italy had a lasting effect, nonetheless, and the Roman oligarchy was determined never to see Italy invaded again. Threats posed by the kings of Macedonian successor states to wider Mediterranean security needed to be addressed, most particularly, the half-hearted decision of King Philip V of Macedonia (221-279 BC) to align with Hannibal during the Second Punic War. This and later provocations precipitated the repeated dispatch of Roman armies to the Greek East. As powerful as they appeared, the Macedonian successor states of Antigonid Macedonia and Seleucid Syria were simply no match for the Roman military establishment that arguably stood at its highest state of readiness. Rome defeated each successor state relatively handily (in three wars between 200 and 168 BC, the Romans defeated Philip V of Macedonia, Antiochus III of Syria, and Perseus of Macedonia), largely with the support of threatened states in the vicinity (Athens, Rhodes, and Attalid Pergamum). Although Roman forces withdrew from the Aegean theater following each conflict, many have interpreted this behavior as a calculated attempt to maintain their welcome in anticipation of further intervention. With each succeeding conflict came a discernible change in attitude. Early Roman interventionists such as T. Quinctius Flamininus (during the War with Philip V) and L. and P. Cornelius Scipio (during the War with Antiochus III) were Hellenophiles, that is, nobles educated in Greek language and culture and imbued with admiration for the heritage of this once great civilization. These generals attempted to work together with Greek hierarchies to extend Roman security to the region in a cooperative manner. Later generals (Cn. Manlius Vulso, L. Mummius) were less tolerant, avaricious, and in some instances brutish in their treatment of Greek communities. As each Macedonian threat subsided, the Roman hierarchy grew more confident of its position. Early efforts at cooperation yielded to visible instances of Roman impatience; awe for the Greek past yielded to contempt for the perfidy of Greek contemporaries. Most importantly, the patriotism and self-sacrifice exhibited during the long years of the Punic Wars gave way to open desire for conflict as a path to personal enrichment, particularly now that the cities being plundered housed centuries of accumulated cultural heritage. This phase of Roman expansion can safely be interpreted as wars of outright conquest. With its armies invincible on the battlefield Rome absorbed most of the northern coast of the Mediterranean Sea into its hegemony. Macedonia was incorporated as a province in 148 BC, Carthage and Corinth were destroyed in 146, and the Attalid kingdom of Pergamum was accepted as an inheritance in 133. Unlike its dealing on the Italian peninsula, Rome incorporated overseas territories as provinces, to be ruled by Roman promagistrates (governors) and subject to annual payments of tribute. The inferior status of so many once free peoples did not sit well with local residents. Not only had Roman attitudes hardened against the once proud communities of the Hellenistic East, but an aura of chauvinism began to pervade the attitudes of the Roman aristocracy whose members increasingly looked down on neighboring peoples as subjects, inferiors, and potential slaves. At the same time the senatorial oligarchy began to realize that it was incapable of controlling wayward generals armed with imperium and the unrestricted might of Roman armies. Abuses by Roman provincial commanders became commonplace alongside patterns bribery and extortion. By 149 BC permanent courts were created to address these problems, but it was all to no avail. Roman proconsuls guilty of committing atrocities against innocent tribesmen were repeatedly acquitted by juries of their peers. By 133 BC Rome had essentially defeated all legitimate Mediterranean rivals, but it still had not secured peace. The hard fought wars and turbulent decades that ensued during the Late Republican era (133-27 BC) were as much provoked by civil dissension, a lack of accountability, and confusion regarding the best way to govern so far flung an empire, as they were by foreign brush wars and native resistance to Rome.

To put the Roman military experience in perspective one can point to the venerated tradition for the cult of the two-headed Roman deity, Janus. Janus looked forward into the future and backward into the past, and the doors of his temple were kept open whenever Rome was engaged in open hostilities. During the course of the Republic the doors to the temple were closed only twice (in 715 and 235 BC); so sustained were Rome's military operations against foreign adversaries. The uniqueness of the Roman experience enabled Republican armies to conquer the entire Mediterranean world and much of modern day northern Europe by 31 BC. The reasons for Roman military success may be summarized as follows:

1. Aristocratic Ethos -- the intense competition for office and the winnowing effect of the cursus honorum meant that all Roman generals enjoyed minimum competency in command. All Roman praetors and consuls knew how to command, to supply, and to protect their armies in the field. The result was that Rome rarely experienced disasters in the field. Roman generals tended to be cautious against dangerous adversaries. Most Roman generals knew how to hold the line and to avoid making serious mistakes. This enabled the Republic to sustain its forces in the field almost indefinitely. If Roman forces confronted a superior adversary, such as the Carthaginian general Hannibal, mediocre generals were able to engage in defensive tactics to minimize losses until such time as truly ingenious generals such as M. Claudius Marcellus and P. Cornelius Scipio came along to engage Hannibal with his own tactics. In short, if Roman adversaries failed to land blows at the outset of a conflict against Rome, they were unlikely to score successes later.

2. Professional training of the troops.

A. With the siege of Veii in 410 BC, the Republic was compelled to keep its forces in the field through the year, keeping soldier citizen farmers away from their farms. From then on the Republic paid its troops under arms, enabling it to dispatch forces over extended periods of time. Although a draft army, the Roman army became a professional army, with all citizens liable for 16 years of compulsory military service. By the time of the Punic Wars, weaponry and formations had become standardized. Weaponry and supplies were organized and provided by the state (though expenses were deducted from military payroll).

B. Although the Roman army began as a hoplite phalanx during the course of the 4th century BC it adapted to a more maneuverable formation known as the Manipular Legion of 5400 men. Companies or maniples of 180 men were arranged in a checkerboard fashion into three lines in the field, with each line extending some 900 yards. The front line contained the hastati, young green recruits experiencing their first taste of combat; the second line the principes, the seasoned ranks of the army in their prime; the third line the triarii, the survivors of the legion's past conflicts who were close to discharge and would only be committed in combat when absolutely necessary. This formation enabled Roman armies to maneuver in rough terrain and to sustain itself in the field by resting elements in battle. Space was left between maniples to the same distance as the maniples themselves. Roman generals would typically commit their lines in a rotating sequence -- first the Hastati, ten maniples or 1800 men, would be committed and advance. The maniples would approach the enemy uniformly yet independently to obviate obstacles in the field. Just prior to contact the maniples would form a "mini-phalanx", by drawing close together and by having troops from the back ranks shift forward to fill the spaces between the maniples. This mini phalanx would then assault the enemy. Through conflict with Samnite mountain tribes and Gallic and Spanish warriors elsewhere, the Romans adapted to the use of throwing spears as missiles and hand-to-hand combat with short "Spanish" swords. The legionaries would hurl their spears just prior to contact and then charge the enemy with swords drawn, engaging in a uniform motion of "cut an thrust". To develop skills in hand-to-hand combat, legionaries were trained in swordplay by gladiators. They learned to space themselves at arms' length to allow maximum space for maximum sword combat. The purpose of the Hastati assault was to test the mettle of the enemy, to probe weaknesses, and to soften them up. As soon as the committed formation began to take losses the general would sound the retreat. The Hastati would withdraw in organized manner, racing through the gaps behind the advancing maniples of the principes, where scattered Hastati would reassemble around their manipular standards. The 10 maniples of the Principes would meanwhile advance to assault the enemy in the same manner as before. If necessary these could be withdrawn to rest while the Hastati, now regrouped, could be recommitted to the front. This rotation of formations was standard procedure and enabled the Romans to rely on "reserve forces" to rest troops and sustain the army in combat. At the Battle of Heraclea against King Pyrrhus of Epirus in 280 BC, the Roman legions confronted the Macedonian phalanx seven times on the battlefield -- first the hastati, then the principes, then the hastati again, then the principes, then the hastati a third time, then the principes, and finally a last stand by all three ranks, after which the Romans suffered defeat and withdrew from the field, abandoning their camp. After holding the field Pyrrhus was congratulated by his various officers on his victory. He looked out across the battlefield to see so many fallen Macedonians that he exclaimed, "One more victory like this, and I will be forced to return to Epirus alone." The process of conscription, sustained training, long experience in the field, enhanced maneuverability, reserve formations, and ready adaptation to more sophisticated field tactics, heightened Roman military readiness over time. The sustained challenge of the Hannibalic Wars brought the Roman legions to the highest state of military readiness of any military establishment in the Mediterranean, and explains the rapidity with which they defeated the professional armies of the Macedonian realms.

Professional training of the troops did not cease here. All legionaries assumed non-combat responsibilities as well, a well organized and implemented Roman duty roster. Most troops carried tools to dig moats and construct palisades for the camp, others cooked or dug latrines. All noncombatant responsibilities, like combat itself, were supervised by non-commissioned officers known as centurions. The tasks of the duty roster focused on the construction and maintenance of the Roman legionary camp. Unlike Greek armies that would merely post pickets, Roman armies were required to construct fortified camps everywhere they stopped along their march. The arrangement of the camp was a broad rectangle divided into quadrants by two intersecting N-S, E-W tending streets and protected by a mound frequently fortified by a palisade of wooden stakes. Inside the camp every maniple knew its place and where to pitch its tents. The camp not only protected the army during night, it enabled the army to leave its equipment, its supplies, and its wounded safely behind when going into battle. In the event of defeat, the army could withdraw within the fortifications of the camp and hold out indefinitely, depending on the stock of its supply. The general could meanwhile dispatch messengers to Rome to inform the Senate of the army's defeat and to call for reinforcements or relieving forces. The fortified camp played an important part in Rome's ability to project and to sustain military force in the field. Roman armies operated deep in enemy territory and used camps in defeated lands to maintain garrison colonies. The centers of dozens of medieval cities such as Cremona or Padua on the Po River Valley betray the unmistakable quadrants of the intersecting streets of the Roman military camp.

3. Increasing Manpower from Allies and Expanding Roman Towns.

The Kings of Rome began the process of forging alliances with neighboring cities, forming the original Latin League of Latin cities that ultimately opposed the Etruscans. As Rome defeated more and more cities in Italy, it constructed a defensive alliance similar to that of the Spartans, known as the Roman Confederacy. This hegemonic alliance recognized the military supremacy of the Roman consuls. All allies had to have the same friends and enemies as Rome and had to maintain the readiness of their native legions and commit them at their own expense to Roman offensive when summoned by Rome. Otherwise, the allies preserved local autonomy and Rome did not impose tribute or military contributions. This practical, loose knit confederacy enabled the Romans to draw on increasing manpower over time. In addition, the Romans engaged in a sustained program of colonization. Land taken from defeated states was used to plant garrison colonies in non-pacified regions. Most colonies were located strategically along choke points such as mountain passes, to insure Roman movement, or along the Italian coast to protect against naval attacks. Gradually Rome and its Latin allies understood the advantages of colonization as a way to export excess population and to expand the available pool of manpower eligible for the draft. As colonies became organized in distant theaters it was more suitable to grant their inhabitants "Latin status" to allow sufficient local autonomy. The result was a patchwork of settlements throughout Italy that grew into communities, and helped to assimilate native inhabitants to Roman culture, language, and law. Roman colonization formed an important tool of Romanization and converted the Italian farming population into a large manpower reserve that could be called on in emergencies. According to Roman census figures, as a result of colonization there were 292,000 adult male Roman citizens eligible for the draft in 264 BC. By 225 BC it is estimated that the Italian allies were contributing 375,000 regular troops. Estimates of total available manpower eligible for the draft during the Hannibalic War (218-201 BC) are 1 million Romans and 2 million Italians. This explains the staying power of Roman military campaigns. Hannibal reportedly destroyed 20,000 roman troops on the Ticinus River in 218, another 30,000 at Lake Trasimene in 217, and reportedly 80,000 at the Battle of Cannae in 216, more than 120,000 troops destroyed in the first 3 years of conflict. After a suitable period of of shock and alarm, the response of the Senate was clear -- call up another levy of young, green troops and dispatch them to defeat Hannibal. No other military establishment in the Mediterranean could sustain such losses. Most Macedonian realms had one field army that marched with the king, generally a force of some 30,000-50,000 troops, apart from mercenary garrison forces posted throughout the empires. If that field army were destroyed, the king's ability to exert force was essentially finished. Only the Romans could absorb such losses and continue to sustain conflict in the field.

4. Rome Displayed a Willingness to incorporate outsiders into its Republican political system gradually and by degrees.

One of the keys to Roman military success was the willingness of the hierarchy to absorb outsiders into the body politic, albeit begrudgingly, gradually, and by degrees. But the result was to construct a web of interconnected personal and family relationships across mainland Italy, to forge a more cohesive society and alliance structure.

Roman status was organized as follows

Roman citizens as follows:

A. Roman citizens, living in Rome or on viritine land allotments throughout Italy.

B. Roman colonies on public land, ager publicus (local land seized from natives).

C. Towns incorporated into the Roman state, mostly Latin towns such as Tusculum, Lanuvium, or Aricia. These towns retained local magistrates, but acted as subordinates to Roman magistrates. They struck no local coinage and were enrolled into the Roman tribal assembly.

2. Latin Allies -- States recognized as enjoying limited civic rights at Rome. These included most Latin states, all Latin colonies (including Roman citizens that were dispatched to these colonizing efforts), and all other allied states that were elevated because of loyal service to Latin Status by Rome. Latin states preserved local autonomy, but all ex-magistrates automatically received Roman citizenship. Any Latin citizen could also migrate to Rome, settle there, and obtain Roman citizenship. Generally this enabled the aristocracies of Latin states to obtain Roman citizenship and to participate in Roman political affairs. Elements of these families gradually migrated to Rome, took up residence, and rose to acquire public office and to enter the Senate for life. Roman senators from Latin states became knows as domi nobiles -- nobles at Rome and back at their home cities. So many families rose to Roman political distinction in this manner that the majority of senatorial families at Rome at the time of the Hannibalic War, in fact, originated from cities outside Rome. The Roman aristocracy essentially replenished itself by recruiting the best and the brightest of its allied states into the Roman body politic gradually and by degrees. This explains the cohesiveness of the Roman Confederacy and its ability to weather storms such as the 15-year presence of Hannibal and his army in mainland Italy.

C. Italian Allies or free states (civitates liberae), enjoyed full local autonomy and treaty relations with Rome. They had to enjoy the same friends and enemies as Rome and furnish their military forces on demand. Otherwise, they were left to their own devices. Many tribal elements such as the Samnites, inveterate foes of Rome throughout the Republican era, found this sufficiently palatable as an arrangement, since the less they had to do with Rome the happier they remained.

5. Rome never surrendered, nor negotiated from a position of weakness.

The reserves of Roman manpower enabled the Romans to weather numerous crises during the Middle Republican era, from military defeat by King Pyrrhus, to the destruction of whole Roman armies by Hannibal. At no point did the Romans consider negotiating for terms. Moreover, the strength of the alliance network and the interrelated aristocracies meant that the Roman Confederacy held even during the darkest days of the Hannibalic War. Few allied states broke away to join Hannibal against Rome. The notion of a Just War. The Romans claimed to have always fought “just wars.” The meaning of this was largely religious: the Romans always attempted to conduct the necessary rituals preliminary to open conflict with an adversary. However, the argument could be made that no war was ever conducted without full preliminary discussion of its causes and legitimacy in the Roman Senate and before the Roman People. At these times advocates, patrons, of the adversarial party, could be counted on to present the opponent’s case as well as to demand explanation of just cause as to why such a conflict was necessary. A decision to go to war had to be sufficiently compelling to override these objections. At the very least this furnished the Roman people with the necessary moral satisfaction to engage in such a conflict. To this degree they could be said to be just conflicts.