Hashim, M., K. Kannan, S. Maximiano, and J.R. Ulmer (2014). Information feedback, targeting and coordination: An Experimental Study, Information Systems Research forthcoming.

Hashim, M., K. Kannan, S. Maximiano, and J.R. Ulmer (2014). Digital Piracy, Teens, and the Source of Advice: An Experimental Study , Journal of Management and Information Systems, 31(2): 215-248.

Andersen, S., S. Ertac, U. Gneezy, JA. List and S. Maximiano (2013). Gender, Competitiveness and Socialization at a Young Age: Evidence from a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society , The Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(4), 1438-1443.

Maximiano, S., R. Sloof, and J. Sonnemans (2007). Gift exchange in a multi-worker firm. Economic Journal, 117, 1025-1050.

Maximiano, S., R. Sloof, and J. Sonnemans (2013). Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control. Games and Economic Behavior, 77, 41-60.


Revise & Resubmit

Andersen, S., S. Ertac, U. Gneezy, JA. List and S. Maximiano On the Cultural Basis of Gender Differences in Negotiation Experimental Economics.


Other Publications

Ertac, S. and S. Maximiano (2010). Experimental Economics, in Free, R. (Ed.) 21st Century Economics: A Reference Handbook, SAGE Publishers, Thousand Oaks, California.

Maximiano S. (2007). Essays in Organizational Economics, Vol. 400 of Tinbergen Institute Research Series. ISBN: 905170800.


Working Papers

Deception, social preferences, and friendship (JOB MARKET PAPER) with Sugato Chakravarty

We investigate the interaction between friendship and deceptive behavior. We implement a sender- receiver game, in which senders choose from a distinct set of allocations that embodies a multi-dimensional set of potential lies. Our design directly distinguishes between lying aversion and outcome oriented social preferences without the need for explicitly eliciting social preferences. We consider a “strangers” treatment and a “friends” treatment. Results show that subjects are less likely to lie to friends than to strangers; that they have different degrees of lying aversion, and that they lie according to their social preferences. Pro-social individuals appear more lying averse. If they do lie, they are equally likely to do so with friends as with strangers.

On the determinants of workers’ and firms’ willingness to train.

This paper estimates the determinants of workers’ and firms’ willingness to train. While previous studies imposed assumptions on firms’ ability to force workers into training, I show that such assumptions are unnecessary for identification, are rejected by the data, and lead to biased estimates. I find that different training rates between workers with various levels of education are mainly due to differences in workers’ willingness to participate in training. Different training rates across age are primarily driven by differences in firms’ willingness to train certain groups. These results give clues about the successfulness of policies aimed at increasing training participation.

Does replacing a manager improve performance?

This paper investigates whether managerial turnover in the soccer industry improves team performance. The impact of managerial succession on firms' performance has been extensively studied for the particular relationship between firm's performance and top management changes (i.e. CEOs) in publicly traded firms. The results are mixed with the estimates being sensitive to different measures of performance. Moreover, the lack of data makes it difficult to investigate the effect of firing managers on performance at lower hierarchical levels. Using soccer data allows us to overcome this problem. We estimate the impact of firing the coach, who can be seen as a “middle manager”, using match-level team performance data and a propensity score matching triple difference estimator. Our results show that on average, teams perform better with the new coach. However, the positive effects disappear when one compares the improvement in performance of those teams whose coach was fired with the corresponding "improvement'' achieved by control teams that have a similar probability of firing the coach but have not done so. Doing this we show an overall null effect of coach replacement, which can be readily interpreted from the point of view of scapegoating theory. Our results do suggest that firing is likely to be an instrument used to provide incentives.

Measuring reciprocity: Do survey and experimental data correlate?

This paper investigates whether the answers to commonly used attitudinal survey questions are significantly correlated with actual behavior and checks whether survey questions do exist that provide satisfactory measures of willingness to reciprocate. To address this issue I analyze the data from a questionnaire which subjects filled in after participating in a gift exchange experiment. I proceed in two steps. First, I perform a factor analysis to investigate whether different questions can be grouped into one factor. I then check whether the factors extracted correlate with the type of worker, as measured by the estimated slope parameter of the individual wage-effort schedule, and the employer's wage choice. I extract four factors that correspond exactly with the a priori classification of the survey questions, i.e. reciprocal attitudes, trusting attitudes, lending behavior, and tipping attitudes. The results suggest that survey questions that ask respondents directly about their reciprocal attitude are the best predictor of actual reciprocal attitudes. Additionally, questions about trust appear to be a good predictor of employers' wage offers.

The effects of responsibility and intentional trust on performance an experimental study. with Seda Ertac and Ayse Damla Uzrek

This study explores the impact of informal, non-monetary incentives on employees’ performance. In particular, we investigate whether (1) being responsible for the employer's payoff, and (2) being intentionally trusted by the employer improves employees’ performance in a real task. We design and implement a laboratory experiment where employers' payoffs might depend on their agent's performance. Depending on treatment, the link between the employer's payoff and employee's performance is either randomly determined by the computer, or intentionally by the employer. Our main finding is that being responsible for the employer's payoff significantly increases the employees’ performance. Breaking this down by gender, we find that the effect comes mainly from females.

The effect of range of outcomes and magnitude of rewards on lying behavior in anonymous dice-under-cup trials. with Carlos Lourenco and Camilla Zallot

We examine the effect of changing the structure of the lying opportunity by conducting a laboratory experiment. In particular, we vary the range of possible false outcomes and the magnitude of rewards. We apply the dice-under-cup paradigm which uses anonymous dice rolls to record actual lying behavior by comparing the distribution of participants’ stated outcomes to the expected statistical distribution of dice roll outcomes. We find that although some small changes in lying behavior can be achieved with an increase in the possible range of outcomes and by exponentially increasing rewards, lying behavior is generally robust to changes in the lying opportunity structure. Our study concludes that lying behavior seems to be driven by the aim to achieve a certain payoff regardless of conditions.<\h6>


Work in progress

Losses vs. Gains: Do managers reward good decisions or good outcomes? (with Andrew Meisner)

Selection into competition: Gender differences and the effect of experience, incentives, and feedback. (with Seda Ertac)

Game Form Representation and Knowledge Spillovers. (with Karthik Kannan and Kory Garner)

Does it take a crisis to get women in power? The glass cliff in the lab. (with Fatemeh Momeni and Seda Ertac)

Immediate and delayed reciprocity

Unexpected gift and pain perception

Menstruation, access to sanitary products, and girl’s education outcomes in Zimbabwe. (with Anna Josephson)