"Scrambling for Africa: The ‘German-German’ Rivalry South of the Sahara, 1958-1970" William Glenn Gray / Texas Tech University [at the time] German Studies Association San Diego, CA, October 2002

The Hallstein Doctrine has left a bitter taste in the mouths of many Germans. For two decades, West German diplomats expended untold energy (and millions of marks in aid) trying to keep East Germany at bay. All of that effort seemed in vain once Brandt’s government had reached a modus vivendi with the GDR in 1972, paving the way for East Germany’s international recognition. Perhaps understandably, scholars in the Federal Republic have not been keen to revisit this chapter of West German diplomacy. Nevertheless, the rivalry between East and West Germany was no private feud; as a dimension of the global Cold War, the struggle over who represented the "true" Germany had an impact on countries around the world. No continent was more affected than Africa, where the legacy of colonialism rendered many new leaders susceptible to East German overtures. Emissaries from the GDR were on the spot in Guinea just days after that country’s proclamation of independence from France in 1958; East Berlin shipped off aid deliveries to Zanzibar within weeks of a 1964 revolution. In Ghana, the Stasi operated an important guerrilla training camp until a coup drove Kwame N’krumah from office in 1966. East German documents reveal a remarkable degree of independent initiative on the part of the SED Politbüro; in many cases East German activity preceded Soviet involvement in African countries. Unlike Moscow, East Berlin did not have to worry that opportunistic behavior would sully its international reputation. Despite all of these promising leads, the GDR failed to make significant progress toward its long-term goal of diplomatic recognition. This paper argues that – contrary to received wisdom – the Hallstein Doctrine was highly effective in Africa (as elsewhere). Morally conscious leaders such as Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere found Bonn’s political pressure distasteful, but they refrained from provoking West German wrath all the same. After all, the Federal Republic’s aid programs dwarfed those of the GDR. Some African governments, most notably Ghana and Guinea, managed to squeeze even more aid out of Bonn by threatening to draw closer to East Berlin; but these were exceptional cases. West Germany’s aid policies were driven by a more general Cold War angst, the fear that Third World poverty would promote the cause of worldwide revolution. Ironically, assumptions about the appeal of communism in Africa led West Germans to forsake the tenets of the "social market economy" when dealing with African partners. The Federal Republic, like most Western countries, offered generous loans without reference to the state-heavy policies of African recipients. Building on French, British, American, and East and West German sources, this paper concludes that Bonn’s isolation policy in Africa was a success, but that its aid policies contributed to the distortion of African economic development from the 1960s onward.