

CHAPTER 5

The Growth of Civil Society

Historians agree that international relations entered a new phase during the 1970s. Whereas the period between 1945 and 1970 may possibly be comprehended within the framework of the Cold War—although this book argues that there are other ways of conceptualizing the quarter century—during the 1970s so many drastic changes occurred that the decade may be said to have marked the beginning of a new period of world affairs. Among such transforming events were the rapprochement between the United States and the People's Republic of China, the deterioration in Soviet-Chinese relations, and the détente between Washington and Moscow. The Cold War, in the sense of the bipolar division of the globe, lost whatever meaning it had ever had. As if to symbolize the passing of an era, the U.S. war in Vietnam, fought in the name of containing Soviet and Chinese communism, was brought to an end, to be followed promptly by a Chinese invasion of the newly united Vietnam—something that would have been incomprehensible in a world conceived in the vocabulary of the Cold War.

But that was not all. In the international economic sphere, the 1970s saw such cataclysmic changes that historian Eric Hobsbawm characterizes the history of the world during the twenty years after 1973 as “the crisis decades,” in contrast to the “Golden Age,” the term he chooses to

refer to the period between 1945 and the early 1970s.¹ While it would be difficult to agree with Hobsbawm that world history after the early 1970s became a “landslide,” there is no denying that in the economic realm at least, the world order that had prevailed during the 1950s and the 1960s broke down in the 1970s. First the United States government decided in 1971 to decouple the dollar from gold, so that the value of the dollar began falling against the currencies of most European countries as well as of Japan. Profound instability appeared in the international currency market as a result, a departure from the so-called Bretton Woods system that had been based on stable rates of exchange between the dollar and other currencies. In 1973 and again in 1979, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) adopted the policy of reducing their petroleum output, tripling and then quadrupling the wholesale price of crude oil. The result was a worldwide shortage of oil and a soaring inflation as consumer prices rose everywhere. The world economy that had steadily expanded after the Second World War now began to stagnate, and even the United States, Western European countries, and Japan recorded zero or minus growth rates. All these developments indeed impressed contemporary observers that the golden age of economic recovery, growth, and prosperity had come to an end. Just as a fundamental transformation was taking place in the geopolitical sphere, in the economic realm, too, one era was passing and another, presumably less certain and far more disorderly, era was dawning.

That world history, or more specifically the history of international relations, was entering a new epoch in the 1970s is beyond dispute. The nature of the transformation, however, is open to varying interpretations. In the framework of this book, the most striking feature of the changes, both geopolitical and economic, is that they were in effect integrating different parts of the world to a far more extensive and intimate degree than during the preceding period. The rapprochement between the United States and China, and between the United States and the Soviet Union, were bringing the two socialist giants into the international community where before they had largely remained apart from it.

(True, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were seriously estranged, thus dividing the socialist world, a phenomenon that would not fit into the theme of global reintegration, but the Beijing-Moscow rift would prove to be temporary, and besides, they were now more involved in international economic affairs than ever before.) In a similar way, the petroleum-producing countries were asserting their prerogatives as members of the international economic order. Of course, their orientation would be distinct from that of the capitalist industrial nations, but that was precisely the novelty; the world economic order now accommodated a growing number of countries that had hitherto tended to be minor players but that now demanded more say. Likewise, the global currency regime that had been built upon the overwhelming power of the dollar was giving way to a multicurrency system in which rates of exchange would fluctuate constantly.

All this made for unpredictability and even instability, but it did not necessarily spell the coming of an age of crisis. Actually, the volume of international trade continued to grow throughout the 1970s, and the world's major economic powers made much effort to cooperate in solving currency, energy, and other problems—in sharp contrast to the 1930s, when no such cooperation was possible. Nor should it be forgotten that the Third World, which had emerged as a group of underdeveloped (and, in most cases, recently independent) countries, found it difficult to maintain its uniform identity; while, from time to time, its members put up a common front toward the advanced, industrial nations, some of them began taking steps to industrialize themselves to join the ranks of the latter countries. Either way, the Third World was now more than ever part of global developments.

Seen in such a perspective, the 1970s may be considered to have marked a definite phase of globalization, a process that was to continue into the subsequent decades. Forces of globalization that had been manifest during the earlier decades became even more effective in connecting different parts of the world. In that process, a genuine world community was emerging—a world community, however, that was not

necessarily identical with the visions that dreamers and idealists long entertained. This is a fascinating story that has not yet ended. For that reason, assessing the historical significance of various facets of international affairs since the 1970s is extremely difficult. In this and the next chapters, I attempt to understand contemporary history through an examination of activities by some intergovernmental organizations and international nongovernmental organizations, old and new. Such examination shows that these organizations have played a decisive role—in some instances even more so than the sovereign states—in the global transformation since the 1970s.

To begin with, the number of both intergovernmental organizations and international nongovernmental organizations, already impressive in the 1960s, grew phenomenally during the 1970s. According to the Union of International Associations, the former increased from 280 in 1972 to 1,530 by 1984, and the latter from 2,795 to 12,686 during the same period. Both types of international organizations had been steadily growing in number, but never with such speed. And if local branches were taken into consideration, the figures were even more spectacular; in 1984 there were altogether 7,073 intergovernmental organizations and 79,786 international nongovernmental organizations, including both their headquarters and various local offices.²

Why such a burst of international organizations? One way of understanding this phenomenon would be to put it into the larger framework of the growth of nonstate, nonterritorial actors in the world. For instance, the 1970s began to develop what Hobsbawm calls a “transnational economy” in the world, symbolized by the mushrooming of multinational business enterprises.³ (There were about nine hundred of them in the early 1980s.) Such enterprises had existed earlier, but their number began to grow quickly only during the 1970s. More and more businesses were turning extraterritorial, operating far away from their original locations and establishing factories and offices with workforces consisting of individuals from several countries. Some scholars have argued that the presence of multinational corporations contributed to a

smooth functioning of the international economic system; before the Great War, while globalization was progressing apace, the possibility always existed that the whole mechanism of worldwide transactions could become unhinged, because the majority of manufacturers and trading companies retained their national identities, engaging themselves in fierce competition and in the process generating nationalistic animosities. The growth of multinational enterprises, on the other hand, served to develop transnational interests and solidarities conducive to international order.⁴ This is an intriguing argument and fits nicely into the overall picture of the growth of nonstate actors throughout the world. Multinational businesses and international organizations represented forces that were in effect seeking to create an international society that was distinct from the international system, defined as a sum of interactions among sovereign states. The former was challenging the latter's traditional hegemony as the definer of world order.

A similar process, the rise of civil society and the diminishing role of the state, was under way throughout the world as well. Loss of faith in government was a phenomenon witnessed in many countries, most dramatically with the Watergate scandal in the United States, which climaxed with the president's resignation in 1974. But this was not an isolated incident. In many parts of the globe, civil society was asserting itself, willing to challenge the authority of the state and to undertake tasks the latter was either unwilling or unable to perform. In the democratic states of Europe as well as in the United States and Japan, political commentators began discussing the question of governability—the ability of the state to cope with the increasing demands of society.⁵ There was less and less optimism that the governments had the will or the capabilities to do so; hence their increasing willingness to turn to civil organizations to share the task. All in all, then, state-society relations were changing rapidly, both within individual countries and in world affairs as a whole. Perhaps it was no accident that religious bodies, especially the Catholic Church, were beginning to regain their influence

in domestic political and social affairs, as if to reclaim the influence they had lost to the secular authorities.

Even some countries that had not hitherto tolerated anything close to a civil society began to witness the emergence of nongovernmental associations, thanks in no small degree to the encouragement and support that the Church provided. Charter 77, an informal group of intellectuals in Czechoslovakia founded in 1977 to call for respect for human rights, was one example, and Poland's labor organization, Solidarity, offered another. Established in 1979, the latter started out as a trade union of Gdansk dockworkers led by Lech Walesa. But, as an association outside the government or the Communist Party, it soon attracted a membership totaling some nine million and became a model for similar organizations in other socialist states. In the Soviet Union and elsewhere, students, intellectuals, and dissidents grew steadily bolder and began to organize themselves. Their associations, many of them clandestine, may not have been exact replicas of nongovernmental organizations in democratic countries, but they were clearly becoming self-conscious members of a civil society that was emerging in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the concept of civil society came to be developed during the 1970s as representing forces that were not controlled by the state.⁶ Those involved in the construction of nonstate organizations in Eastern Europe were conscious of the international implications of what they were doing. They were in increasing contact with developments in the West, and European and American capital was beginning to be invested in the Soviet Union and elsewhere to produce larger quantities of consumer goods. There is little doubt that for intellectuals, journalists, labor leaders, and others in these countries, freedom of association came to be seen as a key aspect of contemporary Western society and that they believed this was where they would have to start to become part of global developments.

Civil society also grew outside Europe, although the impetus for the growth of nongovernmental organizations seems to have been more social and economic than political. In Latin America, Asia, and Africa, a

large number of voluntary agencies sprang up to cope with problems of poverty, hunger, and health to complement work by the public authorities. Often governments were too weak, corrupt, or inefficient to administer social services, and they willingly turned these tasks over to non-state bodies. Why their number should have begun to increase during the 1970s is unclear, but it is remarkable that so many community organizations that are active today seem to have originated at that time. Perhaps the world economic disarray of the early 1970s hit particularly hard those Third World countries that were not endowed with rich natural resources. It may also have had something to do with the spectacular rise in cross-national migration. Driven by civil strife, ethnic conflict, and poverty, millions crossed borders, often illegally. Fortunate ones found refuge in richer countries of Europe, North America, Oceania, or the Middle East, but a greater number ended up in refugee camps. In Africa, for instance, the number of refugees grew from three hundred thousand in 1960, to one million in 1970, and to over three million ten years later.⁷

Even among those who stayed home, sprawling slums were a common sight in larger cities. Voluntary work was often the only effective means of dealing with such a critical situation. Small-scale community organizations were founded, and successful ones inevitably grew larger as they expanded the scope of their activities.⁸ Even such organizations, however, held political connotations inasmuch as they were involving people—the poor, women, and other marginalized groups—in community affairs. They were engaged in grassroots, bottom-up efforts in contrast to the top-down pattern of governmental programs for relief and economic development. Thus, in many instances community organizations served to empower people who had hitherto been deprived of a voice in their own governance. From there, it was but a step to an active campaign for their rights. Such a development seems to have exemplified many nongovernmental organizations in the Third World during the 1970s. Thus in the non-Western parts of the world, too, self-conscious civil society was emerging.⁹

Nor was the growth of civil society in many parts of the world limited to domestic organizations. Branches of international nongovernmental organizations were established everywhere, their total number increasing from 36,336 in 1966 to 52,074 in 1977, and to 79,786 by 1983. In 1977 the Soviet Union belonged to 43 international nongovernmental organizations, and China to 71.¹⁰ These were much smaller figures than the number of international nongovernmental organizations in the United States (1,106) or in Japan (878), but they were nevertheless indicative of a trend. The figures for Africa, the Western Hemisphere, and Asia (including the Pacific) for that year were 6,830, 11,076, and 9,725, respectively. It was almost as if the whole globe was becoming dotted with domestic and international nongovernmental organizations. Added to them were local offices of intergovernmental organizations, totaling 6,432 in 1977. These numbers show that global consciousness was becoming even more fully institutionalized than earlier. The new international order that was being promoted at the geopolitical level through the rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and between the former and China, had its counterpart in the emerging global community consisting of thousands of intergovernmental organizations and international nongovernmental organizations, as well as of domestic civil societies.

It is no accident that astute observers of the international scene began to notice this phenomenon. Some of the seminal works on international organizations were published during the 1970s. In 1975 Johan Galtung, a leading scholar of nonstate actors, argued in a pioneering essay, "Nonterritorial Actors and the Problem of Peace," that a "sixth continent" of the world, "the invisible continent of nonterritorial actors," was emerging.¹¹ Two years later, Evan Luard, a British student of international politics, published *International Agencies*, a guide to the existing intergovernmental organizations that is still useful.¹² The important work by these and other scholars was summed up and put into a comprehensive framework by Harold K. Jacobson, whose *Networks of Interdependence* (1979) may be considered the basic text for the study not

simply of international organizations but also of international relations in general during the 1970s. As he wrote in the preface, "Humankind is crafting new political institutions that have already contributed significantly to greater global security, to better material welfare through a larger gross world product, and to higher standards of social welfare."¹³ All these authors were noticing a global development that would soon enter the consciousness of millions of people everywhere: the proliferation of international organizations, some of which expanded on the work begun earlier, while others were innovative in that they were not elite bodies but were products of, and responses to, the political, social, economic, and cultural concerns of ordinary individuals

To examine these organizations systematically is beyond the scope of this book. But it seems useful to describe briefly some of their activities in the fields of human rights, humanitarian relief, developmental assistance, environmental protection, and cultural exchange. We have seen in the earlier chapters that these five, plus peace and disarmament, had been among the most important objectives of international organizations. While peace advocacy was by no means inactive, the easing of Cold War tensions may have had the effect of eclipsing it as a central issue for international organizational attention. According to Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, twenty international nongovernmental organizations were concerned with peace issues in 1963, but the number declined to fourteen ten years later.¹⁴ Further fluctuations would occur in the years to come, and while generalizing may be impossible, one could argue that the five fields just mentioned were now considered more urgent. If such a generalization is tenable, it underscores the fact that beginning in the 1970s, so many issues outside of world peace and arms control came to command the attention of people everywhere, who were increasingly seeing that the solution to these problems lay in international organizations, not sovereign states.

To start with human rights, one remarkable development during the 1970s was the increasing attention that began to be paid to women's rights. The years 1975 to 1985, according to the historian Harriet

Alonso, were "ten years of unprecedented global organizing" among women's groups.¹⁵ These years were designated by the United Nations as the "International Decade of Women," with 1975 as "International Women's Year," an indication that at both nongovernmental and intergovernmental levels, women's movements were becoming an important part of any discussion of world affairs. While such a widened perception of international relations had become notable during the cultural revolutions of the 1960s, the new decade added significant elements to the phenomenon. For one thing, even outside Western Europe and North America, where women's organizations had had long histories, similar movements developed to such an extent that in 1975, an international congress of women was convened in Mexico City. Not surprisingly, the participants resolved to create networks of women's organizations throughout the world. They recognized that women's conditions and lifestyles varied from country to country and from one culture to another, but the common sentiment was that by coming together, women's groups from different parts of the globe could develop a common consciousness—a consciousness of shared concerns and commitments. This was reflected in the publication, starting in 1975, of *Women's International Networks News*, a quarterly journal of information, and in the first "international tribunal on crimes against women," held in Brussels in 1976. This was not a formal trial in the ordinary sense of the term, but an occasion where two thousand participants from forty countries aired their grievances concerning violence against women, including rape and prostitution.¹⁶ Such developments may suggest that while women's international movements had initially focused on peace issues, especially against nuclear armament, the easing of Cold War tensions during the 1970s enabled them to deal with other matters as well, and in so doing, women's organizations became more than ever an integral part of the emerging phenomenon of globalization. For instance, the establishment in 1974 of a new organization in the United States, Women for Racial and Economic Equality, suggests that marginalized and disadvantaged segments of the population could join

forces with women everywhere to search for a new order at home and in the world.

Human rights, in that broad sense, were becoming a major theme of international affairs. Three disparate episodes would demonstrate this graphically. One was the 1975 Helsinki accord on human rights, adopted at a meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a body that had just been organized by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact. The creation of the CSCE was itself a major landmark in postwar international history. Significantly, the declaration defined human rights broadly and referred to "the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights." That such a principle was never wholly accepted, let alone practiced, in socialist regimes was less important than that the nations belonging to opposite sides in the Cold War now put their signatures to the same document, indicating that they were willing to embrace common values regarding the human condition. In 1978 Helsinki Watch was established to monitor the signatory nations' compliance with the 1975 agreement. In that process its staff met, often clandestinely, with dissident individuals and groups, thus encouraging the growth of civil society in the Soviet Union and East European countries.¹⁷

Another interesting example concerned the rights of those who were physically, mentally, or otherwise disabled and had traditionally been subject to harsh discrimination in many societies. The United Nations' universal declaration on human rights had not asserted the rights of the disabled. At last the world organization made amends when it issued a declaration on the human rights of the mentally disabled in 1971 and another, encompassing all types of disability, in 1975. These declarations called on all countries to improve the conditions of such people. Hitherto, religious organizations, especially various Catholic orders, had been conspicuous because of their attention to the disabled, considering them to be God's special children, but now in many parts of the world, disabled persons and their relatives and friends began to establish organizations to lobby their respective states for more support, financial

and moral. In the United States, for instance, people with disabilities asserted their rights as consumers: they should, they insisted, have the right to choose their own rehabilitation programs, hospital and institutional care, and welfare facilities.¹⁸

Similar movements developed elsewhere, and in time awareness grew that the disabled should organize themselves internationally. The first international nongovernmental organization of the disabled, Disabled Persons International, was not founded until 1981, but in the meantime worldwide awareness of their existence and problems was aroused through international sporting events. Although the first Paralympic games had been held during the Rome Olympics of 1960, and the second in Tokyo in 1964, it was during the 1970s that such activities became more truly international. In 1969 the Stoke Mandeville Sports Stadium for the Paralysed and Other Disabled was opened in Aylesbury, Britain, and in the following year an international competition was held there, attracting four hundred physically disabled athletes from twenty-eight countries.¹⁹ Soon such events came to include the blind and those with cerebral palsy, and in the meantime the mentally disabled began to have their own "special Olympics." The 1980 Olympics for the Disabled, held in Arnhem, the Netherlands, drew twenty-five hundred competitors from forty-two countries. Such an event could not have taken place without the painstaking preparation by a large number of volunteer organizations, and it reflected the fact that human rights during this period were broadening to encompass the well-being of people with disabilities.

A third illustration of the growing influence the human rights question was having on the world was the award, in 1977, of the Nobel Peace Prize to Amnesty International. Since its founding in 1961, the organization had rapidly established branches in various parts of the world and widened the range of its activities. It was particularly active in sending observers to prisons to ensure proper treatment of inmates. When, in 1975, the International Council of Nurses declared that "the nurses in the care of detainees and prisoners" must report all instances of "physi-

cal or mental ill-treatment," Amnesty International made sure that such a rule was enforced. It also took seriously a declaration by the World Medical Association at its convention in Tokyo in 1975 that obligated doctors "not to condone, countenance, or participate in torture."²⁰ That most countries of the world were willing to let Amnesty personnel visit their prisons indicates the tremendous authority this international organization was already beginning to assume in international affairs.

Given the rising global concern with human rights, it is not surprising that the United States government under the presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) responded to the situation by establishing a bureau of human rights and humanitarian affairs within the State Department. The bureau was headed by the assistant secretary of state for human rights and worked energetically to promote democratization. Although Carter's human rights diplomacy was criticized for its lack of consistency—for instance, he insisted on democratization of South Korea, but not as firmly in China or in Pakistan—we should realize that he had to juggle various demands (geopolitical, economic, humanitarian) and often had to deal with unpredicted occurrences pragmatically. International organizations, not separate states, provided consistency. Where governments could pay only limited attention, nongovernmental organizations made sure that pressure would be kept up on behalf of incarcerated political dissidents and other victims of discrimination and injustice. A great deal of cooperation in this regard also existed between intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. The United Nations Center for Human Rights, for instance, was in constant communication with international nongovernmental organizations and was receiving information from them on abuses of human rights in many parts of the globe. Private foundations in Europe and North America, notably the Ford Foundation, for the first time came to interest themselves in funding international human rights work.²¹

All such activities in the human rights field did not mean, however, that international organizations were neglecting other areas of their traditional and recent concern. In the broad area of humanitarian relief, for

instance, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) continued to be active in providing health services to children and their mothers. Some seventy million people were reportedly being served by clinics equipped by UNICEF in the mid-1970s.²² Among international nongovernmental organizations were some notable newcomers, such as Africare and Food for the Hungry International, both established in 1971. The former complemented work by older institutions such as Project Concern International and worked closely with the World Health Organization and other intergovernmental organizations to provide medical service and health care facilities in remote areas of the African continent. Africare's initiative for its founding came from African leaders (such as Diori Hamani, president of Niger) who appealed to African Americans for help. C. Payne Lucas, director of the Peace Corps Office of Returned Volunteers in Washington, took up the challenge and started the project, initially headquartered at his home with a small budget of less than forty thousand dollars. At first envisaged as a relief organization to help victims of drought in West Africa, it soon came to embrace a more ambitious, long-term goal, to offer developmental assistance.²³

Food for the Hungry, in the meantime, was founded in southern California (and later moved to Arizona) as "an international organization of Christian motivation, committed to working with poor people to overcome hunger and poverty through integrated self-development and relief programs." Soliciting donations from other countries as well as the United States, the organization helped refugees in Bangladesh (which separated itself from Pakistan in 1971), earthquake victims in Nicaragua, and the hungry in West Africa. It also created a Hunger Corps to send volunteers to administer food distribution programs in cooperation with local organizations.²⁴ In 1976 a new organization was set up in London, the Appropriate Health Resources and Technology Action Group, to serve as a repository of information concerning public health research and administration. Around this time, the notion of primary health care became incorporated into the vocabulary of international organizations.

At an international conference convened by the World Health Organization and UNICEF in Alma-Ata in 1978, attended by representatives of 143 countries as well as sixty-seven international organizations, a declaration was issued, asserting the rights and duties of people everywhere to participate in primary health care "in the spirit of self-reliance and self-determination." "Health for All by the Year 2000" was adopted as the goal toward which nations and international organizations were to strive.²⁵

No international nongovernmental organization founded during the 1970s in the field of humanitarian relief has been as well known or influential as Doctors without Borders (*Médecins sans Frontières*). Its creation in 1971 owed itself to the initiatives of a handful of volunteers and donors (mostly in France) who were committed to the idea that humanitarian activities recognized no national boundaries and that physicians and nurses should go wherever they were needed to help victims of famine, disease, or natural disasters. (The phrase "without frontiers" was so attractive to other organizations that in France alone, more than thirty of them adopted it as a part of their names.) As a founder of the organization wrote, in this way it was frankly "subversive"; it would not always wait for, or go through, government authorization before acting, and it would not hesitate to publicize its activities or the plight of the people it assisted.²⁶ During the 1970s, doctors and aid workers dispatched by the organization became involved in relief work in Nicaragua after an earthquake, in Vietnam after the long war, in Thailand to provide assistance to refugees from Vietnam and Cambodia, and in several African states to care for refugees fleeing civil strife.

In such activities, Doctors without Borders often frankly confronted the issue of human rights and was willing to disseminate information on violations of those rights. The line between humanitarian relief and human rights activism was thin. The Alma-Ata declaration spoke of the principle of making primary health care accessible to "individuals and families in the community through their full participation." People's involvement in their own health care, and more broadly in their own

development, was being asserted as a right, but this could come into conflict with local political ambitions and traditional prejudices. From the beginning, volunteers working for Doctors without Borders and other organizations encountered situations in which the implementation of humanitarian activities experienced difficulties in the absence of a system of governance through which individuals could assert their rights. In such instances, they would have to organize themselves as autonomous entities—something state authorities would not easily tolerate. But it was becoming clearer that the more humanitarian agencies involved themselves in the local scene, the greater the challenge to the existing framework of state sovereignty. Thus here, too, the growth of civil society was emerging as an inevitable by-product of international humanitarian work.

The same was true of developmental assistance. The 1970s witnessed a continued growth in the number of international organizations in this field. This clearly reflected that the rising cost of energy and the fierce trade competition that resulted from it were making the economic conditions of developing countries worse than ever, relative to those of more advanced countries. The former came to be known collectively as the "South," and the latter as the "North," and it seemed as if the North-South rift was becoming even more serious than the geopolitical conflict between East and West. As many Third World countries found it difficult to obtain revenue by marketing their primary exports, whose prices tended to be depressed throughout the decade, they began pressing for what they called a "new international economic order" in which their special circumstances would be given consideration and their products given preferential treatment. Because the governments of the richer countries would make only partial concessions in this regard—for instance, exempting such products from international agreements on mutual lowering of tariffs—private groups would naturally become more deeply involved than ever in providing developmental assistance.

Many of them were organized in France where, as earlier, the Catholic Church expanded the scope of existing organizations and cre-

ated new ones to extend assistance programs to former French colonies in Africa and in Latin America.²⁷ One of them, the Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement, devised a slogan, "Rien ne changera dans le tiers monde si rien ne change chez nous" (nothing will change in the Third World if nothing changes at home).²⁸ Such a view expressed the recognition that developmental assistance made sense only in the context of a world that was becoming closely interconnected and in which values such as freedom, justice, and human rights applied everywhere, at home as well as abroad. For this reason, developmental assistance programs and projects came to have an important human rights component, another remarkable phenomenon of the 1970s. We can see this, for instance, in the founding of the Centre for Development and Population Activities in 1975 in Washington (with field offices and "partner organizations and networks" in many countries), aimed at "empowering women at all levels of society to be full partners in development." As the insertion of the word "population" in its title suggests, this organization stressed women's reproductive health and family planning as essential aspects of economic development. These were politically sensitive issues, and, as noted later, the growth of multiculturalism, a parallel development in the same decade, would make them extremely controversial. Of interest to our discussion is that social and cultural questions were becoming inseparable from developmental assistance.

To consider a few other examples, in 1971 a Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research was launched at the behest of the World Bank and of several governments and nongovernmental organizations. Initially designed to help agricultural research, especially in rice production, the Group soon became involved in broader issues such as farming systems, conservation of genetic resources, and other phenomena that had "ecological, economic and social factors."²⁹ Also about that time, the World Council of Churches established a "program to combat racism" to help individuals and groups in Portuguese Africa as well as Rhodesia and South Africa that were struggling against colonialism and racism. Oxfam America, founded in 1970, often criticized the United

States government for its aid policy that seemed to help existing regimes entrench themselves in power instead of promoting the well-being of ordinary citizens. Reflecting a similar concern, the Society for International Development adopted "jobs and justice" as its objectives for the 1970s, justice being defined as a concept including "cultural diversity and safeguarding the environment."³⁰

Cultural diversity and the safeguarding of the environment — these two themes were beginning to claim the serious attention of governments and nonstate actors alike during the 1970s, another distinctive characteristic of the decade's international relations. Not just in connection with humanitarian relief or developmental assistance, but with regard to many other issues, the two subjects were entering into the vocabulary of national and international discourses. Understanding why is not difficult. To discuss environmental protection first, by the early 1970s this issue was apparently becoming urgent, given the polluted skies and waters in so many parts of the world, products of rapid industrial development and population growth during the preceding decade. "Defoliation" and "desertification" were now familiar terms; renowned forests such as the Black Forest in Central Europe began to lose their trees as a result of atmospheric pollution, and deserts spread in Africa because of overgrazing and other causes (including climatic change, although there was no consensus on this point), causing havoc with animal habitats and food shortages for humans. In many cities of the world, as more and more people gained sufficient incomes to own a car, not just gasoline consumption but also air pollution from automobile exhaust grew. Diseases, physical impairment, even deaths were reported in different parts of the world as a result of poisoning by mercury and other industrial chemicals. When nations steadily switched to nuclear power, a move that seemed essential to reduce their dependence on petroleum, they encountered the problem of protecting themselves against radiation.

The connection between environmentalism — the concern with hazards to the biosphere caused by economic activities — and developmentalism was clear. As more and more countries undertook industrializa-

tion, they encountered the same environmental issues that plagued the more advanced nations. Would development and environmental protection be compatible? That was becoming a major issue of international affairs. Most Third World countries insisted on the imperatives of economic growth, to remove themselves from the indignity of perpetual poverty. And yet the vocabulary of environmentalism was such that unlimited growth appeared less and less a desirable end — so it seemed to some observers among the already industrialized countries. Such vocabulary came into conflict with the increasingly popular view that it was precisely because the more advanced countries had enriched themselves by relentlessly exploiting the resources of the poorer lands that the earth faced an ecological crisis. Furthermore, some factories from industrialized nations were relocating themselves, partly to take advantage of cheaper labor in Third World countries but also to escape environmental regulations at home. That such factories might be “exporting dirty air” to less advanced countries was a charge that began to be made in the 1970s. But that did not mean that these lands should remain in a perpetual state of underdevelopment. Here was the dilemma: How could nations promote both development and environmentalism? Soon the world would become familiar with the concept of sustainable growth, a pattern of economic development in all nations that did not overburden the earth’s resources or injure its biosphere.

It was in the 1970s that the potentially explosive issue of environmental protection was first addressed internationally, at conferences and through new organizations. Despite the deeply divisive nature of the issue, there was agreement that this was a worldwide problem and therefore had to be dealt with in a global framework. A landmark event in internationalizing environmentalism was the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, convened in Stockholm in 1972. (That the organizers chose to use the term “the human environment” to refer to a conference on the biosphere was indicative of the way in which humans and nature were beginning to be seen as sharing an inseparable destiny.) A product of the UN resolution of 1968 calling for such a gath-

ering, the conference attracted representatives from 114 countries.³¹ The gathering was often contentious, as could have been predicted, but remarkably the delegates adopted a resolution calling on the United Nations to establish a special body to deal with environmental issues through international cooperation. The recommendation resulted in the inauguration, in 1973, of the United Nations Environmental Program. This body became a major forum for defining international environmental policy in connection with developmental assistance. Third World countries insisted, and developed countries usually agreed, that the enforcement of environmentally sound programs should not be at the expense of the former’s sound economic development or trade, and that the costs of instituting such programs should be largely borne by the richer nations.³² The objectives of environmentalism and developmentalism could come into conflict, but the new international organization served as a forum where such differences could be aired and, to the extent possible, ironed out. This was a perfect example of the impact of new issues upon international governance.

The Stockholm conference produced almost immediate results in Europe, where the European Community was being established through the addition of Britain, Ireland, and Denmark to the original European Economic Community. From its beginning, the European Community took environmental issues seriously. Through the European Council, the Community’s ultimate governing body, the member governments adopted environmental action plans and, at the same time, began coordinating their plans so as to develop common regulations for environmental protection.³³ In the meantime, the European nations as well as others organized a large number of conventions throughout the 1970s dealing with such specific issues as “the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the sub soil thereof” (1971), “the prevention of marine pollution by dumping from ships and aircraft” (1972), “international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora” (1973), “the protection of animals kept for farming purposes”

(1976), and "the conservation of migratory species of wild animals" (1979). These agreements testified to the willingness of sovereign states, particularly of Europe, to give up part of their national prerogatives to cooperate in pursuit of common objectives.

While national governments became increasingly interested in environmental issues, nongovernmental organizations that had already been active in the field redoubled their efforts, and many new organizations were established during the 1970s. Some of them were represented at the Stockholm conference, while others held their own meetings apart from the United Nations-sponsored gathering. Their agendas were not always compatible, but their presence demonstrated that they could not be ignored in any discussion of environmental problems. The Stockholm conference provided an occasion for internationalizing the activities of many national nongovernmental bodies concerned with the environment. As of 1973, according to a survey, ten international nongovernmental organizations existed in this field, one of the most influential of which was Friends of the Earth, established in the United States in 1969. Its founder, David Brower, had been active in the Sierra Club but felt that this and other conservationist groups were not resisting strongly enough pressures from business and governmental offices for "wise uses" of natural resources. Rather than reform such associations from within, Brower and others decided to create their own organization, which from the beginning would be global in scope.³⁴ During the 1970s, Friends of the Earth branches were formed in many other countries to disseminate information and campaign actively for the preservation of the natural environment. After the Stockholm conference, additional organizations were created, so that within ten years the number of environmental international nongovernmental organizations reached twenty-six.³⁵ In 1974 the Center for International Environmental Information was established in New York, and six years later its name was changed to the World Environment Center, a clear indication of the globalizing trend of such activities. These organizations grew so numerous that in 1975, a conference was held in Austria to review the

relationship among them, as well as between them and the United Nations, in administering environmental and related social programs.

One of the most energetic and successful organizations founded during this period was the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, formed in 1977 to try to preserve the Antarctic region from oil drilling and excessive fishing. Its representatives began to lobby nations participating in the Antarctic treaty system, a collection of treaties that governed this area. The Coalition eventually won the right to send observers to these meetings, and in the meantime, they engaged in a worldwide campaign to preserve the Antarctic.³⁶ Although many political and legal issues complicated their activities, especially regarding the enforcement of any international agreement, the organization was tireless in publicizing the critical situation in the region and promoted, among other objectives, the negotiation of a convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources. Their efforts were to be rewarded in the early 1980s when such a convention was adopted and became part of the treaty system.

The protection of endangered species was an integral part of environmentalism. The safeguarding of wildlife from human encroachment had a long history, but during the 1970s international nongovernmental organizations became even more conspicuous than before in speaking out against the killing of elephants, whales, and a variety of animals, birds, fish, and plants. When various individuals and organizations spoke of the "quality of life," an increasingly popular phrase, they meant not simply that of humans but also of all living beings that shared the "planet earth," another increasingly used term. Reflecting such a trend, the World Wildlife Fund, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, and other organizations that had been founded earlier were now more successful than before in persuading national governments and intergovernmental organizations to take wildlife protection seriously. For instance, in 1972, the World Wildlife Fund, in cooperation with Friends of the Earth, spearheaded a campaign to save whales through newspaper advertisements and street marches in

London. (That the Duke of Edinburgh was by then president of the WWF gave the movement much greater visibility.) In response, the British government imposed a ban on the import of products made from baleen whales. This was far from being a complete victory for whale conservationists, and some of them were to move on to become Greenpeace activists. The growing influence of all these nongovernmental organizations is remarkable all the same.³⁷

An interesting development of the 1970s was that the preservation of the natural environment was often coupled with that of historical and cultural landmarks. In 1972, at a UNESCO meeting in Paris, a "convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage" was signed by seventy-five countries. (The United States was the first nation to ratify the convention.)³⁸ The coupling of cultural and natural resources showed that culture and nature were beginning to be seen not as opposites, as had long tended to be the case in many parts of the globe, but as closely integrated so that talking of preserving one at the expense of the other would be impossible. An emerging perspective of this period saw culture and nature as interdependent. Moreover, rapid economic growth in many parts of the world had caused serious damage not only to nature and wildlife but also to ancient monuments and works of art. Just as endangered species needed protection, rare historical artifacts had to be treated with care lest they should disintegrate. According to the 1972 convention, individual countries were to prepare a list of historical landmarks within their borders, from which a number would be registered with an international committee on historical preservation. The latter would compile a master list of the world's most precious historical heritages, and those that required immediate care would be provided with funds for restoration and protection. The assumption was that these cultural monuments, just like the natural habitat, belonged to the whole of humanity, and that it was the responsibility of all people to ensure both natural and cultural preservation.³⁹

The growing popularity of the notion of multiculturalism, another interesting development of the 1970s, may be said to have been an

aspect of the concern with the preservation of historical heritages. Multiculturalism connoted the idea that culture must be seen as pluralistic, consisting of divergent ways of dealing with the human condition. Just as the preservation of pristine oceanic conditions and endangered wildlife was a moral imperative for the whole world, respect for different ways of life and thought came to be seen as an important agenda for international affairs. Pleas for cross-cultural understanding had long existed and produced many important movements and organizations dedicating themselves to a myriad exchange programs. And during the 1960s, a sense of transnational cultural consciousness had emerged. But during the 1970s, multiculturalism gained even greater influence because of its conjunction with other developments such as the rise of global environmentalism and the worldwide mushrooming of nongovernmental organizations. Here were forces pushing for globalization — the term began to be used toward the end of the decade — but the growth of global consciousness was also giving rise to awareness of diversity. Globalization and multiculturalism as twin themes — this was an idea that would eventually come to seem commonsensical. In the 1970s the picture was not yet so clearly recognized, but even so, individuals and organizations promoting educational and cultural exchanges were becoming keenly aware of the connection.

The continued growth of exchange programs during the 1970s and subsequently tends to be overlooked by students of international organization because of their fascination with the more dramatic activities by advocacy groups, such as those concerned with human rights and environmentalism. Purely in terms of number, however, exchange organizations continued to overshadow these other associations. International organizations promoting educational and cultural exchanges grew just as rapidly as the latter, and together they contributed to strengthening transnational networks.

For one thing, the 1970s saw significant developments in exchange programs between the two sides in the (already waning) Cold War, as well as between the West and the People's Republic of China. In 1971

UNESCO began the World Scientific and Technical Information Service to provide bibliographic information on published articles, numbering over one million a year, in seventy thousand specialized journals, which provided an opportunity for scientists from the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries to join the international community of scientists. The 1975 Helsinki accord contained the so-called Basket III, which dealt with cultural relations and endorsed exchange programs between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. About this time, cultural exchange between socialist and capitalist nations picked up momentum. For instance, American and Soviet scientists began collaborating in energy and space research, as exemplified by the *Apollo-Soyuz* joint space mission undertaken in 1975. Two years later, two Soviet historians co-authored a book, an account of the history of U.S.-Russian relations, that was published by the University of Chicago Press; while the book struck many American reviewers as biased, its very publication indicated that the transnational interchange of ideas across ideological divides was becoming accepted.⁴⁰

Likewise, the rapprochement between the United States and the People's Republic of China after 1971 reopened channels of communication between the two that had all but disappeared during the preceding two decades. The Committee on Scholarly Exchange with the People's Republic of China, which had been set up in 1966 under the auspices of the National Science Foundation in anticipation of the resumption of scholarly contact, now established a Beijing office to oversee the renewed exchanges. In cooperation with the Council for International Exchange of Scholars, the Washington organization that administered the Fulbright program, the Committee served as a liaison between Chinese and American students, academics, and professionals as they visited each other's country. On the Chinese side, the Chinese Academy of Social Science, a Beijing organization, played the key role in hosting visiting Americans and coordinating plans for scholarly cooperation. At this time such cooperation was still very limited, but at least the beginnings of the U.S.-Chinese cultural exchange, coming on the heels

of the worldwide cultural revolution of the 1960s, served to make international intellectual cooperation and communication more nearly global than had been the case earlier. Moreover, in the United States and elsewhere, new nongovernmental organizations sprang up with a focus on the promotion of exchanges with the People's Republic. Foundations, universities, and professional societies began establishing offices and training staff to serve this purpose. While no exact counterpart to such organizations existed in China, these private initiatives from abroad sowed the seed for what would soon blossom into a large-scale exchange between the Chinese and the rest of the world.

That the growth in the number, scope, and diversity of international exchange programs was giving rise to serious questions may be seen in the fact that during the 1970s, the governments of the United States, Britain, France, and Germany commissioned studies to reexamine their respective cultural policies.⁴¹ In the United States, an "independent panel on international information, education and cultural relations," funded from private sources, recommended that the dissemination of information about the nation should be combined with exchange programs under a single administration. For this purpose, the United States Information Agency was renamed the United States International Communication Agency, starting in 1978. Although the former name was restored after only four years, the stress on communication and exchange, not just on information, was to remain. This change reflected the recognition that the spread of information as an aspect of Cold War diplomacy was now of secondary importance compared with the sharing of ideas and experiences with all countries. In the meantime, an officially sponsored review undertaken in Britain recommended, in its report of 1977, that the British Council be either abolished or scaled down. Such a radical idea was more in response to severe economic problems at home than the product of a new view of international cultural relations, and the government did not accept the recommendation. But the review did reflect the growing sentiment that cultural affairs could mostly be left in private hands rather than officially promoted. In any event, the

official response to the report pointed to the importance of "educational and cultural work" in "stimulating the use of the English language" abroad.

This, apparently rather mundane, point was becoming a matter of serious concern to French officials concerned with cultural affairs. A report written in 1979 by a committee headed by Jacques Rigaud acknowledged that English had overtaken French as the language of international communication. The report suggested that France's cultural heritage and ideas could be promoted by languages other than just French. The world was changing, the report pointed out, because of "the involvement of people in international affairs," and it was therefore imperative to consider French cultural centers abroad as places of exchange with the local populace. This did not mean that the teaching of French in other countries should be neglected, but that the training of teachers of French abroad should be emphasized, linked to the concept of *francophonie*.⁴² A German report, published by the Foreign Ministry in 1978, admitted that German was not an international language, but it was even more emphatic than the documents of the other countries in stressing the significance of "international cooperation in the cultural sector" so as to "create ties between peoples of different nationalities." Echoing the French report, the German statement asserted, "All nations are today, more than ever before, dependent on one another for their existence. . . . The value of what we give is only worth as much as our willingness to take. Thus, an open attitude towards others is a principle of our cultural policy abroad."⁴³

It was against such a background that organizations, national and international, faced the issue of cultural diversity. Those espousing multiculturalism insisted on the autonomy of each culture, defined by religion, ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, and other factors. The world, in such a view, consisted of a variety of specifically definable cultures, each with its own values and agendas. No one culture was inherently superior to others. To the extent that one culture, for instance Western civilization (characterized by exponents of multiculturalism as

having traditionally been dominated by white males), tended to claim superiority (or "hegemony," another word gaining currency), it must be rejected. To push such an argument to its extreme, multiculturalism would deny the existence of universal truths or values; all cultures were equally valid. The validity or authenticity of a culture must be recognized before constructing any device for cross-cultural communication and cooperation.

Such an assertion presented a serious challenge not only to cultural exchange but also to human rights, environmentalism, and a host of other causes that were being promoted by intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations. If there were no universal human rights or a shared commitment to the protection of the natural habitat, how could a global community of men and women with common interests and agendas develop? Was it ever possible to conceptualize such a community to begin with? Was not the idea itself a hegemonic one, coming from a dominant civilization to impose its definition of the world on others? If the globe was becoming subdivided into self-defining cultures with their own local loyalties, should communication and dialogue among these cultures be even attempted? Was a multicultural world compatible with a viable international civil society?

These were serious questions, and they added complexity to international affairs in general and to the workings of international organizations in particular during the 1970s. The very idea of cultural exchange came to be assaulted as a product of Western civilization, even a maneuver by the powerful European and North American countries to hang on to their position of worldwide influence. Although during the 1950s UNESCO had stressed humanity's diverse cultural heritage and sponsored conferences on Eastern and Western values, the assumption was that dialogue was possible and desirable among such diverse heritage and civilizations. All countries and cultures, cultural internationalists had believed (and continued to believe), shared a commitment to mutual communication and understanding. During the 1970s, however, some of the more outspoken leaders of Third World countries began to insist

that they did not necessarily share Western ideas about such matters, and that any attempt at cross-cultural cooperation must reflect their perspectives also. Some intellectuals — among the most influential was the Algerian writer Franz Fanon, whose book *The Wretched of the Earth* (1965) was among the first systematic presentations of the argument — asserted that their first task was to liberate themselves from the cultural vocabulary that had provided them with words and concepts to comprehend the world, indeed to describe themselves. The time had come, they argued, for them to develop their own vocabulary if they were to be fully independent of the colonial past. Similar ideas were expressed in a scholarly fashion by Edward Said, the American scholar of Palestinian background, whose *Orientalism* (1978) became something of a bible of multiculturalism. In such a perspective, freeing Third World people from their dependence on the West for knowledge and information would be vitally important.

These views were aired at UNESCO and other international settings, making cross-cultural exchange a far more complex undertaking than earlier. Some observers considered the situation so serious as to nullify all attempts at international cultural cooperation. Add to this the rise, in the late 1970s, of postmodernist theory, which argued against the ideas of progress, modernization, and evolutionary historical processes but stressed the essential meaninglessness of concepts, terms, and words, except in the context of the individual uttering (or hearing) them. Postmodernism could present a serious intellectual challenge confronting all attempts at global community by intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations.

The crisis would continue into the subsequent decades, but remarkably it did not prevent the further promotion of international exchange programs. The governments of the United States, Britain, France, and Germany continued to recognize the importance of cultural and educational exchange, although they were also aware of the need to refine and reformulate their exchange programs to cope with the challenges of the age. The 1970s saw many new initiatives undertaken by these and other

countries, both officially and privately, to promote communication and understanding among nations. In 1971, for instance, the European Federation for Intercultural Learning was established as the umbrella organization of American Field Service offices throughout Europe. These offices had been engaged in providing “home-stay” experiences for young people as a way to foster transnational learning and understanding.⁴⁴ In the United States, many programs designed for encouraging cross-cultural understanding were created, such as the Educational Resource Development Trust, the Educational Foundation for Foreign Study, and Friendship Force. All were established during the 1970s to bring Americans into closer contact with people elsewhere, especially from non-Western parts of the world. In 1977 the Fulbright Association was founded in Washington to facilitate interaction among former Fulbright scholars. And in 1979 the International Student Exchange Program was organized to provide funding and logistical support for interchange among American and overseas students and young faculty members.⁴⁵

Even among European nations that had been traditionally active in cultural exchange programs, there were so many of them that in 1976, a conference of cabinet ministers in charge of cultural affairs was held in Oslo to coordinate European cultural exchange. In the meantime, the French-American Foundation was established to initiate a program of exchange professors between French and American universities, while the German Historical Institute opened its offices in Washington, London, Tokyo, and elsewhere to undertake cultural exchanges. And in 1972 the Japan Foundation was created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to encourage the development of Japanese studies abroad as well as the exchange of scholars, artists, journalists, and many others between Japan and other countries. Around this time, research organizations, or think tanks, began to be set up in Japan, after the pattern of those in the West. The National Institute for Research Advancement was one of the first such organizations, and from the beginning it engaged in projects that were predominantly international in character.

All such efforts suggest that the challenge of multiculturalism was being met in a constructive fashion by promoters of international exchange programs. Rather than give up such programs as hopeless, anachronistic, or misguided in a rapidly changing world of self-conscious diversity, they persisted in the faith that it was possible to incorporate cultural diversity in an interdependent world community and that for this purpose, cross-national, cross-cultural exchange was still the best way. Together with individuals and organizations involved in human rights, environmental, and other international movements, promoters of cultural and educational exchange paved the way for a stronger emergence of global consciousness toward the end of the twentieth century.

In 1970 an Italian spokesman noted that his country's policy on cultural exchange had "evolved from a Euro-centric and elitist view" toward "an attitude of mass-enlightenment and scientifically oriented technical cooperation." Italy, he said, favored a "constructive approach towards understanding between different civilisations" as well as combating "illiteracy in the developing world."⁴⁶ The statement neatly summed up the broadening of the scope of cultural exchange in the 1970s. Promoting understanding among divergent civilizations and trying to eradicate illiteracy were now among enterprises that were at the core of cross-cultural relations. These efforts were filled with conceptual difficulties and political obstacles, and yet there were intergovernmental organizations and international nongovernmental organizations ready to meet the challenge. In so doing, these organizations were continuing their attempt at reformulating international affairs.

CHAPTER 6

Toward Global Community

International organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, continued to grow in number and scope during the 1980s and the 1990s. Little was qualitatively different about their activities from what they had been in the preceding decade, but their cumulative and combined importance in the world increased because of the dramatic turn of events at the level of interstate affairs. In most accounts of the last two decades of the twentieth century, the erosion and eventual end of the Cold War are presented as the key themes of international relations, which are then considered to have ushered in a new age known as the post-Cold War period. But, as I have argued throughout this book, these terms look at only one level of international affairs and do not help us understand many other developments that were equally significant to, if not more significant than, such dramatic episodes as the crumbling of the Berlin Wall or the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition to seeing these episodes in the framework of the history of the Cold War, we must make an effort to see them as aspects of some other, nongeopolitical developments as well. All these developments may be said to have combined together to generate a greater global consciousness, the idea that there were transnational themes that affected people everywhere and produced universal standards for judging the behavior of nations. The