ARKADY PLOTNITSKY

IN THE SHADOW OF

HEGEL

Complementarity,
History,
and the
Unconscious
CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ix
Preface xi
Chapter 1. Matrices 3
  History 3
  General Economy 10
  Complementarity 30
Chapter 2. Connectivities 53
  Genealogies 54
  Hegel’s Quanta and Bohr’s Phenomenology 75
  Transformations and Complementarity 84
Chapter 3. Landscapes 96
  Chains 97
  Closures and Question Marks 115
  Suns, Nights, and Chiaroscuros of Hegel 136
Chapter 4. Mediation, History, and Self-Consciousness 150
  Conjunctions 151
  The Mediated Immediate and the Closure of History 169
  Concepts, Forces, and the Differences of Forces 205
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 5. Continuums</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Continuums</em>: Geist und Zeit</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Continuums Continued</em>: Reveries</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Continuums Discontinued</em>: Irreverences</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6. The Whole and Its Parts</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Delays and Programs</em></td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Being on One’s Own</em></td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Double Binds</em></td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7. History as Complementarity</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>History in Freud and Nietzsche</em></td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Irreducible Effects of Deferral</em></td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>More History, Less History, More or Less History</em></td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The present study proceeds along three principal lines of inquiry:

First, it is concerned with understanding the question of history operating against, although in the shadow of, Hegel's thinking and the Hegelian logic of history and consciousness—the logic that defines history as the development and unfolding of the Absolute and Absolutely Self-Conscious Spirit, *Geist*.

Second, the book offers a general theoretical framework enabling the understanding of history it develops, but with much larger implications. This framework is introduced in the wake of recent, specifically poststructuralist, developments in modern critical theory and intellectual history, following Nietzsche, the grand thinker of the unconscious and possibly still the case of the most radical excess of Hegelian thinking ever. It is specifically constructed, however, under the general heading of complementarity—a conceptual matrix drawn from Niels Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics and conjoined by the present study with the matrix of general economy as developed, via Nietzsche and Freud, in the work of Georges Bataille and Jacques Derrida. A general economy becomes necessary once the unconscious enters a given theoretical field; but
a general economy also, necessarily, transforms the concept of the unconscious itself. The framework developed by the present study equally transforms both concepts—history and the unconscious—in part by relating them to each other by means of general economy and complementarity.

Third, the book also explores the role of quantum mechanics and several other recent developments in mathematics and science in modern intellectual history, particularly along the axis of the unconscious and general economy, from Nietzsche to Freud to Bataille to Lacan to Deleuze to Derrida.

The principle and then the matrix of complementarity were developed by Bohr in order to account for the indeterminacy of quantum systems and to describe—jointly, but without classical synthesis—their conflicting aspects. In Bohr’s interpretation such aspects become complementary features—features that are mutually exclusive, but equally necessary for a comprehensive description and analysis of all quantum processes. Complementarity was the basis of Bohr’s great debate with Einstein; and Bohr’s theory and, more generally, the developments in physics that led him to complementarity have had an enormous impact on modern intellectual history, affecting many developments outside the field of the natural and exact sciences, including those at issue in the present study and particularly the idea of general economy.

General economy, as understood by Bataille, relates the configurations it considers to the loss of meaning—a loss that it regards as ineluctable within any given system. According to Bataille, “the general economy . . . makes apparent that excesses of energy are produced, which, by definition, cannot be utilized. The excessive energy can only be lost without the slightest aim, consequently without any meaning.” General economy and its practice—in Nietzsche, Bataille, and Derrida—are juxtaposed to classical theories or restricted economies, and specifically to Hegel’s system of philosophy. Such classical theories configure their objects and the relationships between those objects as always meaningful, and they deal with systems that are claimed to avoid the unproductive expenditure of energy and to contain multiplicity and indeterminacy. General economy exposes all such claims as finally untenable.

Under the rubric of complementarity, the present study joins both ideas—general economy and complementarity—within a comprehensive
historico-theoretical framework. Complementarity so conceived is a profoundly, fundamentally anti-Hegelian matrix, even though, and in part because, it does not escape the shadow or penumbra of Hegel. It is quite possible that even the most radical departures from Hegel and transformations of concepts, such as history, cannot escape, if not Hegel himself, at least his shadow or the (en)closure of Hegelianism—the far-reaching influence of his ideas, logic, strategies, and project-building. These ideas, logic, and strategies help to make Geist possible or necessary for Hegel, but they cannot be contained by the logic of Geist alone. Their operation in Hegel and elsewhere makes possible many other things, some still subject to Hegelian constraints, others leaving these constraints, or at least some of them—such as, finally impossible and unnecessary, Geist—behind. A transformation of and departure from Hegel may, then, not be effective or even possible, if attempted by simply renouncing Hegel altogether, without a rigorous analysis and discrimination of manifold elements and dimensions of his logic. In this sense, a radical—fundamental and far-reaching—departure from Hegel or other classical theories may not be a total or absolute departure, although the degree of proximity to and distance from Hegel and philosophy does count and is a crucial issue for the present study. In general, a radical critique of Hegel demands a radical suspension of all absolutes, positive and negative alike; and Hegel profoundly understood the complicity between them. We must therefore continue and extend Hegel while departing from him, by using means both available within the Hegelian (en)closure and found elsewhere. Our understanding of history is tied to this joint process of extension-continuity with and departure from Hegel’s ideas.

While several other developments and figures such as Marx, Freud, Heidegger, Lacan, and Althusser will be discussed, this study focuses particularly on Nietzsche, Bataille, and Derrida. Their texts will be read together—against, but in the shadow of, Hegel—by means of a kind of parallel processing of Hegel and post-Nietzschean theory via complementarity.

I borrow the latter metaphor from modern, or postmodern, computer technology, where the term ‘parallel processing’ refers to the systems—software and hardware—that allow one to process multiple data and solve many problems simultaneously. Such data and problems may or may not be related to each other; and systems of that type are designed
primarily to solve the problems arising in processing heterogeneous information and tasks. But such systems also allow one to solve mathematical problems whose complexity makes their sequential processing impossible and demands multilinear arrangements of the data and procedures involved. In the present context, 'parallel processing' refers to the concurrent consideration of concepts, metaphors, or whole conceptual and metaphoric frameworks. Whether a theoretical or historical processing is at issue, such a multiple parallel processing is, I shall argue, always necessary under the joint conditions of general economy and complementarity. The metaphor itself is consonant with complementarity in the expanded sense of the present study. In fact, complementarity as understood here refers to the multiple parallel interactions and engagements of concepts, metaphors, or frameworks; and this complementary economy extends to the very mode of analysis undertaken here.

In part, this mode of analysis is a response to the limitations of solely historical or solely theoretical analysis. Instead, both types of analysis must be employed complementarily. It also responds, however, to a broader array of constraints and uses a broader array of complementarities. One of the great lessons of poststructuralist or postmodernist theory and textual practice, and of their persistent interpenetration, is that it may no longer be possible to carry on certain arguments by traditional, linear means. Yet traditional means cannot be simply dismissed or suspended, either, and we should not bypass the possibilities that they still yield. These possibilities can in fact be utilized more than ever through a general economic and complementary analysis. The economy, the general economy, of this utilization will, however, be quite different from the restricted economy of Hegelian synthesis.

Complementarity entails a multidimensional and complementary style, a multiple parallel processing, which has been incorporated as much as possible into the book's structure and lines of argument. The book is divided into several areas of special focus: Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 7 offer a general theoretical discussion, while Chapters 4 to 6 are devoted more specifically to the analysis of Hegel. These areas, however, continuously overlap and interpenetrate each other. They are complementary within and among themselves. Conversely, or again complementarily, Hegel and his shadow pervade all theoretical discussions and readings of the book. One cannot not read Hegel, even if one only deals—and can one do
otherwise?—with shadows of shadows and spirits of spirits—ghosts of ghosts, *Geister der Geister*—who, like philosophy itself, according to Hegel, spread their wings at dusk.

Pervasive throughout much of modern intellectual history, Hegel’s impact is felt particularly powerfully whenever the question of history is taken up—the question of the definition, understanding, and theory of history; the functioning and the very possibility of the term and concept of history; or the question of practice, for example, the political practice, of history. Ever since the appearance of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* in 1807, Hegel has shaped, or at the very least overshadowed, the history of the question of history, although of course the achievement and impact of the *Phenomenology* and Hegel far exceed the problematics of history. This history has staged itself as a drama with a tremendous cast of characters, from Hegel’s contemporaries, such as Schelling, who appears on this scene both before and after Hegel, to Marx and Nietzsche, and on into the twentieth century and current intellectual history—to Freud, Heidegger, Bataille, Lacan, Deleuze, and Derrida.

The figures most crucial to this study—Nietzsche, Freud, Bataille, and Derrida—have often been seen more as thinkers of the unconscious than of history. While the relative roles of and the relationships between history and the unconscious in each of these authors are complex issues reflecting the reception and understanding of their theories and attitudes toward history, the emphasis on the unconscious in their works is undeniable. For this reason, they are positioned *against* Hegel as the thinker of history and—and *as*—consciousness—of historical *consciousness* and of *historical* consciousness—on the one hand, and as the thinker opposed to the unconscious, on the other.

Nietzsche, Freud, Bataille, and Derrida, however, do have fundamental historical concerns. In fact, even though their work has not been associated with the question of history, at least not until recently, they may be considered to be as historical in their thinking as Hegel—in the end, even more so—given the complex nature of their understanding of history and the radical transformation of classical ideas concerning history found in their writings. These writings have had crucial implications for our understanding of history, leading to the conjunction or the *complementarity* of history and the unconscious; a complementarity that becomes necessary under the conditions of general economy defining the analytical
matrix of this study. The resulting economy is, on the one hand, fundamentally historical, even though and indeed because, along with any unique determination, it prohibits all absolute or unconditional historicity—a fully historical determination of any given process or configuration. On the other hand, it is fundamentally and radically anti-Hegelian, if, and again in part because, it carries some Hegelian shadows, penumbras, and chiaroscuros along.

While and to the extent that an account of new theories, such as the one undertaken by this study, may be seen as a history, it can in turn be a history—one of many possible histories; and this historical perspectivization, to use a Nietzschean term, obviously applies to the present analysis as well, even though it does not aim to offer a strictly historical account. Historical localizations and perspectivizations are part of the general economy of perspectivization affecting analysis or description—whether historical, theoretical, or other—and often forcing one to employ different modes jointly or complementarily.

In a general economy, this localization is structural—irreducible. It cannot be avoided. Under the conditions of general economy one can only speak of local configurations, whether historical, political, theoretical, interpretive, or still other. But, by the same token, this structural localization cannot be absolute. In a general economy, there can no more be absolutely local—fully and unconditionally localized—than absolutely global—fully and unconditionally totalized—configurations. The locality of local configurations can never be fully contained—fully demarcated, framed, or contextualized—any more than an all-encompassing total economy can be produced. Local configurations can and often must be extended in the course of a given analysis, in the first place, because any analysis is bound to enter some histories or extended historical trajectories. Any historical perspective is irreducibly local only in the sense that one can never claim, or rather rigorously sustain a claim of, a unified historical perspective or an unconditionally privileged historical position. But one can extend such locality to very broad historical intervals or, of course, conversely, further localize it. Such extensions or further localizations, however, can only follow one given historical trajectory or a conglomerate of trajectories among other potential historical extensions. Beyond allowing alternative historical positions and perspectives at any point, such other—unconscious, as it were—histories always affect and often produce
a given historical perspective without being the subject of, or otherwise explicitly represented in, a given analysis. Under these conditions, however, one would be equally prohibited from postulating, even locally, a full—locally total—history, whether conceived of as representable or unrepresentable in its fullness; or from postulating any other form of containment of a given configuration by means of a historical determination. To do so would be to repeat an absolute, Hegelian economy of a historical whole at the local level. The conditions of general economy thus equally prohibit absolute unities and absolute fragmentations, and thus any form of full, loss-free, historical representation.

The present analysis also produces or implies a history or several histories on its margins, and it may be seen as a historical analysis, responding to the limits and limitations of historical analysis, which will be considered in Chapter 7. The book offers a complementary historico-theoretical analysis responsive to the respective limits of historical and theoretical analysis. It also has to rely on what the history under examination here has produced: theories and critiques of history, consciousness, the unconscious, and many other ideas and frameworks. By virtue of the very general economic conditions at issue in the present analysis, one can, however, employ or relate to only a relatively small portion of such a historical ensemble. Many other theories participate in the history at issue and make this history possible; and along with a formidable array of other ideas, these theories affect the transformation of our ideas about history. These developments, as heterogeneous as they have been massive, certainly cannot be reduced to the names mentioned thus far. Thus, Lacan, for example, obviously has a crucial significance for the questions at issue here and would merit much more space than the present study is able to offer to him. His role is central, first, in view of both his debt to and his radical subversion of Hegel, particularly of the dialectic of desire that opens Hegel’s analysis of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology, and second, in view of his profound insights into the problematics of the unconscious, where he anticipates much of Derrida. In the course of the analysis to follow many other names will inevitably appear. Still others will be forgotten, repressed, or deliberately omitted, or will remain unknown and unperceived. Along with many other indeterminacies, there is always, in any text, an indeterminacy of names, lost and found, overtly used—promoted or denigrated, or both at once—names that will surface
in one form or another, in spite of one's designs and desires, or that will be lost forever. This indeterminacy of names is itself an ineluctable effect of the processes at issue in this study. In order to understand them one needs both general economy and complementarity.

Chapters 1 and 2 explore the conjunction of complementarity and general economy. Along with considering the genealogy of complementarity in Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics, on the one hand, and of the general economic theories of Nietzsche, Bataille, and Derrida, on the other, I analyze the complementary relations between these two fields and, by implication, between modern science and intellectual history in general.

Preparing for and anticipating subsequent analysis, I also consider in this part of the book several crucial applications of complementarity to the question of history and the question of theoretical transformations. The economy of theoretical transformation—"the structure of scientific revolutions"—is itself a major case, anticipating the general matrix of history to be developed against and in the shadow of Hegel in the remaining part of the book, particularly in Chapter 7. The relationships and complementarity between continuous and discontinuous models of historical transformations acquire a particular significance in this context and are considered extensively. The question of these relationships affects all the major texts treated in this study, in particular, Hegel's economy of history and consciousness and the complementary models of quantum physics. I also discuss several major developments in modern physics involving the idea and metaphor of complementarity and Gödel's theories of incompleteness and undecidability, specifically in the context of the relationships between complementarity and deconstruction.

The exposition of these chapters is determined first by the provenance of the concept and principle of complementarity, as formulated by Bohr, although other links, including Nietzsche, are pertinent; and second, by the fact that these ideas of modern science are a crucial part of the historico-theoretical ensemble undermining Hegel and Hegelianism.

The analysis refers to relevant works, especially Bohr's, in the fields of physics and the history of science, and it draws on the historical, theoretical, and metaphorical potential of these fields. My aim, however, is also, indeed mainly, to present these scientific theories in terms of the present
study, by engaging Nietzsche, Bataille, Derrida and deconstruction, and several other related frameworks and frames of reference. The analysis is designed to explore the possibilities that complementarity offers in these terms and these fields, even though I also want to show that modern mathematics and science are conceptually and metaphorically rich enough to permit more rigorous and productive interactions with contemporary critical theory than has been customary. Reciprocity or complementarity already exists through the mutual influences of the exact sciences and philosophy—or rather a complex manifold of fields multiply divided or united, within and without. Indeed, the history of philosophy and intellectual history in general have had as powerful an influence upon modern science as, from Galileo and Newton to twentieth-century science, scientific thinking has had upon them. While engaging the relevant concepts and metaphors as rigorously as possible, however, we must also rigorously respect the differences between different fields, specifically but not exclusively as concerns the mathematical formalism and experimental technologies on which modern science relies.

Chapter 1, “Matrices,” outlines the basic contours of history, general economy, and complementarity in the context of the present study.

Chapter 2, “Connectivities,” considers interactive, or complementary, genealogies of complementary modes of thinking and analysis inside and outside mathematics and science, most specifically some of Georg Friedrich Bernhard Riemann’s ideas and their role in the genesis of complementarity in Bohr and elsewhere, particularly in Deleuze and Guattari. I then discuss Hegel’s place in the history of complementary modes of analysis and the relationships between complementarity and self-consciousness in Bohr. The final section of the chapter considers the economy of theoretical transformations or the structure of scientific revolutions.

Chapter 3, “Landscapes,” serves as a broad entrance to the part of the book devoted to Hegel. By means of a collocation of Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Bataille, Derrida, and several other authors, this chapter offers a kind of historical and theoretical landscape around Hegel and his shadow—his many shadows and chiaroscuros.

Chapters 4 to 6 then consider the place of Hegel’s central concepts—such as Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Mediation, History, Knowledge, Science, and Philosophy—in the historical and theoretical field
demarcated by the preceding discussion, in the shadow of but nevertheless against Hegel. These concepts define the Hegelian Geist as an always historical and always conscious process—the historical consciousness.

The goal of this exploration is thus not an interpretation of Hegel, or even fully of his concepts as just listed. Nor is it a reading or, let us say, a textualization in the deconstructive or postdeconstructive sense. The latter, broadly speaking, connotes an exploration of the differential space between interpretations; and according to all major poststructuralist understandings of reading, for example, Derrida’s and Paul de Man’s, all our readings and interpretations alike are always—always already—between interpretations. The term ‘interpretation’ would then apply to more stable, classical configurations such as the meaning or the signified content of a text. Reading or textualization is, I think, a project preferable to interpretation, often having produced more rigorous and more productive readings and interpretations than readings as interpretations, although, to one degree or another, no reading or textualization can avoid interpretation, either. The main concern of the present study, however, is the theoretical possibilities—and impossibilities—offered by Hegel’s text, within the historico-theoretical ensemble presented here, in relation to our understanding of history by way of the unconscious and to the thematics of complementarity.

Specifically, this analysis will be concerned with the two principal Hegelian themes and their interaction:

1. the conjunction of history and consciousness, and particularly self-consciousness;
2. the economy of continuity, or the continuum, as the basis of all history and historicity, also of all consciousness and, particularly, self-consciousness in Hegel.

Taking some of the major and best-known moments of Hegel’s text as a point of departure, I argue as to what is still possible or indeed necessary and what is no longer possible or has become unnecessary along these lines, and also how one can think in terms of and write history or about history, given the transformations of the modern intellectual and political landscape surveyed.

In this sense, my goal is not primarily to give a new understanding of Hegel and his concepts, even though some new points may well develop.
In a way, some “old” understanding may still be at issue and cannot be discounted, no matter how much “new” understanding has emerged through new readings and even interpretations of Hegel, particularly but not exclusively in the wake of deconstruction.

The temptation to reread Hegel and (re)make him into Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Bataille, Lacan, Derrida, or several other figures that may be mentioned here is great; and even leaving aside their unquestionable debt to Hegel, Hegel has indeed much to offer by way of proximity to all these thinkers. The most careful discrimination is in order, however; and one must equally respect and account for both differences and proximities between Hegel and these figures, and among these figures themselves. Transformational—or, to add a perhaps most pertinent older name to the list, Heraclitean—as it is, the Hegelian economy should not be identified with the theoretical economies of any among the figures just mentioned; and both in historical and theoretical terms, exploring differences among them may prove more productive than locating proximities.

Accordingly, the analysis to follow will attempt to explore and utilize both proximities to and differences from Hegel. Thus, in particular, the conjunctions of history and consciousness, or of history and philosophy, are brought into the foreground in order to explore, on the one hand—both at a certain distance and a certain proximity to Hegel—a complementarity of history and theory, and on the other—now more radically against Hegel and through Nietzsche, Freud, Bataille, and Derrida—a complementarity of history and the unconscious.

To take a stance closer to Nietzsche than to Derrida and deconstruction, it may be better and perhaps necessary to suspend “Hegel” as radically as possible and to try to develop a profoundly anti-Hegelian understanding of history. It is also necessary, of course, to make sure that Hegel is indeed suspended or transformed as a result, or that such a suspension has not already been enacted or made problematic by Hegel himself. In short, a suspension of or departure from Hegel, or other classical theories, must be rigorous. Our analysis must respect the textual and theoretical constraints, however much such constraints are transformed by new theories or in the very process of a given reading or encounter; and we cannot dispense, at least for now, with many classical, including specifically Hegelian, constraints. To enact such a rigorous departure is not easy, as Derrida and several other readers, in both classical
and deconstructive modes, persuasively argue. Nietzsche succeeds, however; and at this point of history, one is armed against Hegel and these problems with Nietzsche, Bataille, Derrida and deconstruction, together with other theories of history and readings of Hegel. While no departure of that type can be absolute or unconditional, the degree of transformation and differences in this respect, for example, between Nietzsche and Derrida, cannot be disregarded, either; and they may in fact be decisive.

While this study does depend on commentary and scholarship on Hegel and on other major figures it considers, and will refer to some of it whenever necessary, such sources will not be engaged as actively as I might wish. The scholarship and commentary on Hegel is immense, of course, whether Anglo-American or Continental and whether one thinks along the lines of interpretation or, by now, along the lines of deconstruction and textualization or reading as just indicated, to which the present view of Hegel is most indebted and remains the closest—particularly to Derrida, Bataille, and Nietzsche.

In this sense, the present book, even in its discussion of Hegel, while not strictly a project of reading or commentary, is as much a reading of Nietzsche, Bataille, and Derrida as of Hegel, so that all four are engaged in a kind of parallel processing. Naturally, like any other text, Hegel’s text cannot exist outside a reading or interpretation, although it can never exist fully inside one, either. Consequently, I engage in a certain amount of reading and interpretation of key Hegelian concepts, and make claims that may at times be affirmative but never absolute. Not even Hegel makes such claims: he leaves them to the Absolute, such as Absolute Geist or Absolute Knowledge. The claims of this study concern both Hegel’s concepts, which, it is true, resist definite and at times even relatively stable claims, and Hegel’s own claims, which, while requiring careful sorting out, remain more stable and determined than his concepts.

The Phenomenology is the text most often referred to, although I relate the main points to Hegel’s later works as well. The later works, from the first or greater Logic to the Encyclopedia and the lecture on the philosophy of history—with related moments in others of his late lectures or, in more political terms, in the Philosophy of Rights—contain some important nuances and transformations of the Phenomenology, which I shall indicate as the analysis progresses. The first Logic, in fact, somewhat overshadows several of the major topics covered by the present study,
particularly the question of the continuum. It does so from a certain
distance, as it were, but thus perhaps casts a longer shadow. The analysis
of even its major concepts, which have a fascinating specificity in Hegel’s
corpus, let alone a reading of it, would easily take another book—a very
long book. I do agree, however, with those who think that the Phenome-
nology remains Hegel’s most important and ground-breaking work and
that throughout his writing Hegel remains in the shadow of the Phenomenology—Hegel in the shadow of Hegel, cast from behind. In
addition, this study concerns itself mainly with *how* Hegel, and we,
can—and no longer can—think about or in terms of history and con-
sciousness, and the unconscious. No other book of Hegel’s is, I think,
more interesting and revealing in this sense than the Phenomenology,
which establishes the logic of all Hegel’s “logics,” whether one speaks of
Hegel’s procedures or various books and texts under this title. Naturally
the *Logic*, and indeed both *Logics*, the second being part one of the
*Encyclopedia*, suggest many crucial points as well.

In the Phenomenology, the process culminates in Absolute Knowledge
as simultaneously both absolute self-consciousness and absolute pres-
ence, and *history, mediation, becoming*, outlined in broad terms and,
given the present subject, mostly along the axis of the question of history,
as explored in Chapter 4, “Mediation, History, and Self-Consciousness.”
It suggests a kind of matrix of Hegel and Hegelianism as the unity, as
opposed to the complementarity, of history and consciousness, and fi-
nally self-consciousness. In order to arrive at a general economy of his-
tory, one needs instead the complementarity, not unity, of history and the
unconscious, along with a general economic theory of materiality, con-
ceived via complementarity, as opposed to Hegel’s idealism, however
complex the latter determination might be in Hegel. While the unity of
history and consciousness in turn exhibits great complexity in Hegel, the
conjunction itself enacted by way of unity, synthesis, dialectic,
*Aufhebung*—the triple economy of negating, conserving, and supersed-
ing, suggested by the multiple meaning of the German word itself—must
be seen as defining Hegel’s matrix and many other Hegelianisms.

This claim appears to be well supported both by textual analysis and
by the best interpretations and readings of Hegel, whether along classical
or deconstructive lines. I shall call this joint economy of *presence* and
*becoming*—the “continuum”; and in relation to Absolute Knowledge
and other utopian models of that type, I shall speak of the "continuum utopia." In choosing the name "continuum," I follow Bataille, who uses the term; Althusser on the "homogeneity of historical time" in Hegel; and Derrida on "presence" and "the line," "ousia and grammē."

The model itself is considered in Chapter 5, "Continuums." It is discussed there in relation to the question of temporality in Hegel, his major precursors, most particularly Rousseau, and several major critics of classical temporality—Heidegger, Bataille, Althusser, Derrida, and de Man.

Chapter 6, "The Whole and Its Parts," discusses the question of self-consciousness, which, interactively with the continuum, defines the Hegelian economy as the speculative philosophy of history. The main argument in this chapter is the necessity of a radical, general economic, deconstruction and complementarization of all self-consciousness and all reflexivity in general—of all "self." Under the conditions of general economy and complementarity, nothing can become self-identical, self-contained, self-enclosed, or constitute a whole—a "self"—either in being or becoming, conscious or unconscious, Hegelian, Marxist, Freudian, Heideggerian, or other.

In the concluding chapter, Chapter 7, "History as Complementarity," the unconscious historicity or historical unconsciousness or, in terms of the present study, a complementarity of history and the unconscious, emerging in the margins of the preceding analysis, takes center stage. The chapter also provides a technical account of the specific conceptual structures of the complementary economy of history. The first section, on "History in Freud and Nietzsche," examines Nietzsche's "attitudes towards history." Freud's global conceptions of history are considered along the way. As global conceptions, they ultimately emerge as Hegelian—a Hegelian unity, rather than a complementarity, of history and the unconscious. Freud's global economy of history in fact represses a more general economic and complementary engagement of history and the unconscious suggested by his local economies of memory and psychological processes, particularly as retexualized by Derrida's reading of Freud. Reversing Hegel, Freud offers the Hegelian history as the unconscious, which he should not have done, given the economy of the unconscious he had inscribed elsewhere. If Hegel or Marx are much better on history than on the unconscious, the Hegelian Freud—after Hegel, after Marx, after Nietzsche—is much better on the unconscious than on his-
tory. Freud’s economy of the unconscious figures a local history or local historicity that undermines all Hegelian historicity, global and local alike, including in Freud himself. Freud cannot have both “Freud” and “Hegel,” as he wants. He needs a special effort undermining his own local economy of the unconscious in order to arrive at or to return to Hegel.

The technical apparatus of Chapter 7, presented mainly in the second section, “The Irreducible Effects of Deferral,” proceeds via Freud and Derrida, with some Lacanian overtones. Both Nietzsche and Bataille, however, remain important for this discussion as well; and complementarity is implied throughout. Freud offers a more “technical” articulation than Nietzsche of the matrix of the unconscious, which is then extended and deconstructed by Derrida into the general economy of différence and its satellite structures, such as trace, supplement, and writing.

History, this analysis concludes, can only be complementary, specifically complementary to the unconscious, as both notions are deconstructed and restructured in general economic and complementary terms. We need complementarity in order to theorize history, even though we are thereby constrained to accept the limits and limitations, at times severe, of historical analysis. As a result, however, new possibilities emerge.