

The Challenge of Authenticity: Enhancement and Accurate Self-Presentation

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ABSTRACT *This article explores the significance of authenticity for debates about the ethics of enhancement. According to the view defended here, what lies at the heart of authenticity is a disdain for phoniness or fakery – two notions which essentially concern the way we present ourselves to others and, in turn, the way we are viewed by those others. Being authentic thus requires that we not pretend to be something or someone we are not or otherwise represent ourselves falsely to the outside world. As far as authenticity is concerned, then, the primary ethical challenge to the use of enhancements is to those uses that are hidden or unacknowledged – instances in which individuals represent themselves as having achieved or become something without technological assistance when, in fact, the converse is true. One is not undermining one’s authentic self when one uses technology to accomplish a particular goal or undergoes some procedure to alter oneself, even quite radically. Rather, one is only being inauthentic to the degree that one passes off oneself and one’s achievements as something they are not.*

Introduction

The ideal of authenticity has played a prominent role in debates about the ethics of enhancement.¹ On the one hand, some of those urging the ethical permissibility of various enhancements have argued that enhancement technologies can remove obstacles that prevent individuals from living as their true selves or, alternatively, serve as legitimate tools in projects of self-creation.² That is, various enhancement technologies can help us find and shape a self that we regard as more authentically our own rather than simply being content with our personal status quo. On the other hand, some enhancement sceptics have voiced concern that the use of enhancements poses a threat to our authentic selves. On this latter view, taking a drug may change my personality or give me abilities I did not previously possess, but the results of this process would not truly belong to me. Personality traits and abilities shaped by enhancement technologies would not fully be *mine* but would instead be manufactured traits, foreign to my true identity.³

Some philosophers have responded to this debate by arguing that it is clouded by the invocation of multiple conceptions of authenticity. Thus, Erik Parens has suggested that proponents and critics of enhancement both ‘proceed from a ‘moral ideal of authenticity’ and that even though they differ somewhat in how they understand that ideal, they nevertheless ‘share more than they usually remember in the heat of academic battle’.⁴ The conceptions of authenticity at work in the minds of advocates and critics may not be the same, but the fact that they are all concerned with

authenticity entails that there are broad areas of agreement that often go unacknowledged. In a similar vein, Neil Levy has invoked the distinction between authenticity as *self-discovery* and authenticity as *self-creation* and argued that neither view entirely rules out the legitimate use of enhancements.⁵ While their conclusions differ, Parens and Levy thus seem to agree that progress can be made in the enhancement debate without committing to a particular account of authenticity or what it demands.

Despite my sympathy with the irenic tone of this suggestion, I want to argue that we have at hand a fairly well-worn conception of authenticity which yields a somewhat different understanding of the ethical terrain surrounding enhancement than that put forward by Parens and Levy. According to this conception, what lies at the heart of authenticity is a disdain for phoniness or fakery – two notions which essentially concern the way we present ourselves to others and, in turn, the way we are viewed by those others. Being authentic thus requires that we not pretend to be something or someone we are not or otherwise represent ourselves falsely to the outside world. As far as authenticity is concerned, then, the primary ethical challenge concerning enhancements is to those uses that are hidden or unacknowledged – instances in which individuals represent themselves as having achieved or become something without technological assistance when, in fact, the converse is true. One is not undermining one's authentic self when one uses technology to accomplish a particular goal or undergoes some procedure to alter oneself, even quite radically. Rather, one is only being inauthentic to the degree that one passes off oneself and one's achievements as something they are not.

I present my case for this conclusion in three stages. In Section 1, I sketch an account of authenticity as the absence of phoniness and argue that the challenge of living an authentic life is the challenge of presenting ourselves accurately to the outside world. In so doing, I contrast authenticity with other putative ideals such as sincerity and self-knowledge – notions which differ from authenticity in ways that shed light on what is distinctive about accuracy as an ideal of self-presentation.

Section 2 turns to consider the self that we may seek to accurately present to others and the degree to which the account of authenticity on offer depends on the existence of an essential self – an unchanging core of identity that uniquely determines us as the particular individuals we are. While thinking of authenticity as accurate self-presentation may be consistent with an essentialist view of the self, such an account by no means requires that our identities be fixed in this way. An authentic self is not the same as an essentialist self, and authenticity is compatible with individuals who undergo changes over time that range from unexceptional to quite radical.

I conclude in Section 3 by examining how this account of authenticity bears on the use of enhancement technologies. While I do not think that authenticity so construed renders all uses of enhancements unethical, neither do I think that it supports the unmitigated and uncritical use of any enhancement technology at our disposal. I also address what I take to be the most serious objection to the view on offer, namely, that it opens the door to troubling invasions of privacy and a coercive tyranny of public opinion about which uses of technology are acceptable (and which are not). Responding to these concerns thus serves to fill out what any ideal of authenticity can plausibly demand of us.⁶

Though I hope the scope of these conclusions is clear in the discussion that follows, it may be worth noting at the outset that I don't intend to be offering anything like a comprehensive account of the ethics of enhancement. Nor do I mean to imply that authenticity is an overriding good such that we should always strive to be authentic. Rather, my aim is to explore the distinctive demands that authenticity may place on us as well as how those demands relate to the use of various medical technologies. In my view, these findings must then be balanced with other considerations to determine whether any given use of enhancement technologies is ethically problematic – considerations which include the appropriate weight to be given to authenticity in rounding out a plausible vision of the good life.

1. Holden Caulfield's Complaint

In J.D. Salinger's novel *The Catcher in the Rye*, Holden Caulfield famously (or infamously, depending on one's view of the book) levels the charge of phoniness at numerous targets. Among many other examples, he notes that his school roommate, Ward Stradlater, is 'a phony kind of friendly,' that the word 'grand' is phony (as is everyone who uses it), insists on reading plays rather than watching performances in the theatre because he worries that any actor playing a part 'is going to do something phony every minute,' and laments that the most recent school from which he has been expelled is 'one of the worst schools [he] ever went to,' largely because it is 'full of phonies'. His primary complaint about the world around him is not that it is harsh and cold or that those who inhabit it are mean and unsympathetic to the plight of others, though he may believe all those things as well. Rather, his biggest problem is that so many people are fake: they put on airs and are not really who or what they seem to be.

Perhaps the clearest statement of this concern is in a conversation that Holden has with his (decidedly un-phony) sister in which he contemplates the possibility of becoming a lawyer like his father:

'Lawyers are all right, I guess – but it doesn't appeal to me,' I said. 'I mean, they're all right if they go around saving innocent guys' lives all the time, and like that, but you don't *do* that kind of stuff if you're a lawyer. All you do is make a lot of dough and play golf and play bridge and buy cars and drink Martinis and look like a hot-shot. And besides. Even if you *did* go around saving guys' lives and all, how would you know if you did it because you really *wanted* to save guys' lives, or because you did it because what you *really* wanted to do was be a terrific lawyer, with everybody slapping you on the back and congratulating you in court when the goddam trial was over, the reporters and everybody, the way it is in the dirty movies? How would you know you weren't being a phony? The trouble is, you *wouldn't*.'⁷

Holden's antipathy toward phoniness is thus importantly connected to a fear of becoming like his parents. Perhaps being a lawyer would enable him to accomplish some things that he might regard as worthy, but succeeding in that job would also require a lot of pretence: representing his motives, goals, and aspirations in one way while gradually becoming unsure whether he really is as he presents himself to be. As

Gerald Rosen puts it: ‘His parents live in two worlds: the real world and the world of appearances. The surface does not reveal the underlying reality and Holden has been taught not to talk about what lies beneath.’⁸ The prospect of carrying on this bifurcated legacy is, therefore, one that he shudders to contemplate.

In accusing others of being phony, and in worrying about the possibility of becoming phony himself, Holden is expressing a concern for authenticity. On his view, to be authentic is to be who one presents oneself to be to the outside world, and what the targets of Holden’s ire have in common is that they fail in various ways to live up to this standard. His roommate appears outwardly to be friendly, and may even have a reputation for being friendly around school. But Holden thinks it is all an act – that Stradlater is just pretending to like other people while not really caring about them at all. Indeed, his school is filled with people like Stradlater, his parents operate similarly, and he worries about becoming that kind of person himself, a career in the law being only one of many routes to such a phony existence. What he longs for instead is authenticity in himself and those around him – a sort of ‘what you see is what you get’ world free of posturing and misrepresentation.

Holden’s concerns about phoniness draw on a fairly established understanding of the opposition between what is authentic and what is inauthentic. Jay Newman thus suggests that ‘phony’ is a ‘fairly reliable substitute’ for ‘inauthentic’ and that ‘an inauthentic object, action, or institution might also be identified as “sham,” “counterfeit,” “fraudulent,” “pretentious,” “fake,” “contrived,” “feigned,” “deceptive,” or “artificial.”’⁹ While there are, no doubt, subtle differences among these notions, what they have in common is that they all involve departures from accurate self-presentation. The fraudulent or contrived individual no more presents himself accurately than does the fake or the phony.

Viewing authenticity as an ideal of self-presentation thus contrasts with another view of authenticity which some have found attractive. In this vein, business authors James Gilmore and B. Joseph Pine II identify two standards that they believe should serve as ideals for companies striving for authenticity:

1. Being true to your own self
and
2. Being who you say you are to others.¹⁰

They then suggest that it is possible to violate these standards in ways that render one ‘fake’ in any number of ways. One can fail to be true to oneself, fail to be who one says one is to others, or both. Similarly, Charles Taylor has argued that there is an important place in our ethical thinking for the ideal of authenticity where that notion is understood as ‘being true to oneself’.¹¹ Even if that ideal has been distorted in various ways that Taylor finds problematic, he nevertheless thinks that authenticity – understood along these lines – ‘should be taken seriously as a moral ideal’.¹²

Being who you say you are to others fairly clearly involves an ideal of self-presentation and, to that degree, squares with the view of authenticity on offer. It assumes that there is a match between what you put forward to the public and what is true of you when no one is looking. If you tell co-workers that you are a devoted father even though you can’t remember the last time you spoke to your children, you are not being what you say you are to others. And insofar as Gilmore and Pine are right to tie

such a norm to authenticity, the connection between authenticity and self-presentation is well expressed by their standards.

However, the notion of being true to oneself seems to be less outwardly directed such that it aligns more closely to concepts other than authenticity. When we are trying to be true to ourselves, we are, in effect, serving as our own audience and are thereby trying to block out what other people think. We are attempting to set our own course rather than being driven by the desires, judgments, and preferences of others. Marya Schechtman thus discusses the case of a 1950's housewife who is caught between the expectations placed on her by her social role – expectations that require her to attend primarily to domestic matters – and strong competing ‘desires to take courses at the local college, spend time with her friends, apply for part-time jobs, or get involved in political causes.’¹³ Such a person might indeed fail to be true to herself by persisting in the domestic routine. But this failure does not seem to result from a failing in her self-presentation but rather from the fact that she is not living up to her own standards and is instead organising her life around what other people want. If it is a failure of self-presentation, it is a failure of self-presentation to herself.

Framing matters in this way suggests that what is primarily at stake in being true to oneself is a kind of autonomy rather than authenticity. Thus, we might think that such people fail to act autonomously when they simply do what other people want them to do rather than what they want to do themselves. Even granting that individuals can make all sorts of mistakes in the governance of their lives – and even be wrong about what will conduce to their own happiness – we might think that it is better for people to follow their own desires and judgments. This is the thought expressed by John Stuart Mill when he suggests that one’s ‘own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode.’¹⁴ Individuals trapped by society’s expectations are not living in their own mode and are not, therefore, being true to themselves.

To be sure, challenges to autonomy may often constitute challenges to authenticity, to the point that we might be tempted to equate the two notions. Thus, in considering whether a woman’s choice to have breast augmentation surgery is authentic, David DeGrazia has argued that what matters is whether the woman’s pursuits ‘are really hers’ or whether ‘she is capitulating to social forces that largely determine her choice.’¹⁵ In DeGrazia’s view, then, ‘legitimate concerns about authenticity seem to be concerns about autonomy.’¹⁶ If a woman chooses surgery of her own accord, she is being authentic; if she is making that choice as a result of undue pressure and ‘would choose differently were she more perceptive about her psychological situation’ – then the choice is not autonomous and, therefore, not authentic.¹⁷

But while DeGrazia is right to question whether the choice of a woman to have breast augmentation surgery is autonomous if it is made under social conditions that pressure her to make that choice, it is not clear that a non-autonomous choice is necessarily an instance of phoniness or inauthenticity. Suppose one is completely aware of giving in to various social forces as well as the fact that those forces are the reason for one’s choice. Even if one doesn’t endorse the forces in question – that is, even if one believes that things would be better if those forces weren’t in play – it is far from obvious that such a choice would render one inauthentic. Because we prize freedom from social influence – and, rightly or wrongly, often think we achieve such freedom – it may sound odd to hear someone say, ‘I’m doing this because society wants me to do

it'. But it would be equally odd to charge someone with being a phony who was transparent in this way. One would only deserve the charge of phoniness in this scenario if one represented oneself as confidently making a decision free of any such influence. Similarly, the housewife in Schechtman's example may lack autonomy because her life is not one that she wants to be living, and we might therefore criticise her choice or the social conditions that lead her to make it. But she only lacks authenticity if she represents herself as genuinely valuing her predicament or as having made the choice entirely of her own accord.

If authenticity and autonomy can come apart, it seems that authenticity and happiness can also come apart in ways that challenge the status of authenticity as an overriding value that must be pursued at the expense of all other considerations. In general, we might be happier when we are authentic – that is, when we present ourselves accurately to others. The effort to hide truths about ourselves may induce stress and anxiety that decrease our wellbeing. Moreover, some individuals may regard authenticity as a constitutive feature of the good life – something that, by itself, makes one's life better. For them, the simple fact that they are not being authentic will lead them to conclude that their lives are not as good as they would be if they were presenting themselves accurately, no matter the psychological cost of doing so.¹⁸

For others, however, authenticity might not play as central a role in determining their happiness. Perhaps social conditions make it easier for them to present themselves to others in ways that are not entirely accurate. All else being equal, it might be better for individuals to live in ways that are entirely truthful. But all else is hardly ever equal and social expectations and prejudices can often make it difficult for some to maximise their own happiness while being fully authentic. This kind of scenario may be lamentable, insofar as it would clearly be better if the expectations and prejudices that make these kinds of trade-offs attractive did not exist. Nevertheless, given the pervasiveness of social values that we might find problematic, we should be slow to judge individuals who decide to leave authenticity to the side in the name of their own happiness.

In rounding out this view of authenticity, it may also be helpful to contrast it with other ideals of self-presentation. For example, truthfulness and sincerity might be ideals of self-presentation, but are these notions importantly different from authenticity? And how does authenticity, as an ideal of self-presentation, relate to ideals of self-understanding or self-awareness, given that presenting ourselves accurately to others seems to require that we know something about ourselves?

Consider sincerity. While we may generally regard sincerity as a quality of speech acts, it seems possible to view it more generally as an ideal according to which one presents oneself as one takes oneself to be.¹⁹ On this view, if one presents oneself to others as a friendly individual, in the vein of Ward Stradlater, then one is being sincere as long as one takes oneself to be, in fact, friendly. Intentional misrepresentation would be ruled out by this account, since one cannot be sincerely friendly if one does not actually like other people. Being friendly in an effort to ingratiate oneself to one's enemies would not, on this view, count as being sincere.

However, this much can be accepted while noting that sincerity is compatible with a lack of self-awareness. You can sincerely present yourself as friendly even if, unbeknownst to you, you are not all that fond of other people. As long as you *think* you are friendly, your self-presentation is sincere. Some may find it initially awkward to

claim that we can be mistaken about our own mental states in ways that allow us to think that we are friendly when, in fact, we are not. But other sorts of examples may render the basic idea more palatable: the law student who thinks he loves studying the law, but later realises that he does not, or the woman who thinks she is happy in a relationship and wakes up one morning to the realisation that she has been miserable. We may think that we are transparent to ourselves – that we immediately know what we are thinking or feeling – but there are good reasons for being sceptical that we know ourselves as well as we think we do.²⁰

If we then turn our attention to authenticity, the significance of what we believe about ourselves fades into the background and what matters instead is simply the accuracy of our presentation. In other words, one can be authentic without being either sincere or self-aware. Stradlater may not be at all insincere in presenting himself as friendly, because he might really think that he is friendly. However, if he is mistaken about how much he likes people, then his friendly self-presentation will not count as authentic and would instead be phony because he is putting himself forward as something that he is not.

Examples that do not appeal to knowledge of our own mental states similarly illustrate this difference between sincerity and authenticity. I might sincerely present myself to others as a dynamic basketball player because I believe that I am pretty good at basketball. However, I might also drastically overestimate my abilities and thereby falsely present myself. This presentation would not, therefore, be authentic because it would not reflect who I really am: someone whose basketball skills are, at the very best, middling. Similarly, owners of an ethnic restaurant may make a sincere effort to create an authentic Mexican experience for their customers. That is, they may very well think that they are providing atmosphere and food that reflect what natives of Mexico might expect. But unless they get things right – unless they are successful at creating the experience that they are seeking to create – their restaurant cannot rightly be called authentic.²¹

Importantly, appealing to this distinction between sincerity and authenticity is the only way to make sense of the concern that Holden expresses to his sister. After all, it is not a lack of sincerity that most concerns him when he contemplates a future as a lawyer. It is rather the possibility that he won't know why he is doing what he is doing and so won't know whether he is being a phony or not. He worries that he might end up thinking he is engaging in legal work for one set of reasons – to help people – even though he is really motivated by the external trappings of a successful legal career: money, status, and the like. In such a future, he might end up as a fully sincere lawyer who does not know he is a phony because he has false beliefs about why he is doing what he is doing. And it is that prospect which seems to trouble Holden more than the possibility that he will end up intentionally deceiving others about what he is up to.

To deny that sincerity entails authenticity – i.e. that all sincere actions and speech are also authentic – is not to deny that violations of sincerity can also be violations of authenticity. The liar, in deliberately misrepresenting what he takes to be the truth about himself, is clearly being neither sincere nor authentic. And the bullshitter of Harry Frankfurt's seminal paper cares only about how others view him and so deceives others into thinking that he cares about accurately conveying the truth when, in fact, 'the truth values of his statements are of no central interest to him'.²² Such an individual – shiftily navigating his way through the world while being concerned only with

how others view him – is no more authentic than the liar. Nevertheless, the fact that insincere people can be phony does not mean that all sincere people are thereby authentic.

What does follow from this account is the possibility that insincere individuals can be unintentionally authentic. For example, one who takes oneself to be exceedingly friendly might, in an attempt at levity, present oneself as a surly curmudgeon. But if that individual is, in fact, a surly curmudgeon whose self-perception is mistaken, he may unintentionally present himself as he really is. People who try too hard in their self-presentation may not be able to avoid presenting themselves as they truly are, namely, individuals who try too hard in their self-presentation. Their particular choices in fashion, music, cars, and the like do not really make a difference; no matter what they do, their efforts come across as forced and overwrought. The slovenly academic may not be able to avoid appearing to others as a slovenly academic, no matter his efforts to the contrary. And attractive people may try to downplay their looks to no avail; trying to hide their beauty in various ways may only serve to accentuate it. While the details in these examples are different, they all seem to be plausible instances of unintentional authenticity: cases where attempts to present oneself inaccurately are unsuccessful, and individuals end up putting themselves forth as they really are.²³

To be sure, it may be desirable to achieve an authentic self-presentation intentionally – to try to present ourselves as we really are and be successful in so doing. And to the degree that we regard authenticity as a desirable aim, we may strive to achieve it. But if what I have argued thus far is compelling, there is no reason to think that our efforts at authenticity will always be successful. We may not possess enough self-awareness to know what sort of self-presentation will count as authentic, or we may simply not know how best to put forward our true self. These factors may undermine our efforts at authenticity, even when it is our explicit aim.

Further, as I have argued above, some people might not especially desire authenticity in their life. They may not like the truth about themselves and therefore work to keep it hidden from others, or they may simply want to avoid dealing with the reactions of others to their true identities. Comfortable in their own skin, it may just be easier to present a self to others that is different from who they truly are. Many people likely regard it as important to pursue authenticity, but others may not achieve it because they are not particularly concerned to live authentically. The pressures to conform (or at least appear to conform) to various external expectations may undermine the happiness of many people (like Schechtman's 1950's housewife). But it seems entirely possible that others can achieve a higher measure of satisfaction with their lives by adopting multiple personas. Perhaps it is simply easier for such people to achieve happiness by living one way in private and putting forth a different self to the public. It may be difficult for many of us to believe that such an approach to life is sustainable over time or preferable to living authentically. But barring clear empirical disconfirmation, there is no reason to rule out this possibility from the armchair.

At this point, one could press a more robustly ethical line and argue that a failure to live authentically is problematic, not because authenticity is a crucial means to achieving life-satisfaction but rather because failures of authenticity constitute more straightforwardly moral or ethical failings in their own right. In other words, one might argue that there is a moral obligation to present oneself as accurately as possible to the public. While the existence of such an obligation is consistent with the view of authenticity

I have been putting forward, nothing I have said requires it. Perhaps it is the case that authenticity is an overriding imperative that trumps other values such as life-satisfaction. Or perhaps authenticity is simply one value among many others that we might use to direct our lives. That question, it seems to me, must be decided on grounds other than those I have explored here.

2. Authenticity Without (Or With) An Essential Self

Viewing authenticity as accurate self-presentation clearly requires that there be some truths about who we are as individuals that can be conveyed to others. If it were impossible for us to live in such a way that others can see what is really true of us, then authenticity would not be a sensible ideal to pursue. Similarly, if we cannot fail to present ourselves accurately to the outside world, then authenticity would be a somewhat vacuous notion – one we cannot fail to satisfy.

However, questions about what, exactly, must be presented in order for us to be authentic quickly complicate matters. In particular, the claim that being authentic requires us to present ourselves as we truly are might seem to appeal to a rather controversial notion of the self, one which, as Elliott notes, ‘brings to mind a core of identity whose attributes are fixed and immutable, cast in childhood and hardened by adulthood, stable and unwavering no matter who or what circumstances a person might encounter.’²⁴ Once that essence is identified, we can then pursue authenticity by striving to accurately present that core identity to others.

But a number of different challenges confront this approach. To begin with, recent emphasis on the importance of self-presentation has led some to more or less discard the notion of identity altogether. Thus, Elliott writes that:

... intellectuals prefer to talk not about authenticity but about performance, masks, and postmodern play. We no longer have identities; we ‘perform’ them. We do not live lives; we follow social ‘scripts.’ The concept of a ‘true self’ has become entrenched in popular culture, but it has abandoned the scholarly journals. As Lauren Slater’s friend Ian tells her in *Prozac Diary*, ‘You’re thinking too much about a real self. At the very least, it’s passé. The real self as a belief went out in the 70s.’²⁵

The more we think of ourselves as playing a role or acting out a part, the less we will think we have any core identity to present. ‘Identity’ is a notion that can only be used in scare quotes because life is just play acting and performance all the way down.

Moreover, once we attempt to articulate which properties of individuals are essential to their identities, it becomes less and less clear which ones are fit to play such a role. You may be friendly and funny and 6’ 4” tall, but so are innumerable other people. And you were not always 6’ 4” and may cease to be friendly and funny at some point in the future. Does that mean that you were not always who you are and that you might cease to be yourself if your personality undergoes a sufficiently radical transformation? Perhaps an account of identity along these lines can be made plausible, but it is worth noting that even such a defender of the authentic self as Elliott is at pains to distance himself from the idea of an essentialist self.²⁶ And in any case, an account of

authenticity would certainly be stronger to the degree that it is not saddled with such a tendentious commitment. We may want to present our true selves to the world, but it is not at all clear what constitutes the self that we are striving to present.

A full account of personal identity is quite clearly beyond the scope of this article. For present purposes, it must suffice to note that the idea of an accurate self presentation does not require the existence of an essentialist self – some unchanging core of identity that wholly determines who we are as individuals. As Elliott contends, ‘you can buy into the idea of an *authentic* self without buying into the idea of an *essentialist* self. An authentic self need not be defined by a single essential characteristic, in the same way that a family need not be defined by any single essential characteristic.’²⁷ As far as authenticity is concerned, it can be left as an open question precisely what it is that makes us the particular individuals we are. All that is required is that there be facts about us that can be presented accurately to others.

Most of the time, these facts will be rather mundane – rudimentary truths about one’s likes, dislikes, accomplishments, plans, and so on. If the Milwaukee Brewers are one’s favourite baseball team, then one is being authentic insofar as one presents oneself as a Brewers fan. And if one doesn’t particularly like sushi, one can’t be authentic when claiming to be a sushi connoisseur. Sometimes these representations will take the form of explicit speech, but many times the representation will be through one’s behaviour. If I wear a Chicago Cubs hat to a Brewers game, then I am plausibly representing myself as a Cubs fan even if I don’t say a word throughout the game. And if I make pleasing noises of satisfaction while eating a plate of sushi, then I am representing myself as enjoying the meal even if I never say, ‘I really like this meal’.

Think of this as a minimalist account of authenticity – one which involves only the idea that we can make true or false claims about ourselves and others. The degree to which any given truth about oneself constitutes one’s essential identity is, on this view, beside the point. What matters is the mere possibility of misrepresenting ourselves. Of course, one might question the importance of authenticity in matters of food preference and sports fandom, and perhaps it is the case that authenticity in these areas of life is simply not that important. Nevertheless, applying the concept of authenticity in these contexts makes sense provided there are truths about what foods and sports teams we like.

If, despite its problems, one is inclined to a more essentialist approach, the view of authenticity on offer is compatible with a more robust view of the self. For example, suppose that there is some essential property or cluster of properties that represents the unchanging core of our identity. One striving for authenticity may, therefore, think it is important to accurately present this property or set of properties to others in order to be fully authentic. Perhaps one’s identity is constituted by a particular personality trait – like being extroverted or an avid baseball fan. In order to be fully authentic on this view, one might have to present oneself as extroverted. The fact that it is difficult to identify properties that are fit to play such a role might lead us to question the essentialist account of the self. But on the assumption that such a property or set of properties could be identified, it is consistent with the view of authenticity on offer that those properties could be accurately presented to others.

Alternatively, maybe the self is constituted by a cluster of personality traits that changes over time. Elliott thus contends that:

... the mere fact that people behave differently under different circumstances, or for that matter, over time, does not mean that they are constantly transforming into different people, or that they have different selves. It simply means that the self has many aspects. These aspects may show themselves in some circumstances but not others like a family trait that emerges among some cousins but not others.²⁸

On this view, individuals can change without becoming wholly different people, and the same person can act very differently in one context than he or she acts in another without becoming a wholly different person at those different times and places. As Elliott puts it, invoking a literary example,

[t]he fact that Anna can behave differently when she is with Vronsky than she does when she is with Karenin does not mean that there is no authentic Anna. It simply means that any account of the authentic Anna will need to be rich enough to take account of the complexities of her character.²⁹

Maybe there is no stable set of personality traits that defines Anna such that what is true about her is that she behaves very differently depending on the nature of her company. If that is true of her, then an authentic self-presentation will accurately convey her variable personality to others. Somewhat paradoxically, what would be inauthentic would be for her to represent her herself as someone whose behaviour is broadly consistent across different contexts.

To be sure, there is no reason to think that our efforts to present ourselves accurately will always be successful. How successful we are at presenting ourselves accurately always depends, to some degree, on those to whom we are presenting, and their understanding of us may be influenced by any number of factors: their own past experiences and prejudices, their emotional response to various behaviours and personality traits, the attention and effort they devote to seeing others accurately, and many more. In light of these influences, it seems that those striving for authenticity should devote some attention to determining how they will be perceived. The friendly person striving for an authentic self-presentation should consider whether his or her actions will be regarded as friendly, and people with light-hearted comedic temperaments should take care that their actions and words do not come across as unduly serious.

To suggest that our ability to present ourselves authentically is constrained in some way by the views that others have of us is not to suggest that those others are able to exercise complete control over the self that we put forward. However, success in any communicative endeavour requires that we take account of the manner in which an intended message is likely to be received, and there is little reason to think that communicating facts about ourselves should necessarily be any different. For example, I might sarcastically remark to my waiter that the meal is awful in an effort to communicate precisely the opposite message. But if the waiter misses the sarcastic tone, I will not be successful in saying what I want to say or in letting him know how highly I think of the food. It would be odd, in such a circumstance, to say that I have accurately presented my thoughts and feelings to the waiter, since my intended message has not been adequately received.

Similarly for my efforts to present myself accurately to others. If I want others to see me as I really am, then I should take some account of the ways in which my words

and deeds might be perceived by those others. This is not to suggest that hostile or uninterested observers can wholly undermine my ability to present myself authentically any more than a waiter who has no real interest in hearing what I have to say undermines my ability to accurately express my feelings about the meal. However, it does mean that I am not wholly free to decide for myself what form an authentic self-presentation will take.

Margaret Olivia Little emphasises this point in her insightful discussion of cosmetic surgery and the messages that medical professionals communicate to the broader public in choosing to perform various procedures. She writes:

Clearly, one should not be held hostage to all possible interpretations of our actions, to all the meanings others might attach to our behavior. But it is negligence to ignore the interpretations that others may naturally be expected to place on our actions given the broad context in which they take place. That is, while one is not responsible, for instance, when others willfully or negligently misinterpret one's actions, one cannot simply turn a blind eye to all but the meanings one *wishes* others would see in our actions: we have a duty to forestall those interpretations that, while unintended, would be completely natural given the larger background context in which the action takes place.³⁰

In the present context, we can leave aside Little's claim that we have a *duty* to consider how others will regard our actions. It is sufficient for my purposes to note that insofar as we are concerned with authenticity, we should give some weight to the view that others are likely to have of us – how our speech and actions will be interpreted and whether those interpretations accurately reflect who we are.³¹

Or consider, in a somewhat different vein, individuals who have undergone fairly significant changes in personality or appearance and desire to leave their past selves entirely behind. A recovering alcoholic may wish to present himself only as the calm and sober individual he has become rather than one who, though he is now calm and sober, used to be violent and temperamental. Does an authentic self-presentation require that he somehow include facts about his past such that others are able to regard him as a recovering alcoholic whose personality has undergone a major transformation? Or is his identity solely what it is now such that his former personality is that of another individual entirely? Such changes, whether intentional or otherwise, are common, and so it seems that a plausible view of authenticity should account for them.

I think three points are worth making in response to these questions. First, there are times when, no matter what our intentions, we cannot avoid presenting ourselves as individuals who are engaging in concerted efforts to change ourselves in some way. A man who is not naturally outgoing may not be able to present himself as someone who is gregarious and extroverted. He may instead come across as a shy person who is trying to become someone who is more outgoing. Similarly, one who is out of shape may undertake an exercise regimen in the hopes of putting forward a healthier image to the public. But until a certain amount of work has been accomplished, one might not be able to appear as anything other than an out of shape person who is trying to get into better shape. In these sorts of cases, one's self-presentation may not be intentionally authentic, but it may be authentic nonetheless.

Second, as I hope to make clear in the next section, part of the way in which we think about what authenticity requires in cases of personal change will depend on the degree to which others can legitimately expect to know certain things about us. Thus, authenticity may require that a recovering alcoholic disclose more about his past to a friend of fifteen years than a perfect stranger. And it may not be incumbent upon a shy individual who is working to become more outgoing to draw the attention of everyone at the party to the nature of his efforts. Being authentic in different contexts may look very different for the same person because different contexts carry with them different standards of appropriate disclosure. The recovering alcoholic may not be authentic when he tells the person he just met about his past; he might just be offering too much information. And if the shy person simply wants to become more outgoing, it is not clear why that goal requires him to reveal that he is acting against his natural inclination in talking to so many people at the party.

Third, even if we grant that what authenticity requires of us may vary from context to context, it nevertheless seems that at a certain point, the desire to wholly distance ourselves from our pasts is incompatible with a fully authentic self-presentation. Among the many things that are true of us now are numerous facts about what we have done in the past. We may not always wish to present these facts to others, and in many cases we may wish to conceal them. But it nevertheless seems to follow from the account of authenticity on offer that a fully accurate self-presentation will ultimately require that these facts come to light. The recovering alcoholic who never discloses his past to long-time friends simply cannot be fully authentic with those who do not know about his struggles. In this way, authenticity can sometimes demand that we put forward things about ourselves that we would much rather leave behind.

As I have already noted, none of these points imply that authenticity is always an overriding consideration in determining the appropriate course of action to take. Perhaps there are very good reasons for individuals to conceal facts about their past from even their closest friends. People who have worked in the world of espionage may endanger numerous others by being wholly authentic about their pasts. And there may very well be times when presenting ourselves as we would like to be is more important than presenting ourselves as we actually are. For example, maybe the best way to effect personal change in a particular case is to simply act how one would like to be in the hopes that the internal change one is seeking will follow. ‘Dressing for the job you want,’ as it were, may be the best way to become the kind of person one wants to be. Nevertheless, it follows from the account I have been trying to develop that authenticity is sacrificed in these contexts.

3. Enhancements, Context, and the Importance of Minding Your Own Business

When we turn to consider how the ideal of authenticity I have been elaborating bears on the use of enhancements, it seems that what is minimally required is the absence of successful deception. Thus, an individual is not being authentic if he successfully conceals his use of enhancement technologies in an effort to convince others that his accomplishments have been achieved without such assistance. The student who lies about having written a paper with the assistance of Adderall is being phony. He is intentionally putting forward himself and his paper as something they are not: the

results of processes that did not include the use of a particular drug. Similarly for the athlete who claims to have won a competition without chemical aids. Lance Armstrong was hardly being authentic when he forcefully asserted that he had never taken erythropoietin in the course of winning seven Tour de France titles. Rather, he was attempting to pass off his accomplishments as something they were not.

Pointing out that being inauthentic in these ways is problematic may just be to point out that the deception at issue is problematic. In other words, if there is anything of moral significance in the charge in inauthenticity, it may not go beyond the significance of deception. As DeGrazia puts it:

[I]ntentionally presenting oneself false to others subverts our expectations for honesty and sincerity – and may involve actively lying, adding unambiguously wrong action to bad character. But these ethical concerns are explicable by appeal to widely embraced norms for virtue and conduct, leaving unclear whether the charge that a self-creation project is *inauthentic* adds any distinctive moral content.³²

One needn't think that all instances of lying or all failures of sincerity constitute wrong action or bad character to agree with DeGrazia's basic point – that being inauthentic is wrong insofar as the deception that constitutes the failure of authenticity is wrong.³³ Perhaps it is sometimes ethically permissible to be deceptive. And in cases where permissible deception involves truths about oneself – that is, where the deception at issue is deceptive self-presentation – it would seem to follow that being inauthentic does not constitute an ethical failing. Nevertheless, those instances of inauthenticity that are wrong may be so because of the wrongness of the deception at issue.

By the same token, authenticity does not seem to be undermined when individuals are entirely forthcoming about their use of various enhancements. The student who openly admits to having written his paper in an Adderall-fuelled binge of activity is not being phony because he is presenting himself and his paper as they really are. And while the athlete who acknowledges using performance-enhancing drugs may be breaking the rules of his or her sport, breaking the rules does not make one a phony, provided that one does not present oneself as an assiduous rule-follower. Had Lance Armstrong been forthcoming about his use of testosterone and EPO, he might have been derided as a cheater, but it would not have been accurate to criticise him for being the phony that, alas, he is.³⁴

However, clearly not all uses of enhancements fall into these neat categories. Professors may know of a handful of students who are taking prescribed doses of Adderall (or other similar drugs), but students who take such medications off-label do not tend to announce such use publicly to their instructors. (I have yet to receive a paper headed by the disclaimer: 'This paper was written with the assistance of Adderall which I obtained without a prescription'.) And precisely because the use of many technologies is outlawed by the governing bodies of most sports, athletes tend to be less than forthcoming when they break the rules.

More generally, people who use various enhancements in their projects of self-creation and self-discovery may not intentionally try to hide that use even as they are not especially keen to announce it to the world. If directly asked, the woman who takes anti-anxiety medication in order to better navigate social situations may acknowledge that she uses the drugs. But she may be rather unlikely to volunteer this information

to many of her acquaintances, much less people she is meeting for the first time. Her use of the drugs may not, therefore, be entirely transparent, but neither is she working to keep it a secret. If a stranger asks her whether she uses anti-anxiety medication, she may lie about it or attempt to change the subject, but she is happy to tell her friends the truth about what she is doing. If we are comfortable concluding that Lance Armstrong was a phony because of his use of performance-enhancing drugs, and that a student is phony when he uses Adderall off-label in order to write a paper (but presents himself as having written the paper without chemical aid), what are we to conclude about these sorts of cases – cases which, presumably, cover the vast majority of enhancement uses?

One way to respond is simply to reiterate the point that we needn't view authenticity as an overriding value. Maybe it simply isn't important for someone struggling with anxiety to present herself accurately to others. If she conceals her use of anti-anxiety drugs, perhaps she is being phony, but maybe that lack of authenticity is outweighed by the importance of pursuing her own psychological health without the added pressure of worrying about what other people think of her. That is, maybe the pursuit of authenticity adds stress that makes it more difficult for her to deal with anxiety than simply keeping her use of medication a secret. In such a case, a certain kind of phonianness may well be justified.

Moreover, there seem to be constraints internal to the notion of authenticity that are relevant in these kinds of cases as well. In other words, while authenticity may sometimes be outweighed by other considerations (so that phonianness is appropriate), it is also the case that the mere fact that a given use of enhancement technology is undisclosed is not enough to render such use phony. More needs to be said about the circumstances in which one finds oneself as well as the expectations that others might have regarding one's behaviour before it can be determined whether a particular undisclosed use of medical technology constitutes a failure of authenticity.

Two constraints along these lines are therefore relevant for our thinking about the demands of authenticity and the use of enhancements. First, it seems that our background assumptions about the use of enhancements play an important role in determining whether any particular use qualifies as phony. For example, in the context of competitive athletics, the baseline expectation is that participants will be playing by the rules. Rules constitute sports as the particular activities they are, serve as a basis for competitive fairness, and ground our appreciation of the athletic excellence we see on the field. Against these background assumptions, the use of banned technologies in sports violates the expectation of rule-following and is thereby phony. Athletes know that both fans and their fellow competitors are expecting them to obey the rules, and as a result, breaking them is an intentional deception: a deliberate attempt to pass off their accomplishments as something they are not.

Similarly, an academic job candidate may be asked to give a presentation on the assumption that she will be able to (more or less) repeat her performance on a regular basis. Suppose she gives her job talk under the influence of a medication on which she will not be able to rely in the future (perhaps because its side effects will prohibit her from taking it or because she obtained it without a prescription and won't have reliable access to the drug). In this case, the background assumption is that whatever medications the candidate is taking that might affect her performance in the classroom are medications which she will be taking should she get the job. The assumption in this

case is not that she is, or is not, operating under the influence of medication. It is rather that the conditions under which she is operating will be replicated in the future. Should that not be the case, we might regard her teaching demonstration as somewhat phony.³⁵

However, in other contexts, there may be no such expectations. When two people meet for the first time, it is unlikely that either person knows whether the other is using any enhancement technologies – whether they are on anti-anxiety medication, or anti-depressants, or have used anabolic steroids to improve their appearance or Adderall to be more productive. We may be able to hazard a guess about these matters, based on statistical regularities about drug usage or impressions we have from our initial interactions with others, but no firm conclusions are justified by these impressions. I might have strong suspicions about whether someone is taking a particular medication based on the way they look or how they are acting, but absent more definite information, these will be nothing more than suspicions.

Moreover, given the numerous ways that individuals may, or may not, legitimately avail themselves of various technologies in the pursuit of lives they regard as satisfying, there does not seem to be any ethical expectation regarding the ways in which others may use any number of different enhancements. Whereas in the context of athletic competition, the expectation that individuals will not use banned technologies is supported, in large part, by an ethical commitment to the importance of obeying the rules, such a commitment is far from ubiquitous in everyday life. Some people will, no doubt, express their disapproval of enhancements, but such a viewpoint is not sufficiently pervasive to create a general expectation that people will conform to that standard.

Thus, when individuals use enhancements in the context of everyday life, they may be violating some people's preferences or convictions about what is right or wrong, but they are not violating a generalised expectation that they behave in a certain way, because there is no such generalised expectation. As a result, they are not necessarily being phony when they use enhancements but fail to publicly signal their use. They may not be entirely forthcoming about such matters. But most of us are not entirely forthcoming about everything in our lives, and that fact does not mean that we are all phonies. What it does mean is that we do not really know all that much about most of the people we encounter on a daily basis.

In appealing to the existence (or absence) of widespread expectations about whether people are using enhancements, one can grant that these expectations might shift considerably over time and may vary from place to place. For example, university professors in the United States may not currently have any settled expectations about whether their students are using Adderall off-label in writing their papers. If, however, we learn more about what percentage of students use Adderall off-label or if there becomes a broader consensus about whether such use constitutes cheating in an academic context, that expectation may become increasingly widespread and settled. Similarly, I might assume that most people I see on the street in downtown Winston-Salem, North Carolina have not had cosmetic surgery, but those assumptions may be very different in certain neighbourhoods of Southern California. Different assumptions may, therefore, yield correspondingly different norms for what authenticity might require of us. In the wealthier circles of Southern California, authenticity might require that some people explicitly reveal that they have *not* had cosmetic surgery, and

Adderall use may become so widespread and accepted that student work is assumed to be aided by its use until declared otherwise.

This point leads to the second constraint on authenticity as an ideal of self-presentation, namely, that it must be compatible with a modicum of personal privacy. After all, we can force the hand of others regarding the accuracy of their self-presentation by asking them questions which are intended to garner information about their use of enhancements. Meeting someone for the first time, I may straightforwardly ask them whether they are on anti-anxiety medication or anti-depressants, whether they have had plastic surgery or some other procedure, or whether their last study session was propelled by Adderall. If the correct answer to these questions is 'yes,' but the individuals decline to offer that information, there is certainly a sense in which they are not being accurate in their self-presentation. They have represented something as being true about themselves that is not, in fact, true.

Nevertheless, attributions of phoniness in such cases would be misplaced, because the questions that elicit the false responses are inappropriate. It is, to put it bluntly, none of my business whether someone I have just met at a social gathering is taking anti-anxiety medication, and if I pose such a question to them, they are justified in refusing to answer or (in my view, at least) lying in an effort to conceal the truth. The inquiry is intrusive and rude and ignores the fact that there are some truths about oneself that need not be revealed to strangers. As noted above, authenticity does not require that individuals announce certain truths about themselves upon first meeting someone, and so we should not think that it requires individuals to offer that information upon request in a similar context.

Importantly, the relational background of the parties involved also makes a difference to what authenticity might require of us in response to direct questions about our use of enhancements. If I ask my close friend of twenty years whether he is taking anti-anxiety medication (because, say, I notice a change in the way he behaves in social interactions), that request might not be intrusive. It may instead be motivated by genuine concern for his well-being or the reasonable expectation that such a close friend will be willing to discuss such matters. By the same token, if I decide to begin using Adderall to boost my writing productivity, but fail to tell my wife about this decision, I am not being authentic in my self-presentation with her. Given my significant track record of not using drugs off-label, her reasonable expectation is that I am not using them, in the absence of other indications to the contrary. And should she ask me directly whether I have been using the drug, authenticity would seem to require that I tell her the truth.

We can, of course, construct examples along these lines where revealing the requested information would not be the thing to do or where authenticity does not seem to demand that one be especially forthcoming. Perhaps one is not on especially good terms with one's long-time friends or spouse such that questions about whether someone is using an enhancement are much more intrusive than they are in relationships that are on better footing. Or perhaps one party to the relationship recognises that what his friend or spouse needs at that particular moment is space and extra consideration for her privacy. Under those circumstances, authenticity may require that one be left alone. What is important for my purposes is that there be some contexts in which a failure to respond truthfully to inquiries about one's use of enhancements

does not make one a phony. Respecting the ability of others to live authentic lives of self-presentation sometimes means that we should mind our own business.³⁶

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NOTES

- 1 My discussion leaves aside any consideration of the therapy-enhancement distinction, and thus some of the examples of enhancement technologies that I invoke may be regarded by others as examples of medical treatment. While I am sceptical regarding the usefulness of this distinction, I do not think that anything in the argument on offer depends on it. Thus, as far as I can tell, the view of authenticity that I develop below has the same implications for the use of medical therapies as it does for the use of enhancements. For a criticism of the therapy-enhancement distinction, see David Resnick, 'The moral significance of the therapy-enhancement distinction in human genetics,' *Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics* 9 (2000): 365–77. For a modest defence of the distinction, see Norman Daniels, 'Normal functioning and the treatment-enhancement distinction,' *Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics* 9 (2000): 309–22.
- 2 The former view is to be found in Peter Kramer, *Listening to Prozac* (New York: Viking, 1993); the latter view is defended by David DeGrazia, 'Prozac, enhancement, and self-creation,' *Hastings Center Report* 30,2 (2000): 34–40.
- 3 This way of framing the objection is drawn from Carl Elliott, 'The tyranny of happiness' in E. Parens (ed.) *Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press), p. 182.
- 4 Erik Parens, 'Authenticity and ambivalence,' *Hastings Center Report* 35,3 (2005): 34–41, at p. 34.
- 5 Neil Levy, 'Enhancing authenticity,' *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 28 (2011): 308–18.
- 6 As I hope becomes clear as the discussion unfolds, my concern here is with the fairly narrow question of how authenticity bears on the use of enhancement technologies. It is perfectly consistent with the view on offer that any number of other considerations are also relevant to whether any given use of enhancement is problematic. Nor do I think that authenticity is necessarily the most important ideal at stake in this debate. Filling out a comprehensive ethical picture regarding the use of enhancements thus requires that we consider how authenticity relates to other normative concerns, a task at which I can only gesture within the scope of this article.
- 7 J. D. Salinger, *The Catcher in the Rye* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Co., 1951), p. 175, emphasis original.
- 8 Gerald Rosen, 'A retrospective look at *The Catcher in the Rye*,' *American Quarterly* 29 (1977): 551–2.
- 9 Jay Newman, *Inauthentic Culture and its Philosophical Critics* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), p. 6.
- 10 James H. Gilmore & B. Joseph Pine II, *Authenticity* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2007), p. 96.
- 11 Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 15.
- 12 Taylor op. cit., p. 22.
- 13 Marya Schechtman, 'Self-expression and self-control,' *Ratio* XVII (2004): 409–427, at p. 417. Thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this example.
- 14 John Stuart Mill, *Three Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 83. Quoted in *The Ethics of Authenticity*, p. 128. Taylor seems to agree with Mill's basic point here but questions those who think that the significance of one's life can be grounded wholly on that life's being chosen. As Taylor puts it, such significance 'depends on understanding that *independent of my will* there is something noble, courageous, and hence significant in giving shape to my own life' (p. 39).
- 15 David DeGrazia, *Human Identity and Bioethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 112.
- 16 DeGrazia op. cit., p. 112.
- 17 DeGrazia op. cit., p. 112.
- 18 I think one can value authenticity as a constitutive feature of one's own happiness without being committed to the idea that authenticity is intrinsically valuable, full stop. In other words, one might value authenticity intrinsically without thinking that anyone who fails to do so is therefore making a mistake. For a

- further elaboration of this distinction, see Richard Kraut, 'Two conceptions of happiness,' *The Philosophical Review* 88 (1979): 167–97.
- 19 For discussion of the structure of sincerity, see John Eriksson, 'Straight talk: Conceptions of sincerity in speech,' *Philosophical Studies* 153 (2011): 213–234.
- 20 For a helpful overview of the problems associated with self-knowledge, see Quassim Cassam, *Self-Knowledge for Humans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) and Brie Gertler, *Self-Knowledge* (New York: Routledge, 2011).
- 21 For an interesting discussion of real world business examples along these lines, see Gilmore & Pine op. cit., pp. 95–114.
- 22 Harry Frankfurt, 'On bullshit' in his *The Importance of What We Care About* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 130.
- 23 It is here that some distinctions among the terms discussed by Newman above begin to emerge. Thus, a relevant difference between being phony and being a fraud is that the fraud necessarily aims at misrepresenting himself whereas the phony does not. Put differently, it seems fair to conclude that the fraudulent is a subclass of the phony.
- 24 Carl Elliott, *Better Than Well* (New York: Norton, 2004), p. 48.
- 25 Elliott op. cit., p. 48.
- 26 Elliott op. cit., pp. 48–53.
- 27 Elliott op. cit., p. 49, emphasis mine.
- 28 Elliott op. cit., p. 49.
- 29 Elliott op. cit., p. 49.
- 30 Margaret Olivia Little, 'Cosmetic surgery, suspect norms, and the ethics of complicity' in E. Parens (ed.) *Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press), p. 173.
- 31 Elliott makes a similar point when he writes that 'the codes available to you are dependent on the broader culture in which you live. You can't just decide these things for yourself. You can't simply decide, for example, that Maggie Thatcher-style helmet hair codes for come-hither seductiveness. The code is determined by the culture in which you are situated' (Elliott op. cit., p. 116).
- 32 DeGrazia op. cit., p. 109.
- 33 Though I think the passage quoted here can be read to mean that all instances of lying and all failures of sincerity are wrong, I don't mean to imply that such a view is DeGrazia's considered position.
- 34 At least at the time of this writing, Armstrong's failure to be entirely forthcoming about his use of performance-enhancing drugs still renders him a phony.
- 35 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this example.
- 36 The central argument of this article was first presented in August 2014 to an audience at the Enhancing Responsibility Conference in Delft, The Netherlands. Many thanks to the participants in those proceedings for their probing questions. I am indebted as well to the very helpful comments of two anonymous referees.