Abstract: Class, race, and gender are theoretically distinct forms of "categorical inequality," rooted in "exploitation" and "opportunity hoarding," reproduced through "emulation," and institutionalized through "adaptation." These distinct forms of inequality are relatively autonomous, but their relative importance and autonomy varies socially and historically. They follow, in general, the dialectical relations of institutional political and economic development, on the one hand, and political opportunity and challenge, on the other. In the U.S., for example, class, race, and gender inequality develop and change in the course of capital accumulation and state making as these engender and respond to cycles of collective action by various class, race, and gender interests that challenge institutionalized inequality in the course of its development. The rise and fall of class, race, and gender inequality between 1776 and 1929 illustrates the potential of this perspective. This exploratory analysis suggests that race and gender were the predominant economic relations and political interests in the Antebellum political economy. After Reconstruction, however, class and gender economic relations and political interests became more prominent as white male capitalist privilege was challenged.

Keywords: political economy, social theory, social history: U.S. 1776-1929

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Marxists, feminists, and advocates of racial equality continue to grapple, in theory and in praxis, with the relationship between class, race, and gender inequality (Wright et al., 1995; Hartmann, 1981; Duncan, 1968; Wilson, 1980; Kim and Perrucci, 1994; Hogan et al., 1997). Unfortunately, their efforts to accommodate competing if not conflicting concerns often fall into three equally unsatisfactory traps. First, many reduce one form of inequality to another, as when Wright and Perrone (1977) reduced racial inequality to class inequality in employment income. Second, others elevate one particular interest, as when Hartmann (1982) argued for the primacy of patriarchy over capitalism. Third, some follow the liberals, who offer race, class, and gender as evidence of the multi-dimensionality of political interests (Weber, 1978; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993).

Thus advocates of social justice often face the forced choice between minimizing other interests or accepting some version of the liberal, pluralist image of multiple independent interests, negotiated through a process of give and take that offers the greatest good for the greatest number (Dahl, 1961). In other words, advocates are pressured to choose between "foundational" and "relativist" perspectives. Foundationalists argue that all forms of inequality are based on one fundamental form, representing one essential interest, which the others mirror or mimic. Marx, for example, argues that politics and religion are rooted in material life, so political freedom for the German Jew was contingent upon “abolishing the empirical essence of Judaism—huckstering and its conditions” (Marx, 1978[1843]:52). Relativists challenge these foundational claims and argue for multiple, relatively independent, equally important bases of inequality. Weber, for example, argues that political parties might represent class or status interests, but are equally likely to represent both or neither (Weber, 1978:938).

In choosing the foundational position, academics and activists join a debate on which path leads toward revolution. Thus Hartmann (1982) challenges the foundational claim of Marxism but offers gender as an alternative foundation. Hartmann (1982:446) argues, “the very division of labor between the sexes itself must be eliminated if women are to attain equal social status with men and if women and men are to attain the full development of their human potential.” The relativist alternative to this debate is to recognize multiple dimensions of inequality and accompanying interests. Thus Garnsey (1982: 443) argues, “Production, distribution, and consumption provide the impetus for changes in the class system in part through their effects on the division of labor between men and women, both in the household and in the occupational system.” The problem in choosing this relativist position is in determining what
is important and how one set of relationships affects another. When academics or activists accept the most extreme relativist position, that everything affects everything else and no relationship or interest should be "privileged" as more important than any other, they enter the postmodern quagmire of circular paths to nowhere (see debates on postmodernism in Farganis, 1999; Alexander and Seidman, 1990).

A more promising path toward the analysis of multiple facets of inequality is to sidestep the forced choice and attempt to incorporate elements of foundational (particularly Marxist) and relational (Weberian) approaches, as exemplified by Tilly (1998). Tilly (1998) concedes the relativist claim that there are multiple forms of enduring inequality that are socially and historically variable (in form and content). He argues, however, that relations of "categorical inequality" are generally founded (or established) as mechanisms for "exploitation" or "opportunity hoarding." Particular types of categorical inequality, such as race, class, or gender inequality, come to characterize particular societies. These become "traditional" or "habitual" social relations (Weber, 1978:25), because organizations adopt familiar forms of inequality (such as race or gender differences) or attempt to accommodate these in establishing networks and hierarchies that are designed to serve frequently unrelated organizational goals.

Universities, for example, reproduce gender inequality by hiring women (particularly faculty wives) in non-faculty administrative-professional positions (particularly as lecturers or as teaching assistant supervisors), so the organizational boundary between faculty and staff "emulates" traditional male-female gender inequality. In this case, faculty (usually men) supervise the administrative staff (usually women), who supervise the graduate students or teach the undergraduate students. In this sense, administrative professionals "take care of the kids," so that the professors can do their research. The university does not intend to exploit women, in particular, or to reproduce traditional gender relations. The university simply takes advantage of existing gender inequality and the readily available labor pool—the "Lazarus layer" of administrative-professional workers who are "trapped" in marriage to tenured faculty and thus available as "lumpen" administrative-professional workers (Marx, 1967[1867]: Vol. I, chapter 25, especially: 644 on "lazarus-layer") on the "mommy track" of "good jobs" for faculty wives.

From this perspective, class, race, and gender are qualitatively different examples of "categorical" inequality, produced and reproduced through relations of "exploitation" and "opportunity hoarding." In fact, the relationships that define class, race, and gender are theoretically distinct, but empirically confounded by the social processes of "emulation" and "adaptation" that generalize and institutionalize each of these forms of "durable inequality." They are, however, rooted in "modes" and "relations" of production and reproduction that follow a contingent, indeterminate yet far from idiosyncratic life-history.
The university, for example, makes its own history but does not construct that history from “whole cloth” (Marx, 1974[1869]:146). The university did not create gender inequality anymore than it created the private-sector market for MBA versus Ph.D. recipients. In both cases, it emulates what exists in the outside world or adapts organizational relations to accommodate external threats or opportunities. The university (or the corporation, or the social movement organization for that matter) does not, however, simply develop “functional” internal relationships in order to achieve its goals and adapt to external circumstance. It is not, in this regard, totally innocent, since the production of knowledge emulates, to a large extent, the dominant mode of commodity production and thereby produces its own internal contradictions and crises (too many MBAs or Ph.Ds, for example), quite independent of what occurs in the economy or the government. Nevertheless, emulating and accommodating the outside world of categorical inequality creates additional crises and contradictions that are, essentially, imported with the emulated or accommodated relations.

The Women’s Movement and the Civil Rights Movement were not products of the modern university, but they did produce problems in the university. For example, the increasingly stormy relations between traditionally female administrative professionals and increasingly female faculty are not direct effects of the Women’s Movement. These stormy relations are, in fact, complicated by age, class, and status (or lifestyle) differences. The increasingly differentiated and complex nature of inequality is not, however, as conservatives might lead us to believe, the product of political challenges to enduring inequality. In fact, it is the development of institutional structures, particularly modes of production (such as capitalism) and reproduction (such as patriarchy), that seems to multiply and complicate categorical inequality, as life and work become increasingly complex and alienated endeavors.

The struggle for social justice (or against durable inequality) challenges the multi-faceted nature of inequality, and each struggle is able to take advantage of opportunities afforded by other challengers, if only in exposing the weakness of the institutional order and offering new tools or “repertoires” for challenging traditional social control tactics. Thus the Labor Movement had provided models and organizations for the development of the Civil Rights Movement (Pfeffer, 1990), which exposed a new generation to civil disobedience and thus opened the floodgates for what is now popularly known as “The Sixties” (McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1984).

As evidenced in that short cycle (from Rosa Parks in 1955 to Nixon’s resignation in 1974), successful political protest tends to reduce the complexity of social inequality and political interest. In “The Movement” of the Sixties, there were only two types of people: those who were “in” and those who were “out.” Admittedly, “hippies” distinguished “straights” while “politicos” distinguished “apathetics,” but even the SDS folks realized that “hippies” were
not the enemy but were, at worst, beyond the target for mobilizing new adherents. Similarly, even the "hippies" recognized that "clean for Gene" [McCarthy] political activists were not, essentially, "straight" but were, at worst, temporarily insane in thinking that electing an "anti-war" candidate was either possible or necessary.

Such speculation on the recent past and possible future of inequality, its defenders and its challengers, is premature. In order to understand the current state of inequality we need to begin with a simple set of categorical distinctions, a little foundational and relativist theory, and a little historical perspective. Tilly (1998) offers the concepts and the general theoretical model, which will be supplemented with a little additional Marxist and Weberian theory and then offered as a perspective on class, race, and gender inequality as it developed in the U.S. during the "long nineteenth century," 1776-1929.

A SIMPLE MODEL

Tilly's (1998) model of "categorical inequality" builds upon the concepts of "social categories" (types of individuals) and "social networks" (relationships between individuals) that he borrowed from Harrison White and used in his conceptualization of social organization in his early work on collective action and social protest (Tilly, 1978). "Categorical inequality" involves unequal relations between categories of individuals, such as "black/white, male/female, married/unmarried, and citizen/noncitizen" (Tilly, 1998:8). Tilly argues that familiar and enduring relations of social inequality, including "class, gender, race, ethnicity" (1998:4), although qualitatively different, are produced and reproduced "through similar social processes" (1998:9). Specifically, all of these relations of social inequality are established through "exploitation" and "opportunity hoarding" and then generalized through "emulation" and institutionalized through "adaptation."

Tilly (1998) defines exploitation as relations through which "powerful, connected people command resources from which they draw significantly increased returns by coordinating the efforts of outsiders whom they exclude from the full value added by that effort" (p.10). Opportunity hoarding is defined as the means through which "members of a categorically bounded network acquire access to a resource that is valuable, renewable, subject to monopoly, supportive of network activities, and enhanced by the network's modus operandi" (p.10).

For our purposes, Tilly's "social processes" that produce categorical inequality—exploitation" and "opportunity hoarding"—are considered as "mechanisms of surplus appropriation." or, simply stated, different ways of gaining (or taking) advantage in social relations. Figure 1 combines these differences in "mechanism" with differences in "locus" or site ("productive"
versus "reproductive" relations) to distinguish four types of social inequality. Each type of social inequality is distinguished by the mechanism of surplus appropriation that is, theoretically, the primary or "foundational" basis for establishing these relations (either exploitation of opportunity hoarding). These relations are also distinguished by their primary or definitive locus or site: production of goods and services versus reproduction of labor power (or persons, more generally).

**Figure 1:** Class, Race, Gender, and Patronage Relations Distinguished by Mechanism of Surplus Appropriation (Exploitation versus Opportunity Hoarding) and Locus of Relations (Production versus Reproduction)

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<td>Opportunity Hoarding</td>
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Class is defined by the "exploitation" of labor in the relations of production. This entails the appropriation of surplus labor value, in the form of commodity prices, or, more generally, in the value of goods and services that labor produces (Marx, 1967[1867], vol. 1, chapters 1, 7, and 25). Class need not refer to capitalist relations of employment, however. The peasant's work in the lord's field (corvee) or his contribution (to the church) of a share of his domestic product (tithe) also describes a class relation, in this case, in a pre-capitalist but still patriarchal society [hence the intentional use of the masculine pronoun].

Gender is defined by the exploitation of (traditionally unpaid female) labor in the relations of reproduction, specifically, marriage and household or family relations, sustaining and reproducing the (traditionally patriarchal) family (Bernard, 1972; Perrucci et al., 1978; Perrucci and Targ, 1974; Presser, 1994; Waite, 1995; Wolf et al., 1997). As suggested above, gender relations were equally patriarchal and comparably gendered in pre-capitalist or feudal societies. In slave societies, as we shall see, slave labor, both male and female, was exploited in gender relations, although "free" (white, married) women continued to be exploited in childbearing.

Race is defined by "opportunity hoarding" in relations of reproduction, specifically, endogamy rules that divide a population into separate pools of acceptable marriage or family members. Race is not viewed as a biologically
based "phenotype" or subspecies but as a socially constructed characteristic (e.g., "blackness") that yields socially sanctioned "racial" endogamy norms and thereby produces a biological result. In other words, race is not a biological characteristic ("skin color") that produces a social consequence ("racism"). Instead, it is a social construction ("blackness") that produces a biological consequence, "endogamy" (see Harris, 1999:437-450 on constructionist and objectivist definitions; see Kitcher, 1999:92-93 on endogamy and lineage rules for determining "pure races" and Kitcher, 1999:99 on racial endogamy in the U.S. in 1970; Loury, 2000:2-15 offers comparable figures for 1990; see also Tilly, 1998:64).

Patronage (or clientism) is defined by "opportunity hoarding" in relations of production, specifically, the social, familial, or ethnic relations through which opportunities to invest capital or labor are distributed.

In this purely theoretical conceptualization of race, class, and gender relations, each is distinct. Class and gender are each rooted in relations of exploitation, but class is associated, primarily, with commodity production or, simply stated, "work." Gender is associated with domestic labor, "mothering" (or housework), or, simple stated, "family" (Chodorow, 1978). Race, unlike gender, is defined by opportunity hoarding rather than exploitation, by exclusion rather than inclusion within the family. Race is also distinguished from ethnic or familial relations that provide employment or investment opportunities through patronage.

Class relations, as defined in Figure 1, refer to relations between classes (e.g., employment), while patronage, gender, and race relations are, in general, intra-class relations. In fact, it seems that patronage, gender, and race relations are qualitatively different across class. Patronage among capitalists is probably more familial, being associated, primarily, with inheritance (Smith, 1995; Smith, 1997; Oliver and Shapiro, 1995; Aldrich et al., 1998). Patronage among workers seems to be more extensive, encompassing ethnic communities rather than family members (Pfeffer, 1994; Roediger, 1991; Tilly, 1998:165-166). Gender relations seem to reproduce class relations most directly. Capitalist wives employ domestic workers. Proletarian wives physically labor in the household, and petty-bourgeois (shopkeeper) women and men rely on their children to help in the house and the shop (Portes, 1996:46; Sanders and Nee, 1996:235; see Carr, 1996 on self employed women; see also Portes and Zhou, 1996). How race relations vary across class is less clear, although racial differences certainly would be confounded with class differences in courtship, engagement, and marriage rituals. It would seem, in any case, that racial endogamy rules operate within class endogamy rules.

Although theoretically distinct, class, race, and gender relations are confounded, as indicated above, in the employment of domestic labor and in class-based endogamy rules that appear indistinguishable from race. In fact,
distinguishing productive from reproductive relations is problematic, particularly in pre-capitalist economies where both production and reproduction are situated in the family home. Even in modern industrial capitalism, however, the distinction is problematic. First, the exploitation of the working class at work is predicated on the exploitation of the working class at home. Labor would not be able to produce a surplus at work if it were not sustained and reproduced at home. Thus the exploitation of the working class encompasses both work and home, both class and gender (Humphries, 1982; Marx, 1967[1867], Vol.1:38-41, 193).

Second, the familial or ethnic reproduction of class privilege through patronage seems inseparable from the reproduction of race (see Robinson, 1983, chapter 1, on Anglo-American colonization; see Balibar, 1999:208-209 on blacks as both industrial reserve army and patronized workforce; McGary, 1998 rejects the "paternalism" argument offered by, among others, Eugene Genovese). White families have effectively monopolized capital (Oliver and Shapiro, 1995). White workers have similarly monopolized employment opportunities (Tilly, 1998:167-168). How then is patronage different from race? The simple answer is that ethnic relations hoard access to work but not to family. Ethnic, familial, or social-cultural patronage systems are relatively open through marriage. Religious endogamy, particularly for Catholics and Jews, approaches but does not match racial endogamy, since religions accept converts while races do not.

Nevertheless, these neat conceptual boundaries mask the relationship between the appropriation of surplus labor value in productive enterprise and the reproduction of labor in the family. Similarly, the relationship between intra-class ethnic opportunity hoarding at work and racial exclusion in the family is masked in this simple model. The extent to which gender, race, and patronage relations reproduce class relations and are, in turn, reproduced by the state, is also masked in this tidy conceptual scheme.

Figure 1 does, however, identify the contested terrain of work and family relations and thus provides a basis for analyzing the production and reproduction of class, race, and gender inequality. Also, the extent to which one type of relationship is reproduced as another, which Tilly (1998) defines as "emulation," and the extent to which one type of relationship is modified (or "adapted") to accommodate another can be incorporated into this model. We can describe, for example, how gender relations within the family are reproduced (emulated), at work, in class relations between secretaries and their bosses, or how race relations in segregated neighborhoods are reproduced (emulated) in segregated schools, factories and unions. Similarly, the extent to which labor markets are "adapted" to race can be considered in tandem with the extent to which gender relations in the family are adapted to accommodate labor market changes. We might consider, for example, changes in gender relations associated with corporate downsizing and the feminization and
proletarianization of the "high-tech" or "information" sectors that were booming during the Reagan years (South and Spitze, 1994; Presser, 1994; Castells, 1989:179-181; Reskin and Roos, 1990:306-307).

The simplicity of this conceptual model will facilitate the consideration of complex social and historical processes associated with capital accumulation and state building. In a similar vein, this simple model might guide us through the complexity of classification systems. The model focuses our attention on relationships, in order to determine the number and nature of class categories or fractions (Wright, 1982; Wright, 1985; Wright, 1991; Western and Wright, 1994; Perrucci and Wysong, 1999), industrial and occupational segments (Hodson and Kaufman, 1982; O'Rand, 1986), and the relations between these distinct bases of categorical inequality. To simplify an already complex analysis, however, we shall limit our attention in this paper to dichotomous racial (black and white) and gender (female and male) categories and to the relatively short history of the "long nineteenth century" in the U.S. This period is chosen to represent the development of republican capitalism in the U.S., from the emergence of this "first new nation" (Lipset, 1963) in the colonial revolt of 1776 to its first full-blown national capitalist crisis in the "Great Depression" of 1929.

DOING SOCIAL HISTORY: AN APOLOGIA

The objective here is not to offer a definitive revisionist history. The goals are much more modest. Hopefully, this brief historical account will serve two purposes. First, the story should illustrate how race, class, and gender inequality vary over time and place in predictable if indeterminate ways. Second, the story should indicate how the relative importance and autonomy of these particular types of "durable inequality" might be explained or interpreted historically. In the account that follows, socio-historical variability is illustrated and the explanatory or interpretive power of historical materialism is defended by arguing that race and gender were the predominate bases of social inequality before 1861, but that class and gender became more important after 1876.

This is not to say that class did not matter in the Antebellum period (or that race did not matter after Reconstruction). Obviously, slavery is a class system based on the exploitation of slave labor. Slavery was "racialized" in the U.S., however, and, politically if not economically, race was more important than class in the Antebellum U.S. Wage labor was not unknown in the Antebellum U.S., particularly in the Northeast. Nevertheless, even in the Cotton Belt South, the exploitation of slave (as opposed to family) labor was the exception rather than the rule, even in 1860 (Ashworth, 1995:84-101; Wright 1978:15-42). Similarly, even in the North and especially in the Northwest, the exploitation of wage, as opposed to household or family labor, was the exception rather than rule, particularly prior to 1830 but even as late as 1860 (Johnson,
Part of the explanation of the increasing salience of class as opposed to race is the development of U.S. republican capitalism, particularly after 1876. Nevertheless, economic determinants, as envisioned by either the “rational-actor” neo-classical or the “revisionist” Marxist theories (see Wright, 1978, Chapter 1; Ashworth, 1995:1-18, 80-121), fail to account for patterns in the rise and fall of race, class, and gender inequality. The significance of race and gender in the Antebellum period, particularly in New England, the continuing significance of gender after Reconstruction, and the increasing significance of class, particularly after 1870, is not determined by the logic of economic development.

It is only through the emergence of organized political identities that are rooted in the socially constructed relations of durable inequality that the complexity of inequality becomes simplified and thereby comprehensible (Schwartz, 1988[1976]). In other words, the subjects of our analysis are the subjects of durable inequality—blacks, women, and workers. They provide us with the most articulate and compelling account of their identities and interests in their history of their struggle against categorical inequality, in the form of Abolitionist, Feminist, Labor, and Civil Rights Movements.

Theoretically, we can distinguish the economic and social relations of production and reproduction from the political struggle against durable inequality, particularly in the form of race, class, and gender inequality. We must be sensitive, however, to the “missing voices.” History is written by the winners, so accounts of political challenges will always be fragmentary and incomplete. Also, slaves, children, women, and others who were systematically denied voice by being denied the “rights” of speech and assembly or the means of achieving literacy, are frequently relegated to the category of “people without history” (Wolf, 1982; Fuller, 1971[1855]; Kraditor, 1981[1965], chapters 6-7; Roediger, 1991). Thus social history, like the “new” Western History (Limerick et al., 1991) will remain, at best, difficult and incomplete. Even in its crudest form, however, it might provide food for thought. In that spirit, the following account is offered.

The Long Nineteenth Century in the U.S.: 1776-1929

U.S. political and economic history can be characterized by two cycles of economic and political development or, more accurately, capital accumulation and state building. A long nineteenth century extends from the colonial revolt of 1776 to the full-blown republican-capitalist crisis of 1929. A short twentieth century extends from the New Deal to the fiscal crisis of 1989, or, more generally, to the present (Hogan, 1997:255; Calavita and Pontell, 1992). The
most dramatic transformations in categorical inequality are rooted in the development of U.S. republican capitalism, in the long nineteenth century, but change continues through the cycles of political challenge in the short twentieth century. The U.S. Civil War is a convenient watershed—a revolutionary situation that ultimately yielded a more revolutionary outcome than the colonial revolt of 1776 (Ferguson, 1974; Moore, 1966; Ashworth, 1995, like Moore 1966, considers the Civil War to be a “bourgeois revolution”). Thus we might crudely distinguish class, race, and gender relations in the Antebellum (before 1861) and Post-Reconstruction (after 1876) U.S., to illustrate the transformations in the course of the long nineteenth century (Foner, 1990).

Most generally, the story of the “long nineteenth century” is the story of republican capitalism as it developed in the U.S. One version of this story focuses on the evolution of Anglo-American political and economic institutions. Classical liberal evolutionary theory focused on the superiority of modern industrial society and its “survival” as “the fittest” among the nations of the world. As Spencer (1899, vol.2, chapters XVII-XIX) explained, the “industrial” British Empire was naturally superior to the “military” societies of the African and North American continents. Thus the dominance of the British empire and its efforts to reshape the world in its own image were only “natural” and, essentially, inevitable. Later, equally liberal but less deterministic sociological theories focused on the contingent inter-relations of American [sic] cultural, economic, and political institutions, explaining how the culture of Calvinism, for example, facilitated capital accumulation (Weber, 1958). Following this general line of institutional analysis, a variety of scholars have specified how Anglo-American institutions (such as laws governing riparian water rights: Webb, 1931) were adapted or how peculiarly American circumstances facilitated the development of republican capitalism (Turner, 1972; Lipset, 1963).

At the same time (beginning at least as early as 1851), a radical, revisionist critique of Anglo-American institutions has developed. Like the liberal tradition, its roots are also in a version of institutional determinism if not evolution, best represented by Marx and Engels, in their analysis of the Civil War in the U.S. (Marx and Engels, 1971[1937]) and the revolutions in France (Marx, 1974). The inevitable rise and fall of various systems of political economy and the primacy of the economic base is, perhaps, nowhere more clearly stated than in Marx’s analysis of the Second French Revolution, in 1848. He explains, “The bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe can only be followed by a bourgeois republic” (Marx, 1974[1869]:154). In a similar vein, Marx (1974[1861]) argues that the development of American republican capitalism is predicated on the destruction of slavery in the same way in which French (or British) republican capitalism required the destruction of feudalism.

Once again, the economic base of the political conflict is clear. Marx (1974[1861]) explains, “The cultivation of the Southern export crops ... by slaves is only profitable so long as it is conducted on a mass scale by large gangs
of slaves" (341). The development of the plantation mode of production — with large gangs of unfree labor using crude tools in labor-intensive and land-extensive cultivation—required that the land base be continually expanded. Marx (1974[1861]:341) quotes a "Southern spokesperson, Senator Toombs, [who] formulated the economic law ... 'In fifteen years more,' he said, 'without a great increase in slave territory, either the slaves must be permitted to flee from whites, or the whites must flee from the slaves.'" In this account, slavery (as relations of production) were fettered by the plantation "mode of production." Unless the plantation system were allowed to expand its territorial base, the over-production of slaves and the depletion of agricultural lands would generate economic and political crises of revolutionary proportions. Thus the plantation system needed to expand into the Louisiana Territory and, ultimately, into Central and South America. Anglo-American military and diplomatic capacity would, of necessity, be expanded in order to capture and control this territory. Thus the South required the expansion not just "from sea to shining sea" but also to both sides of the equator.

This radical institutional analysis also views plantation slavery as a fetter on capitalist development. History clearly indicates what inevitably must happen, as illustrated by the destruction of European feudalism. As Marx and Engels (1978[1848]:477-478) explain, "feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder." Thus the "structural" (or institutional) Marxist views the development of modern republican capitalism as inevitably destroying the pre-capitalist relations of slavery, the family farm, the (traditionally ethnic) political and economic patronage systems, and, perhaps, even the patriarchal family. Thus the modern system evolved or, more accurately, burst the fetters of the ancient systems.

At the most general level, focusing on political, cultural, social, and economic institutions, viewed as modes of production and reproduction, the Marxist account might be defended. As Ashworth (1995) argues, it is certainly more useful than the evolutionary model, even as modified by liberal historians. Between 1776 and 1929 slavery was abolished (Ashworth 1995), farming became agribusiness (Mooney, 1988), political and economic patronage were replaced with more rational, bureaucratic-corporate public and private employment systems (Weibe, 1989[1962]; Weinstein, 1968; Roy, 1999), and women were granted the rights of citizenship (Kraditor, 1981[1965]). Thus the revolution of 1861 bore fruit in the development of modern republican capitalism, 1876-1929.

What follows, however, is a somewhat different version of this story — one that focuses on the problematic organizational efforts of the powerful and the powerless in a dialectic of imposition and resistance within the institutional context of "modes" and "relations" of production and reproduction. Specifically, the following account begins with the assertion that capitalism,
Class, Race and Gender Inequality

patronage, patriarchy, and racism came to the U.S. on the first ships (Degler, 1970[1959]) and provided the "external" institutional context for the development of race, class, and gender relations in the thirteen U.S. Colonies.

The distinctive "modes" or "relations" of production that characterize the industrial Northeast, the plantation South, and the artisanal (Hogan, 1990) or "yeoman" (Kulikoff, 1989) West will be presented in this context. Specifically, each will be viewed as systems of class and gender (or family) exploitation, on the one hand, and racial and ethnic patronage or opportunity hoarding, on the other. In this account, the political problems that faced white men in attempting to establish and institutionalize gender and racial inequality, particularly in the Antebellum North, are especially prominent. Nevertheless, the success and failure of "Northern Middle Class White Women" and "Working Class Ethnic White Men," particularly after Reconstruction (1876-1929), are at least as important as the success and failure of "Northern [white male] Businessmen" and "Progressive [white male] Politicians" (Wiebe, 1989[1962]).

ESTABLISHING INEQUALITY

The Antebellum U.S. was diverse, combining an urban, industrializing Northeast with a rural, agricultural South and West. Ashworth (1995) distinguishes three modes of productions, which might be called: industrial, plantation, and artisanal (or yeoman). On balance, however, all three were capitalist in that they were subservient to the global capitalist political economy within which each of these colonial systems developed (Hall, 1989; Frank, 1969 [1967]).

The plantation system rested on the exploitation of black slaves in both class (field) and gender (house) relations. As a "mode of production" the plantation system relied on labor-intensive and land-extensive "gang-labor" in agricultural (field) production. As a mode of reproduction, the plantation combined the use of (house) slaves as domestic servants with traditional patriarchal gender and family relations. Thus the production of cotton and the reproduction of planters (household subsistence, childcare, etc.) was effected through relations between white masters (or mistresses) and black slaves (of either sex). Racial exclusion was sustained, however, in maintaining the white planter family across generations. While white plantation owners and their sons might impregnate female slaves, the offspring were not, generally, recognized as white or as legitimate heirs. In this regard, white plantation women continued to physically labor in childbirth and were thus exploited in gender relations, even though they, in turn, exploited the unpaid labor of house slaves in house and child care duties (Patterson, 1982; Davis, 1983).

Gender relations among slaves were, at best, adapted to the demands of the slave system (class relations). Of greater significance were gender relations
in the reproduction of whites. Both males and females were represented among house and field slaves. This distinction (between productive [class or field] and reproductive [gender or house] exploitation), quite apart from the sex of the slave, appears to be most salient in shaping the quality of slave life and the relations between slave and master on a day-to-day basis. In this case, "gender," as defined in Figure 1, is more salient than sex in producing and reproducing categorical inequality. House slaves, male or female, enjoyed a distinct and, arguably, relatively privileged status associated with their "gender" relations or role in the reproduction of whites.

At the same time, however, the double standard associated with the miscegenation taboo suggests that house slave relations with master or mistress were qualitatively different for male and female slaves. Thus gender relations were both "racialized" and "sexed," with distinctive legal and normative sanctions for sexual relations between "consenting adults" or, alternatively, "rape," for each combination of race-sex pairs. Here it appears that the exploitation of married white women, as sex slaves and baby-makers, was emulated in the extramarital relations between white male masters and black female house slaves. It is also possible that much of the social and psychological burden of "mothering" (Chodorow, 1978) was also foisted upon the black female house slave, in which case we might conclude that gender relations (mothering) were adapted to the demands of the slave (class) system.

The female slave, particularly in the master's house, routinely faced sexual abuse if not rape at the hands of the master and his male friends and relatives (hooks, 1990:57-64). The male slave, however, was metaphorically and, if deemed appropriate, physically castrated by white men who sought to protect "their" women (Davis, 1983, chapter 11). The elaborate complex of rules governing gender, race, and class relations were enforced with vigilante and militia efforts, to reinforce the right of white males, in general, and slaveholders, in particular, to inflict violence, up to and including death, on blacks suspected of challenging racial supremacy (Stewart, 1976:50-73; Davis, 1983; Patterson, 1982; Lott, 1998; Lawson, 1998; see Benhabib, 1992 for a critique of western philosophy that focuses on gender as opposed to race). Slaveholders could, of course, claim property damage if a slave were killed by another white man, but it seems that, in this case at least, economic interest yielded to political interest.

Slaveholders in the black belt of Georgia, for example, were probably more concerned with the prospects for slave rebellion, if insolence were left unpunished, than with the loss of the labor value of an insolent slave. Similarly, it appears that slave-owners were more interested in defending their "legal" rights to slaves, in general, than their rights to a particular black person, who may or may not be "legally" enslaved. Thus, in some cases at least, blacks were able to sue for their right to freedom if they were not "legally" enslaved. In one celebrated case, a slaveholder defended an illegally enslaved black women, as
part of his legal defense of the Fugitive Slave Laws that secured the perimeter of the slave system. As he explains, "Gentlemen of the jury, I am a slave-holder myself, but thanks to Almighty God I am above the base principle of holding anybody a slave that has a right to her freedom as this girl has been proven to have" (Allen, 1998:232). In this case, not only was "Polly" freed from "illegal" bondage, but her daughter, who was, ipso facto, "illegally" born into slavery, was also freed. Thus, "the legal concept of ownership ... can work as a two-edged sword" (Allen, 1998:232). The same "Fugitive Slave" laws that protected the slaveholder could also provide a basis for "slaves" to challenge their masters. Generally, however, the fact that all slaves were "black" and most "blacks" were slaves made it cheaper and easier to guard the perimeter of the slave system, legally or otherwise.

Thus racialization was an effective strategy for extending patronage to white men and thus collectivizing the cost of policing the rights to land, slaves, and women. White men monopolized the economic resources of the Antebellum U.S. – specifically, they "owned" slaves, land, women, and children, which were the essential means of production in eighteenth and early nineteenth century agriculture. Thus racialism and patriarchy provided twin pillars supporting white male patronage, across regions and across distinctive modes or relations of production and reproduction. By accommodating both racial and gender inequality, white male patronage became politically expedient in attempts to forge political coalitions, organize parties, or respond to challengers in a political community in which only adult white males were members.

The white male planter was the patriarch and patron. He was the vestryman, the representative in the House of Burgess, and the Colonel in the local militia (Sydnor, 1965[1952]). His generosity and virtue, his willingness to provide leadership, both spiritual and secular, and his success in securing the unanimous endorsement of all white men, who recognized his preordained or natural superiority, was critical. His role as elected leader of the militia, where he could provide his troops with the concentrated means of coercion and inspire them to protect themselves and their wives and children from his slaves, was critical. Here was the democratic alternative to the mercenary (or colonial military) force that traditionally sustained slavery (Patterson, 1982; Robinson, 1983). It was "legitimated," morally, by a philosophy that denied the humanity of "blacks" and "women" (and children, for that matter). Republican law sanctioned the property rights of adult white males, including their right to the persons of "blacks, women, and children" (Boxill, 1998:39). Such a legal foundation was also adapted to legitimate the appropriation of "unimproved" land and the massacre of "savages" (Robinson, 1983).

In the U.S. and, particularly, in the South, slavery was sustained by the citizen militia and, if need be, the lynch mob, in protecting, first and foremost, the virgin white woman from the savage sexuality of the black man (hooks, 1990:57-64; Davis, 1983:172-201). The paramilitary racialist and patriarchal
organization of the Antebellum South reproduced itself in the American West, particularly in Texas, not only in the plantation culture of the black belt but in the cattle baronies of the open range. Much of the rape and pillage and the accompanying vigilante response of the Wild West, particularly in cattle country, was, in Tilly's (1998) terms, an emulation of Antebellum Southern institutions. It is no accident that many of the most notorious gunfighters, particularly the gunfighter-lawman-gambler characters, such as Doc Holliday, were raised as Southern gentlemen (Sydnor, 1965[1952]; Bridenbaugh, 1975[1952]; Buckster, 1992; Tanner1998; see Brown, 1975 and Rubenstein, 1970 for different perspectives on Southern and Western violence).

The counter-point to the plantation society of the Antebellum South was the yeoman farmer community of the Middle and Far West. The "artisanal" (Hogan 1990) or "yeoman" (Kulikoff, 1989) mode of production was small-scale labor and land-intensive agricultural (or household craft) production. The relations of production were between the "self-employed" proprietor (or master) and the family or other household members (including, in craft households, apprentices and sometimes journeymen) whose labor was exploited in household, field, or craft production. Although "yeoman" farmers and independent artisans were numerically superior, even in the South, they were peripheral in establishing and sustaining Antebellum Southern society. Their economic contribution was in sustaining themselves, and their political contribution was in sustaining the planter, in the militia, the legislature, and, ultimately, the Civil War. Outside the South, however, yeoman farmer and artisanal-shopkeeper communities predominated, both economically and politically (Kulikoff, 1989; Clark, 1990).

Outside of Appalachia, it is not clear that the U.S. ever supported a population of subsistence farmers. Nevertheless, prior to the Civil War, the modal U.S. enterprise was the family farm, in which class and gender relations were oriented toward "subsistence-plus" production. Even in the villages and towns, the modal shopkeeper or artisan household was broadly similar, often including a garden and a few farm animals to sustain subsistence while trading "in kind" for needed goods and services. Farm households on the western frontier, which were, essentially, self-sufficient, also engaged in this sort of informal exchange economy. Women and men exchanged goods and services with their neighbors, maintaining an informal or sometimes formal balance sheet of who was "beholding" to whom for how much of what.

Faragher's (1986) research on Sugar Creek, Illinois, suggests that men and women had parallel but rarely intersecting exchange networks. Nevertheless, class and gender relations were confounded in the "subsistence-plus" system of production and reproduction, which, as is typical of self-employed shopkeeper households, exploited family or household labor in house and field to produce whatever surplus might be available. Generally, there was more opportunity hoarding, through land claim clubs and unions, than
exploitation, simply because there was little surplus labor value to exploit (see Bogue, 1975, on claim clubs; see Montgomery, 1987, especially chapter 1, on early unions and the guild-like patronage relations in the early iron rollers' union).

The exploitation of children and of wife's unpaid labor in producing and caring for children was probably the primary base of categorical inequality. Thus gender relations and patronage relations, including the appropriation, hoarding, and intergenerational transmission of property, distinguished the yeoman (or artisan). These relations distinguished him, first, from the unmarried, childless, and landless adult males, who might have been available for casual labor, and, second, from the women and the children (see Johnson, 1978, on artisan-shopkeepers before and after capital accumulation and the alienation of life and work in Rochester, New York).

One could (and many have) exaggerated the harmony of the yeoman farm community. Kulikoff, (1989) makes it clear that this was a patriarchal capitalist society, which defended property ownership and encouraged accumulation. Despite these ambitions, however, the shortage of labor and capital and the uncertain returns on invested household labor combined to promote collective enterprise, at the household if not the community level, to ensure subsistence, first and foremost. Compared to the plantation system, patronage (or opportunity hoarding, particularly with regard to land) and gender relations were more important than class relations, which were limited. Racial exclusion was more real than apparent in a society that was overwhelmingly white and virtually always segregated at the level of the household if not the community.

The third essential "mode of production" was the industrial system, which combined labor and capital-intensive commodity production within the factory setting. Here the predominant relations of production were employment for wages. The "mode of reproduction" was the patriarchal family or household in which the unpaid labor of women and children were exploited in reproducing labor. This essential family structure was supplemented, to some extent, by the use of servants in capitalist households, or the use of boarders in worker households. Prior to 1876 the industrial mode of production was primarily an eastern phenomenon. Employment was becoming increasingly common between 1800 and 1860, however, when it displaced slave and self-employment, as the modal relations of production (Ashworth, 1995:85).

Even in the East, however, industrial production prior to 1876 was often steeped in craft tradition, as exemplified by the iron industry, which was characterized by subcontracting and familial, ethnic, and racial patronage (Montgomery, 1987:17-21,25-26). Elsewhere, as in Rochester, NY, for example, household craft production was, to a large extent, replaced with ethnic and religious patronage systems that maintained a two-tiered pool of available
Class, Race and Gender Inequality

labor: the temperate, Christian permanent workers, particularly the skilled workers and supervisors, and the intertemperate, migratory immigrant labor force (Johnson, 1978).

In sum, one might argue for the primacy of class in the Northeast, race in the South, and gender in the West. Nevertheless, opportunity hoarding, particularly patronage in the control and distribution of jobs in the North, slaves in the South, land in the West, and women and children throughout the U.S., was of critical importance. Class relations, specifically, the exploitation of labor in the production of commodities and services offered for sale in the general market, were critical in the production of cotton in the South and in the factories of the Northeast. For most Antebellum U.S. households, however, class relations, thus defined, were, at best, a subordinate concern. In fact, even in the plantation economy the relations between master and slave were less critical, politically if not economically, than the relations between whites and blacks.

SUSTAINING AND CHALLENGING INEQUALITY

It was only through the cooperation of white males that race, gender, and, ultimately, class relations were sustained. What ultimately tore this system apart, in fact, was not class conflict within the plantation system or even within the South. Neither was it economic or class conflict between Northern factory owners or workers and Southern plantation owners or slaves. It was, essentially, racial and gender conflict, focused on the reproduction of labor and on economic and, particularly, political patronage. In fact, the “revolutionary struggle” of the Civil War was about race and gender, more than slavery per se. The frontline troops were white women and “free” blacks in the North.

What ultimately destroyed the union was, in fact, the unwillingness of the Northern and Western white male yeoman farmers (or artisans or merchant-industrialists) and their wives and daughters to continue to emulate and accommodate the patronage system that sustained race, class, and gender relations in the Antebellum South. As capital accumulation and state building incorporated an increasingly interdependent set of territories and states in what was becoming a national transportation and commercial network that tied eastern manufacturing, finance, and trade to western mining and agriculture, the willingness to accommodate the South declined precipitously (Bensel, 1990: 192-193). As Eastern capital and Western yeomen cooperated in capital accumulation and state building, they became less inclined to defend a complex race, class, and gender system that demanded extensive military protection while maintaining economic dependence on the British Empire, all in the interest of maintaining white male privilege.

Simply stated, in the East and the West, white male privilege was not yet sufficiently challenged, in 1860, to warrant the cost of sustaining the...
patronage system of the Antebellum South. In fact, racialism threatened patriarchy more than slavery threatened capitalism. Nevertheless, continuing to adapt yeoman and industrial relations to accommodate the increasing demands of the Southern patronage system was ultimately deemed more trouble than it was worth, as Northern white female abolitionists were becoming increasingly militant. Northern and Western white men faced the challenge of defending a Southern system of race and gender relations to increasingly militant women who were, themselves, economically dependent and politically disenfranchised. Attempting to accommodate this Southern system was undermining patriarchy if not capitalism, increasingly, after the ladies first convened as “women” (rather than abolitionists), in 1848 (Kraditor, 1981[1965]:2-4). Thus the white adult male voters of the North and West abandoned the Southern patronage system, as institutionalized in its Democratic Party, and supported the emerging Republican Party. Given the clear and present danger that feminism and abolitionism might yield yet more frightening specters, white males in the North and West opted to fight for "free land, free labor, and free men" (Foner, 1970).

After too many years of fighting a losing battle, however, in more than a decade of attempting to reconstruct the South in the image of the North, the defenders of white male privilege in the East and West ultimately, in 1876, surrendered. They realized that they could not sacrifice the Southern patronage system (and the Democratic Party) without endangering the sanctity of property rights, which was one of the foundational pillars for the system of class, race, and gender privilege that distinguished the white male capitalist of the Post-Reconstruction era. Particularly after 1876, white male capitalists could not afford to tolerate challenges to private property (Moore, 1966; Foner, 1990).

It was not simply the internal contradictions of republican capitalism that suddenly and dramatically, once it was “ripe,” in 1861, destroyed the U.S. governing coalition of 1776. Capitalism was not “ripe” until 1929, and even slavery could have survived the 1850s (even Ashworth, 1995:13 concedes this point) and might have endured much longer had it been sustained by Anglo-American military adventures. The fact that American republican capitalism survived 1929 should provide ample evidence that systems of durable inequality do not simply explode when they are fully developed, after years of apparently peaceful progress.

Instead, the process of establishing and sustaining the governing coalition of 1776 was contentious. Race, class, and gender interests continually challenged the categorical inequality institutionalized in Antebellum U.S. republican capitalism. From the outset, the political challenge of the successful completion of the colonial revolt (1776-1789) was to institutionalize local class, race, gender, and patronage systems within the general bounds of patriarchy, racism, republicanism, and capitalism. The problem was not, essentially, the internal contradictions of plantation, yeoman, and industrial systems or even the incompatibility of these institutionalized “modes of production.” The problem
from the very beginning was conflict at the organizational level between established local and emergent national interests.

Clearly, in 1776, the Thirteen Colonies shared a tradition of Anglo-American republican capitalism that was adapted in each colony to accommodate the peculiarities of local class, race, and gender inequality. As indicated above, artisanal (Hogan, 1990) or yeoman (Kulikoff, 1989) “self-employment,” which relied, primarily, on gender and age-based exploitation of family labor, was the predominant mode of production for Antebellum U.S. households. Nevertheless, self-employment rates declined significantly, from an estimated 57% in 1800 to a still substantial 37% of all U.S. households in 1860 (in the twentieth century, rates hover at or below 20%, depending on the population: see Hogan and Perrucci, 1998). At the same time, wage-earning rates increased from 12% to 40%, while slavery rates declined from 31% (in 1800) to 23% in 1860 (Ashworth, 1995:85).

Clearly, wage labor was displacing self-employment and slavery as the predominant relations of production in nineteenth century U.S. households. It is not clear, however, that either slavery or self-employment was in danger of disappearing in 1860 – certainly not in the short-run (Ashworth, 1995:85; Wright 1978). Sharecropping ultimately replaced the plantation system, and substantially undermined the Southern yeoman system, but this did not happen on any appreciable scale until after the failure of Reconstruction, in 1876. In fact, the sharecroppers (as a class) did not challenge planter-merchant hegemony until the 1890s (Wright, 1978; Hahn, 1983; Schwartz, 1988(1976)). Furthermore, the use of convict labor in mining, in Dade County, Georgia, in 1880, suggests that long after slavery was abolished the plantation mode of production (using convict instead of slave labor) was still quite serviceable (U.S. Bureau of Census, 1880).

It is not at all clear that capital accumulation and proletarianization directly threatened either slave or yeoman production in 1860. It was, first, the Greenbackers, in 1872-1876, and then the Labor movement, beginning in roughly the same period but gaining political strength, particularly in the West, between 1880 and 1896, that effectively challenged convict labor. This explains, in part, why, in 1886, the use of convicts in coal mining was typical in Georgia, common in Kansas, but virtually unknown in Colorado, despite the fact that the Colorado State Penitentiary was in the coal-mining county of Fremont (Hogan, 1990; U.S. Bureau of Census, 1880; U.S. Commissioner of Labor, 1887). The militancy of the miners, 1870-1896, essentially foreclosed the possibility of convict labor in the Colorado mines (Wright, 1974).

As Wright (1978:37-42) explains, with regard to the plantation South, “yeoman” relations predominated in 1860, with land ownership estimated at 80-90% of planters, most of whom owned no slaves. Like their counterparts in the North and West, the yeomen were relatively self-sufficient and were not, in any
sense, economically exploited by the slaveholders. Neither were the yeomen exploited, to any appreciable extent, by industrial capitalists, even in Antebellum New England. They were, however, like their yeomen counterparts in the North and West both included and excluded in race, gender, and patronage relations with white male patriarchs and patrons. In this regard, it appears that, ultimately, the white male patriarchs and patrons of the North were more effective in sustaining white male privilege than were their counterparts in the South.

The fact that the white male patriarchs and patrons of the North were more likely to be merchant or incipient industrialist town-dwellers, who relied on the surplus labor and products of local agriculture, was important. The exploitation of the yeoman’s daughters (as factory workers), or the yeoman’s wives and daughters (as cottage-industry out-workers), indicates an economic accommodation of industrial and artisanal (or yeoman) relations of production. Under the umbrella of a (patriarchal) gentlemen’s agreement and a patronage-based system of credit and taxation, this adaptation of the industrial (factory) system was effected. It allowed industrial production to adapt itself to emulate patriarchal relations, with factories that provided dormitories for young farm girls, who worked for a few years before finding a husband (Dublin, 1979, chapters three and five). Capitalist industrial production, in other towns, accommodated the same patriarchal relations in providing outwork for farm women and children, enabling farmers to raise money to pay taxes (and thus providing the “plus” in “subsistence plus” production). Such accommodation in the exploitation of yeoman women and children’s labor, simply indicates how adaptable republican capitalism can be (Clark, 1990:184-189; Dublin, 1985; Kulikoff, 1989, Hogan, 1990).

White male patriarchs in the South had a more stormy relationship with the yeoman farmers, particularly in the UpCountry of the Carolinas (Rubenstein, 1970; Brown, 1975). Problems with the yeoman continued to plague the planters, in Georgia, for example, even after the defeat of Reconstruction (Hahn, 1983), which indicates, once again, the difficulties in accommodating yeoman and plantation production. The problem, however, was not in class relations—planters did not rely on the yeomen as a labor force. The problem was political patronage and military (coercive) control, which rested on a “gentlemen’s agreement” that seems particularly one-sided (when viewed from the outside—particularly from the North or West). The continuing difficulty in controlling the Southern yeoman, and thereby controlling the slaves, was rooted in the difficulties in accommodating plantation and yeoman relations within a political economy that was predominately (and was becoming increasingly) capitalist. Viewed in institutional terms, the plantation “mode” and its “master-slave” relations were “archaic” (Hobsbawm, 1965[1959]). Viewed in organizational terms, the ability to accommodate racialism and patriarchy within a patronage system that offers limited access to land, slaves, or even to white women and their children, was and is a problem that has plagued the South and
the Democratic Party ever since either was established.

The Southern plantation economy needed the North to sustain its control of the yeoman. The Southern military, if sustained by Northern capital and industry, could effect the domination of the hinterland, so long as white men cooperated, regardless of class or region, in defending a version of republican capitalism that could accommodate local variation in class, race, gender, and patronage relations. George Washington’s election was a foregone conclusion. What was problematic was his willingness and his ability to lead “federal” troops on their first nationalist expedition, to crush the patrons of the Western yeomanry. The first challenge to federal authority, which the conventional (“Whig”) history derides as “The Whiskey Rebellion,” marks the opening blow of the war against labor, first, in its guise as federalism and, later, in its guise as the Democratic-Republican Party (Gould, 1996). This hyphenated abomination betrays the internal contradictions of political party patronage that relies on race and gender inequality as the basis for political control, effected through rape and murder. Thus coercive violence provides the institutional basis for legitimating the exploitation of family or slave labor and the basis for maintaining the distinction between the two. This system, shepherded by the charismatic military leadership of Washington, became routinized in the administrative system elaborated by Hamilton and in the partisan system elaborated by Jefferson (then Madison, Monroe, and finally, Jackson and Van Buren – see Charles, 1961[1956]; Cunningham, 1957; Hofstadter, 1969).

Its most serious challenge in the North comes not from Northern labor (white immigrants: see Roediger, 1991) or capital, but from white Northern women and even white Southern women who fled to the North. The Grimke sisters, for example, were traitors to both class and region. They defended human rights with the radical notion that “all human beings have the same rights” regardless of race or gender (Kraditor, 1989[1969]:45). Prudence Crandall, a White Quaker, defied her Yankee neighbors in Connecticut by admitting “blacks” to her private academy for “girls.” Crandall was jailed, and vigilantes destroyed her school in 1834 (Stewart, 1976:63). Clearly, racial exclusion extended beyond the South and beyond gendered family relations to include the private schools through which genteel ladies reproduced themselves in the form of their “girls” (their female students). Even in New England, gender relations were racialized.

The ability of an essentially racist, patriarchal patronage system to physically conquer the West and to subdue, in the process, not simply the “Indian savages” but also the yeoman farmer and the immigrant worker, is, essentially, the subject of the “new” Western History. In the West, capital accumulation and state building were associated with the commercialization of agriculture, the alienation of productive and reproductive labor, and the intensification of class and gender exploitation. The process involved not simply shifting field production from subsistence to commercial crops but also
reorienting household production from subsistence, achieved through interhousehold exchange, toward consumerism. While many family farmers fell into debt and mortgaged their land, railroads and other corporate capitalists in the Western States, such as Kansas and Colorado, instituted sharecropping and tenancy systems, which emulated the sharecropping or debt-peonage system instituted in the South (U.S. Bureau of Census, 1880).

The major difference in sharecropping in the North and South is the presence, in the North, of bankers and merchants who remained independent of the large landowners who rented on shares. As Schwartz (1988[1976]) has indicated, the lack of finance capital in the South created a system in which a single class emerged as the landlord-merchant-creditor, whose relations with the sharecropper characterized the class system of the Post-Reconstruction South. Of course, given the tradition of racialized slavery, the Southern system was much more explicitly racialized. As one Southern sharecropper explains, "My daddy put me to plowing the first time at nine years old, right after my mother died ... plowing up the white man's potatoes" (Rosengarten, 1989[1974]:15).

In the Western States, where sharecropping was less explicitly racialized, class and gender conflict appeared in the form of agricultural cooperatives, mining and industrial unions, and third party political challenges, increasingly after 1870. The alienation and intensification of class and gender exploitation brought gender as well as class interests to the forefront of Western political struggles, particularly in the mining regions, where labor had a history of economic independence and class-based political organization. Not surprisingly, in these regions, leftist labor organizing and campaigns for women's rights increased dramatically in the Post-Reconstruction period (Malone, 1981; Hogan, 1990; Reitman, 1991).

In the East, patronage in immigrant labor recruitment and in both employer and employee organizations provided bases for machine politics, in which parties emulated ethnic, racial, and gender segregation at work, at home, and in the unions. Ultimately, the "progressive" reforms of the northern Republican Party defended the interests of northern native-born white businessmen and women. The party convinced former abolitionists to abandon blacks to the Southern Democracy and to embrace temperance and anti-communism in preliminary efforts to Americanize the immigrant factory workers (Wiebe, 1989[1962]; Kraditor, 1981[1965]; Kraditor, 1989[1969]; McPherson, 1975). These progressive reform efforts, in the northern cities, did little to stifle increasing labor militancy, on the one hand, and increasingly severe economic crises, on the other. When the stock market crashed in 1929 it was clear that the Republican promise of peace and prosperity was, at best, short-lived.
TOWARD THE FUTURE

A history of class, race, and gender relations under the New Deal, the Great Society, and Reagan's America would take us well beyond the limits of current concerns, but much of this history has already been written. The struggle of left labor, including the I.W.W. (Cohen, 1990; Dubofsky, 1988[1969]), and the efforts to organize inter-racial unions in racially segregated cities (Horowitz, 1997) or to organize black labor (Pfeffer, 1990), and Southern labor (Honey, 1993) deserve the book-length treatment that recent historical scholarship has provided. Similarly, the struggle of women within male unions (Gabin, 1990) and within unions of their own making (Quadagno, 1988) is well documented.

Aside from making reference to these stories, two points are worthy of note. First, communist and socialist labor organizations attempted to overcome the tendency of employers to emulate, within the factory, the racial and gender relations within the family and the residential community. Militants opposed adaptation of factory employment and union recruitment relations in the service of racial and gender interests. They also opposed efforts to divide and conquer labor by adapting race and gender relations in the interest of undermining unions and establishing employer controlled patronage systems. Second, employers and, to some extent, more conservative union organizations opposed the left and the more militant unions on these issues. In fact, the struggle to defend the "free enterprise system" from the combined effects of economic and political crises in the 1930s was a collaborative public and private, economic, social, cultural, and religious campaign that paralleled the efforts to create a racialist slave society in the Antebellum South (Fones-Wolf, 1994). It was, in fact, equally successful.

The corporate liberal triumph of the New Deal, the nationalist surge of World War II, and the conservativism and anti-communist hysteria of the Postwar years defeated the "militant movement" of the 1930s. These "progressive" or "moderate" forces were as effective as the moderate Republicans and the Democrats, who had defeated the "radical" reconstructionists, the Knights of Labor, and the Greenbackers, in the 1870s, and, ultimately, the Populists, in 1896 (Foner, 1990; Voss, 1993; Montgomery, 1987; McNall, 1988; Schwartz, 1988[1976]). Nevertheless, the class, race, and gender interests that were preempted, coopted, and repressed in each of these cycles of political challenge re-emerged, after a period of latency in which organizational networks thinned but did not disappear (Rupp and Taylor, 1987; Taylor, 1989; McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1984, Pfeffer, 1990).

When political opportunities increased, in the 1950s, a new cycle of political challenge began, spearheaded by the Civil Rights Movement. In response, the Great Society program of the 1960s included fair employment and housing legislation. Thus federal law attempted to counter the race and, ultimately, gender inequality that had, by this time, been institutionalized in the seniority system of corporate unionism in the industrial North and in the "right to
work" anti-unionism of the South. Since then, however, and particularly during the Reagan years (1981-1988) the struggle to reassert white male capitalist privilege has been renewed, in efforts to break unions, beginning with the air traffic controllers, to unfetter "free enterprise," and to redistribute wealth from the poor to the rich. The collapse of the speculative pyramid scheme of Reaganomics, in the savings and loan crash of 1989 (Hogan, 1997), and the resurgence of liberalism since 1992 has, perhaps, provided opportunities for addressing the race and gender (if not class) inequality that had been a less prominent concern in the 1980s. Changes in partisan political agendas notwithstanding, academics have become concerned with the lack of progress in reducing race and gender inequality as it had become institutionalized both at home and at work.

Ultimately, white male capitalist privilege is produced and reproduced through class, race, gender, and patronage relations, at home and at work, that maintain the privileged position of the married white male capitalist (Hogan et al., 2000). Relations with these men reproduce their privilege and the durable inequality in class, race, gender, and patronage relations. The exploitation of labor in the monopoly sector and the colonization of the more competitive sectors sustain the hegemony of large capital and the process through which surplus capital accumulates in the monopoly sector while surplus labor accumulates in the ghetto. Similarly, the exploitation of women and the racial exclusion of blacks, within the family, and their exploitation or exclusion, through patronage, in the workplace, reproduces white male privilege. The struggle to escape the poverty and instability of the ghetto sector is not simply an individual quest to accumulate human capital, such as educational or professional credentials. The path toward managerial or professional employment, for example, is through relations of exploitation and opportunity hoarding through which privilege is reproduced and inequality endures.

Most generally, "durable inequality" develops and changes as part of a dynamic process of developing modes of production and reproduction, within which, relations of production and reproduction develop. Multiple dimensions of inequality appear to be characteristic of institutional development. Waves of economic and political development yield multiple loci of exploitation and opportunity hoarding, as life and work become increasingly alienated and complex. Political challenge reverses this tendency toward multiple facets of durable inequality, as the various manifestations of exploitation and opportunity hoarding collapse in the course of revolutionary struggle.

It may be that Marx mistook the simplification of class and party relations, associated with the revolutionary struggles of the nineteenth century, as a secular trend in the development of capitalism. This mistake is paralleled by the neo-liberal or the postmodern tendency to view the multiplication (and de-centering) of categorical inequality as inherent in the post-industrial or postmodern condition. Instead, this "postmodern" condition might reflect the
relative growth of institutional forces at the expense of revolutionary challenge, particularly during the Reagan-Thatcher years (Harvey, 1990). Sustained revolutionary challenge that is focused on class or gender exploitation or on racial or ethnic patronage systems of opportunity hoarding might yield a much less complex and multi-faceted system than the neo-liberals or post-modernists suggest. It is clear, however, that durable inequality will not disappear without a fight.

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