

Richard Hogan

Resisting Redemption

The Republican Vote in Georgia in 1876

Analysis of the Republican Party popular vote in Georgia county congressional elections of 1876 suggests that Charles Tilly's (1978) model of interest-based collective action would be useful if embedded in the dynamic model of political processes and mechanisms that Tilly (2007) proposes. Specifically, class (petit bourgeois), status (black), and party (liberal Republican) interests explain 25 percent of the variance in the election returns. Adding a racial-change variable increases the explained variance to 32 percent but fails to distinguish the yeoman and freedman constituencies and the process through which the Democratic Redeemers divided and conquered the opposition in the process of "de-democratization" (ibid.). By embedding the structural analysis in the analysis of process (quantitatively and qualitatively), we can appreciate how yeoman and freedman constituencies experienced contract/convict labor differently and expressed opposition to Redeemers in qualitatively different ways, ultimately facilitating divide-and-conquer efforts.

Once they lost federal allies, Republicans in Confederate states were hard-pressed to resist Democratic Redeemers. Democrats reestablished the uneasy alliance of Appalachian and cotton-belt whites while effectively dividing and conquering black opposition. Although most Confederate states could claim a white majority (Degler 1974: 193) and could use state government authority or local Ku Klux Klan or militia coercion to undermine opposition in black-majority counties (Campbell 1877; Woodward 1951; Wynne 1986), the Democrats ultimately refused to tolerate islands of opposition and instead disenfranchised blacks and imposed oppressive one-party rule, enforcing labor

discipline through contract labor and convict labor systems that eventually sustained a population of unfree white as well as black labor (Schwartz 1976).

The South could not accommodate demands for free land and free labor (Foner 1974 [1970]), because, like the Party of Order in 1848 France (Marx 1978 [1852]), it lacked a hegemonic capitalist class that could provide the foundation for a republican form of government. Thus the prospects for a moderate Republican (or even Democratic) Party were nil. Instead, a Radical Republican Party, representing the expressed interests of black freedmen and the imputed interests of white yeomen—essentially, a petit bourgeois agrarian class—fought for a revolutionary redistribution of property and the celebration of the rights of labor. Ultimately, the revolutionary forces were defeated, and the prospects for a democratic South were foreclosed by the rise of the Democratic Redeemer Party representing the interests of land and trade. This was a dominant but not a hegemonic class, a fledging capitalist class largely without banking and insurance interests and thoroughly dependent on the government to protect itself from workers, on the one hand, and from its own impotence and ambition, on the other. In other words, the problems of labor discipline and honor among thieves inspired repressive and conspiratorial efforts that defied the logic of republican capitalist institutions as they developed elsewhere in the United States (Moore 1967; Burawoy 1985; Bensel 1990).¹

Nevertheless, counterrevolutionary, reactionary politics and oppressive labor relations were not inevitable (Honey 1993). There were times and places where it appeared that revolution was possible, and we can learn much about the prospects for social justice and democratic politics by looking at those places where, against the most overwhelming odds, black and white Republicans or third-party challengers opposed the Democratic Redeemers. Here we shall focus our attention on the white yeoman constituency of the Seventh Congressional District (in the northwestern corner of Georgia, on the Cumberland Plateau) and the black freedman Atlantic coastal constituency of the First Congressional District (in the southeastern corner of Georgia) in contrast to the rest of Georgia, particularly the black/cotton-belt county of Oglethorpe in what became the Eighth Congressional District (in northeast-central Georgia). These three districts were selected because they represent interesting differences within the range of local Georgia politics that correspond to major regional differences (on negative case methodology, see Hogan 1990: 18; Emigh 1997: 653–60).

The yeoman and freedman constituencies were united by class interest and divided by racial status, so their common partisan orientation in the congressional elections of 1876 suggests the triumph of class over race, particularly since the black/cotton belt voted Democratic. Ultimately, however, we shall see that they had a common enemy—liberal Republicans who became Democratic Redeemers—but their relationship with the Redeemer government and the contract/convict labor system led these constituencies down diverging paths in opposition. Thus we can see how efforts to divide and conquer opposition would bear fruit in the coercive economic and repressive political system that the Redeemers eventually institutionalized in the process of “de-democratization” (Tilly 2007).

Predicting/Explaining Partisanship

Much of the confusion regarding partisanship in elections stems from a focus on the social psychology of mass belief systems (Converse 1964, 1980) or on institutional models of party systems (Burnham 1970; Club et al. 1980; Campbell 1992; Campbell 2006) rather than on the organization of partisan efforts to control the ballot box (Bensel 2004). A historical, social-movements approach is most useful in this regard. Here I begin with general assumptions regarding interests (Tilly 1978: 61), imputing class-based interests likely to predict collective action in the long run and relying on expressed interests in particular instances of collective action.

Thus I assert that the Republican Party generally represented the interests of an emerging bourgeoisie, which in 1860 sustained the unstable coalition of western yeomen and eastern industrialists, united around the expressed interest “Vote yourself a tariff; vote yourself a farm” (quoted in Wright 1978: 137; on Republican ideology, see Foner 1974 [1970]: 1–10). To this “class” interest we can add the purely political (“party”) interest of Republican Party officials, who adopted a cautious attitude toward slavery, limiting opposition to its extension but then proclaiming emancipation in response to Southern rebellion (Stewart 1976: chap. 8). From that moment, the politics of class were inextricably bound with the politics of race. Blacks (especially freedmen) supported the Republican Party as their liberator. Whites were not, however, uniformly Democratic, even in the South (Hart 1975; McKinney 1978; Anderson 1981; Hahn 1983). But there was a decidedly regional interest expressed by voters voting as they shot and by poli-

ticians “waving the bloody shirt” (Holt 2008: 5; see Weber 1978 [1956] on class, status, and party interests).

Interests are a necessary but not sufficient base for political action. As John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (1977: 1215) have asserted, “We are willing to assume . . . that there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grassroots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite groups.” My inclination is to soften the assumption that only elites (or “conscience constituents”) have adequate resources (*ibid.*: 1216) and to follow instead the resource mobilization model of Charles Tilly (1978: 36), which posits interests as the base for organization, mobilization, repression/facilitation (the basis of power), and opportunity/threat. For our purposes, the class, status, and party interests described above provide a foundation for political challenge but only to the extent that these constituencies are organized and have mobilized sufficient resources to take advantage of the opportunities (and respond to the threats) represented by voting. As we shall see, particularly for the freedmen, the threats associated with voting Republican were considerable, for it increased the cost of collective action and the necessity of organizing and mobilizing local resources to oppose the Redeemers. The resources and organization of the northwestern yeoman constituency surrounding Dade County and, particularly, the southeastern freedman constituency surrounding McIntosh County are critical in explaining regional differences in challenging Democratic Redeemers between 1868 and 1876.

For those constituencies prepared to act, the seemingly irreconcilable differences between the Democratic and Republican Parties provided challengers with tremendous opportunities (Tarrow 1998: 76–80), particularly for the yeoman and freedman constituencies that were the most direct beneficiaries of the Republican Party program of 1860–68. Then, as the lines of cleavage between national parties shifted, the opportunities to exploit these divisions diminished. Opportunity/threat have, at times, appeared to be exogenous: part of the larger political environment and largely imperious to challenger efforts (*ibid.*: 89). More recently, however, Tilly (2007) has incorporated opportunity/threat into the model as conditions that affect mechanisms that are embedded in larger processes, both of which tend to produce similar results across time and place, subject to certain conditions (including opportunities/threats).

In the Reconstruction South, Redemption follows the logic of

de-democratization. The major mechanism that will be the focus of attention here is divide and conquer, which includes the repression of radicals and leaders (especially radical leaders) and the co-optation of moderates and followers (especially those who might be induced into lower-level leadership positions, e.g., deputy sheriff). Generally, these mechanisms facilitate de-democratization, but their efficacy is conditioned by state capacity and the correlated problem of hegemonic versus coercive modes of production and by the organization, resources, and power of challengers, antagonists, and authorities.

In Georgia in 1868 the most important interests were white yeomen, who could be recruited by conservative Democrats and even liberal Republicans, and freedmen, who tended to be loyal to the Radical Republicans but could sometimes be recruited by liberal Republicans or intimidated if not co-opted by conservative Democrats. The planters and the entrepreneurial railroad and coal-mining/industrial interests formed an unstable coalition of old Whigs and Democrats, a coalition of land and trade lacking a substantial, hegemonic finance, industrial, or even commercial capitalist class. These dominant but not hegemonic fractions of the capitalist class floundered through Radical Reconstruction and the elections of 1868, casting themselves alternately as liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats, until they emerged as Redeemers in waves beginning in 1870 (Michael Perman [1984: 89–90, 292n2] reviews the historiography, especially Woodward-Alexander perspectives on Whiggery).

How these lines of cleavage shifted between 1868 and 1876 is a complex story, but I can offer a few observations. First, at the national level, particularly in the North, there was a concerted effort by Democrats and Republicans to attract the moderate or liberal Republican vote. Lawrence Grossman (1976: 15) explains, “After the 1868 election Democratic moderates gave up opposition to the Reconstruction Acts as futile, while the old-liners kept up the fight.” Second, both Republicans and Democrats attacked the Radical Republican Party and attempted to preempt third-party challengers. “[These efforts], in 1875[,] produced convergence between Republican and Democratic stances on Reconstruction, monetary policy, and reform” (Holt 2008: 48). In Georgia the Democrats vilified Ulysses S. Grant for sending troops to Louisiana and accused Radical Republicans, black and white, of stealing from the school fund and plundering the Freedmen’s Bank (*Darien Timber Gazette* [DTG] 1874b; Foner 1990: 229–33). The Georgia Democratic

Party attempted to undermine Radicalism, at times by supporting moderate Republicans, including some black candidates (*DTG* 1874d; Duncan 1986: 83–86, 97–99).

Ultimately, we should expect to see petit bourgeois yeoman and freedman support for third parties and for the Republican Party, but we should also expect the Democrats to preempt, co-opt, or repress yeoman and freedman demands in building a one-party state. Efforts to divide and conquer the challengers will be most successful when Democrats have and challengers lack the organization and resources required to control the ballot box. Obviously, the Radical Republican government of 1868 offered the privileges of membership for what became, by 1872, the challengers. Once the Democrats redeemed Georgia in the elections of 1870 and 1871, the tables turned. Nevertheless, the Democrats were still much more successful in dividing and conquering the opposition in the black-belt county of Oglethorpe than in the freedman stronghold of McIntosh County or the yeoman preserve of Dade County.

Why not attempt to establish bipartisanship? Clearly, bipartisanship was the dominant institutional order, inherited from the British and cultivated in the colonies, but the conditions in the South did not permit the establishment of bipartisanship. The problem was that the emerging bourgeoisie, a combination of industrial and commercial interests still struggling with a recalcitrant planter class and starved for finance capital, needed to control the state to sustain itself as a dominant but not yet hegemonic class. Securing labor to work the cotton and rice plantations was particularly vexing. In McIntosh County a local rice planter tried importing Chinese (*DTG* 1874a; Duncan 1986: 58). Ultimately, a contract labor system developed, which later deteriorated into debt peonage (Schwartz 1976; Wright 1978: chap. 6; Duncan 1986: 28–32; Hunter 1998: 23–24), but even in 1874 the contract labor system required the coercive power of the state to keep labor from running away. Legal notice of runaway contract labor was reminiscent of the fugitive slave law, as evident in this notice from the *DTG* (1874c):

NOTICE

All persons are hereby cautioned and forbid to employ or harbor one John or Frank Marshall, Freedman. The said freedman, having contracted to work on my plantation until January 1875. Said freedman is coal black, 5 feet 3 or four inches high. The penalty under the law being

\$250 Fine and imprisonment in the common jail, which will be rigidly enforced.

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Contract labor was sustained by a repressive police state that enforced contracts and leased convicts as indentured laborers. Farmworkers with nothing to sell but their labor faced the choice of honoring oppressive labor contracts or being convicted of breach of contract and then leased as convict labor.

As Michael Burawoy (1985) explains, when capitalists are not hegemonic they must rely on oppressive (or coercive) regimes that make popular participation in government a virtual impossibility. Tilly (2007) explains that democracy requires both state capacity and binding consultation with citizens. As Burawoy (1985) suggests, however, this is not an option without a hegemonic class. In fact, weak and divided elites create political opportunities (Tarrow 1998) only in a negative sense. They are vulnerable to claims from an angry mass public, but they lack the power to make concessions. Such was the predicament of the coalition of declining planters, emerging commercial and industrial capitalists, and struggling Democratic politicians, who formed a decidedly undemocratic one-party governing coalition that Woodward (1951: 14–15) characterizes as the “Bourbon Triumvirate.”

Why Georgia in 1876?

Georgia in 1876 is the ideal case for illustrating the extent to which blacks and whites resisted Redemption, even against overwhelming odds. Georgia, like much of the South, had a white majority (Degler 1974: 193), but Georgia has been singled out by historians as one state where the Radicals never gained a foothold (Perman 1984: 28–30). Georgia was subject to Radical rule briefly, if at all, despite the election of the Radical Republican governor Rufus B. Bullock in 1868. Moderate Republicans opposed the Radicals as early as 1869, and Democrats swept the legislative elections of December 1870 and then replaced Bullock in a special election the following year (Wynne 1986: 54–62). By 1872 Georgia was Redeemed and was distinguished as the only Southern state where the conservative Democrats “were already dominant” (Perman 1984: 122).

Thus Georgia is a particularly appropriate case to challenge the conventional wisdom and to indicate how resource mobilization and political pro-

cess theories can guide us in our efforts to identify pockets of resistance to the Democratic Redeemers by combining structural models of interests with more dynamic models of the process of de-democratization (associated with Redemption) and the mechanism of divide and conquer as it operated within the repressive system of contract and convict labor. In this way we can offer yet another piece of the puzzle of Radical Republicans and Independents fighting separate battles against Redemption. Thus we can add to the growing revisionist literature, which documents similar pockets of resistance in Virginia (Dailey 2000), North Carolina (Anderson 1981), and Florida (Ortiz 2005).

Political Geography and Race in Reconstruction Georgia

Between the Confiscation Acts of 1861 and Sherman's Order No. 15 in 1865, blacks in Georgia were promised farmland that, for the most part, they never received (Duncan 1986: 7). In Darien, the seat of McIntosh County, just above the Florida border on the Atlantic coast, however, the efforts of Tunis G. Campbell Sr., a freeborn black from New Jersey, were instrumental in building an urban black middle class that combined relatively abundant economic resources with religious and paramilitary organization as bases for sustaining local control of the ballot box. Campbell was given the authority in 1865 to organize a colony of freedmen on the islands off the Georgia coast. The Freedmen's Bureau soon abandoned land redistribution, however, and adopted the contract labor system (Duncan 1986: 20–31; Wynne 1986: 12–18; Hunter 1998: 23–24), so plantation owners' property rights were secured, and state and local governments dedicated themselves to enforcing labor contracts, publishing notices of runaway blacks, and threatening anyone who harbored fugitives (*DTG* 1874c).

Campbell then left the bureau and rented the 1,250-acre Belle Ville plantation in McIntosh County with an option to buy it (Duncan 1986: 36; Sullivan 2001: 333–34) and set up a new version of his colonizing scheme. The ability to turn freedmen into yeomen (or black versions of the same) rested on three institutional supports. First, there was the economic independence of proprietorship. Second, there were the educational efforts of black schools and school masters supported through the American Missionary Society and the African Methodist Episcopal Church, which, with the schools, consti-

tuted the cultural (or status) pillar of institutional support (Duncan 1986: 25–25, 45). Third, the Republican Party rounded out the class, status, and party bases of the organized interests of freedmen (Weber 1978 [1956]).

Campbell was instrumental in building all three institutional bases. He organized the Belle Ville Farmers Association and was elected its president (Duncan 1986: 37–41). He registered voters in 1867 and stumped for Republican candidates in Darien in April, attended the Georgia Educational Convention in Macon in May, and attended the regional conference of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in Augusta in June. In July he represented McIntosh County at the constitutional convention and was then elected state senator and McIntosh County justice of the peace in 1868, campaigning with his son, Tunis G. Campbell Jr., who was elected to the lower house (U.S. Census Bureau 1870; Duncan 1986: 43–51; Foner 1990: 152–53; Sullivan 2001: 333–38). By then newly registered freedmen and their sometimes Radical Republican representatives were a force in state government and effectively controlled the local governments of McIntosh County and Darien.

At the opposite end of the state, in white mountain Georgia (including Dade County), the yeomen were relatively independent economically and politically. In 1868 liberal Republican (and former Confederate governor) Joseph E. Brown convinced Dade County yeomen to support the new constitution, which repudiated secession and granted freedmen the rights of citizens. Brown promised the yeomen that blacks would be allowed to vote but not to hold elected office (Wynne 1986: 53). In Dade County, which was only 10 percent slave in 1860 and only 8 percent black in 1870 (U.S. Census Bureau 1870), it was clear that blacks would not be elected, but elsewhere in Georgia there was a modest and sometimes substantial black majority (fig. 1).

Figure 1 displays Georgia counties in 1870 in shade gradations that indicate the proportion black (reported in the 1870 census and coded in Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [ICPSR] 1970). Dade, Oglethorpe, and McIntosh counties are labeled because they represent the state's yeoman, black-belt, and freedman populations, respectively, and are focal points in the discussion below. There are some blank spots indicating current counties not yet organized in 1870, but the general pattern is clear. What historians usually call the black belt was the plantation or cotton belt, mostly in the Fifth Congressional District (which became the Eighth in 1872), including counties with substantial black majorities surrounding




Figure 1 Proportion black in Georgia counties, 1870
 Source: ICPSR 1970.

Oglethorpe County, running from the South Carolina border (above the Savannah River, which defines the eastern state border between Augusta and Savannah) into the center of the state. The “Terrible Tenth” District of Populist fame (Hahn 1983), the predominately black region just south of the black belt that included the white-majority counties Glascock (30 percent black) and Johnson (31 percent black), was included with the black belt in the Fifth District of 1870 and the Eighth District of 1872. Black-majority counties were clustered in a broad band that ran diagonally from the black belt (or cotton belt) to the southwestern corner (the Second District), as seen in figure 1. Along the western Florida border were more black-majority counties, but there were fewer blacks farther north and east (in the outlying areas of the First District).

From Savannah to the Florida border, surrounding McIntosh County, is the Atlantic coastal region, including the swamplands, coastal islands, and rice plantations that were part of the geographically vast First Congressional District. The First District then encompassed what became the Eleventh

District and pieces of what became the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Districts, extending from present-day Thomas County on the western Florida border (near Alabama), north to Laurens, and east to the South Carolina border, including Screven but not Burke County, which was in 1868 and 1870 part of the Fifth District but which became part of the First District in 1872. The coastal region of the First District was colonized by Campbell's freedmen after the Civil War. The port town of Darien, seat of McIntosh County, was overwhelmingly (80 percent) black as early as 1870.

Although Georgia was a white-majority state throughout this period, the bulk of the white population was in the north, from the Cumberland Plateau coal-mining county of Dade (in the Seventh District), along the Tennessee border, to the Appalachian northeastern corner of the state (the Sixth District in 1870, which became the Ninth District in 1872), on the North Carolina border. This northern hill and mountain country might be considered similar to the backcountry of North and South Carolina and what became West Virginia. There yeomen lived in an uneasy alliance with the plantation culture, relying on the Appalachians and the sandy soil of the hills to the west as a natural barrier protecting subsistence plus agriculture from the gang labor of cotton cultivation in the lowlands (Rubenstein 1970: 25–26; Brown 1975: chap. 3; McMath 1976, 1985). This “backcountry” together with the “up-country” of the Terrible Tenth (Thomas E. [Tom] Watson's domain) constituted the heart of the white independent proprietor culture, comprising those whom we are referring to (following Kulikoff 1989) as the yeomen (Hahn 1983).

The Economic Crisis of Reconstruction

The problem of race in the postemancipation era was of course monumental, but the significance of race should not blind us to the economic crises that also shaped Reconstruction partisanship. In general, the Southern states lost not simply a labor force but their primary capital investment. The capital shortage was aggravated by the repudiation of Confederate war debts and currency, a condition of readmission to statehood. Thus the emerging industrial and commercial classes were facing a critical shortage of capital, which underlay both the repressive labor relations of contract and convict labor and the eventual deterioration of those relations into the well-documented system of sharecropping and debt peonage (Schwartz 1976). In Georgia in

1870 total capital invested in manufacturing was only \$13,930,125—merely 30 percent of the average for states and territories of the United States. The “true” value of real and personal wealth in Georgia was only \$268,169,207 in 1870—merely 40 percent of the average. If these figures do not seem particularly troubling, we should recall two points. First, Georgia was one of the original 13 colonies and was a much more populous and economically developed state than some of the territories included in the average. In this regard, Georgia compares favorably to the territories but not to its Northern counterparts, such as New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, or even Indiana or Illinois. Second, and more important for documenting the crisis of capital drought, total wealth (“true” value) in Georgia declined by 58 percent between 1860 and 1870 (U.S. Census Bureau 1872).

The Atlantic port city of Darien (the seat of McIntosh County) experienced the economic crisis of Reconstruction differently from Lexington (the seat of Oglethorpe County) in the old cotton belt and Trenton (the seat of Dade County) on the Cumberland Plateau. Darien had been a secondary port in the antebellum cotton trade (compared to Savannah), but its strategic location near the mouth of the Altamaha River provided access to the western cotton-belt counties. After Campbell came to Darien and built his Radical Republican machine, wealthy whites, who settled in the upland suburb of Ridgeville, reestablished the port economy on the basis of timber rather than cotton. By the 1870 census enumeration Darien was a thriving (if mosquito-infested and swampy) town of over 500 persons on the bank of the Darien River. Lexington was not even enumerated in 1870. There were no cities or even post office addresses identified in the Oglethorpe County enumeration, which listed mostly farm and farm laborer households. Trenton was clearly a farming town, although it lived in the shadow of the Rising Fawn coal mine and ironworks.

Table 1 displays mean (and standard deviation) real and personal wealth for Darien, for a 10 percent sample of Oglethorpe County households, for all households within the Trenton post office district, and for the state of Georgia and the United States.² Clearly, Darien was relatively wealthy by Georgia, if not U.S., standards, while rural Oglethorpe County was well below the Georgia average, and Trenton reported wealth greater than the Georgia average but still below the obvious affluence of Darien.

Table 2 offers comparable data, this time computed separately for whites and nonwhites (enumerated as black or mulatto). Here we can see the inter-

Table 1 Mean (and standard deviation) real and personal wealth by locality, 1870

Locality	Real wealth	Personal wealth	<i>N</i>
Darien	\$208 (1,281)	\$139 (755)	547
Oglethorpe	\$88 (680)	\$50 (242)	1,166
Trenton	\$154 (950)	\$87 (478)	1,613
Georgia	\$115 (1,142)	\$65 (534)	11,448
U.S.	\$444 (4,466)	\$210 (3,243)	383,308

Sources: Trenton, Darien, and Oglethorpe county data were coded from the manuscript census, available on microfilm through interlibrary loan. The Georgia and U.S. samples were downloaded from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles et al. 2004).

section of class and race, beginning with the difference between the black residents in Darien, which was 80 percent black, and their counterparts in Oglethorpe and Trenton. Darien's black majority reported average wealth far exceeding the state and national averages. Darien also reported white wealth that exceeded the national average, but more important were the size and wealth of its black (and mulatto) population, which far exceeded state and national standards.

Blacks constituted only 58 percent of the 10 percent sample of Oglethorpe households but 61 percent of the enumerated 1870 population in this county. Thus they were still a majority but a less overwhelming majority than in McIntosh County (73 percent) or in Darien (80 percent). More important, Darien blacks were relatively wealthy and, thanks to the indefatigable Campbell, better organized socially and politically. It is not surprising that they constituted the base of black political power in 1870 Georgia (Foner 1990: 152).

Darien was not a utopian dream. Most of the workers, including common laborers (67 of 68) and service workers (34 of 46), were black, and they reported on average less than \$100 of combined real and personal wealth.³ Most reported no wealth at all. There was, however, a small black middle class of craftsmen (31), shopkeepers (2), managers (2), and professionals (including schoolteachers, ministers, and state government officials, 4 in all) plus the owner of the local gristmill (a mulatto). All of the merchants (17)

Table 2 Mean (and standard deviation) wealth for blacks/mulattoes and whites by locality, 1870

Locality	Blacks/mulattoes			Whites		<i>N</i>
	Real wealth	Personal wealth	<i>N</i>	Real wealth	Personal wealth	
Darien	\$50 (274)	\$26 (112)	435	\$827 (2,711)	\$588 (1,595)	111
Oglethorpe	\$9 (87)	\$9 (50)	680	\$198 (1,038)	\$108 (362)	486
Trenton	\$5 (49)	\$4 (19)	105	\$164 (982)	\$93 (494)	1,508
Georgia	\$3 (59)	\$6 (40)	5,076	\$204 (1,524)	\$112 (711)	6,368
U.S.	\$16 (401)	\$11 (147)	48,420	\$507 (4,778)	\$239 (3,473)	334,024

Sources: Oglethorpe, Trenton, and Darien county data were coded from the manuscript census, available on microfilm through interlibrary loan. The Georgia and U.S. samples were downloaded from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2004).

and manufactures (1 lumber company owner) were white, and these persons controlled the bulk of local wealth. There was no bank—no finance capital at all. Commerce and manufacturing were in the hands of whites, but the black schoolteachers, ministers, and shopkeepers provided a base for organizing and educating the black community, including the neighboring agricultural classes. Equally important, local government in 1870 was clearly in the hands of the black majority. Black craftspersons (mostly carpenters) and professional workers (a teacher and a preacher) virtually monopolized state and local offices. Only two white officials were enumerated in Darien. One was the federal postmaster. The other was a naturalized Frenchman clerking for the black ordinary (see the occupational titles by race in the appendix).

Redeeming Georgia, 1870–1876

Campbell was enumerated in 1870 as a minister and state senator. His son (Tunis G. Campbell Jr.) was a representative in the general assembly, but all elected blacks were denied their seats in the legislature by a vote of the white majority in March 1869. The Republican governor appealed to federal authorities, who reestablished martial law in December 1869 and reseated

the black officials in January 1870. Ultimately, however, their tenure was short-lived. In the December election of 1870 Democrats recaptured control of the state legislature and, in a special election in 1871, unseated the Republican governor. By December 1871 the Redemption of Georgia was complete (Wynes 1977: 213–15; Foner 1990: 183–84). The Georgia legislature organized new county governments in 1871, replacing the elected black governments of Darien and McIntosh County with appointed white Democrats (Duncan 1986: 82–82). These new officials preempted the authority and undermined the influence of Tunis G. Campbell Sr. and his black Republican electorate between 1871 and 1876 with, at best, limited success.

Local control of the ballot box was essential in combating Democratic Redemption, which effectively dismantled local governments that it could not otherwise control. Thus Darien, the hotbed of Republican and Greenback Party support during and after Reconstruction, enjoyed various state and federal elections between 1872 and 1876 but continued to operate under the appointed county government of Democratic Redeemers. Those officials continued to act as *ex officio* municipal officers, replacing the popularly elected black Republican government of 1870 and preempting efforts to reestablish municipal government as a base for expanding local control. Campbell won reelection to the state senate in 1872 but was denied office by the machinations of the elections board in neighboring Liberty County, part of the Second State Senate District (State of Georgia 1927). Realizing that his base of power did not extend beyond McIntosh County, Campbell ran for the lower house in 1874 (Duncan 1986: 95–99).

In this election he was opposed by the Democratic candidate A. S. Barnwell, a rice plantation owner, and by the moderate Republican James R. Bennett, the black sheriff of McIntosh County (*DTG* 1874d), who was endorsed by his black deputy sheriff and by Lectured Crawford (*ibid.*), a local black thrice elected to the general assembly between 1886 and 1900 (State of Georgia 1925) and one of Campbell's most vociferous critics. When Campbell defeated both adversaries, the Democrats discovered that the election judge in Darien (whom they had appointed) was not a property owner and was therefore ineligible for office. Thus they invalidated all of the Darien ballots and declared Barnwell duly elected (State of Georgia 1925; Duncan 1986: 96–99). In the federal congressional election that year there was also a moderate Republican, John E. Bryant, whom the Darien editor supported as the lesser of two evils. Bryant carried only two counties (Bryan and Camden) in

the First Congressional District, and the Radical, Jesse Wimberly, carried only McIntosh County. With the Republicans divided, the Democratic candidate, Julian Hartridge, claimed an overwhelming majority (*Savannah Morning News* 1874) and served in the Forty-fourth Congress (State of Georgia 1923).

After exhausting all of these electoral tricks, the Democrats finally resorted to the “legal” arrest and prosecution of Tunis G. Campbell Sr., who was convicted and leased as convict labor in 1876 for his audacious efforts to defend the civil rights of freedmen during his stint as justice of the peace. Campbell was convicted of arresting a white man for contempt of court (Duncan 1986: 104–7). Even so, with Campbell in chains and appointed county commissioners dominating all aspects of political life, the black Darien voters whom Campbell had registered and represented continued to control the local ballot box and elected black and Republican, if not Radical, representatives to the general assembly in virtually every election until blacks were officially disenfranchised in 1907.⁴

Before we turn to election data, however, we need to add one more piece to the puzzle of political geography. Between 1870 and 1880 the Democratic Redeemers enforced contract labor and supplemented this with the forced labor of convicts (like Campbell), who were leased to Dade County coal mine owners, notably Brown, governor from 1857 to 1865 (Coleman 1977: 411) and U.S. senator from 1880 to 1891 (State of Georgia 1923), who used gang labor reminiscent of slave plantations in the Rising Fawn militia district, where white men supervised a vast army of black convicts (Woodward 1951: 15–16). Dade County went from 8 percent black in 1870 to 23 percent black in 1880. The county’s white population increased by 30 percent (from 2,788 in 1870 to 3,618 in 1880), but its black population increased by 342 percent (from 245 in 1870 to 1,084 in 1880). After emancipation, the black population had dropped from 304 to 245 in the 1860s. The increasing proportion of black residents was clearly a post-Redemption phenomenon and was in fact a carefully orchestrated plan to remove black troublemakers (like Campbell) from the black communities of the cotton and rice belts and secure them as unfree labor in the white wilderness of Dade County.

The Oglethorpe County newspaper editor offered a clear warning to local blacks in reporting that “the Radical negroes who assaulted two colored Democrats [were] elected members of the chain gang” (*Oglethorpe Echo* 1874). The black Savannah newspaper was more direct in issuing this warn-




Figure 2 Change in proportion black in Georgia counties, 1870–1880
 Source: ICPSR 1970.

ing: “Is not Campbell’s sentence to the penitentiary only the forerunner? It is rumored that every leading colored man in the State is to be sent there. So look out ye big negroes” (*Savannah Colored Tribune* 1876).

Figure 2 presents another map of Georgia counties, with shade gradations indicating the change in the proportion of the black population from 1870 to 1880 (the ratio of the proportion black in 1880 divided by the proportion black in 1870). The darker areas are counties where the proportion black increased. The darkest counties include Dade (with a score of 2.9, indicating that the proportion black almost tripled), Wayne, and Clinch, the largely white counties near the Florida border and the Atlantic coast. Wayne, just across the Altamaha River from McIntosh County, near Darien, was 17 percent black in 1870 but reached 32 percent black in 1880. The white population increased by 126 percent (1,798 to 4,060), but the black population increased by 407 percent (379 to 1,920). In the adjacent county of Appling, further inland but still along the southern bank of the Altamaha, the white population declined slightly (less than 1 percent, from 4,110 to 4,084), but

the black population increased by 22 percent (from 976 to 1,192), resulting in a 23 percent increase in the proportion black. South of Wayne and Appling counties, on the eastern side of the Florida border, Clinch County went from 13 percent black in 1870 to 20 percent black in 1880.

There were modest increases in the black population in the black-majority counties of the cotton and rice belts. On the Atlantic coast, Chatham (Savannah was the seat), McIntosh, and Glynn counties all increased modestly, McIntosh from 73 percent to 75 percent black. Similar increases occurred in the Atlanta region and in the black-majority counties on the Florida border. Except for Clinch County and adjacent Ware County, the southeastern counties on the Florida border all declined modestly in the proportion black. Most of the white yeoman region in northern Georgia experienced modest to substantial loss of black population with the notable exception of Dade County.

Simply stated, black migration in the 1870s was primarily a movement of free blacks toward the center of black political power and economic resources, specifically the farmland above the swampy coastal area near Darien and the Florida border, and a movement of unfree blacks, specifically convict labor, from the black-majority counties to the Dade County coal mines. Although these represented distinct migrations of blacks with nearly opposite social, economic, and political status, the consequences for the election of 1876 were the same. On the one hand, the black immigrants to the land of freedom and economic opportunity joined the black majority in Darien and the adjacent coastal counties in supporting the Republican Party, the political base of the freedmen's freedom. At the opposite extreme geographically and socially, the yeomen of Dade County, having already shown a willingness to support moderates in 1868, turned against the Democratic Redeemers, who were importing black convict labor and thereby threatening the tranquility of their white yeoman preserve (Wynes 1977: 218–21). The ability of the Republicans to mobilize the Dade County yeomen and their neighbors in 1876 was not unlike the efforts of the Democrats in Denver, Colorado, in 1880. In Colorado it was the invasion of the Chinese at the behest of the Republican mining corporations (Foner 1990: 135; Hogan 1990). In Georgia it was the invasion of the black convict laborers at the behest of the Democratic governor. In both cases, the voters turned the rascals out.

Table 3 Unstandardized coefficients (and standard errors) from OLS regression predicting county popular vote for the Republican Party, 1876 ($N = 132$)

Variable	Coefficient	Standard error
Manufacturing firms per capita	48.625**	13.984
Owner occupied per farm	0.302*	0.129
Blacks per capita	0.349**	0.110
Liberal Republican, 1872	-0.390***	0.087
Adjusted $R^2 = 0.262$		
Standard error = 0.18078		
$F = 11.254$ ***		
Degrees of freedom = 4, 127		

Sources: ICPSR 1968, 1970.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Estimating Race and Class Effects on Partisanship

Table 3 displays the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicting the proportion of the popular vote for the Republican candidate in the 1876 congressional election in Georgia counties. Race is indicated by the proportion black. Class is represented by manufacturing firms per capita and the proportion of the farms that were owner occupied. Party is represented by the proportion of the popular vote cast for the liberal Republican candidate in 1874.⁵ All of these data are from the ICPSR. Census data (ICPSR 1970) and historical elections data (ICPSR 1968) were downloaded from the ICPSR Web site. The census data are from the 1880 census, which includes measures of land tenure (owned, rented for cash, or sharecropped) and is generally regarded as a more reliable enumeration than the 1870 census (which did, however, include real and personal wealth for individuals).

This model explains more than 25 percent of the variance in the popular vote and provides statistical support for the argument offered above. Party is the most significant, but all three effects are significant ($p < .05$) and in the predicted direction. Yeoman and freedman counties, characterized by small farms, craftspersons, and shopkeepers in places like Darien (McIntosh County) and Trenton (Dade County), tend toward greater support of the Republican candidate. Race also predicts partisanship. Black counties tended to vote Republican. Furthermore, the liberal Republican vote from the 1872 elections predicts fewer votes for the Republican Party in 1876, since both

Table 4 Unstandardized coefficients (and standard errors) from OLS regression predicting percentage of the county popular vote for the Republican Party, 1876 ($N = 132$)

Variable	Coefficient	Standard error
Manufacturing firms per capita, 1880	18.324	14.843
Owner occupied per farm, 1880	0.200	0.124
Blacks per capita, 1870	0.245*	0.111
Black change, 1880 to 1870	0.101***	0.023
Liberal Republican, 1872	-0.479***	0.085
Adjusted $R^2 = 0.320$		
Standard error = 0.17081		
$F = 13.337^{***}$		
Degrees of freedom = 5, 126		

Sources: ICPSR 1968, 1970.

* $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$.

the freedmen and the yeomen were, in different ways, rebelling against the liberal Republican effort to co-opt or repress opposition to the Democratic Redeemers.

Table 4 presents the results of a slightly different OLS model, which uses blacks per capita in 1870 and change from 1870 to 1880 along with the class and party measures from table 3. The black-change variable is computed as the ratio of the proportion black in 1880 divided by the proportion black in 1870. The result is squared to capture the effect of the positive outliers, such as Dade County, the host for most of the convict labor, and the white-majority counties near Darien, which hosted the massive immigration of freedmen who aspired to proprietorship. As seen in table 4, the effects of class are diminished to insignificance. Even race (per capita in 1870) is reduced in significance compared to its effect in table 3. The most significant effects are vote in 1872 and change in the proportion black squared.

Discussion

Beginning with McCarthy and Zald (1977), social movement scholars have suggested that interests are not terribly important in predicting political challenges, but our crude measures of class, status, and party interests explain 25 percent of the variance in county-level vote for the Republican congressional candidate in Georgia in 1876. We could probably improve on this if

we had better measures of resources and organization. The ICPSR election data include county-level data on religious organizations, but the denominations are not distinguished by race, so the effect of the “colored” Baptist and Methodist congregations cannot be estimated with these data.

We could code individual-level census data for all of the Georgia counties (to parallel our data for Dade, McIntosh, and Oglethorpe in 1870), but there are no individual-level voting data; even if we had such data, we would still be left with a static, structural analysis when we really need a dynamic model of changes between the Radical Republican regime of 1870 and the Redeemer government of 1880. Unfortunately, changes in the census schedule from 1870 to 1880 make it impossible (or at least very difficult) to estimate changes in land tenure. Changes in racial composition are the simplest and in fact are quite instructive. The boost in explained variance (to 32 percent) and the specification of the class effects might provide the basis for the claim that status and party and not class explain partisanship. My conclusion is that change measures are more effective in capturing the process of extinguishing Republican partisanship.

We could just as easily use these results to proclaim the triumph of class over race, since the white yeoman county of Dade voted Republican, while the black belt was solidly Democratic. Most important, however, is the effort to locate structural analysis in the context of a dynamic process. We need to locate the interest-group analysis in the context of the ongoing efforts to divide and conquer opposition to the convict/contract labor system. These are the mechanisms that the Redeemers used to facilitate de-democratization, but their effectiveness varied considerably according to the conditions that obtained in particular times and places. For present purposes, we can crudely distinguish the conditions in the yeoman northwest and the freedman southeast in contrast to the black-belt region that lies between these two geographic extremes.

The political geography of Georgia is a bit more complex than the politics of race, but the political effects of race and racial migration can be seen clearly in figure 3, which presents Georgia counties in shade gradations indicating the vote for the Republican U.S. congressional representative in 1876. Georgia had been redeemed in 1870–71, so there were few counties reporting Republican majorities. There were Republican candidates in all congressional districts, but they received no votes (according to the official returns, reproduced in ICPSR 1968 in Oglethorpe County and the surrounding black/




Figure 3 Proportion of popular vote for Republican U.S. representative in Georgia counties, 1876
Source: ICPSR 1968.

cotton-belt counties. In fact, the solid Democratic counties extended south into what would become the Terrible Tenth and north into the Appalachians. There were isolated pockets of Republican constituencies near Atlanta and in the southwest, but there were only two clusters of Republican counties: the white yeoman counties near Dade and the black freedman coastal counties near McIntosh.

The counties posting an overwhelming (60–90 percent) Republican majority include Dade, Catoosa, and Chattooga in the northern half of the northwestern Seventh Congressional District. The Republicans did not win the election, however. With the support of the adjacent counties, including 82 percent of the popular vote in Cherokee County, Independent William H. Felton of Cartersville was reelected to his congressional seat representing the Seventh District (State of Georgia 1923). In southwestern Georgia only Lee County voted overwhelmingly (60–90 percent) Republican. Lee was a

distinct outlier, even geographically, in the otherwise Democratic Third District, and in the Second District, Decatur (southwestern corner) was similarly distinguished but only moderately (50–60 percent) Republican. The southeastern, Atlantic coastal region was the only cluster of Republican partisanship that approached the Seventh District. Moving north from the Florida border, Camden, Glynn, and McIntosh were overwhelmingly Republican, while adjacent Liberty offered a more modest Republican majority. Bryan and Chatham counties voted Democratic.

These coastal counties of the southeast were part of a geographically vast First Congressional District, which extended inland through the largely white hinterland to the border of what became the Tenth District. This diluted the Republican vote in the First District, which did not elect a Republican.

The extent to which the two major parties were divided into moderate and extreme wings, which formed unstable alliances with Independents, confounds efforts to analyze partisanship in bipartisan, winner-take-all elections. Nevertheless, it is fairly clear that Dade and McIntosh counties, although both voted Republican in 1876, represented very distinct bases of opposition to the Redeemers.

In the congressional elections between 1868 and 1872, Dade County voted consistently Democratic (or liberal Republican in 1872). In 1874 and 1876, when the Seventh Congressional District went Independent, electing Felton, Dade remained relatively immune to the Independent partisan movement, casting only 1 percent of the vote for Felton in 1874 and only 11 percent in 1876. What changed was that Dade voted overwhelmingly (99 percent) Democratic in 1874 and overwhelmingly (89 percent) Republican in 1876. In both cases of course, Dade County voters were rejecting the Independent candidate, whose support in neighboring counties carried the election for the Independents. Thus Dade County was an exception to the general support for Independents in the Seventh District in 1874 and 1876.

McIntosh County voters, in contrast, became increasingly faithful to the Republican Party between 1868 and 1872. The McIntosh County Democratic vote declined from 26 percent in 1868 to 19 percent in 1872. In the 1874 congressional election, Democrats claimed 75 percent of the popular vote, but the Republicans turned the tables and claimed 69 percent of the popular vote in 1876. Like Dade County's conversion to Republican principles in 1876, the remarkable surge of Democratic partisanship in McIntosh County

in 1874 was more apparent than real. The Darien vote in the state legislative elections of 1874 was declared invalid because the local election judge (appointed by the Democrats) was not a property owner and was thereby disqualified for office. Apparently, the same judge provided the same basis for disqualifying the Darien vote in the congressional elections. Only 268 McIntosh County votes were counted in the 1874 election (compared to 671 in 1872 and 973 in 1876).

Disenfranchising Darien blacks was only one part of the Redemption plan for Georgia. Poll taxes and various types of electoral qualifications effectively reduced the black voting public, while the reorganization of county government effectively removed black leadership (Foner 1990: 183). Oglethorpe County, in the heart of the old black/cotton belt, does not appear to be represented in 1868 congressional elections but is identified as part of the Fifth Congressional District of 1870, which became the Eighth in 1872 (ICPSR 1968). In fact, none of the black-belt counties of the Fifth District in 1870 appear among the congressional districts of 1868, although the counties certainly predated the election and voted in the gubernatorial and presidential elections of that year. Oglethorpe County was created in 1793 (State of Georgia 1927) and voted a split ticket in 1868, casting only 11 percent for President Grant (Republican) but 67 percent for Governor Bullock (Radical Republican).

In the U.S. congressional elections, Oglethorpe voted 65 percent Democratic in 1870 but only 52 percent liberal Republican in 1872. By 1874, however, Republican partisanship was extinguished in Oglethorpe County. Oglethorpe voted 100 percent Democratic in the 1874 and 1876 congressional elections. It appears that in 1874 Oglethorpe blacks were effectively disenfranchised. In a pattern not unlike that in McIntosh County, the Oglethorpe County voting population was reduced from 873 in 1872 to 329 in 1874, then rebounded to 937 in 1876. This was in fact characteristic of black-belt counties in what became the Eighth Congressional District, where only 6,834 votes were recorded in 1874—merely 43 percent of the 1872 tally. By 1876, however, 15,748 votes were polled (99 percent of the 1872 total).⁶

One might conclude that Oglethorpe experienced the same temporary drop in its voting population that McIntosh County experienced in 1874, but there were two important differences. First, the disqualification of Darien voters affected McIntosh County but not the First Congressional District,

where the turnout in 1874 was greater than that in 1872 or 1876. In other words, this was a surgical strike at Darien black Republicans rather than a districtwide effort to disenfranchise black Republicans. Second and most important, the shift in McIntosh County partisanship did not extend beyond 1874. After that the Democrats lost virtually every election until blacks were “legally” disenfranchised in 1907. In Oglethorpe and the rest of the Eighth District the shift from mostly or even partly Republican to entirely Democratic was permanent. How was this change effected? “Economic coercion and intimidation caused the Negro to vote Democratic, or terror tactics kept him from voting at all” (Wynes 1977: 217). This general explanation is not contested in the historiography of Reconstruction Georgia (see, e.g., Wynne 1986: 58; Foner 1990: 183–85). The only qualification that we should make here is that this was particularly true of the old plantation/black belt of the Eighth District and was decidedly less true, if at all true, in Darien.

The Lessons of History

Simply stated, it is clear that the combined explanatory powers of resource mobilization (Tilly 1978) and de-democratization (Tilly 2007) theory can shed valuable light on the question of where and how Republicans survived in the wake of Redemption. We see in the congressional election of 1876 both the division between yeomen and cotton-belt planters and the sustained opposition of the Atlantic coast, rice-belt freedman communities, particularly Darien, where blacks had the resources, the social and cultural institutional bases, and the political organization and experience to sustain themselves even after their leader had been falsely convicted and leased as convict labor. Campbell was finally driven from Georgia and settled in the relative safety of Washington, DC, but his followers continued to vote, first Greenback in 1878 and then Republican until they were “legally” disenfranchised in 1907.

The power of class, race, and community provided a base for continuing challenge to the terrors of Redemption and even the degradation of Jim Crow that followed. This experience provides yet another example of how the general experience of the black urban middle class facilitated the collective pursuit of collective interest, which we have seen so clearly in the civil rights era (Morris 1984) but often fail to recognize in the dark days of the post-

Reconstruction South.⁷ Part of the problem of course is that the vast majority of blacks could not organize, not simply because of the Ku Klux Klan and the white militia but because they lacked the social networks and cultural institutions that provide a base for articulating common interests and exercising potential influence.

The other part of the potentially confusing story is the seemingly irrational behavior of white yeomen. Hopefully, we can appreciate the extent to which yeomen were not simply cultural dopes or ignorant racists. The psychology of the mob and the racist hillbilly stereotype are as politically charged and as empirically untenable as the image of the lazy, ignorant freedman who needed the master's protection. In Dade County, it seems, the yeomen were capable of recognizing the wisdom of racial tolerance or moderation, as indicated in their support for the constitution of 1868 and their support for the Republican candidate in the congressional election of 1876. As we have seen, however, the yeomen and the freedmen were not cooperating in their opposition to the Redeemers, although they were at times fighting a common enemy. The fact that they were socially and geographically isolated made it easier for the Bourbon Triumvirate to play race against class in exporting disruptive blacks, like Campbell, to the yeoman region coal mines in Dade County. Although in the short run this generated opposition at both ends, it perpetuated the confounding of race and class interests and facilitated efforts by the Democrats to appeal to the yeomen with moderation tempered with the need to repress the unruly, particularly the blacks who claimed the rights of free men.

This analysis suggests the efficacy of Tilly's (1978) resource mobilization model of interests, organization, mobilization, and power. At the same time, however, the failure of structural equation models to adequately capture the qualitative difference in white yeoman and freedman Republican partisanship might help us understand why Tilly (2002) moved away from what he came to see as the ahistorical structuralism of his earlier work. He became committed to a different sort of explanation. As he describes it, "Explanation requires identification of recurrent causal mechanisms . . . plus specification of conditions that affect emergence and concatenation of those mechanisms" (*ibid.*: 190).

In this case, we can see that interests and organization mattered in the resistance to Redemption, but equally important were the mechanisms of

co-opting moderates and repressing Radicals as part of a general divide-and-conquer strategy, facilitating the process of de-democratization. Clearly, the success of this strategy was conditional. Specifically, social isolation and lack of organization and resources facilitated efforts to disenfranchise blacks in the black/cotton belt. In the port cities of Savannah and especially Darien, it was necessary to co-opt black moderates and repress Radical leadership. This was successful in Savannah but not in Darien, where legal coercion and corruption of the electoral process were required to stem the tide of the Radical demand that black men should be treated like men. Ultimately, as Tilly (2007: 23) explains, “the fundamental processes promoting democratization in all times and places [includes] increasing insulation of public politics from categorical inequality.” In this case, in Georgia in 1876 democracy was not possible without conceding the political rights of freedmen, which the Redeemers were not prepared to do for another four score and seven years or more.

Tilly (2007) does not include in his analysis what might be the most important of the conditions affecting the process of de-democratization and the mechanisms through which it might be established. Burawoy (1985) provides a useful corrective here in explaining how hegemonic capitalism facilitates democracy while coercive capitalism forecloses that path. To his credit, Tilly (2007: chap. 6) does recognize that weak states cannot effect the transition to democracy and that, “broadly speaking, elites find democratization costly” (ibid.: 196). Being less concerned than Tilly with the problem of structuralism, if not structural determinism, I find Burawoy’s contribution a welcome escape from the conundrum of determining when and where elites will join nonelites in promoting democracy. In this case at least, the lack of hegemony seems to foreclose the prospect of a democratic path, which is of course simply a new way of articulating what Barrington Moore Jr. (1967) explains as the structural constraints on paths to the modern world. However, we can find some hope in the prospects of a new world order in which categorical inequality does not serve as a crutch, sustaining a weak and divided capitalist class from its ultimate demise.

Appendix Occupations by class for Darien, Georgia, 1870

Class	Occupational title (copied from microfilm)	Black/ mulatto	White	Total
		102	20	122
	At home	74	13	87
	At school	30		30
	Keeping house	88	21	109
Craft	Alderman carpenter ^a	1		1
Craft	Blacksmith	1		1
Craft	Blacksmith apprentice	1		1
Craft	Blacksmith at the sawmill	1		1
Craft	Brick maker		1	1
Craft	Brick mason	1	1	2
Craft	Brick mason and sheriff ^a	1		1
Craft	Butcher		1	1
Craft	Carpenter and ordinary MC [McIntosh County] ^a	1		1
Craft	Carpenter	3	1	4
Craft	Carpenter and jobber	1		1
Craft	Carpenter (house)		1	1
Craft	Carpenter's apprentice	1		1
Craft	Caulker	1		1
Craft	Drayman	2	1	3
Craft	Dressmaker	2		2
Craft	Engine builder	1	1	2
Craft	Engineer on st tug [steam tugboat]		1	1
Craft	Engineer on tugboat		1	1
Craft	Hairdresser	1		1
Craft	House carpenter	1	1	2
Craft	Keeper of boom	1		1
Craft	Keeping house laundry [laundress]	1		1
Craft	Laundress	3		3
Craft	Midwife	1		1
Craft	Seamstress	1		1
Craft	Steam engineer		1	1
Craft	Stevedore	1		1
Craft	Teamster	1		1
Craft	Timber sawyer	1		1
Craft	Wheelwright		1	1
Craft	Wood sawyer	1		1
Farmer	Farmer		1	1
Manager	Farm overseer	2		2

Appendix (continued)

Class	Occupational title (copied from microfilm)	Black/ mulatto	White	Total
Manager	Inspector of lumber		1	1
Manager	Timber inspector		1	1
Manufacturer	Manufacturer of lumber		1	1
Merchant	Merchant (lumber)		1	1
Merchant	Merchant (ret [retail])		16	16
Miller	Sawmill and gristmill	1		1
Planter	Planter		1	1
Professional	Clergyman and state senator ^a	1		1
Professional	Clergyman (Methodist)	1		1
Professional	Physician		1	1
Professional	Representative Ga C [Georgia Council, i.e., General Assembly] ^a	1		1
Professional	Schoolteacher		2	2
Professional	Schoolteacher old S.C. [colored school] and assistant marshal ^a	1		1
Professional	Surveyor of lumber		1	1
Professional	Timber surveyor		1	1
Service	Bartender	1		1
Service	Boom tender	1		1
Service	Clerk		1	1
Service	Clerk court of ordinary ^a		1	1
Service	Clerk in store		1	1
Service	Constable ^a	1		1
Service	Cook	3		3
Service	Domestic servant	8		8
Service	Former servant	1		1
Service	Grocer's helper		1	1
Service	Housekeeper	11	2	13
Service	Job porter	4		4
Service	Porter	1		1
Service	Porter in grocery	3		3
Service	Postmaster ^a		1	1
Service	Salesman		1	1
Service	Salesman and Clerk		1	1
Service	Steamboat agent		1	1
Service	Telegraph operator		1	1
Service	Watchman at mill		1	1
Shopkeeper	Boardinghouse [keeper]		1	1
Shopkeeper	Grocer and baker (ret [retail])		2	2

Appendix (continued)

Class	Occupational title (copied from microfilm)	Black/ mulatto	White	Total
Shopkeeper	Grocer (ret [retail])		1	1
Shopkeeper	Hostler	1		1
Shopkeeper	Hotel and saloon		1	1
Shopkeeper	Lodging home keeper	1		1
Worker	Alderman who works with carpenter ^a	1		1
Worker	Day laborer	18		18
Worker	Dockhand on st e [steam engine]	1		1
Worker	Laborer (day)	1		1
Worker	Mill laborer, saw	3		3
Worker	Raft hand	4		4
Worker	Works at mill	1		1
Worker	Works at sawmill	12		12
Worker	Works for baker		1	1
Worker	Works on farm	13		13
Worker	Works with brick mason	2		2
Worker	Works with carpenter	10		10
Worker	Works with stevedore	1		1

^aGovernment officials.

Notes

- 1 Political corruption and the “private face” of government were not limited to the Reconstruction South (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Hogan 1990), although Barrington Moore Jr. (1967) has argued that the South was a barrier to what would otherwise appear to be the democratic path to the modern world.
- 2 Data from Dade, McIntosh, and Oglethorpe counties were coded from the *Census of Population and Housing* (U.S. Census Bureau 1870), available on microfilm. The data were coded initially for the city of Darien and its suburb Ridgeville, a population of 961. These data were then to be matched with comparable populations from the county seats of Oglethorpe and Dade counties. The goal was samples of similar size (about 1,000 people), so I took a 10 percent systematic sample with a random start of occupied dwellings in Oglethorpe County. Similarly, since Trenton was a very small town, I included all of the persons within the Trenton post office address. Leslie Kish (pers. com., 1980) explained to me that the goal is to have comparable sample sizes (rather than proportions) to compare statistics.
- 3 Data I coded from microfilm include a measure of social class based on occupation. The appendix lists occupations included in class categories for 547 persons enumerated in Darien.

- 4 Russel Duncan (1986: 114) explains that Crawford was thrice defeated by white candidates. See Wynes 1977: 304–6 on disenfranchising blacks; see also Duncan 1986: 116–17.
- 5 Descriptive statistics, inter-item correlations, and plots of residuals are available on request from the author. Collinearity is not a problem in these models: all VIF (variance inflation factor) statistics < 3.
- 6 The fact that 1874 was not a presidential election year might explain part of the decline but not the pattern of decline across districts. Neither the white north (districts Seven and Nine) nor the black port/border south (districts One, Two, and Three) evidenced declining numbers of voters. Only the central Georgia districts experienced a drop in voter turnout in 1874, and this was most pronounced in the old plantation/black belt (district Eight).
- 7 Traditional accounts of the post-Reconstruction era (Woodward 1951) focus on cotton-belt counties like Oglethorpe (Grossman 1976; Wynne 1986), but a growing number of local histories (Anderson 1981; Dailey 2000; Ortiz 2005) document pockets of black resistance.

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