Plausibility Structures, Status Threats, and the Establishment of Anti-Abortion Pregnancy Centers[1]

Rory McVeigh
University of Notre Dame

Bryant Crubaugh
Pepperdine University

Kevin Estep
University of Notre Dame

The authors offer a theoretical framework that resolves conflicting ideas found in extant theory pertaining to moral reform movements. The framework focuses on how community attributes, particularly the relative size of populations affiliated with supportive belief systems, shape moral reform activism by affecting both the convictions and motivations of potential supporters. The theory is applied in an analysis of county-level variation in the presence of antiabortion pregnancy centers (PCs). The authors find that the proportion of individuals affiliated with Roman Catholicism or evangelical denominations has a curvilinear relationship with PC establishment, reflecting the way in which group size can affirm convictions that are the lifeblood of moral reform but can also reduce motivation to act when the size of the group surpasses majority status. The authors also find that PCs are more likely to be found in communities where gender roles are relatively egalitarian.

While some scholars have bemoaned the decline in social capital reflected in "bowling alone" imagery (Putnam 2000), others have proclaimed that we now

[1] We are grateful to the Guttmacher Institute for providing us with data on abortion clinics. Some of the data utilized in this study were made available by the American Religion Data

© 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0002-9602/2017/12205-0005$10.00

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

live in a "social movement society," where collective protest has become increasingly common and accepted as a legitimate way of engaging in politics and in social life more generally (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Although some forms of participation in community life have declined, collective action nevertheless occurs with great frequency in ordinary daily life as well as in social movements and public demonstrations (Soule and Earl 2005; Caren, Ghoshal, and Ribas 2011).

For several decades, scholarship on collective action has focused considerable attention on the art of persuasion. Social construction processes are vital to recruiting and retaining participants and adherents. According to Benford and Snow (2000), "Social movements are not viewed merely as carriers of extant ideas and meanings that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or existing ideologies. Rather, movement actors are viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers" (p. 613; see also Snow and Benford 1988). These signifying activities often include morality claims. Gamson (1992) argues that individuals are unlikely to participate in collective action unless they are convinced that existing circumstances are not only undesirable but also unjust. This sense of injustice triggers emotions such as anger, indignation, and compassion that can motivate people to take action (Jasper 1997). Workers, for example, may be poorly compensated, but are motivated to take action based on a moral understanding of what constitutes fair compensation (Thompson 1963).

In this article we are particularly interested in collective action that is oriented toward moral suasion as an end in itself. Collective action has emerged, for example, promoting issues such as temperance (Gusfield 1963), sexual abstinence (Bearman and Brückner 2001), language conformity (Santoro 1999; Pinard and Hamilton 2000), opposition to gambling (Beisel 1997; Sallaz 2006) and to legal abortion (Luker 1984; Burns 2005; Munson 2008), and banning of textbooks (Page and Clelland 1978) and pornography (Wood and Hughes 1984). We focus on what has been referred to as moral reform movements for two primary reasons. First, developing an understanding of moral reform efforts holds broad implications because moral suasion takes many forms and is not restricted to social movement activism (e.g., potentially ranging from child-rearing practices to high-level diplomatic negotiations). Second, there is no clear consensus among scholars when it comes to identifying the underlying causes of moral reform movements. Some scholars attempt to explain

Archive and by the National Center for Charitable Statistics. We thank Kraig Beyerlein, Bill Carbonaro, Christian Smith, and members of the Notre Dame Working Group on Politics and Movements for valuable comments and suggestions. Direct correspondence to Rory McVeigh, 810 Flanner Hall, Department of Sociology, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana 46556. E-mail: rmcveigh@nd.edu

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

them in terms of psychological attributes of the adherents (Hofstadter 1963; Lipset and Raab 1978). Others posit that moral reform action reflects a response to specific threats to a social group's status (Gusfield 1963; Luker 1984). Still others argue that moral reform advocates' claims should be taken at face value. That is, they are simply reflections of moral beliefs and values developed through lifelong socialization processes (Page and Clelland 1978; Wood and Hughes 1984; Clarke 1987).

We develop a theoretical framework that resolves conflicting ideas found in extant theory. The framework should not only help us to understand the emergence and sustenance of moral reform movements but should also address more general questions about conditions under which individuals and groups feel justified in taking action to try to influence or change the beliefs and values of others. As an initial test of our argument, we examine county-level variation in the location of antiabortion pregnancy centers (PCs)—organizations that offer various services to pregnant women while simultaneously attempting to persuade them to carry their pregnancy to term rather than to seek an abortion. In Munson's (2008) analysis of the antiabortion movement, he notes that many activists are involved in these organizations—what he describes as the "individual outreach" stream of the movement (rather than an explicitly political stream). According to Munson (2008, p. 113), "Individual outreach is perhaps the least publicized and least understood stream of the movement. Ironically, it is also the stream to which the majority of all volunteer hours in the pro-life movement is devoted."

We give particular attention to ways in which specific features of local contexts can either facilitate or hinder the formation of PCs. By focusing on the structure of local settings, we seek to identify conditions that increase the likelihood that a critical mass of individuals will organize in an effort to promote conformity with their own beliefs about abortion. We highlight two features of local structure—features that reinforce the convictions of those who feel that their beliefs represent an absolute truth and features that motivate individuals to take action to persuade others to conform to their own beliefs and values.

More specifically, we focus on distributions of individuals in local contexts who affiliate with religious institutions that depict the act of abortion as a deviant and immoral activity. To bring greater clarity to the study of moral reform activism, as we will argue below, it is necessary to reconcile two seemingly contradictory aspects of social behavior: exposure to deviant ideas and practices can (1) lead to adaptation and assimilation, undermining in-group solidarity and shared cultural norms (Simmel 1955; Lipset 1960; Berger 1967; Blau 1977) or (2) promote in-group solidarity leading to intergroup conflict (Durkheim [1893] 1964; Erikson 1966; Fischer 1975; Olzak 1992; Smith 1998; McVeigh 2009; Cunningham 2013). We resolve the apparent contradiction in our study of PCs by highlighting the importance of group proportions for

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

value affirmation and for perceptions of threat. We show that failure to consider a curvilinear relationship between group proportions and a collective outcome can lead to incorrect conclusions about the relationship between collective action and the size of the group adhering to a supportive belief system.

PREGNANCY CENTERS

Pregnancy centers have become the most active stream of the antiabortion movement (Munson 2008), with more than 4,500 functioning centers operating throughout the United States (this number is based on the data collected for this study). While the antiabortion movement remains active on legislative and judicial fronts in its efforts to limit legal access to abortion and, ultimately, to overturn *Roe v. Wade*, the increase in the "individual outreach" stream of the movement represents a shift in attention away from the battle in centers of government and toward the individuals who are faced with decisions about abortion. The activists who work for and volunteer at PCs believe that women who are given practical help, emotional support, and information about their options will choose to carry their pregnancies to term (Munson 2008; FRC 2012). They consider their work to be the "frontline" of the opposition to abortion, advancing a kinder and less judgmental face of the pro-life movement (Care Net 2014*a*; see also Ianora 2009; Draper 2013; NIFLA 2014). Reflecting on the growth of PCs, one antiabortion activist wrote, "Our passion is far reaching, yet it only needs to reach as far as the individual woman. We eschew political intrigues for the real action instead. We meet mothers where they are, where they need" (Ianora 2009, p. 102).

Typically, PCs offer a range of free services, including counseling, labor classes, access to infant clothes and other supplies, life skills training, financial management classes, and even occupational training (Munson 2008; Kelly 2012; FRC 2012; Hussey 2014). Many centers offer pregnancy testing and free ultrasounds, which can make the center appear to be a legitimate medical alternative to visiting an abortion clinic (Munson 2008; FRC 2012). These PCs attract clients through advertising on local billboards and in various directories, as well as through membership in national antiabortion networks that coordinate online and phone-based help lines that direct women seeking help to PCs in their area. Advertising is rarely explicitly antiabortion. For instance, the Option Line website—which is run by Heartbeat International, the largest network of antiabortion PCs—welcomes visitors with a sympathetic tone: "Think you might be pregnant? If you are wondering whether or not you're pregnant, your mind is probably racing with questions. It's common to feel confused, scared, or overwhelmed. Emergency contraception? If you've recently had unprotected sex or the condom broke, you might be feeling anxious about the possibility of pregnancy. Considering an abortion? Scared.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Pressured. Trapped. If a baby is not in your plans right now, it's possible you're feeling at least one of these emotions" (Option Line 2012). The language above affirms the difficulty of an unexpected pregnancy and suggests that decisions about how to move forward should not be made alone. Activists believe that once a woman experiencing an unplanned or undesired pregnancy comes into their facility, she can then be guided away from the option of terminating the pregnancy and toward either parenting or adoption (Munson 2008).

Pregnancy centers tend to be independently organized, funded, and staffed, but the vast majority of them are affiliated with one, or more, larger networks or federations (Hartshorn 2003; Gibbs 2007). The most prominent federations are Birthright (a Catholic organization with 241 centers in the United States), the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA, which specializes in providing legal assistance to its 1,310 affiliated centers), Care Net (an evangelical Christian organization with 1,850 affiliates), and Heartbeat International (which runs Option Line and serves as a clearinghouse of resources for nearly 4,000 PCs). These larger federated structures facilitate communication among PCs, provide legal assistance, offer liability insurance, offer counseling training, and sometimes conduct national advertising and fundraising for their network of affiliates (FRC 2012; Munson 2008). An individual PC might choose to affiliate with several federations, allowing it to draw on the collective identity provided by a particular religious belief system (i.e., Catholic, evangelical) while also maximizing exposure to resources and to potential clients. A center started by a group of evangelicals, for instance, might initially join the Care Net federation, attend Care Net conferences, and even include "Care Net" in their name, but they might later choose to also affiliate with Heartbeat to receive referrals from Option Line, or they might seek assistance from NIFLA when they want to pursue legal status as a medical clinic.

The large federations described above provide critical infrastructure for the movement. Care Net, for example, offers step-by-step instructions for how to begin a center and how to affiliate with their network. Potential affiliates must complete a lengthy application that requests information about the center's director, governing board, legal status, and the services the center provides (Care Net 2014*b*). Centers that have not yet opened to the public can apply for affiliation under slightly less rigorous guidelines, but still must have already identified a director and developed articles of incorporation, bylaws, organizational charts, volunteer training materials, and descriptions of services the PC will provide (Care Net 2014*b*). Clearly, affiliating with Care Net is not the first step in this form of collective action. The practical guidance and start-up manuals that the large networks provide are, undoubtedly, critical resources for the diffusion of PCs into new areas.

National leaders have shown some interest in targeting particular types of communities for PC formation. Antiabortion activist John Ensor, for ex-

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

ample, headed up an "urban initiative" on behalf of Heartbeat International. In the early stages of the initiative in 2006, Ensor expressed the general goals: "The coming greatness of the pregnancy center movement will require us to go outside our own neighborhoods, to go where the need is greatest, the resources more limited, and the task far more complex—to take the gospel of life to the major cities of America" (Heartbeat International 2006, p. 5).

This strategy includes targeting racial and ethnic groups. For example, movement leaders point to what they perceive to be high rates of abortion among African-Americans, and they characterize their own efforts as a response to what they believe is Planned Parenthood's targeting of poor and minority communities. The antiabortion activists see their PC efforts as forming an alliance with minority group members in part of a broader civil rights struggle. As Ensor (2013) expressed it in a recent essay, "If the civil rights movement had actually kept its focus on the main issue—the dignity of personhood, as Martin Luther King, Jr., articulated it, they would have transitioned from achieving equal rights for black people to achieving equal rights for unborn people" (Ensor 2013). It should be noted that these outreach initiatives seem to reflect antiabortion activists' awareness of the difficulties of the establishment of centers in communities with high proportions of racial and ethnic minority group members.

Geographic Distribution of PCs

Of the many Americans who oppose abortion, only a small proportion of them take action in support of those beliefs or directly engage with pregnant women in an effort to persuade them to conform to their own beliefs pertaining to abortion. Factors that contribute to individual beliefs about abortion, therefore, do not fully explain the formation of PCs and other organizations that carry out an antiabortion agenda. The location of these organizations, however, is extraordinarily consequential for individuals because, in the ongoing fight over abortion, antiabortion activists have adopted a strategy of restricting access to legal abortion facilities. They have done this, for example, by protesting outside of abortion clinics and using a variety of other tactics designed to raise the costs of operating facilities or utilizing facilities that offer abortion services. Antiabortion activists at the state level have sought legislation requiring that abortion providers hold admitting privileges to local hospitals. Others have sought legislation requiring that women receive counseling (and in some cases with mandatory sonograms) and undergo postcounseling waiting periods before abortion services can be provided (Meier and McFarlane 1992; Medoff 2002; Crowley, Jagannathan, and Falchettore 2012).

Currently, a woman's access to abortion is very much a function of where she lives. Data collected for this study indicate that abortion providers are numerous in many states, while in other locations such as South Dakota or

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Mississippi there may be only a single provider for the entire state. Yet in Mississippi there are 53 facilities affiliated with Heartbeat International, Care Net, NIFLA, or Birthright International organizations, and in South Dakota there are 23 affiliated PCs. However, PCs are also commonly located in states such as California, where abortion clinics are numerous. The geographic distribution of PCs is depicted in figure 1. As can be seen, the geographic placement of both PCs and abortion clinics has important substantive implications pertaining to women's access to abortion and exposure to those who seek to discourage abortion.

Extant Theory Pertaining to Moral Reform Movements

To account for geographic variation in the placement of PCs, we focus our attention on distributions of those who affiliate with institutions that offer ideology or religious schemas that support the mission of PCs. Perhaps unsurprisingly, most PCs are run by conservative Christian groups (both evangelical and Catholic) that tend to emphasize commitment to absolute moral truths (Munson 2008; Kelly 2012). Extant theories of moral reform movements show little consensus on the question of where reform movement organizations are most likely to take root and how that likelihood may be related to the relative presence of those who conform to or deviate from the group's values. Gusfield's (1963) classic analysis of the temperance movement suggests that spatial proximity to the movement's targets (drinkers) is largely irrelevant to movement emergence and growth. According to his status politics formulation, moral reform movements are something like the dying gasp of social groups that are losing economic standing in a modernizing society. While experiencing downward mobility in the class structure, they seek to compensate by securing state recognition of the superiority of their own moral values and lifestyle. While moral deviants are a necessary foil for this form of symbolic politics, Gusfield's theory does not indicate that reform movement supporters are reacting to any kind of localized threat to their values. Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that temperance activists were not necessarily concerned with actually bringing about changes in the behavior of those who drink, but were instead pursuing status gains.

Other scholars (Page and Clelland 1978; Wood and Hughes 1984; Clarke 1987) view the status politics formulation as being too cynical in that it downplays the importance of the actual issues for moral reform activists. From these scholars' perspective, movement supporters are motivated by deeply held values developed through lifelong socialization processes. While this latter approach focuses on individuals' support for moral reform, rather than the mobilization of collective action, the argument implies that moral reform organizations would be most likely to form in locations where higher proportions of people feel strongly about the issue that the movement is contesting.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).



FIG. 1.—Location of pregnancy centers (PCs) and abortion clinics

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Luker's (1984) groundbreaking analysis of pro-choice and antiabortion activism treats both socialized values and status concerns as important. In her research she found that antiabortion activists' opposition to abortion could be traced to socialization and life experience, but she also argued that their opposition was in large part motivated by a sense that abortion devalues the status of motherhood in a way that is particularly threatening to women who have a stake in the maintenance of traditional gender roles by virtue of their investment in, and commitment to, the roles of mother and homemaker. Notably, she finds that antiabortion activists were drawn into activism by the shock they experienced when they learned of the *Roe v. Wade* decision legalizing abortion. As Luker (1984, p. 137) describes it, these women experienced the ruling as a "bolt from the blue." This finding and the theoretical argument she employs suggest that moral reform activists would be relatively isolated, spatially, from those who hold different values and from those who favor legalized abortion.

However, Beisel's (1997) study of the antivice movement of the late 1800s shows that proximity to those holding opposing values contributed to the movement's growth. Antivice crusades of the time were particularly appealing to wealthy and middle-class individuals who were concerned about downward mobility for their children. Exposure to vice, they feared, could connect their children with undesirable elements, leading them into activities that could be detrimental to their future prospects while also bringing disgrace upon the family. Beisel found that the movement was particularly successful in attracting supporters where the risk of exposure to immigrants—the carriers of different cultural values—was highest. Similarly, Burns's (2005) study of conflict over contraception and abortion in the United States emphasizes the way in which decisions to frame issues in terms of moral claims is likely to spur conflict in culturally heterogeneous settings where no single moral code holds sway. Other recent research, such as Andrews and Seguin's (2010) study of the prohibition movement and Tepper's (2011) study of cultural conflict over art, also suggests that moral reform movements are spurred, in part, by exposure to those who do not share the activists's values.

Thus there is no consensus on the question of where moral reform movement organizations are most likely to take root. In all formulations, a critical mass of believers or supporters seems necessary. Yet it is unclear whether spatial proximity to those who do not share the group's values motivates, or undermines, collective action efforts. We find both Luker's (1984) argument and threat-based arguments to be persuasive (Beisel 1997). Social isolation can serve as a means of reinforcing values and convictions, because under those circumstances individuals are mainly exposed to others who share their beliefs and values. Yet the proximity of those holding alternative values, as other scholars have demonstrated (Beisel 1997; Burns 2005; Andrews and Seguin 2010; Tepper 2011), can motivate action because believ-

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

ers have reason to be concerned about the consequences of social interaction with those who might undermine a value system which they deem to be not only morally superior, but also beneficial to their livelihoods. Below we seek to resolve this apparent conflict.

Intergroup Contact and Moral Reform

The literature on moral reform movements, as well as literature that addresses more general questions about how people respond to conflicting values, forces us to reconcile seemingly contradictory aspects of social behavior. Exposure to people with alternative values can both undermine *and* foster group solidarity. We begin by summarizing two competing arguments about the role that exposure plays. We then show how the tension between these two arguments can be resolved by considering the implications of group proportions for collective action.

Exposure to Deviance as a Potential Detriment to Moral Reform Movements

Changes in ideas, behaviors, and practices typically occur through social contact. Children learn modes of appropriate behavior from parents, and those patterns of behavior are modified through the life course as their network ties expand and they are exposed to alternative ways of thinking and behaving (Mead 1934; Elder 1974; Bandura 1977). According to differential association theory, criminal behavior is learned through interaction with law breakers (Sutherland and Cressey 1978). Participation in a riot is influenced by exposure to rioters (Granovetter 1978; Myers 2000, 2010). Social movement tactics diffuse through ties between movement organizations and between activists (McAdam 1988; Soule 1997; Rojas 2006; Wang and Soule 2012). Competing business firms tend to adopt organizational forms and practices of their competitors (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). More generally, Blau's (1977) macrostructural theory of social relations shows how intergroup contact can lead to higher rates of a broad range of intergroup relations, including interracial marriage or interreligious marriage (Blau and Schwartz 1984).

Given the role that intergroup contact plays in diffusion and assimilation processes, it might be expected that greater exposure to those who do not share a group's values would undermine the firm convictions that are vital to moral reform efforts. Berger addressed this issue in terms of "plausibility structures": "Worlds are socially constructed and socially maintained. Their continuing reality, both objective (as common, taken-for-granted facticity) and subjective (as facticity imposing itself on individual consciousness), depends upon specific social processes, namely those processes that ongoingly reconstruct and maintain the particular worlds in question. Thus each world requires a social

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

'base' for its continuing existence as a world that is real to actual human beings. This 'base' may be called its plausibility structure" (1967, p. 65).

According to Berger, the legitimation of a belief system can be undermined when it is not reinforced through social interaction with others—"The reality of the world as socially defined must be maintained externally, in the conversation of men with each other, as well as internally, in the way by which the individual apprehends the world within his own consciousness" (Berger 1967, p. 32).

While contemporary religion scholars debate Berger's grander claims about secularization undermining an overarching and unifying religious worldview, there is much in the social science literature that supports more modest claims about how socially constructed meaning systems are reinforced through social interaction with others who share the same beliefs or understandings. For Noelle-Neumann (1974), reluctance to express a minority viewpoint stems from a fear of social isolation. Indeed, she (1974, p. 45) argues, "Willingness to expose one's views publicly varies according to the individual's assessment of the frequency distribution and the trend of opinions in his social environment." Similarly, Granovetter (1978) calls attention to a number of circumstances in which peoples' willingness to join in collective action is shaped by the number of people who have already joined the fray.

Arguments about reinforcement of beliefs and collective identities, of course, extend beyond the subject of religion. Bearman (1991), for example, shows how desertion among Confederate soldiers during the latter years of the American Civil War was most common in units where soldiers were the most homogeneous in terms of their local origins. For these soldiers, he argues, "their localist identities as members of civil society" undermined attempts to sustain "a competing Confederate nationalist identity" (Bearman 1991, p. 340). Similarly, Bearman and Brückner (2001) found that adolescents taking a virginity pledge are more likely to delay first intercourse and, notably for our purposes, that effect is initially strengthened with increases in the proportion of students in the school who also take the pledge. Interestingly, as we will discuss later, increases in the proportion of students taking the pledge lose deterrent capacities when the proportion of pledgers reaches a point where the pledge comes to be viewed as normative.

Arguments pertaining to reinforcement of socially constructed frames or schemas are also found in the social movement literature. Snow and Benford (1988) argue, for example, that frames must resonate strongly with targeted audiences to be effective in recruitment—an argument that suggests a pairing between the frame and the lived experience of those targeted by the frame. Babb (1996) compares movement frames to falsifiable scientific theories that can become ineffective when movement members or potential members are confronted with evidence that disconfirms the empirical credibility of the frame. Similarly, McVeigh (2004, 2006) has emphasized the way in which the

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

resonance of movement framing should vary across local settings, as different structural conditions and different patterns of intergroup contact in those settings conceal or reveal information that can be used to diagnose the frame's credibility.

The work cited above emphasizes ways in which sustained in-group interaction is vital for maintaining commitment, or acting upon commitment, to belief systems across a wide range of social settings and that exposure to deviance can, therefore, deter collective action.

Exposure to Deviance as a Potential Stimulus for Moral Reform Movements

Although spatial isolation from those sharing opposing values or one's sense of morality can strengthen moral convictions, such isolation may also provide little incentive to take action to defend a group's values or to try to change the values of others. What's more, there is much in the sociological literature that documents ways in which exposure to out-group members can promote in-group solidarity. Indeed, going back to Durkheim (1964), deviance is seen as a means through which group boundaries are defined, as it can bring into focus, through contrast, common elements within a group (see also Erikson 1966). More recently, ethnic competition theory proposes that increased contact between racially or ethnically distinct groups, under conditions of scarce resources, can lead to collective conflict as groups draw upon common cultural bonds to facilitate a defensive or reactive form of collective action (Nielsen 1985; Olzak 1992). Increasingly, social movement researchers have also been paying attention to how collective action can be sparked by a group's perception of various types of threat posed by the proximity of other groups (Tilly 1978; McVeigh 1999, 2009; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Van Dyke and Soule 2002; Almeida 2003).

In contrast to Berger's (1967) argument about belief systems being undermined by exposure to those holding alternative or conflicting beliefs, scholars of religion have more recently argued that religious groups can actually thrive in a competitive environment. Smith (1998), focusing specifically on evangelical Protestants, argues that their belief system is, in fact, strengthened by exposure to opposition: "Collective identities depend heavily for their existence on contrast and negation. Social groups know who they are in large measure by knowing who they are not. Ingroups establish what it means to be 'in' primarily by contrasting with outgroups whose members are 'out'" (Smith 1998, p. 91). In contrast to the "sacred canopies" concept first articulated by Berger (1967), wherein religion is seen as providing overarching protection for individuals from anomic chaos and terror, Smith (1998, p. 106) offers instead the concept of "sacred umbrellas," referring to meaning systems that are portable, flexible, and durable. This approach does

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

not imagine a broad, overarching religious worldview in tension with modernity, but instead emphasizes an ongoing social construction of meaning systems informed by interaction with members of one's own social group and in relation to reference groups (also see Evans 1997). The very existence of outgroup members, rather than undermining the belief system, can actually strengthen it by providing evidence of opposing forces that must be resisted.

Also positioning themselves in opposition to Berger's claims, Finke and Stark (1988) offer a general theory of "religious economies," proposing that denominational pluralism, via a competition mechanism, can lead church leaders to be more responsive to members and potential members. This argument spawned numerous studies evaluating the relationship between religious pluralism and religious vitality. It should be noted that significant disagreement continues to exist on the nature of this relationship. Indeed, Chavez and Gorski (2001) engaged in a comprehensive metanalysis of these studies and concluded that empirical evidence does not support the religious economies theory.[2] Yet while scholars may continue to debate the relationship between religious pluralism and religious participation, the sociological literature offers numerous examples of how exposure to difference can enhance, rather than undermine, in-group solidarity.

The Importance of Group Proportions

We have argued that moral reform movements are facilitated by features of local contexts that contribute to the development of a critical mass of individuals who hold firm convictions and also feel motivated to take action. As discussed above, some scholars have noted how exposure to individuals with alternative beliefs can undermine faith and conviction, while others have argued that this same exposure strengthens convictions and promotes in-group solidarity. While these appear to be competing arguments, we propose that both are useful in understanding moral reform movements. To reconcile these arguments, however, it is necessary to consider the significance of group proportions. As Peter Blau (1977, p. 22) points out, "Extensive associations with persons who have different backgrounds and experiences are likely to make people more tolerant, broaden their horizons, and provide intellectual stimulation." Consistent with Berger's (1967) ideas on plausibility structures, these conditions would seem to work against moral reform move-

[2] Voas, Crockett, and Olson (2002) present evidence indicating that virtually all of the findings of these studies should be disregarded as the findings reflect an artifact of a measurement of the key variables—a previously overlooked mathematical relationship between measures of religious participation and the index of denominational pluralism.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

ments. Importantly, however, rates of intergroup contact are heavily dependent on group size. Members of a group that constitute a large numerical majority of the population typically have limited contact with members of the minority population, while those in the minority, by virtue of group proportions, have numerous daily contacts with individuals from the majority group (Blau 1977, p. 23).

This majority/minority imbalance holds important implications for the maintenance of belief systems and the development of the firm convictions that are the lifeblood of moral reform movements. Even in a heterogeneous context, individuals tend to associate with people who are similar to themselves (see, e.g., Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; Rotolo and McPherson 2001). Nevertheless, heterogeneity in the broader community imposes constraints on opportunities to form homophilous ties, particularly for those who are members of the minority (Blau 1977; Rotolo and McPherson 2001). Those affiliated with a belief system that represents the majority can easily restrict their primary social associations to those who share their beliefs, allowing them to reaffirm their own convictions even when confronted with contradictory evidence or with those holding conflicting beliefs. Yet individuals affiliated with a belief system, when they are in the minority, find it more difficult to form exclusively homophilous associations and thus may have more difficulty in consistently reaffirming their beliefs through social interactions with like-minded individuals. These dynamics are reflected in Fischer's (1975) subcultural theory of urbanism. He argues that urban environments facilitate the maintenance of many different subcultures because individuals are able to form homophilous relationships that reinforce their distinctive lifestyles, beliefs, and values even in a broader context where they are viewed as unusual or deviant. Group proportions, as we argue in the next section, are key to determining conditions under which a particular belief system can provide both the firm convictions and motivation facilitating moral reform activity such as that represented by antiabortion PCs.

Religious Belief Systems, Group Proportions, and Pregnancy Centers

In the United States, PCs have strong ties to Catholic and evangelical churches (Munson 2008; Kelly 2012). These religious faith traditions unequivocally condemn abortion as sinful, based on a belief that human life begins at conception. Notably, a very high proportion of individuals who identify as evangelicals are opposed to abortion under all circumstances and the percentage of evangelicals opposing abortion has increased substantially over time, while opinion among Catholics is more divided (see Evans 2002; Hoffman and Johnson 2005). It is important to keep in mind that not all adherents of these faith traditions conform to their church's teaching about abortion. Adamczyk (2008), for example, used data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Health to examine self-reported abortions of first pregnancies for unmarried women. She found that Catholic women did not significantly differ from those who identified as mainline Protestant, "other Protestant," and "other religion" in terms of self-reported abortions. And while she found that "conservative Protestants" were significantly less likely than affiliates of these other groups to report an abortion, bivariate findings nevertheless indicate that more than one-fourth of women who identified as conservative Protestant reported having had an abortion. We are not claiming, therefore, that proportions of Catholics or evangelicals in a community can influence PC formation by virtue of stark differences in patterns of choosing to end a pregnancy. Instead, we argue that the proportion of individuals affiliated with religious institutions that oppose abortion influence perceptions about the need for, and viability of, PCs in local settings.

Because of the way in which evangelical and Catholic belief systems support an antiabortion position, it might be expected that high proportions of individuals affiliated with either one would increase the likelihood of a PC being located in a community. However, based on the argument we have made above, we expect the relationships to be curvilinear (inverted U). For example, in a community with a small proportion of Catholics or evangelicals, we would not expect to find PCs (all else constant). Evangelicals or Catholics living in such communities may oppose abortion, but by virtue of their low numbers they may be less willing to take a public stand in support of those beliefs. With increases in the size of the faith groups, however, it becomes easier for adherents to restrict their primary relations to homophilous ties, thus reinforcing their convictions even in the presence of some in the community who disagree. Increases in group size are also linked to increases in resources controlled by the group that might be directed toward collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1973; Oberschall 1973). Yet we expect a saturation point can be reached where the size of the group (evangelicals or Catholics in this example) becomes so large that it reduces the likelihood of a PC being present. While convictions pertaining to abortion may be strong in such a community (Wilde 2007), and the availability of organizational resources is even more abundant, the numerical dominance of believers can reduce the motivation to act. When individuals have so little contact with others who do not share their religious identity, it is likely that the sense of urgency will be diminished as they will not sense a threat to their values that might otherwise motivate action.

Notably, Bearman and Brückner (2001) observe similar dynamics in their study of the effectiveness of virginity pledges. They find that the pledge is effective only in contexts where it is "at least partially nonnormative" (p. 859). While the presence of peers joining in making the pledge offers support needed to maintain the commitment, the positive effect of support is reversed when the proportion of pledgers becomes large. The authors argue that identity-

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

based movements are based on formation of a self-conscious community set apart from others. As a result, “if the movement successfully bridges the gap between heterodoxy and orthodoxy, there are no more reasons to join” (p. 871). McVeigh (2009) utilizes similar logic in his theory of power devaluation, arguing that status tends to be derived by “displaying behaviors and traits that are simultaneously admired and scarce” (p. 41; also see Simmel 1950). Motivation to act in defense of values, from this perspective, is lacking when values appear to be commonly held.

Finally, it should be noted that compatible claims can be derived drawing upon theories of institutionalism. Institutions—in this case, religious institutions—provide stable scripts or schema to guide action (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 2008). These scripts guide individual and organizational actions, constraining fields into increasing isomorphism over time (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Yet the power of scripts to promote conformity weakens in the presence of alternative scripts (e.g., see Clemens and Cook [1999] for a review of politics and institutionalism). For example, French cuisine was highly institutionalized for centuries, strictly following rules that were learned from professional schools and chefs until the 1970s and 1980s, when changes in other institutional fields of French art and cinema began to challenge traditional institutions in French cooking (Rao, Monin, and Durand 2003). Once these alternative scripts were available, chefs started to question the existing institutions and the nouvelle cuisine movement started in full force, changing the entire field of French cooking to the point where it became an institution itself, eventually slowing the rate of change and the need for contention over the changes (Rao et al. 2003). From an institutional perspective, the capacity of religious doctrine to motivate action in support of its teaching should be low where religious institutions have a limited presence. Alternatively, where religious institutions have a strong presence and alternative scripts to guide action are scarce, apparent conformity to religious teaching would minimize the need for collective action.

Other Considerations

Our core argument highlights how belief systems pertaining to religion in local contexts not only reinforce convictions of those who feel their beliefs represent an absolute truth, but can also motivate adherents to join collective efforts to alter the beliefs or practices of others. Yet we also give attention to other community-level factors that could contribute to the formation and sustenance of PCs. An interesting aspect of the particular form of organization studied in this article is that it necessitates contact between antiabortion activists and populations perceived to be susceptible to choosing abortion to end a pregnancy. In order to promote conformity, in other words, activists must identify populations that they perceive to be in need of persuasion. We give

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

particular attention to the presence of abortion clinics, to ascertain whether PCs are, in part, a direct response to the availability of abortion in a local setting. Or, alternatively, PC formation may be driven by a niche-seeking process where organizations are more likely to be established in locations where they do not face direct competition with abortion clinics within the local context and therefore may be able to reach a higher number of women seeking guidance during an unanticipated pregnancy.

We also give attention to features of counties that are related to gender roles, such as occupational sex segregation, the percentage of women in the labor force, average family size, and the percentage of adult women who are married. Luker (1984) argues that many women, as well as men, have a stake in restricting abortion when the primary financial support for the family comes from a male bread winner. Women's control over their own fertility allows them to compete more effectively in the labor force—a situation that can be perceived as threatening to family units when they are primarily dependent on male earnings. It may be the case that in counties where traditional gender roles are prevalent, many residents would oppose abortion. Yet these same conditions may offer little incentive to organize a PC, since status threats posed by more egalitarian gender relations would be minimal. In communities characterized by higher levels of gender equality there are still many men and women who adhere to traditional gender roles and values. Indeed, in almost all counties that we examine, the number of individuals engaged in traditional gender arrangements seems sufficient to allow for homophilous associations. This is particularly true to the extent that gender roles are correlated with social class distinctions that strongly influence patterns of residential segregation. Counties with higher levels of nontraditional gender roles, therefore, contain both the potential for reinforcement of traditional values *and* conditions that generate a sense of threat to those same values as relatively high numbers of individuals are breaking with tradition.

We also control for the political context in counties, as reflected in the vote for a Republican presidential candidate. In the current era, the two major political parties have become highly polarized at the national level, with voter preferences across several key issues aligning within the two major parties (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; McVeigh, Cunningham, and Farrell 2014). As this party polarization process has unfolded, arguments against abortion have become firmly embedded in Republican ideology, while the pro-choice position is deeply rooted in Democratic ideology. Formation of PCs may benefit, therefore, from a supportive political climate provided in counties where the Republican vote is higher. Finally, in light of the PC leaders' attempts to target urban locations and racial and ethnic minorities, it is particularly important to control for not only the population size of the county, but also for measures of urbanization and racial and ethnic distributions.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

DATA AND METHODS

Because we are interested in assessing local conditions that facilitate or discourage the establishment of PCs, we examine variation in the number of PCs across U.S. counties. Counties in the state of Alaska are excluded due to data limitations. A county-level analysis provides us with considerable comparative leverage, as we are able to examine variation across 3,105 cases. To isolate these localized effects, though, we also include an analysis that controls for state-level differences. Because states have different laws and restrictions pertaining to abortion, each state is akin to a unique field of action where abortion opponents and supporters advance their positions. Our dependent variable, the number of anti-abortion PCs in the county, is a count variable, and we therefore estimate our models with negative binomial regression. We use negative binomial regression rather than a Poisson model because the former allows for overdispersion by relaxing assumptions that the variance is equal to the mean and that counts are statistically independent (King 1989).[3]

We measure the dependent variable as the number of organizations in a county that are affiliated with any of the four major PC networks described above (Birthright, National Institute of Family and Life Advocates, Care Net, and Heartbeat International). The vast majority of local pregnancy care centers in the United States are affiliated with at least one of these national networks. Publically available data from these networks were gathered from each association's online directories of their members (Birthright International 2014; Care Net 2014*a*; Heartbeat International 2014; NIFLA 2014). Location of the PCs is determined by the addresses provided by the organizations. Inclusion in one of these networks does not preclude a PC from joining another network. To avoid counting the same organization more than once, we combined all lists and manually removed duplicates, sorting within cities to assure accuracy. Before removing duplicates, there were 7,344 listings, but after duplicates were removed the total number of unique PCs is 4,530. In order to keep the analysis focused on PCs, our measure does not include organizations affiliated with these networks that are identified as maternity homes or adoption agencies.[4]

[3] Because of the distribution of the dependent variable, calculating the dependent variable as a rate of the county population size would produce severe estimation problems. The dependent variable ranges from 0 to 49, and just over half of the counties have a value of zero. Therefore, a measure of PCs as a rate of population size produces extreme outliers and gives highly disproportionate weight to counties with small populations that have even a single PC. For example, Stanton County, Kansas, with a total population of just under 4,000 and only one PC would have a value on the dependent variable that is more than 14 SDs above the mean.

[4] We obtain similar results when these organizations are included in the measure of the dependent variable.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

We are particularly interested in examining how the distribution of adherents of supportive belief systems is related to the location of PCs in local settings. To obtain measures of religious distributions, we use data from the 2010 Religious Congregations and Membership Study, conducted by representatives of the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB; see Grammich et al. 2012) and disseminated by the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA). The 2010 study represents an update of studies carried out in prior decades by the National Council of Churches and the Glenmary Research Center. Sponsors of the study invited participation from all religious bodies that they identified as having congregations in the United States; 236 of the 296 religious groups that were contacted agreed to participate. These include 217 Christian denominations (including Latter-Day Saints, Messianic Jews, and Unitarian/Universalist groups) as well as a variety of non-Christian groups (Grammich et al. 2012). A contact person from each participating group was responsible for obtaining and providing information about their congregations, members, and adherents (Grammich et al. 2012). The 236 religious groups "reported a total of 344,894 congregations with a total of 159,686,156 adherents, comprising 48.8 percent of the total U.S. population" (ARDA 2012). Of the 236 religious groups in the study, 146 are classified as evangelical, based on their emphasis on personal faith in Christ, the divine inspiration of the Bible, and the importance of evangelism, as well as their conservative theological and social positions relative to mainline Protestant denominations (ARDA, n.d.).

In our analysis, we utilize a measure of religious "adherents," rather than "members." The term adherent in this case refers to all those identified as having an affiliation with a congregation and can include children, church members, and attendees who are not members (ASARB 2012). This measure of adherents provides advantages when the goal is to compare across different denominations, because different faith traditions have different requirements for when attendees can be considered to be members.[5] In the nation as a whole, the data show that 39.1% of adherents in the data identified as

[5] At the county level, our measure of %Catholic or evangelical *adherents* is highly correlated with a measure of %Catholic or evangelical *members* (r = 0.7133). We opt for the more inclusive adherents measure in our analysis. In preliminary analyses, we did estimate our models substituting the %members variable for the %adherents measure and found only minor substantive differences in the findings. When all control variables are included, a measure of antiabortion organizations is significant when we estimate models with the members variable, but falls short of significance when the adherents measure is used. The only other notable difference is that when we use the measure of adherents, a measure of male educational advantage remains statistically significant in the models, but falls short of significance in some models when the members variable is used instead of our measure of adherents.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Catholic, 33.2% are evangelical Protestant, 15% are mainline Protestant, and 12.7% are grouped into other categories.[6]

Because the vast majority of PCs are sponsored by evangelical or Catholic groups (Munson 2008), in our analyses we are particularly interested in the percentage of religious adherents in a county that are Catholic and the percentage that are adherents of evangelical denominations. Because the measures of %Catholic and %evangelical are highly (and negatively) correlated ($r = -.746$), we initially examine each separately. Because both faith traditions are supportive of PCs, we combine them into a measure that represents the percentage of religious adherents that are either Catholic or evangelical (%evangelical or Catholic). Particularly important to our argument is the specification of a curvilinear relationship, where an increase in the percentage of adherents initially has a positive relationship with the dependent variable because it provides abortion opponents with greater confirmation of their convictions when surrounded by more people who share their religious belief system. Yet beyond a certain point, increases in the percentage of residents sharing the belief system should reduce PC establishment because the numerical dominance of the group reduces the sense that action is needed to address what is perceived to be deviant or even sinful behavior in the community.

Because the two political parties have aligned on opposite sides of the abortion debate, Republican strongholds are likely to provide a more supportive environment for PCs. Therefore, we include a measure of the percentage of voters who voted for Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney in 2012 (%Republican). Data were obtained from the *Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections*, which compiles data on voting collected by Secretary of State offices, or their equivalents (Leip 2013).

We also consider whether PC establishment is related to the presence or absence of abortion clinics. On the one hand, PCs may be more likely to emerge in reaction to an abortion clinic in the community (via a competition mechanism). Yet it may instead be the case that PC establishment is structured more in terms of niche-seeking processes, where organizations are more likely to take hold where abortion opponents have the field of action to themselves and may, therefore, be more effective in reaching their targets

[6] Although Catholics and evangelical Protestants constitute the majority of religious adherents in the nation as a whole, there is considerable variation across U.S. counties. Indeed, our measure of the percentage of adherents that is either evangelical or Catholic has a mean value of 68.91 ($SD = 16.9$), and ranges from 0 to 100. Mainline Protestants represent a primary comparison group throughout most regions of the United States. Low percentages of Catholics or evangelicals in the state of Utah, however, reflect very high proportions of adherents of the Church of Latter-Day Saints. As a robustness check, we estimated our models with and without Utah counties and obtained similar results.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

(women experiencing an unplanned pregnancy). We obtained data on abortion providers from the Guttmacher Institute, a policy research and public education nonprofit organization focused on sexual and reproductive health worldwide. Data were collected as part of their 16th census of the known universe of abortion providers in the United States in 2011 (Jones and Jerman 2014). These data are of nonhospital abortion providers. Hospitals are excluded from the census because they provide less than 5% of abortions and do not keep or provide detailed abortion data as clinics do (Jones and Jerman 2014). Because people may be aware of abortion clinics within their own county and in nearby counties, we form a measure that combines the number of abortion clinics in a county with the number of clinics in adjacent counties. Adjacency is measured using queen contiguity, which includes counties that share an edge or even a single point with the focal county.[7] Because of skewness of the variable, we use the natural log of one plus the number of clinics.

We include a variety of measures that are related to gender roles and gender inequality in U.S. counties. First is a measure of male educational advantage, which is calculated as the percentage of women age 25 or older with a bachelor's degree or higher subtracted from the percentage of men age 25 or older with a bachelor's degree or higher. We also include a measure of the percentage of women age 16 or older who are in the labor force (%women in labor force), the percentage of women age 15 or older who are married (% married), and the average family size in the county. These data were all gathered from the 2006–10 U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey five-year summary files, the only available source for these data at the county level (ACS 2012). We also include a measure of occupational sex segregation. Because data on detailed occupational categories are not available in more recent census data due to the switch to the ACS, for this measure we rely on data from the 2000 census. Occupational sex segregation is calculated using a dissimilarity index across the 93 occupational categories within the *Standard Occupational Classification* manual. This measures the percentage of women who would have to change occupational categories for there to be an even distribution of men and women across occupational categories (for more information see, Massey and Denton [1988] and McVeigh and Sobolewski [2007]).

We include a number of control variables that could potentially be related to PC establishment. We draw on data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) to obtain a measure of the number of Right to Life organizations in a county. The NCCS collects Internal Revenue Ser-

[7] To determine adjacency in this manner we used GIS shapefiles from the U.S. Census (2010) and R packages spdep and maptools.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

vice (IRS) filings on incorporated nonprofit organizations and implements the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities to classify organizations. Right to Life organizations are classified as "R62"; that is, "organizations that support the passage of legislation which assigns legal rights to the unborn and seeks to criminalize the termination of unwanted pregnancies" (NCCS 2014). All other controls are compiled from the 2006–10 ACS (2012). Because the formation of a PC is likely to be heavily dependent not only on population size but also on the concentration of the population within counties, we include a measure of the natural log of total population, the log of square miles in a county, and the percentage of the population residing in a rural location (%rural). Population size, of course, is related to the number of people who might be willing to contribute to PC establishment and maintenance, as well as the number of people who might be seeking the services of the organization. Additionally, rural counties may not have concentrations of people, resources, and clientele to sustain a PC. We also control for median age, median family income (measured in thousands of dollars), and the percentage of adults age 25 and over who have earned a bachelor's degree (%college degree). Finally, in light of the attention that some PC leaders have given to targeting minority communities, we include a measure of the percentage of people in the county who identify as black or African-American (%black) and the percentage who identify as Hispanic or Latino (%Latino).

RESULTS

We begin by examining bivariate relationships among some of our key variables of interest. Figure 2 depicts a matrix of bivariate scatterplots including our measure of PCs, religious distributions, population size, and %rural. In the top row on the left-hand side, we see that PCs are unlikely to be found in counties where there are high proportions of evangelicals or high proportions of Catholics. When we combine the religious distributions in a measure of the percentage that are either evangelical *or* Catholic, we see a distribution that resembles a bell curve. There are few PCs in counties that have low percentages of Catholics or evangelicals and also few PCs in counties with high proportions of evangelicals or Catholics. Yet we also see that, as is the case with most organizations, PCs are much more likely to be found in populous counties and in counties that are predominantly nonrural. Population size and %rural are also moderately correlated with the measures of %Catholic and %evangelical (%Catholic tends to be higher in populous and nonrural counties and %evangelical tends to be higher in less populous and rural counties). While the scatterplot diagrams do reveal what appears to be a curvilinear relationship between the presence of PCs and the proportion of Catholic and evangelical religious adherents, multivariate analysis is needed

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).



FIG. 2.—Bivariate scatterplot matrix: Pregnancy centers, religious distributions, and population

to determine whether that relationship holds when population size and other factors are taken into consideration.

A matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients and descriptive statistics for all variables is presented in table 1. As can be seen, there are some strong correlations among some of our independent variables. The correlation between the population measure and %rural, for example, is −.757. Yet as figure 2 reveals, there are quite a few counties that are highly urbanized but are relatively low in terms of population size, and some counties that are relatively populous but highly rural. These differences should be consequential for organizational presence, so we include both measures in our analyses. We present models, however, that both include and exclude the %rural variable.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

TABLE 1
BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1. Pregnancy center	1.00																			
2. %evangelical	−.16																			
3. %Catholic	.24	−.75																		
4. %evangelical or Catholic	.08	.51	.20																	
5. Total population (log)	.66	−.10	.23	.15																
6. Square miles (log)	.08	−.23	.22	−.05	−.03															
7. %rural	−.50	.21	−.30	−.08	−.76	.08														
8. Republican, 2012	−.28	.38	−.36	.09	−.40	.13	.34													
9. Abortion clinic proximity (log)	.52	−.30	.38	.05	.61	.07	−.47	−.35												
10. Antiabortion organizations	.52	−.14	.19	.04	.40	−.02	−.32	−.20	.31											
11. Average family size	.12	.05	.05	.14	.19	.02	−.19	−.17	.15	.07										
12. %women in labor force	.22	−.44	.34	−.20	.29	.01	−.37	−.22	.29	.21	−.09									
13. %married	−.19	−.08	.01	−.10	−.29	.17	.31	.55	−.09	−.11	−.44	.15								
14. Occupational sex segregation	−.47	.16	−.20	−.02	−.79	.12	.63	.48	−.48	−.31	−.04	−.42	.28							
15. Male educational advantage	−.23	.07	−.05	.04	−.28	.01	.31	−.03	−.21	−.16	.03	−.06	−.11	.27						
16. %black	.05	.24	−.29	−.01	.13	−.23	−.10	−.38	−.01	.03	.30	−.17	−.61	−.07	.13					
17. %Latino	.15	−.15	.37	.26	.11	.27	−.28	−.10	.22	.05	.38	−.03	−.09	.01	−.10	−.11				
18. Median age	−.22	−.04	−.02	−.09	−.44	.05	.50	.20	−.17	−.15	−.58	−.25	.45	.36	.04	−.23	−.30			
19. Median income	.30	−.37	.37	−.07	.42	−.06	−.41	−.11	.53	.21	−.01	.63	.31	−.40	−.26	−.22	.04	−.12		
20. %college degree	.39	−.38	.33	−.13	.46	−.04	−.51	−.31	.48	.28	−.09	.54	−.01	−.57	−.35	−.10	.03	−.19	.69	1.00
Mean	1.25	45.24	23.67	68.91	10.28	6.47	58.51	59.64	.53	.14	3.04	55.88	54.02	57.04	.48	8.91	7.82	39.90	44.08	18.98
SD	2.59	24.91	21.90	16.92	1.44	.87	31.40	14.76	.79	.50	.27	6.73	7.20	7.58	3.40	14.63	12.87	4.86	11.41	8.62
Min	0	0	0	0	6.05	.69	0	0	0	0	2.15	27.18	22	28.3	−21.48	0	0	21.70	19.35	3.68
Max	49	100	100	100	16.09	9.91	100	93.30	4.32	6	5.04	82.50	78.66	82.90	21.65	86.14	98.33	61.40	115.57	70.96

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Table 1 reveals other strong correlations, such as that between occupational sex segregation and population size, family size and median age, and the measures of income and education. Including these additional variables is important in order to give our argument about the effects of religious distributions the toughest test possible by holding constant other factors that can explain variation in PC presence. We first estimate models only including our religion variables and the essential control for population size. In subsequent models, we add the other controls. The findings pertaining to our religion variables are extraordinarily robust, regardless of what other variables are included in the analysis. We also performed sensitivity analyses and found that coefficients for the other variables are stable as well.[8] As an additional robustness check, we also estimated our full models with logistic regression with the dependent variable measured as a dichotomy (presence or absence of at least one PC). We did this to check the possibility that our results might be driven by counties with unusually high numbers of PCs (see app. A). Results are similar for our key variables of interest. Most important, we observe the same curvilinear relationship between our religion variable and PC presence and also similar relationships between PC presence and our measures of traditional gender roles.

Because of the strong relationship between population size and our dependent variable, we first assess the estimated effects of our religion variables controlling only for population size (table 2). We present results of negative binomial regression. In all of our analyses, we use the robust cluster command in Stata to adjust standard errors, accounting for the clustering of counties within states. Because measures of %evangelical in a county and %Catholic are highly correlated (−.746), we begin by examining each separately to determine whether their relationships with the dependent variable are similar. As shown in table 2, column 1, the measure %evangelical is not statistically significant. This is consistent with our argument. Simply having high percentages

[8] We estimated models including our measure of %evangelical or Catholic and its squared term, with controls for population size and %rural. We then estimated models inserting each additional variable, one at a time—without the other controls included—and compared the coefficient and its sign to those found in full models with all controls included. With only a few exceptions, the results from the stripped-down models and the full models were similar in terms of the magnitude and signs of the coefficients. Our measure of median income loses statistical significance when control variables are added to the model. We also found that the measure of %married becomes statistically significant when we control for %black. This should be expected, and it represents a classic suppressor effect. Both variables are negatively related to the dependent variable, as expected, and the two variables are negatively correlated with each other. The percentage of married women tends to be low in counties with high proportions of African-Americans. Similarly, we find that the measure of occupational sex segregation becomes significant when we include a control for the percentage of persons with a college degree. Again, this represents an expected suppressor effect where both variables, as expected, are negatively related to the dependent variable and strongly and negatively correlated with each other.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

TABLE 2

NUMBER OF PREGNANCY CENTERS, U.S. COUNTIES: RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTIONS WITH CONTROL FOR POPULATION SIZE

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
%evangelical	.001	.023***				
	(.002)	(.005)				
%evangelical^2		−.0003***				
		(.0001)				
%Catholic			−.0004	.023***		
			(.002)	(.004)		
%Catholic^2				−.0003***		
				(.0001)		
%evangelical or Catholic					.001	.075***
					(.003)	(.009)
%evangelical or Catholic^2						−.0006***
						(.0001)
Total population (log)	.80***	.79***	.80***	.78***	.80***	.78***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Constant	−8.81***	−8.97***	−8.76***	−8.78***	−8.78***	−10.90***
	(.30)	(.27)	(.28)	(.24)	(.27)	(.35)
Log likelihood	−3,208.07	−3,180.35	−3,208.22	−3,169.86	−3,208.22	−3,170.27

NOTE.—Negative binomial regression estimates with robust SEs (in parentheses) to account for clustering of counties within states. Coefficients multiplied by 10 for presentation. N observations = 3,105.

* $P < .05$, two-tailed test.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

of evangelicals in a county is not associated with the presence of PCs. Instead, as results presented in model 2 show, the relationship is curvilinear, as we predicted. Higher percentages of evangelicals initially have a positive effect, suggesting that higher proportions of adherents provide greater opportunity for reinforcement of beliefs through homophilous interactions. Yet as evangelicals surpass majority status, the predicted effect grows increasingly negative, which reflects the extent to which the dominance of a belief system in a local setting can reduce the motivation to engage in collective action because the threat posed by adherents of other belief systems is minimized.

We obtain similar results in models 3 and 4 when we examine the estimated effects of the percentage of Catholic adherents. By itself, %Catholic is not a significant predictor of PC establishment. Yet once again we find the expected curvilinear relationship where increases in %Catholic initially increase the likelihood of PC establishment, but after the size of the Catholic population surpasses majority status, the relationship becomes increasingly negative.

Because both evangelical and Catholic individuals and organizations support PCs, and because our measures of %Catholic and %evangelical are strongly correlated, we should expect to find a stronger impact of religious distributions if we set up a comparison of Catholics *and* evangelicals, with other religious denominations. In models 5 and 6 we present the results found when our independent variable is a measure of the percentage of religious adherents who are either evangelical or Catholic. As was the case for %Catholic and %evangelical separately, the variable by itself is not statistically significant. And we also see the expected curvilinear relationship, where initial increases in %evangelical or Catholic have a strong, positive effect on PC establishment. When the proportion of evangelicals and Catholics surpasses majority status, however, additional increases substantially reduce the establishment of PCs.

Up to this point we have demonstrated a strong empirical relationship between the distribution of Catholics and evangelicals in a county and the placement of antiabortion PCs. Importantly, this relationship is not revealed until we include the predicted quadratic specification. Failure to do so would lead to the incorrect conclusion that religious distributions are unrelated to PC placement.

Yet variation in PC placement should depend on several other factors as well. Results presented in table 3 include the additional variables under consideration. Again, in the first column we demonstrate that our measure of the religious distribution is not related to PC placement if we fail to include the quadratic specification. As can be seen in table 3, column 2, when we do include the quadratic specification, the curvilinear relationship between PC placement and the %evangelical or Catholic remains strong even when our control variables are included. In column 3, we see that the estimate of the relationship is not affected when we add the additional control

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

TABLE 3

Number of Pregnancy Centers, U.S. Counties: Religious Distributions, Control Variables, and State-Level Controls

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4 (with State Controls)
%evangelical or Catholic	.004	.067***	.066***	.058***
	(.003)	(.008)	(.008)	(.012)
%evangelical or Catholic^2		−.0005***	−.0005***	−.0004***
		(.0001)	(.0001)	(.0001)
Population (log)	.81***	.81***	.71***	.67***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.03)
Square miles (log)	.10*	0.09*	.11**	.13***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)
%rural			−.01***	−.01***
			(.00)	(.00)
%Republican, 2012	.01*	.01**	.01*	.01**
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Abortion clinic proximity	−.06*	−.06*	−.04	−.06*
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Antiabortion organizations	.02	.02	.03	.04
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Average family size	−.58***	−.39**	−.28*	−.31*
	(.15)	(.13)	(.13)	(.12)
%women in labor force	.014**	.01*	.01	−.00
	(.005)	(.005)	(.01)	(.01)
%married	−.03***	−.03***	−.02**	−.02**
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Occupational sex segregation	−.02**	−.02*	−.02**	−.03***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Male educational advantage	−.03**	−.04***	−.02*	−.02*
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
%black	−.01***	−.01***	−.01***	−.01***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
%Latino	−.01**	−.01*	−.01***	−.01***
	(0.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Median age	.00	−.00	−.00	−.00
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Median income	.00	.00	−.00	.00
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)
%college degree	−.02**	−.02**	−.02**	−.02***
	(.01)	(.01)	(0.01)	(.01)
Constant	−6.12***	−8.41***	−7.35***	−5.81***
	(1.04)	(1.01)	(1.14)	(.94)
Log likelihood	−3,094.15	−3,068.83	−3,052.37	−2,988.74

Note.—Negative binomial regression estimates with robust SEs (in parentheses) to account for clustering of counties within states. N observations = 3,105.

* $P < .05$, two-tailed test.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

for %rural. The relationship between PC placement and the %evangelical or Catholic is depicted in figure 3. The figure displays the predicted value of the dependent variable at varying levels of our religious distribution measure when all other variables are set at their mean values. Here it can be seen that increases in %evangelical or Catholic have a strong positive effect on the dependent variable up until the point where Catholics and evangelicals constitute approximately 60% of religious adherents. With further increases in evangelicals and Catholics, however, we see a sharp decline in the predicted number of PCs.

Looking beyond our measures of religious distributions, results presented in table 2, model 3, show that population size and the size of land area are positively associated with PC placement, and PCs are significantly less likely to be found in highly rural counties. The coefficient for our measure of proximity to an abortion clinic is negative, but it falls short of statistical significance when a control for %rural is included in the model.

Notably, we also find that PCs are more likely to take root in counties where the vote for the Republican presidential candidate was high. This is consistent with social movement scholarship that emphasizes a tendency for movement organizations to benefit from a favorable political context (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994). Given the extent to which antiabortion stances have become deeply rooted within the national Republican Party's platform and ideology, counties with high proportions of Republican voters provide a context where antiabortion activists may feel greater support in taking public action to establish or maintain a PC. In general, our results indicate that PCs are more likely to be found in counties characterized by relatively egalitarian gender roles. The measure of %women in labor



FIG. 3.—Predicted number of pregnancy centers at various levels of %evangelical or Catholic.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

force is not significant, but PCs are significantly less likely to be found in counties where high percentages of women are married, where average family sizes are high, and where occupational sex segregation is high. Above we have argued that counties with more egalitarian gender outcomes contain both the potential for reinforcement of traditional values for a significant conservative subset of the population and also conditions that generate a sense of threat to traditional values.

We also find that in spite of outreach efforts by national PC leaders, PCs face difficulties when it comes to taking hold in communities with high proportions of African-Americans and Latinos. We also see that PCs are less likely to take root in communities with higher percentages of college graduates.

It is important to point out that in the analyses presented in columns 1–3, we have not controlled for state-level differences. In order to avoid specification error in our attempts to test arguments about more localized effects, it is strongly advisable to include state-level controls. Different states, largely in response to pressure from antiabortion organizations and levels of support or opposition to abortion in the population at large, have a patchwork of different laws and restrictions pertaining to abortion. Each state, therefore, provides a different environment where abortion opponents and pro-choice advocates seek to advance their positions. These differences hold important implications for establishment of PCs within counties.

As can be seen in table 3, model 4, the results are largely similar when we control for state differences, but with a few notable exceptions. The magnitude of the coefficients for %evangelical or Catholic and its squared term are slightly reduced when state controls are included, but the estimated effects remain highly significant. Notably, we find that our measure of proximity to an abortion clinic regains statistical significance when state-level controls are added. The establishment of PCs seems to benefit from a supportive organizational environment where access to an abortion clinic is limited. This finding is particularly interesting in that it suggests that PC presence is not typically a reactive response to the presence of abortion clinics. The finding could instead reflect difficulties that PCs face locating in communities that have been able to maintain abortion clinics in the face of the national antiabortion movement's attempts to restrict access to abortion. Net of other variables, PCs are more likely to be found in communities where they are not in direct competition with abortion clinics.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

While some groups engage in collective action to win new benefits or to rectify a perceived injustice, others engage in action oriented toward promoting conformity with their own group members' beliefs, values, or codes of behavior. Social movement theory has developed, for the most part, with

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

the former type of collective action in mind. The group's collective grievances are taken as a starting point and collective action is largely understood as an organizational problem. How can the group secure organizational resources needed to entice participation in the effort and to compete effectively with other groups to secure a greater share of societal benefits? (See, e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1973; Obershall 1973.) How can groups exploit vulnerabilities in the political power structure to attract needed participation and to win concessions from the state or other powerful actors? (See, e.g., Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994.) How can movement leaders develop compelling interpretations of existing circumstances that entice participation in collective action? (See Snow et al. 1986; Gamson 1992.) Scholars who have studied moral reform movements, on the other hand, have given relatively little attention to organizational dynamics and have instead focused on the nature of the group's values and the status that can be derived through moral reform efforts.

Moral suasion is central to progressive as well as to conservative movements, and the argument we have made above is agnostic when it comes to the ideological leanings of moral persuasion. Bringing about change through collective action typically involves enlisting participants while also bringing about changes in the hearts and minds of bystanders and, at times, opponents. Different local contexts provide different fields of action, as well as different chances for success and failure. As a first step in developing our ideas about collective action and moral persuasion we have, in this article, focused on activism where moral persuasion is an end in itself, rather than a means to an end. Doing so allows us to resolve disagreements in the literature that specifically focuses on moral reform movements. But our work should be useful in addressing more general questions about how people form beliefs and convictions and about their willingness to act upon them. We argue that, to understand moral reform efforts, it is necessary to consider conditions that promote the kind of moral certitude that is at the heart of the collective effort while also considering the complex interplay between shared convictions and threats to those convictions that may motivate action.

Social scientists, of course, are well aware of how group proportions can shape the nature of social interaction. Soloman Asch's (1960) classic experiments showed how individuals can doubt their own convictions even on something seemingly obvious (such as comparing the length of lines on a page), when they see that their judgment is in the minority. Kanter's (1977) study of "tokenism" in the workplace reveals how members of the minority (women in that case) face unusual pressure by virtue of that minority status. Men, on the other hand, as members of the majority, heightened group boundaries and placed female coworkers into preconceived categories (see also Hughes 1944). Although sociologists have recognized the importance of group proportions, these basic insights are frequently overlooked in contemporary

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

studies of collective action and of social interaction more generally. In our case, the failure to consider dynamics related to group proportions would have led us to conclude incorrectly that PC placement is unrelated to religious distributions.

Public policy is often developed in anticipation of ways that intergroup contact may be related to desirable outcomes. Examples include efforts to desegregate schools (Useem 1980; Olzak, Shanahan, and West 1994), to situate affordable housing for low-income families (Pattillo 1999; de Souza Briggs, Popkin, and Goering 2010), and to help prevent the spread of disease (e.g., Bearman 2010). Our research, particularly with its emphasis on the importance of group proportions, may be useful in designing policies that reap benefits of integration while minimizing conflict.

Arguments presented in this article should be particularly useful in gaining a better understanding of how cultural differences may be resolved or, on the other hand, may generate polarization. On the issue of abortion, Luker (1984) called attention to the way in which the pro-choice and pro-life activists' positions were rooted in fundamental differences in the understanding of when life begins, rendering compromise between the two groups unlikely if not impossible. Beyond the abortion debate, Hunter's (1991) depiction of "culture wars" has been influential: he argues that Americans have increasingly become divided into two hostile camps, with views on a range of issues rooted in opposing overarching worldviews. Contrary to this argument, however, recent research has shown that Americans' attitudes are not becoming increasingly polarized on most issues (DiMaggio et al. 1996; Evans 2002; McAdam and Kloos 2014). Attitude polarization among adherents of the two major political parties, however, has increased (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Evans 2002; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; McVeigh, Cunningham, and Farrell 2014).

In his recent book about conflict over reproductive genetic technologies, Evans (2010, p. 12) points out that opponents and supporters are not, as culture wars arguments would suggest, "split into two irreconcilable groups defined by having distinct worldviews." In fact, he notes that the two sides draw upon much of the same discourse when articulating their opposing positions. This fact, Evans argues, provides potential for compromise and constructive dialogue as people move into uncharted territory and confront a variety of practical and ethical dilemmas. The broader scholarly debate about the capacity for constructive dialogue is of vital importance for both social and political life in complex societies. Our work can contribute to a better understanding of cultural conflict by focusing attention on the importance of the context in which dialogue occurs—or fails to occur. The nature of opinion distributions is consequential for social cohesion. Random distribution of individuals holding divergent opinions across local settings is very

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

different from a situation where like-minded people are bunched together in some communities, while those who hold different opinions are geographically clustered elsewhere. Indeed, the geographical clustering of opinions on important social issues seems to feed into the national-level political polarization we currently observe in the United States, as political representatives face formidable barriers to compromise when they represent culturally homogenous constituencies (McVeigh et al. 2004).

APPENDIX

TABLE A1
Presence of at Least One Pregnancy Center, U.S. Counties

Variables	Model 1	Model 2
%evangelical or Catholic	.004	.127***
	(.006)	(.023)
%evangelical or Catholic^2		−.001***
		(.0002)
Population (log)	1.48***	1.45***
	(.15)	(.16)
Square miles (log)	.25**	.27**
	(.09)	(.09)
%rural	−.02***	−.02***
	(.00)	(.00)
%Republican, 2012	.02**	.02***
	(.01)	(.01)
Abortion clinic proximity	−.09	−.09
	(.10)	(.10)
Antiabortion organizations	.38*	.36*
	(.18)	(.18)
Average family size	−1.02***	−.88**
	(.31)	(.32)
%women in labor force	.01	−.01
	(.02)	(.02)
%married	−.07***	−.06***
	(.02)	(.02)
Occupational sex segregation	−.07***	−.07***
	(0.02)	(.02)
Male educational advantage	−.05*	−.06*
	(.02)	(.02)
%black	−.03***	−.03***
	(.01)	(.01)
%Latino	−.01	−.01
	(.01)	(.01)
Median age	.01	−.02
	(.03)	(.02)
Median income	−.02	−.02
	(.01)	(.01)
%college degree	.01	.01
	(.02)	(.02)

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

TABLE A1 (*Continued*)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Constant	−6.24	−9.10**
	(3.31)	(3.38)
Log likelihood	−1,135.22	−1,116.12

NOTE.—Logistic regression estimates with robust SEs (in parentheses) to account for clustering of counties within states.
* $P < .05$, two-tailed test.
** $P < .01$.
*** $P < .001$.

REFERENCES

Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. 1998. "Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate." *Journal of Politics* 60 (3): 634–52.

Adamczyk, Amy. 2008. "The Effects of Religious Contextual Norms, Structural Constraints, and Personal Religiosity on Abortion Decisions." *Social Science Research* 37 (2): 657–72.

Almeida, Paul D. 2003. "Opportunity Organizations and Threat Induced Contention: Protest Waves in Authoritarian Settings." *American Journal of Sociology* 109 (2): 345–400.

ACS (American Community Survey). 2012. "ACS 2006–2010 (5 Year Estimates)." U.S. Census Bureau data, Social Explorer version. New York: Social Explorer. Retrieved July 9, 2012. http://www.socialexplorer.com.

Andrews, Kenneth T., and Charles Seguin. 2010. "Making America Dry: Ethnicity, Religion, and Urbanization in the Adoption of Prohibition, 1890–1919." Paper presented at the 2010 American Sociological Association Meetings, Atlanta.

ARDA (Association of Religious Data Archives). 2012. "U.S. Religion Census: Religious Congregations and Membership Study, 2010 (County File)." Retrieved February 2016. http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/RCMSCY10.asp.

———. N.d. "Evangelical Protestant Denominations." Retrieved February 2016. http://www.thearda.com/rcms2010/evangelical.asp.

ASARB (Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies). 2012. "U.S. Religion Census, 1952–2010: Data Collected." Retrieved January 2016. http://www.rcms2010.org/datacol.php.

Asch, Solomon E. 1960. "Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments." Pp. 189–200 in *Group Dynamics*, 2d ed. Edited by Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson.

Babb, Sarah. 1996. "A True American System of Finance: Frame Resonance in the U.S. Labor Movement, 1866 to 1886." *American Sociological Review* 61 (6): 1033–52.

Bandura, Albert. 1977. *Social Learning Theory*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall

Bearman, Peter S. 1991. "Desertion as Localism: Army Unit Solidarity and Group Norms in the U.S. Civil War." *Social Forces* 70 (2): 321–342

———. 2010. "Just-so Stories: Vaccines, Autism, and the Single-bullet Disorder." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 73 (2): 112–15.

Bearman, Peter S., and Hannah Brückner. 2001. "Promising the Future: Virginity Pledges and First Intercourse." *American Journal of Sociology* 106 (4): 859–912.

Beisel, Nicola. 1997. *Imperiled Innocents: Anthony Comstock and Family Reproduction in Victorian America*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26:611–39.

Berger, Peter L. 1967. *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*. Norwell, Mass.: Anchor Press.

Birthright International. 2014. "Birthright Locations." Retrieved September 17, 2014. http://birthright.org/en/search-birthrights?view=search®=1.

Blau, Peter M. 1977. "A Macrosociological Theory of Social Structure." *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (1): 26–54.

Blau, Peter M., and Joseph E. Schwartz. 1984. *Crosscutting Social Circles: Testing A Macrostructural Theory of Intergroup Relations*. Piscataway, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.

Burns, Gene. 2005. *The Moral Veto: Framing Contraception, Abortion, and Cultural Pluralism in the United States*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Care Net. 2014*a*. "About Care Net." Retrieved September 6, 2014. https://www.care-net.org/aboutus/.

———. 2014*b*. "Become an Affiliate." Retrieved September 8, 2014. https://www.care-net.org/affiliation.

Caren, Neal, Raj Andrew Ghoshal, and Vanesa Ribas. 2011. "A Social Movement Generation: Cohort and Period Trends in Protest Attendance and Petition Signing." *American Sociological Review* 76 (1): 125–51.

Chaves, Mark, and Philip S. Gorski. 2001. "Religious Pluralism and Religious Participation." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27:261–81.

Clarke, Alan. 1987. "Moral Protest, Status Defence and the Anti-Abortion Campaign." The British Journal of Sociology 38 (2): 235–53.

Clemens, Elisabeth, and James Cook. 1999. "Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change." *Annual Review of Sociology* 25:441–46.

Crowley, Jocelyn E., Radha Jagannathan, and Galo Falchettore. 2012. "The Effect of Child Support Enforcement on Abortion in the United States." *Social Science Quarterly* 93 (1): 152–72.

Cunningham, David. 2013. *Klansville, U.S.A.: The Rise and Fall of the Civil Rights–Era Ku Klux Klan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

de Souza Briggs, Xavier, Susan J. Popkin, and John Goering. 2010. *Moving to Opportunity: The Story of an American Experiment to Fight Ghetto Poverty*. New York: Oxford University Press.

DiMaggio, Paul J., John Evans, and Bethany Bryson. 1996. "Have Americans' Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?" *American Journal of Sociology*: 102 (3): 690–755.

DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1983. "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields." *American Sociological Review* 48 (2): 147–60.

Draper, Electa. 2013. "Conservative Christian Groups Take 'Compassionate' Approach." *Denver Post*, January 22.

Durkheim, Émile. (1893) 1964. *The Division of Labor in Society*. New York: Free Press.

Elder, Glen H., Jr. 1974. *Children of the Great Depression: Social Change in Life Experience*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ensor, John. 2013. "Waiting for the Third Wave: The Pro-Life Movement and the Glorious Black History Yet to Come." *Breakpoint*, February 27. Retrieved August 11, 2015. www.breakpoint.org/component/blog/entry/12/21594.

Erikson, Kai T. 1966. *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance*. Boston, MASS.: Allyn & Bacon.

Evans, John H. 1997. "Worldviews or Social Groups as the Source of Moral Value Attitudes: Implications for the Culture Wars Thesis." *Sociological Forum* 12 (3): 371–404.

———. 2002. "Polarization in Abortion Attitudes in U.S. Religious Traditions, 1972–1998." *Sociological Forum* 17 (3): 397–422.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

———. 2010. *Contested Reproduction: Genetic Technologies, Religion, and Public Debate*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

FRC (Family Research Council). 2012. *A Passion to Serve*, 2d ed. Washington, D.C.: Family Research Council.

Finke, Roger, and Rodney Stark. 1988. "Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies: Religious Mobilization in American Cities, 1906." *American Sociological Review* 53 (1): 41–49.

Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope. 2005. *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America*. New York: Pearson Longman.

Fischer, Claude S. 1975. "Toward a Subcultural Theory of Urbanism." *American Journal of Sociology*: 80 (6): 1319–41.

Gamson, William A. 1992. *Talking Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gibbs, Nancy. 2007. "The Grassroots Abortion War." *Time*, February 15.

Goldstone, Jack A., and Charles Tilly. 2001. "Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State Response in the Dynamics of Contentious Action." Pp. 179–94 in *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*, edited by Ronald R. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell, Jr., Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grammich, Clifford, Kirk Hadaway, Richard Houseal, Dale E. Jones, Alexei Krindatch, Richie Stanley, and Richard H. Taylor. 2012. "2010 U.S. Religion Census: Religious Congregations and Membership Study." Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies.

Granovetter, Mark. 1978. "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior." *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (6): 1420–43.

Gusfield, Joseph R. 1963. *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Hartshorn, Margaret H. 2003. "Pregnancy Help Centers, Abstinence, STDs, and Healing: Putting It All Together." Pp. 106–20 in *Back to the Drawing Board: The Future of the Pro-Life Movement*, edited by Teresa R. Wagner. South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press.

Heartbeat International. 2006. *Pulse: The Quarterly Newsletter*. Retrieved July 2015. https://www.heartbeatinternational.org/pdf/1stQPulse_2006.pdf.

———. 2014. *World Wide Directory*. Retrieved September 7, 2014. http://www.heartbeatinternational.org/worldwide-directory.

Hoffmann, John P., and Sherrie Mills Johnson. 2005. "Attitudes toward Abortion among Religious Traditions in the United States: Change or Continuity?" *Sociology of Religion* 66 (2): 161–82.

Hofstadter, Richard. 1963. *The Progressive Movement, 1900–1915*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Hughes, Everett C. 1944. "Dilemmas and Contradictions of Status." *American Journal of Sociology* 50 (1): 353–59.

Hunter, James Davison. 1991. *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Control the Family, Art, Education, Law, and Politics in America*. New York: Basic Books.

Hussey, Laura S. 2014. "Crisis Pregnancy Centers, Poverty, and the Expanding Frontiers of American Abortion Politics." *Politics and Policy* 41 (6): 985–1011.

Ianora, Terry. 2009. *Crisis Pregnancy Centers: The Birth of a Grassroots Movement*. Bloomington, Ind.: Author House.

Jasper, James. 1997. *The Art of Moral Protest*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jones, Rachel K., and Jenna Jerman. 2014. "Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 2011." Guttmacher Institute. Retrieved August 28, 2014. http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/psrh.46e0414.pdf.

Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1977. "Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token Women." *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (5): 965–90.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Kelly, Kimberly. 2012. "In the Name of the Mother: Renegotiating Conservative Women's Authority in the Crisis Pregnancy Center Movement." *Signs* 38 (1): 203–30.

King, Gary. 1989. "A Seemingly Unrelated Poisson Regression Model." *Sociological Methods and Research* 17 (3): 235–55.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F., and Robert K. Merton. 1954. "Friendship as a Social Process: A Substantive and Methodological Analysis." *Freedom and Control in Modern Society* 18 (1): 18–66.

Leip, David. 2013. *Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections*. Retrieved March 7, 2013. http://uselectionatlas.org.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, ed. 1960. *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and Persistence in Social Structures*. Piscataway, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Earl Raab. 1978. *The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790–1977*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Luker, Kristin. 1984. *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Massey, Douglas, and Nancy Denton. 1988. "The Dimensions of Residential Segregation." *Social Forces* 67 (2): 281–315.

McAdam, Doug. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1988. *Freedom Summer*. New York: Oxford University Press.

McAdam, Doug, and Katrina Kloos. 2014. *Deeply Divided: Racial Politics and Social Movements in Post-War America*. New York: Oxford University Press.

McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1973. *The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization*. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press.

McVeigh, Rory. 1999. "Structural Incentives for Conservative Mobilization: Power Devaluation and the Rise of the Ku Klux Klan, 1915–1925." *Social Forces* 77 (4): 1461–96.

———. 2004. "Structured Ignorance and Organized Racism in the United States." *Social Forces* 82:895–936.

———. 2006. "Structural Influences on Activism and Crime: Identifying the Social Structure of Discontent." *American Journal of Sociology* 112 (2): 510–66.

———. 2009. *The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

McVeigh, Rory, David Cunningham, Justin Farrell. 2014. "Political Polarization as a Social Movement Outcome: 1960s Klan Activism and Its Enduring Impact on Political Realignment in Southern Counties, 1960 to 2000." *American Sociological Review* 79 (6): 1144–71.

McVeigh, Rory, Daniel J. Myers, and David Sikkink. 2004. "Corn, Klansmen, and Coolidge: Structure and Framing in Social Movements." *Social Forces* 83 (2): 653–90.

McVeigh, Rory, and Juliana M. Sobolewski. 2007. "Red Counties, Blue Counties, and Occupational Segregation by Sex and Race." *American Journal of Sociology* 113 (2): 446–506.

McPherson, J. Miller, and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 1987. "Homophily in Voluntary Organizations: Status Distance and the Composition of Face-to-Face Groups." *American Sociological Review* 52 (3): 370–79.

Mead, George Herbert. 1934. *Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Medoff, Marshall H. 2002. "The Determinants and Impact of State Abortion Restrictions." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 61 (2): 481–93.

Meier, Kenneth J., and Deborah R. McFarlane. 1992. "State Policies on Funding of Abortions: A Pooled Time Series Analysis." *Social Science Quarterly* 73 (3): 690–98.

Meyer, David S., and Sidney G. Tarrow. 1998. *Towards a Movement Society? Contentious Politics for a New Century*. Boulder, Colo.: Roman & Littlefield.

Meyer, John W., and Brian Rowan. 1977. "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony." *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (2): 340–63.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Munson, Ziad. 2008. *The Making of Pro-Life Activists*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Myers, Daniel J. 2000. "The Diffusion of Collective Violence: Infectiousness, Susceptibility, and Mass Media Networks." *American Journal of Sociology* 106 (1): 173–208.

———. 2010. "Violent Protest and Heterogeneous Diffusion Processes: The Spread of U.S. Racial Rioting from 1964 to 1971." *Mobilization* 15 (3): 289–321.

NCCS (National Center for Charitable Statistics). 2014. "NTEE Definitions." National Center for Charitable Statistics. Retrieved December 6, 2014. http://nccsweb.urban.org/PubApps/nteeSearch.php?gQry=all&codeType=NTEE.

NIFLA (National Institute of Family and Life Advocates). 2014. "What We Do." Retrieved September 6, 2014. http://www.nifla.org/about-us-what-we-do.asp.

Nielsen, François. 1985. "Toward a Theory of Ethnic Solidarity in Modern Societies." *American Sociological Review* 50 (2): 133–49.

Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. 1974. "The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion." *Journal of Communication* 24 (2): 43–51.

Oberschall, Anthony. 1973. *Social Conflict and Social Movements*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Olzak, Susan. 1992. *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Olzak, Susan, Suzanne Shanahan, and Elizabeth West. 1994. "School Desegregation, Interracial Exposure, and Antibusing Activity in Contemporary Urban America." *American Journal of Sociology* 100 (1): 196–214.

Option Line. 2012. *Option Line*. Retrieved September 6, 2014 (http://www.optionline.org/).

Page, Ann L., and Donald A. Clelland. 1978. "The Kanawha County Textbook Controversy: A Study of the Politics of Life Style Concern." *Social Forces* 57 (1): 265–81.

Pattillo, Mary. 1999. *Black Picket Fences: Privilege and Peril among the Black Middle Class*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Pinard, Maurice, and Richard Hamilton. 2000. "The Class Bases of the Quebec Independence Movement: Conjectures and Evidence." Pp. 1151–88 in *Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith.

Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Rao, Hayagreeva, Philippe Monin, and Rodolphe Durand. 2003. "Institutional Change in Toque Ville: Nouvelle Cuisine as an Identity Movement in French Gastronomy." *American Journal of Sociology* 108 (4): 795–843.

Rojas, Fabio. 2006. "Social Movement Tactics, Organizational Change, and the Spread of African-American Studies." *Social Forces* 84 (4): 2147–66.

Rotolo, Thomas, and J. Miller McPherson. 2001. "The System of Occupations: Modeling Occupations in Sociodemographic Space." *Social Forces* 79 (3): 1095–1130.

Sallaz, Jeffrey J. 2006. "The Making of the Global Gambling Industry: An Application and Extension of Field Theory." *Theory and Society* 35 (3): 265–97.

Santoro, Wayne A. 1999. "Conventional Politics Takes Center Stage: The Latino Struggle against English-Only Laws." *Social Forces* 77 (3): 887–909.

Scott, W. Richard. 2008. *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests*, 3d ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.

Simmel, Georg. 1950. *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*. New York: Free Press.

———. 1955. *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

Smith, Christian. 1998. *American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Snow, David, and Robert Benford. 1988. "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization." *International Social Movement Research* 1:197–217.

Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51 (4): 464–81.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Soule, Sarah A. 1997. "The Student Divestment Movement in the United States and Tactical Diffusion: The Shantytown Protest." *Social Forces* 75 (3): 855–82.

Soule, Sarah A., and Jennifer Earl. 2005. "A Movement Society Evaluated: Collective Protest in the United States, 1960–1986." *Mobilization* 10 (3): 345–64.

Sutherland, Edwin, and Donald Cressey. 1978. *Criminology*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.

Tarrow, Sidney G. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tepper, Steven J. 2011. *Not Here, Not Now, Not That! Protest over Art and Culture in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Thompson, E. P. 1963. *The Making of the English Working Class*. New York: Vintage Books.

Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

U.S. Census. 2010. "2010 TIGER/Line Shapefiles." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau. Retrieved September 10, 2014. https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/tiger-line.html.

Useem, Bert. 1980. "Solidarity Model, Breakdown Model, and the Boston Anti-busing Movement." *American Sociological Review* 45 (3): 357–69.

Van Dyke, Nella, and Sarah A. Soule. 2002. "Explaining Variation in Levels of Patriot and Militia Mobilization: Resources, Political Process, and Strain Explanations." *Social Problems* 49 (4): 497–520.

Voas, David, Alasdair Crockett, and Daniel Olson. 2002. "Religious Pluralism and Participation: Why Previous Research Is Wrong." *American Sociological Review* 67 (2): 212–30.

Wang, Dan J., and Sarah A. Soule. 2012. "Social Movement Organizational Collaboration: Networks of Learning and the Diffusion of Protest Tactics, 1960–1995." *American Journal of Sociology* 117 (6): 1674–1722.

Wilde, Melissa J. 2007. *Vatican II: A Sociological Analysis of Religious Change*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Wood, Michael, and Michael Hughes. 1984. "The Moral Basis of Moral Reform: Status Discontent vs. Culture and Socialization as Explanations of Anti-Pornography Social Movement Adherence." *American Sociological Review* 49 (1): 86–99.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on October 27, 2017 07:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).