Outrages: Contention, Vigilantism, or Lynching?

Accounting for Racial Violence in Biased Sources

Abstract

Reports of outrages against the Freedmen of Georgia in 1868 are coded and analyzed, using insights from Tilly (1978) and Tolnay and Beck (1995) to suggest how both might inform our analysis of racial violence. We find that outrages, vigilantism and lynching represent distinct phenomena, as dependent or independent variables. We also find that the Resource Mobilization model is most effective in predicting outrages and vigilantism, but it also adds some explanatory power in predicting lynching. Finally, the Tolnay and Beck (1995) lynching measure is a better predictor of the vote for President Grant. The implications for further research on racial violence are explored in conclusion.

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The study of Southern lynching relies almost exclusively on newspaper accounts, which are clearly biased sources but thought to be the best sources available. Here we consider another biased source, the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (hereinafter, Freedmen’s Bureau) reports of outrages committed against the Freedmen in 1868 (Bureau 1868). We use one these reports, located in the Georgia Governor’s correspondence for 1868, to identify a population of “outrages” from which we extract two different populations of victims. One includes what Western frontier scholars (Dykstra 1968; Hogan 1990) consider to be vigilantism—taking the law into your own hands in defiance of established authorities. The other imposes the definition of lynching proposed by Tolnay and Beck (1995)—homicide perpetrated by three or more persons, which is the standard in the sociological literature. Using these data, merged with data from Historical Elections (ICPSR 1968) and from the U.S. Census of 1870 (ICPSR 1970), we estimate models that predict outrages, vigilantism and lynching, combining measures from a Resource Mobilization (Tilly 1978) model with others from the Tolnay and Beck (1995) lynching model. We then use somewhat different versions of the same models to predict the vote for Republican Presidential candidate, U. S. Grant, in November of 1868, using outrage, vigilantism and lynching as part of the predictive models.

What we find is, first, that outrages, vigilantism, and lynching represent distinct phenomena, whether considered as dependent or independent variables. We also find that the Resource Mobilization model is most effective in predicting outrages and vigilantism but less effective in predicting lynching. We then estimate three Tolnay and Beck (1995) lynching models and recognize that Resource Mobilization effects, while not significant, seem to add to the overall predictive power of the model. Finally, the Tolnay and Beck (1995) lynching
measure is a better predictor of the vote for President Grant, although, once again, the Resource Mobilization model offers valuable insights.

We consider the implications of these findings both methodologically and theoretically in a concluding discussion of vigilantism, outrage, and lynching, 1830-1930, suggesting a path toward future study. First, however, we review the theoretical and empirical bases for this analysis, beginning with Resource Mobilization theory.

**Resource Mobilization**

Tilly (1978) offers a model that predicts when organized interests will fish or cut bait—in other words, when they will engage in collective action and when they will mobilize their constituent resources toward a future campaign. The predicted answer depends on the organization’s power, mobilization, and the circumstantial opportunity/threat for gain/loss, as indicated in Figure 1.

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**Figure 1**

**Tilly’s Mobilization Model**

![Tilly’s Mobilization Model](source: Tilly (1978), p. 56)

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Tilly (1978) students will recall that these variables were graphically represented in an elaborate rational actor model in which threat and opportunity circumscribed the limits of costs avoidable or benefits obtainable, on the vertical axis above and below the “break even line,” where rational actors get as much good (or avoid as much bad—on the vertical axis) as the resources they are willing to expend (on the horizontal axis). The actor’s power is represented by the height of the S curve indicating return on resources expended. Mobilization is the vertical line indicating how many resources are available. This model is reproduced as Figure 2.

![Figure 2](image-url)  
**Figure 2**  
Tilly’s Model of Collective Action Predicted by Power, Mobilization, and Opportunity/Threat

In this case, the rational actor would be expected to act defensively, in response to threat, up to the limit of mobilization, expending all available resources to break even, and avoiding the threat of losing collective goods through inaction. Such defensive collective action suggests a cautious response, however, avoiding threat rather than taking advantage of opportunity. A more ambitious actor would mobilize first, up to the point where mobilization, opportunity, and the S
curve (indicating power) intersect. Then the ambitious actor would expend all available resources to gain some new advantages within the limits of available opportunity.

Of course, Tilly himself later moved beyond this model, which he came to view as static structural determinism. We who continue to follow his lead, however, can appreciate the fact that Resource Mobilization provides us with analytical rigor largely missing in alternative approaches. We also see that this model can be combined with more historical or process-driven models to explain how and why opportunities or threats might have changed, in part at least, in response to collective action in a cycle of political challenge or contention (Hogan 2011; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 2011). In fact, much of Tilly’s work in the thirty years after his seminal (1978) work might be viewed as an attempt to move beyond the static structural rational actor model toward an interactive model of contender, antagonist, and authority. This work defends an interactive contingency model that is ultimately not so different from the early models, except in its complexity. With the complexity of historical context as a condition for collective action, assuming interests and organization, we can apply this model to the study of Southern lynching.

**Southern Lynching**

Unfortunately, the sociological lynching literature has not progressed comparably in efforts to move beyond the static structural analyses of large datasets, which allow for multivariate models and hypothesis testing using cross-sectional data that map the ecology of lynching victimization across counties over time. Tolnay and Beck (1995) dominate the discourse in the social science journals, where their methodological rigor and comprehensive empirical base are favored over the historical accounts resting on case studies. Most of the hypothesis testing in this literature focuses on status (and status anxiety) versus class (and
economic crises) theories that are crudely rooted in Weberian or Durkheimian theories of collective behavior, usually resting on social psychological explanations for aggression or victimization. The lynch mob was expressing frustration due to status anxiety or economic hardship. Alternatively, the victim represented a threat to white masculinity or was simply a convenient scapegoat. Ecological correlations in large datasets provide patterns that can be deconstructed to test competing hypotheses. This is essentially what the sociological literature offers.

Bailey and Snedker (2011: 415), summarize the ecological patterns as follows:

southern blacks were most at risk of being lynched where and when: (1) the black population was proportionately larger, (2) the white population suffered economic hardship, (3) the Democratic Party was stronger, (4) the white population was threatened economically or socially by the black population, (5) the level of black out-migration was lower, and (6) alternative legal sanctions for serious crimes were lacking.

With shifts in emphasis and packaging these findings can be arrayed in defense of “marginalization” versus “status transgression” theories. In either case, the explanation tends to be reductionist. It explains why these individual perpetrators expressed frustration or why these blacks were victimized. It does not consider how and why racial violence was organized or why “alternative legal sanctions for serious crimes were lacking.” The organization of collective interests, in defense of and in opposition to lynching, is ignored or assumed. Similarly, the
interests and actions of “legal” governing authorities are considered only in their absence. How and why authorities support or oppose lynching is not considered at all.

Gullickson (2010) views lynching as a violent reaction by lower-status whites to the threat of a rising mulatto middle class. Within the context of social psychological (Tolnay et al. 1992; Tolnay et al. 1996) and economic (Tolnay and Beck 1995) theories that attempt to specify the geography of Southern lynching between 1882 and 1930 (Beck and Tolnay 1990) and demographic (Farley 2002), micro-economic (Bonacich 1972) and social psychological analyses of racial identity (Blumer 1958; Brunsma 2005; Brunsma and Rockquemore 2001), this is a more credible argument than it might at first appear to a social historian, particular one inclined toward the analysis of big structures and large processes (Tilly 1984).

Some historians support the status transgression theory of lynching, because it fits primary source (newspaper or eyewitness) accounts (Gilje 1996; Grimsted 1998; Leonard 2002; Pfeifer 2011 and 2013) and provides a base for interpretations of the outrage expressed by white racists. Alternatively, particularly among historians who turn words into numbers (Brundage 1999), lynching is often viewed as a stop gap measure, when local authorities were not effective. These analyses tend to garner greater support from social scientists who see the limits of case study evidence undermining support for status transgression theories (Bailey et al. 2011: 418; Tolnay and Beck 1995: ix-x). Among social scientists, Gullickson (2010) is the exception that proves the rule—the lone sociologist supporting status transgression theory with multivariate methods. At the same time, however, the more reliable estimates of social scientists do not offer much support for the “ineffective authorities” theory either. As Tolnay and Beck (1995: 112) report, “It seems from the evidence presented in this chapter that the intensity of lynching bore little systematic relationship to the legitimate activities of the formal justice system.”
Brundage (1990: 253) suggests an additional wrinkle, however, in considering not simply the capacity of local authorities but the relative power and organization of white and black residents. His analysis of race riots and black efforts to prevent lynching in the Atlantic Coastal region of Georgia, suggests ways in which quantitative and qualitative accounts might move the discussion forward.

In addition to the traditional explanations of the patterns of lynching—poverty, weak rural governments, and economic conditions, for example—the protest of blacks in McIntosh County points to the likelihood that blacks themselves imposed limits on white violence. In other areas of the South where blacks enjoyed a range of economic possibilities, a degree of communal autonomy and articulate leadership, blacks were often outspoken in their opposition to lynching.

A similar set of insights are offered by Dykstra (1968) and Hogan (1990) on vigilantism and lynching on the frontier. Both in Kansas and in Colorado vigilantism represented not the lack of effective local governance but local governance that did not represent a specific class-based interest. In Kansas, the lynching events were part of a more general campaign to use prohibition and other less violent means to protect the interests of farmers against the depredation of cattle. In Colorado, it was a different version of the same problem. The People’s Court protected the petit-bourgeois interest in public order—publicly hanging convicted murderers after public trials that showcased local legal talent in legalistic if illegal trials by jury that mimicked due process and sometimes even acquitted the accused. In this case, the local ranchers and farmers lacked an effective authority willing to hang horse thieves based on circumstantial evidence. The miners’ courts were not interested, and the lawyers in Denver were, it was alleged, implicated in the horse thieving ring. Thus, the resort to violence was not a
response to ineffective local authorities but a response to authorities who defended other interests quite effectively but ignored the interests of the vigilantes. Vigilantism was not a reaction to ineffective authorities but an act in defiance of instituted authorities who were unwilling or unable to defend a specific class-based interest by any means necessary.

Both Dykstra (1968) and Hogan (1990) offer compelling evidence to defend their assertions regarding the class based interests of the frontier actors, but their lack of rigorous multivariate model testing undermines social science support for their insights, just as it does for the insights that Brundage (1990) offers. At the same time, the sociological dearth of historiographic and archival methods and the sociologist’s inability to tell stories alienate historians. This is particularly true for interpretative cultural historians, who shy away from social scientists and even other historians who reduce history to numbers.\(^1\)

The social science literature suffers from its choice to rely on comparative methods in the interest of methodological rigor and reliable estimates based on large samples of relatively rare events that cluster in time and place. Lynching data, or crime statistics, allow researchers to test hypotheses and specify the relationship between size of black population and lynching in late nineteenth and early twentieth century counties, or homicide rates in twentieth century cities.\(^2\)

Lost in these comparative studies is the connection between white-on-black violent crime in the rural South and black-on-black violent crime in the urban North. Obviously, black migration is part of this story, but this begs the question of the nature the “race problem,” which changes in form but not substance between 1868 and 1968, since, in both cases, according to the sociological literature, whites were threatened (or frightened) by the specter of racial revolution, or black power, in the form of Radical Republican voters or urban rioters. Most fundamentally, social scientists sacrifice validity in the interest of reliability. We are very sure that our
measurement is reliable. We are just not sure what we are measuring. This is particularly true in the study of racial violence (Blumer 1958; Brunsma 2005; Brunsma and Rockquemore 2001; Gullickson 2010; Tolnay et al. 1992; Tolnay et al. 1996).³

At the same time, the historical case studies suffer from the problems that the social scientists have addressed—particularly, reliability. It is not at all clear that even students of the same master will find the same documents or code them in the same way. Here the historian is convinced that she has "documented" an event with multiple sources (perhaps even triangulated sources), but it is not clear that another person, using the same data, will code the data in the same way. Pfeifer (2011), Leonard (2002), and I disagree on the enumeration of lynching events (and corresponding victimizations) enumerated in their Appendices. This is, of course, the classic interdisciplinary squabble. The problem is that sociologists look only at the tables, historians focus on the footnotes, and only English majors (most notably, proofreaders) read the text. We proceed like three differently abled unsighted travelers who happen upon an elephant and each examine a distinctive anatomical feature before arguing amongst themselves on the nature of the beast. If only we could all just get along.

**Toward a Theory of Lynching**

Perhaps we might begin with two simple assertions, which provide a theoretical foundation for the analysis to follow. First, whites routinely use violence and the threat of violence to subjugate blacks. Second, blacks routinely resist these efforts. Based on these assumptions we can add two propositions, which will be examined in developing hypotheses for the analysis that follows. First, in keeping with the work of Dykstra (1968) and Hogan (1990), petit-bourgeois shopkeeper/merchant classes will routinely support legal forms of coercive
violence to sustain their booster efforts to attract industry and promote local trade. Second, following the insights of Brundage (1990), the relative power, organization and mobilization of black and white interests will affect (a) their perception of opportunity/threat and (b) their capacity to respond by victimizing or protecting Freedmen. Thus, we offer a little class theory and a little historical insight as the missing link between Tilly (1978) and the Tolnay and Beck (1995) analysis of lynching.

Data

Rather than relying on newspaper accounts, we begin here with data gathered by the Freedmen’s Bureau, in Georgia, in 1868. I found these data in the correspondence of Radical Republican Governor Bullock (at the GA State Archives, in Morrow, GA). We might consider this a convenience sample drawn from the 1865-1869 Bureau reports, but 1868 was a particularly important year, and it was no accident that this report found its way into the Governor’s papers. This was the year when the Republicans took charge of the Georgia State government. It was also the year that the KKK, which had been organized in the Border States in 1866, insinuated itself into Georgia. This was, in short, a period of protracted racial political struggle, in which blacks were registered to vote while whites were encouraged to ignore the elections and the conventions that produced the new constitution and the Republican candidates, including some blacks, who stood for election in April of 1868 (Foner 2014; Hogan 2011).

Georgia newspapers offer a critical perspective on the “black constitution,” the Radicals, and their black supporters. The Dailey News and Herald (Savannah, October 30, 1867: 2), ridicules voters and delegates, and General Pope, commander of the Atlanta region.
We will return to this newspaper and compare its account of the Savannah election riot in 1868 with the report of the Georgia Freedmen’s Bureau. For present purposes we simply need to recognize that most studies of lynching and vigilantism use newspaper accounts, either directly or indirectly (Leonard 2002; Pfeifer 2013; Tolnay and Beck 1995). Even national samples rely on local newspapers, much as the Uniform Crime Statistics rely on local police departments. Thus, we begin with reports that (as we have and will continue to illustrate with the Savannah paper) view racial violence from the perspective of the lynch mob, rather than from the perspective of the victim. Except for a very few black newspapers that have survived, the editorial perspective on outrages is to blame the victims. The Savannah paper reports, “The Darien Outrage,” (Dailey News and Herald 8/12, 1871, p. 3) to highlight the crimes committed by the black mob, led by their elected representative and justice of the peace, which justify the
unfortunate need for whites to resort to violence in self-defense. An earlier editorial (Daily News and Tribune 12/10/1870, p. 2) was even more explicit on this point.

The outrages that we will be analyzing here are not the alleged crimes of Freedmen but the alleged crimes against Freedmen. The Freedmen’s Bureau, quite apart from its short-lived economic reform efforts (Foner 2014: 153-175), was the military presence that sustained black political organization in 1867-1876 (Foner 2014: 281-307). It was the authority of the federal government, defending Freedmen (and Freedwomen) from their current employers and former masters and from local law enforcement efforts that were, in some cases, lynch mobs, as we shall see. After the Georgia Republican governor was elected, in April of 1868, and the new constitutional government was being established, the Freedmen’s Bureau stood as the defender of the Freedmen (and the Republicans) against the outrages committed by the unreconstructed whites (Foner 2014: 412-459).

The Freedman’s Bureau represented the Freedmen, and its reports are a welcome alternative to newspaper accounts. They are not objective. They are, perhaps, as biased as any
police report, but they are biased toward the Freedman, as opposed to the lynch mob or the local authorities, who, in one case, at least, led the mob. They are, arguably, more standardized than local police reports, because they are reports from local commandants to their superior officers. The details of the instructions and the forms that were used were not available in the Georgia archives, but it seems that they were prepared with military precision, although not without errors (see Appendix A.).

The Georgia Freedmen's Bureau enumerated 355 outrages committed between January and November 15, 1868, reported by sub-division officers and summarized in a report to Georgia Governor Rufus B. Bullock (Bureau 1868). This report documents the, at best, feeble efforts by local civil authorities to defend the rights of Freedmen, usually from white assailants, sometimes individuals who beat their former slaves (and current employees). At other times the perpetrators were gangs of thugs, sometimes disguised, who attempted to intimidate or kill Freedmen who attempted to exercise their rights as citizens—Freedman partisan assembly and voting being the most obvious examples.

Nevertheless, few of the events that produced the victimizations enumerated in the report would qualify as vigilantism or lynching. Generally, it is more appropriate to consider these as crimes perpetrated against the Freedmen of Georgia. Only 28% (101) of the 355 outrages were murders. Of these, only 45 entailed three or more perpetrators. Most, in fact, were the actions of individuals, who took the law into their own hands, disciplining Freedmen in the same way that they had punished slaves. Beating and whipping accounted for 31% of all outrages.

Whites committed most of these outrages. Only 26 (6%) of the 425 perpetrators (including both individuals and groups—where individuals were not identified) were identified as black or mulatto. We can assume that all victims were Freedmen, since this is the report of
outrages against the Freedmen of Georgia, and we can assume that virtually all unknown assailants were white. Outrages committed by blacks—what we would today call black-on-black crime, were routinely punished. Fully 58% of black suspects were arrested. White on black outrages, however, were rarely punished (only 15% arrested), even when authorities knew the identity of the perpetrator. This was true even when known white men murdered blacks. Only 7% of white murder suspects were arrested, compared to 71% of black murder suspects.

The rationale for these 355 outrages, as reported to the Freedmen’s Bureau, was unknown (N=67; 18%), blank/missing (N=87; 25%), or political. (N=103; 29%). Nine (3%) of these outrages were reactions to alleged crimes perpetrated by the Freedmen, but most were white reactions to blacks who were acting white or to Freedmen (and women) acting as if they were free. Some of these types of outrages had nothing to do with political partisanship, but were rooted in the social problems of civility and civil rights (N=35; 10%) or economics (N=24; 7%). Eleven percent (N=39) were reported as unprovoked.

The best examples of politically motivated outrages are the election riot in Savannah and the Camilla Massacre. The riot in Savannah was during the voting for the November 1868 Presidential election (which U. S. Grant won nationally, but not in Georgia). In Savannah, railroad workers assaulted black voters, essentially driving them from the polls. At least three people were killed, and at least 15 more wounded, although the Bureau report is confusing, and the newspaper report—which blames the blacks for coming to town armed and looking for trouble, is unclear (*Daily News and Herald* 1868).

Better known is the Camilla Massacre, in which a local sheriff led the posse that prevented local blacks from organizing a local Republican Party. According to the Bureau report (1868), a posse led by the County Sheriff shot and killed ten persons on 19 September 1868, “at
or near Camilla mostly by gunshots.” There were also 14 persons injured and another taken from his house the following day by “distinguished white men” and mortally wounded. The Bureau agent identified the sheriff and two other men by name and concluded as follows.

The names of a great many wounded persons could not be ascertained by the Bureau. The perpetrators of these acts were John W. P. Poore, Sheriff of Mitchell County, Adam Bullett and others, all white, cause determination on their part to prevent a Republican meeting at Camilla and to punish the parties who would make an effort to do so.

These were not “vigilante” events in the Western tradition. Neither were they much like Southern lynching events of the Populist/Progressive Era. The Savannah incident was an election riot—typical in Antebellum America, even outside the South (Bensel 2004). The Camilla Massacre was a paramilitary (posse) effort to defend law (or custom) in denying the vote to blacks or Republicans. This was just a somewhat excessive version of oppressive (as opposed to hegemonic) partisanship. Nevertheless, these two events would qualify as lynching by Tolnay and Beck criteria—murder by three or more people in defense of law or tradition (Bailey and Snedker 2011, p. 845).

In sum, these 355 “outrages” were violent assaults, often (28%) fatal, virtually always perpetrated upon black men by white men (probably 90% or more) for what were often alleged to be political motives (29%). The most spectacular events were collective assaults or massacres, most notably, the Camilla Massacre and the Savannah Election Riot, perpetrated by
or, at least, tolerated by local authorities, who rarely took any action against the white men who freely resorted to violence to punish or intimidate their black neighbors.

Nevertheless, even among these cases, based on Freedmen Bureau reports and limited to Georgia in 1868, there are at least three different types of collective action, including what we might consider vigilantism and lynching. First, there are the outrages, the total number (N=355), which were identified by the Freedman’s Bureau as crimes against Freedmen, including black on black crime and other crimes that routinely inspired arrest and prosecution. Here we are looking at victimization data, which should be analyzed as such.

Second, there were many outrages that elicited no response from local authorities—perpetrated by persons unknown or with the tacit complicity of local authorities, like the vigilantism of the Western frontier (N=303). Here we are looking at a subset of victimization, including only those where no official response is reported. These should be considered either crimes not reported to the police or crimes not solved by the police. For our purpose, they resemble vigilantism, as Dykstra (1968) and Hogan (1990) might use the term.

Finally, a small number of these outrages would qualify as lynching—homicides perpetrated by three or more persons (N=45). These would qualify as part of the population of lynching victimizations that are routinely analyzed by the Tolnay and Beck (1995) School of lynching studies.

These data allow us to distinguish three distinctive rates of victimization for Georgia Counties in 1868. Outrages, in general, are crimes against Freedmen. When there was no arrest or other official response to the crimes, we will consider them to be vigilantism, in the nominal sense of vigilante justice in defiance (or with the tacit complicity) of local authorities. When the
crimes were homicides perpetrated by gangs of three or more persons we will consider them lynching, in the standard sociological definition of that term.

Based on our assumptions and propositions outlined above, we will estimate effects of pertinent variables in models predicting the probability (or logged odds) of outrage, vigilantism, and lynching. Then we will turn to the question of whether these forms of racial violence had any effect on the election of U.S. Grant and, by extension, the future of Republican rule in Georgia, in November 1868.

Models

In keeping with the idea that outrages are victimization, Resource Mobilization theory suggests that we should expect fewer outrages where blacks are relatively well organized and powerful and in petit-bourgeois merchant and shopkeeper communities, which eschew violence and disorder in general and support law and order. At the same time, however, we should consider the possibility that whites are engaged in outrages as a form of organized crime, which would tend to be a rather expensive alternative to public justice and more likely where a wealthy few attempt to control a less wealthy majority. We should also recognize that blacks voted in April 1868 and tended to support the Georgia constitution and the Radical Republican governor. Counties with substantial Republican vote might seem a threat to wealthy white control. If, in fact, the outrages were successful in deterring would-be Republican voters, they would tend to proliferate where the Republican vote was higher in April but lower in November, suggesting that black Republican partisanship was a manageable threat to wealthy whites. Sustained black Republican partisanship and other evidence of black community organization, including black schools and churches, would suggest a prophylactic effect on outrages.
The Tolnay and Beck (1995) model predicting lynching would, of course, include proportion black and proportion black squared—since it was the concentration of black population that tended to foster lynching. We should also include a dummy for the cotton belt or some measure of cotton production, since that is associated with lynching. Economic hardship suggests that the effect of wealth should be negative. Similarly, the Republican vote should be negative, since Democratic partisanship is associated with lynching.4

Thus, we can evaluate the merits of our modified Resource Mobilization model in comparison with the Tolnay and Beck (1995) model, first, in predicting the likelihood of outrage/vigilantism/lynching and then in predicting the vote for U.S. Grant in the November election, to consider the efficacy of racial violence in extinguishing black partisanship.

Results

Table 1 reports the results of identical Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Equation (ZINBE) models predicting outrages, vigilantism, and lynching. The predictors are indicators of petit-bourgeois communities—small farmers (farms per capita) and artisans (manufactures per capita), who tend to promote law and order and thereby discourage crime, including outrages. Wealth per capita predicts outrages, because collective violence (or organized crime) requires slack resources. Vote for Republican Governor Bullock, in April, tended to inspire outrages, while sustained Republican partisanship, including support for President Grant in November, was associated with a mobilized constituency capable of resisting outrage. Finally, black schoolchildren were indicative of black resources and organization and the capacity to protect blacks from outrage. Unfortunately, census data did not distinguish black and white religious denominations, so we have no measure of the effect of black churches.
Table 1
Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Equation (ZINBE) Model Predicting Outrages, Vigilantism, and Lynching by Manufactures, Farms and Wealth Per-capita, Proportion County vote for Republican Governor in April 1868 and for Republican President U. S. Grant in November 1868, and Number of Black School Children in 1870, with Black Population as Inflation Factor (N=120)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>predictor</th>
<th>Predicting Outrages</th>
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<th>Predicting Vigilantism</th>
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<td>Manufactures per-capita</td>
<td>-127.39*</td>
<td>65.121</td>
<td>-198.71***</td>
<td>74.66</td>
<td>-285.58**</td>
<td>130.66</td>
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<td>Wealth per-capita</td>
<td>4.86**</td>
<td>1.889</td>
<td>4.56**</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>4.66</td>
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<td>Republican Gov. Vote</td>
<td>2.05*</td>
<td>1.065</td>
<td>2.42**</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>7.26***</td>
<td>2.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Grant Vote</td>
<td>-1.56*</td>
<td>.854</td>
<td>-2.09**</td>
<td>.901</td>
<td>-5.06***</td>
<td>1.88</td>
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<td>Black School Kids</td>
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<td>.001</td>
<td>-.003**</td>
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<td>.004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.494*</td>
<td>.851</td>
<td>1.63*</td>
<td>.901</td>
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**Inflation Factor**

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<td>Black Population</td>
<td>-.000**</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.825</td>
<td>.531</td>
<td>1.01*</td>
<td>.591</td>
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\[ \chi^2 = 26.56^{***} \text{ d.f.}=6 \]
\[ \chi^2 = 26.76^{***} \text{ d.f.}=6 \]
\[ \chi^2 = 15.53^{**} \text{ d.f.}=6 \]

* p<.10    ** p<.05    *** p<.01

Source: Dependent variables coded by author from Freedmen’s Bureau Report, 1868. Predictors (independent variables) created by author from ICPSR (1970) Study 003 Census Data and ICPSR (1968) Study 001 Historical Elections Data, downloaded from ICPSR, merged, recoded, and analyzed by author.
The ZINBE model might be unfamiliar to readers, but it is appropriate for binomial distributions where most of the cases have values of zero, which tends to inflate the variance and the effects of positive outliers (cases with high scores) in more standard regression analyses (Long 1997: 242-249; Su 2015:156). Here we have a textbook case for why we need this model. Outrages, vigilantism, and, especially, lynching are rare events. No outrages were reported in 52% of the counties; no vigilantism was reported in 55%, and no lynching in 86%. Also, all three victimization measures have standard deviations that far exceed the size of their means (mean divided by standard deviations for outrage is 2.69/5.56; for vigilantism: 2.30/5.15; for lynching: .341/1.40). Since there are no negative values, all three have inflated variance associated with positive outliers. There are 11 counties with ten or more outrages, seven with ten or more vigilante victims. Even for lynching, there is one county with 8 victims and one with 13.

The ZINBE model includes an inflation factor—effects associated with values of zero on the dependent variable. In this case, Black population is an inflation factor, since counties without blacks did not suffer outrages. In fact, there were no other significant race effects. Once we control for the inflation factor, outrages were not significantly more likely in counties with large black populations or in the cotton belt (results available on request).

This model is effective in predicting the logged odds of outrages, although the small number of cases and the admittedly crude measures make for lower significance thresholds than we would impose on larger datasets, but it is much less effective in predicting lynching. In fact, the lynching model includes only three significant effects. The logged odds of lynching are significantly greater where there are fewer artisans (manufactures per capita) and where the vote for Governor Bullock in April was greater and the vote for Grant in November was lower.
### Table 2

**ZINBE Model Predicting Lynching with Tolnay-Beck Model: Proportion Black, Proportion Black Squared, Log of Cotton Production, Plus Resource Mobilization Model: Manufactures Per-capita, Farms Per-capita and Wealth Per-capita, Proportion of County vote for Republican Governor in April 1868 and for Republican President U. S. Grant in November 1868, and Number of Black School Children in 1870, with Black Population as Inflation Factor**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>predictor</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>se</td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>se</td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>se</td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blackper</td>
<td>19.69</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>11.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Blackper²</td>
<td>-.2673*</td>
<td>14.22</td>
<td>-.1277</td>
<td>10.41</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Log Cotton</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>.271</td>
<td>-.099</td>
<td>.317</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mfgper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-149.58</td>
<td>133.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmsper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-24.49</td>
<td>15.86</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wealthper</td>
<td>.733</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov. Vote</td>
<td>5.75**</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>8.00***</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>10.27***</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant Vote</td>
<td>-4.14**</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>-4.78***</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>-6.29***</td>
<td>1.86</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blk Schl Kids</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.10*</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>-5.36**</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>-.360</td>
<td>3.54</td>
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**Inflation Factor**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>predictor</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
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<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>se</td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>se</td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>se</td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>se</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Pop</td>
<td>-.000*</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.000**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.000**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.50*</td>
<td>.831</td>
<td>-2.11***</td>
<td>.664</td>
<td>2.62***</td>
<td>.831</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2=7.95** \]
\[ \text{d.f.}=2 \]
\[ N=129 \]
\[ \chi^2=16.54** \]
\[ \text{d.f.}=6 \]
\[ N=129 \]
\[ \chi^2=25.07*** \]
\[ \text{d.f.}=9 \]
\[ N=120 \]

* p<.10   ** p<.05   *** p<.01

Source: Dependent variables coded by author from Freedmen’s Bureau Report, 1868. Predictors (independent variables) created by author from ICPSR (1970) Study 003 Census Data and ICPSR (1968) Study 001 Historical Elections Data, downloaded from ICPSR, merged, recoded, and analyzed by author.

We estimate three additional lynching models in Table 2 to suggest that we could improve the fit of our Table 1 Model 3 by including more of the variables that are typically used to predict lynching, according to Tolnay and Beck (1995) and Bailey and Snedker (2011),
specifically, proportion black, proportion black squared, and logged cotton production. Model 1 includes only the election effects, which are the only consistently significant effects. Model 2 adds the lynching variables, only one of which is significant (p<.1), but their inclusion more than doubles the size of the chi-square.

Table 3
OLS Models Predicting Proportion County Vote for U. S. Grant in November 1868 in GA Counties, using Outrages, Vigilantism, or Lynching, Tolnay-Beck and Resource Mobilization Predictors (N=129)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Outrages Coeff.</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>Vigilantism Coeff.</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>Lynching Coeff.</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>farms/pop</td>
<td>-1.05**</td>
<td>.448</td>
<td>-1.06**</td>
<td>.444</td>
<td>-1.01**</td>
<td>.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blk/pop</td>
<td>-.932***</td>
<td>.282</td>
<td>-.914**</td>
<td>.281</td>
<td>-.870***</td>
<td>.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blk/pop^2</td>
<td>1.17***</td>
<td>.358</td>
<td>1.15***</td>
<td>.357</td>
<td>1.07***</td>
<td>.357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cottonbelt dummy</td>
<td>-.127***</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>-.128***</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>-.125***</td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RepGovVot</td>
<td>.685***</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.689***</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.700***</td>
<td>.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ot/Vg/Lyn</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.020**</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.209**</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.205**</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.191**</td>
<td>.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R^2</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td></td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td></td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.10   ** p<.05   *** p<.01

Contrary to the Tolnay and Beck (1995) prediction, the effect of proportion black population squared is negative, indicating fewer victims where the population was overwhelming black. This is the opposite of the prediction, but it is exactly what Brundage (1990: 253) suggested. In Model 3, none of the lynching variables and none of the added Resource Mobilization variables are significant effects, but the size of the chi-square is comparable to the best models in Table 1 (predicting outrages and vigilantism), even though only the election effects are significant. On balance then it is fair to say that the lynching variables might add to the Table 1 Model 3 predictive power, but our efforts to predict lynching is still far less successful than the published work of our lynching experts (Tolnay and Beck 1995).5

Finally, lynching, but neither vigilantism nor outrage, is a significant predictor of the vote for Grant (in OLS model including vote for Bullock and other demographics, including, in this case, cotton production and race). Here, we can use Ordinary Least Squares regression, because our dependent variable (proportion of county vote for U.S. Grant) is much closer to normally distributed (mean=.290; standard deviation=.202). The regression results, reported in Table 3, suggest that this wave of lynching, during Reconstruction, was effective in undermining Republican partisanship. This was, of course, the message asserted by Governor Bullock and his supporters. They attempted to postpone the elections of 1870-1871 and to sustain martial law. Unfortunately, they did not have this evidence to support their claims.

Discussion

We consider outrages, vigilantism, and lynching as three different although related types of political contention in the struggle between blacks and whites, Republicans and Democrats, to control the State of Georgia between the election of Radical Republican Governor Rufus
Bullock, in April, and the defeat of U. S. Grant, in November, in 1868. Outrages are the most inclusive form of contention, including everything from black on black crime that was routinely punished to KKK raids where authorities claimed ignorance of the identities of the perpetrators. Many were crimes committed by former masters or other whites who were attempting to maintain a racial order that the war had effectively ended. At the opposite pole, many lynching victims were killed in attempts to intimidate blacks who had the audacity to organize Republican clubs or to vote Republican. Between these two extremes, many outrages were essentially vigilante actions, although often not group actions, in defiance of local authorities, particularly the authority of the State government of black and Republican legislators, elected in April 1868, when many white yeomen refused to vote and even some newspaper editors encouraged sitting out this sham election.

Among these outrages, however, were a growing number of terrorist campaigns, where white gangs of thugs, sometimes railroad workers, sometimes hooded Klansmen, and sometimes just a makeshift posse enforced a “higher” law that legitimated mass murder in the service of white supremacy. These were lynching events—not as stylized and spectacular as the lynching that would characterize the 1920s but functionally similar as acts of terrorism in defense of nativism and racism and petit-bourgeois American values. Lynching undermined petit bourgeois support for public legal violence in defense of public order, so, to sustain this assault on class interests, a crisis of faith was necessary. Faith in bourgeois democracy or republican forms of government was thus a critical piece of the puzzle. How and why this occurred during Reconstruction and again, with greater fury, during the Progressive Era is a challenge for Social Movement scholars.
It is not clear that Resource Mobilization and Political Process theories are incapable of meeting this challenge, although some have suggested this is true (McVeigh 2009). Nevertheless, with sufficient attention to local conditions, it is possible to explain how different class coalitions formed different governing coalitions that were then attacked by class-based or status-based political challengers, promoting racism, nativism, or middle-class values in opposition to class or status-based antagonists. In Reconstruction Georgia, it is perhaps most surprising that blacks effectively resisted the Democratic surge and sustained some degree of political power and economic independence against all odds. That was no less true during the heyday of the Populist challenge or the final days of Jim Crow. In each case, there were political opportunities: divided elites and powerful allies and, to some extent, hesitation to repress challengers. How and why that hesitation was exploited by black resistance and ultimately overcome by the Redeemer reign of terror requires more attention to the details of time and place than we can offer here, but such narrative is not antithetical to the agenda of the “new” social science of the 1970s (Hogan 2011). We still have a lot of work to do, on both sides of the disciplinary fault line.

Conclusion

Tilly (1978) offered a model, a method, and a challenge to think about and analyze what we have come to call contention (Tarrow 2011), including violent and nonviolent collective action that challenges authorities or others who are at least nominally under the protection and control of said authorities. Tolnay and Beck (1995) focus on lynching, in the South, in the heyday of Southern lynching, 1882-1930 (Beck and Tolnay 1990). Although some lynch mobs were more organized than the name itself suggests, it is not clear that studies of lynching have
viewed these events as part of a repertoire of racial violence or part of an ongoing struggle for white supremacy as opposed to racial justice. In this regard, lynching studies have not taken advantage of the insights that a Resource Mobilization or Political Process (McAdam 1982) or opportunity structures (Tarrow 2011) approach might offer.

Lynching and vigilantism find their roots in the border states, dating back to the American Revolution and the patriotism of the first Judge Lynch (Brundage 1999), but they change in form and content as they move West (Dykstra 1968; Hogan 1990; Leonard 2002; Pfeifer 2013) and South (Pfeifer 2011). We need both theoretical and conceptual attention to repertoire and repertoire change in political violence, particularly as it becomes more (or less) racial and barbaric (burning and mutilation as opposed to hanging). How racial violence changed in response to the challenge of Abolitionism, the rise of the Republican party, Reconstruction, Populism, Progressivism, and the Civil Rights Movement would be good questions for social movement scholars to pursue. Perhaps a better understanding of this history could help us to better understand the current challenge of surging white nationalism and the campaign to promote the seemingly self-evident truth that black lives matter.
Notes

1. See, for example, Pfeifer (2011:111 n14) on the qualitative, documentary history offered by Waldrep 2006; in contrast, see Pfeifer (2011:126 n69) on the number crunching efforts of Dykstra (2009). See Grimsted (1998: xiii) and his discussion of “someone dedicated to faith in a better world through numerology” and his confession of “machine-breaking instincts.” His narrative is wonderful but incredibly frustrating for an old-fashioned empiricist like me.

2. Bill Mason taught Ordinary Least Squares regression to University of Michigan graduate students, in 1976, by offering them data on major metropolitan areas of the U.S.A., with variables including percent black and homicide rate, which were highly inter-correlated. His challenge to the students was for them to specify or explain the relationship in a multivariate model. Many people have made careers of this sort of analysis. See, for example Phillips (2006) for a review of the literature and an effort to interpret the race effect, which remains significant among the control variables in this paper, even as its effects are interpreted by variables associated with strain and social control theories).

3. If racism is based on ignorance and fear, then racial violence is irrational, emotional, and essentially meaningless, in our efforts to understand society. It is, perhaps, ironic, that, in the eyes of mainstream functional sociology in the U.S.A., crime is viewed as functional for society and even rational for the criminal, while racial violence is not. Thus, we fail to appreciate the interests of white nationalists or even working-class men and women who voted for Donald Trump.

4. Proportion black and proportion black squared are correlated .97, creating VIF scores above 20 in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models. We will look at these race effects
and at the effect of “log of cotton bales produced in 1870” in Table 2, where we estimate a Tolnay and Beck (1995) model of lynching, using zero inflated negative binomial equation models, as in Table 1. Then, in Table 3, we will these and other variables that did not exhibit high VIF scores (all below 2.0) in an Ordinary Least Squares Model, predicting proportion of county vote for U. S. Grant in Presidential election, November 1868. In those models, we use a dummy variable for the effect of the cotton belt. Counties where tonnage of baled cotton produced is one-half of the standard deviation above the mean for cotton produced in 1870 are coded “1” and other counties are coded “0”. Descriptive statistics and correlations available from author on request.

5. Model 3, in Table 1 is “nested” within Model 3 in Table 2, so we might simply take the difference of the Chi-squares (25.07-15.53) and the degrees of freedom (9-6), yielding a Chi-square of 9.54 with 3 degrees of freedom, which is significant at p<.05. There are more complicated ways of comparing models (Long 1997: 85-98), but it is not clear there is any accepted basis for comparing nested ZINB models in the same way that one could compare two OLS models with an F test (Long 1977: 217-249).
References


*Daily News and Herald.* 1868. "Riot of Tuesday Last." Savannah (daily), 9 November, p. 3.


Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). 1970. Study 003 Census Data, downloaded from ICPSR: [https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/](https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/)

Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). 1968. Study 001 Historical Elections Data, downloaded from ICPSR: [https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/](https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/)


This report was found in Governor Bullock’s correspondence: record Group 1, Series 5, at the Georgia State Archives, Morrow, Georgia.

“Report of Outrages Committed upon Citizens State of Georgia From Jan 1st to Nov 15th, 1868” contains 355 cases (including two different cases, each numbered 338 in the original report), arranged by district, indicating the district commander for each district and following a fairly standard style of reporting usually victim by name, describing incident or injury, perpetrator(s) where known, race of perpetrator, extent of injury/death, and whether perpetrator was arrested, tried of punished by civil authorities and current status—“at large” The handwriting is beautiful.
The Savannah and Camilla riots are enumerated here, but there is no mention of the letter that Governor Bullock received from Captain J. J. Knox, Athens District, regarding the Klan attempts to intimidate Radicals in Oglethorpe County in September of 1868. Other material from the “Additional Reports” are not included in the data analyzed here, because they were not submitted by the commanding officers in a standard reporting formula.

These “Additional Report of Outrages and Wrongs committed upon Citizens State 0f Georgia, since November 1868,” are outrage number 365-407 in the Secretary of State report (included above). These are reports, mostly from local officials, as opposed to Bureau officials, mostly pertaining to KKK or other efforts to intimidate black voters and prevent them from voting in the November elections, in various counties. They could be used to supplement the 355 outrages analyzed here, but it is not clear that they are comparable, in the form or the procedure for reporting. We can be much more confident in the comparability of the 355 outrages reported by the district commandants.