ISRAEL'S BOMB IN THE BASEMENT: A SECOND LOOK

A revisiting of "deliberate ambiguity" vs. "disclosure" by:

Louis Rene Beres

Professor

Department of Political Science

Purdue University

West Lafayette IN 47907

USA

TEL 317 494-4189

FAX 317 494-0833

Prepared especially for publication in ISRAEL AFFAIRS

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During the middle-1980s, some students of Middle Eastern security issues began to speak plainly of Israel's nuclear strategy with particular reference to the question of disclosure. Specifically, these scholars asked whether this strategy should continue to be implicit, deliberately ambiguous, and in the "basement," or whether it should be explicit, clearly articulated, and out in the open. I entered the "debate" personally with a series of lectures at Israeli strategic studies centers in 1984 and 1985, and with the first edited book on the subject in 1986. Today, this debate no longer seems vital to Israeli strategists. As it is perfectly obvious, they reason, that Israel has some significant numbers of nuclear weapons, there really is nothing further to disclose. Israel is patently a member of the Nuclear Club. Everyone already knows this. Case closed!

But there is a serious problem with such reasoning. The rationale of disclosure, of taking the bomb out of the "basement," would not lie simply in expressing the obvious. Rather, it would lie in the informed understanding that nuclear weapons can serve Israel's security in a number of different ways, and that all of these ways could benefit the Jewish State, more or less, to the extent that certain aspects of these weapons and associated strategies were disclosed. Indeed, as we shall now see, the pertinent form and extent of disclosure could soon be more critical than ever before because of the so-called "Peace Process."

For the forseeable future, Israel's state enemies - especially Iran and Syria (but not excluding Egypt and Jordan) - continue to enlarge and improve their conventional and unconventional warfighting capacities. Although no one can say for certain that such improvements are underway with especially Israel in mind, it would be prudent for Jerusalem to assume the worst. Moreover, even if enemy state intentions do not yet parallel capabilities, this could change very quickly. Here, for example, Iranian capabilties could determine intentions, occasioning chemical, biological or nuclear first-strikes against Israel because of expected tactical advantages.

To protect itself against enemy strikes, especially those strikes that could carry existential costs, Israel must exploit every component function of its nuclear arsenal. In this connection, the success of Israel's efforts will depend in large part upon not only its particular configuration of "counterforce" and "countervalue" operations, but also upon the extent to which this configuration is made known in advance to enemy states. Thus, before such an enemy is appropriately deterred from launching first-strike attacks against Israel, or before it is deterred from launching retaliatory attacks following an Israeli preemption, it may not be enough that it "knows" that Israel has nuclear weapons. It may also need to recognize that these Israeli weapons are sufficiently invulnerable to such attacks and/or that they are targeted on their own pertinent weapons and associated command/control systems.

To fully understand the ambiguity/disclosure question, we must first recall the theoretical foundations of nuclear deterrence and nuclear warfighting as they pertain to Israel. These foundations concern prospective attackers' perceptions of both Israel's nuclear capability and Israel's willingness to use such capability. Removing the bomb from Israel's "basement" could therefore enhance Israel's nuclear deterrence and/or nuclear warfighting postures to the extent that it would heighten enemy state perceptions of Jerusalem's capable nuclear forces and/or Jerusalem's willingness to use these forces in reprisal for certain first-strike and retaliatory attacks. Conversely, failing to remove the bomb from the "basement" could undermine Israel's postures to the extent that it would lower enemy state perceptions of Jerusalem's nuclear capabilities and/or its willingness to exploit these capabilities.

Let us look at these requirements more closely. To deter enemy attack or post-preemption retaliation, Israel must be able to prevent that enemy, by threat of an unacceptably damaging reprisal or counterretaliation, from deciding to strike. Here, security is sought by convincing the would-be rational attacker (irrational enemies are an altogether different problem) that the costs of a considered attack will exceed the expected benefits. Assuming that Israel's state enemies: (1) always value self-preservation more highly than any other preference or combination of preferences; and (2) always choose rationally between alternative options, they will always refrain from attacking an Israel that is believed willing and able to deliver an appropriately destructive response.

Two factors must communicate such belief. First, in terms of ability, there are two essential components: payload and delivery system. It must be successfully communicated to the prospective attacker by Israel that the Jewish State's firepower and its means of delivering that firepower are capable of wreaking unacceptable levels of destruction after a first-strike or retaliatory attack. This means that Israel's retaliatory/counterretaliatory forces must appear sufficiently invulnerable and sufficiently elusive to penetrate the prospective attacker's active and civil defenses. It need not be communicated to the potential attacker that such firepower and/or the means of delivery are superior. The capacity to deter need not be as great as the capacity to "win."

With the bomb kept silently in the basement, Israel's imperative communications could be compromised perilously. Unable to know for certain whether Israel's retaliatory/counterretaliatory abilities were aptly formidable, enemy states could conclude, rightly or wrongly, that a first-strike attack or post-preemption reprisal would be cost-effective. Of course, it is conceivable that continued ambiguity would be adequate for Israeli deterrence, but - then again - it might not be adequate. Were it made more plainly obvious to enemy states contemplating attack that Israel's basement bombs met both payload and delivery system objectives, Israel's nuclear forces would likely better serve their overriding security functions.

The second factor of nuclear communication for Israel concerns willingness. How may Israel convince potential attackers that it possesses the resolve to deliver an unacceptably destructive retaliation and counterretaliation? The answer to this question lies, in part, in the demonstrated strength of the commitment to carry out the threat and in the precise nuclear weapons that would be available. Here, too, continued nuclear ambiguity could create the impression of an "unwilling" Israel. Conversely, movement toward some as-yet-undetermined level of disclosure could heighten the impression of an Israel that is willing to follow through on its threats.

What, then, are the plausible connections between a more openly declared nuclear capability and enemy state perceptions of Israel's nuclear deterrent? One such connection concerns the relation between disclosure and perceived vulnerability of Israeli nuclear forces from preemptive destruction. Another such connection concerns the relation between disclosure and perceived capacity of Israel's nuclear forces to penetrate the attacking state's active defenses. To the extent that removing the bomb from the Israeli basement, or disclosure, would encourage enemy state views of an Israeli nuclear force that is sufficiently invulnerable to first-strike attacks and/or is capable of piercing enemy active defense systems, disclosure could represent a rational and prudent option for Israel. The operational benefits of disclosure would accrue from deliberate flows of doctrinal information about such matters as dispersion, multiplication and hardening of nuclear systems and about some other technical features of certain nuclear weapons systems. Above all else, such carefully-controlled flows would serve to remove enemy doubts about Israel's nuclear force capabilities, doubts which - if unchallenged - could undermine Israeli nuclear deterrence. Removing the bomb from Israel's basement might also heighten enemy state perceptions of Jerusalem's willingness to make good on its nuclear retaliatory threats. For example, by releasing information about its nuclear weapons that identified distinctly "usable" forces, Israel could remove enemy doubts about Jerusalem's nuclear resolve. Here, a prospective attacker, newly aware that Israel could retaliate without generating intolerably high levels of civilian harms (possibly because of enhanced radiation and/or sub-kiloton weapons) would be more likely, because of Israel's disclosure, to believe Jerusalem's nuclear threats.

This brings us directly to the doctrinal question of "counterforce" vs. "countervalue." Counterforce strategies are those which target an enemy's strategic military facilities and supporting infrastructures. Such strategies may be dangerous not only because of the "collateral damage" they could produce, but also because they could heighten the likelihood of enemy first-strikes. Should Israel be "going for counterforce" with its nuclear weapons? If so, enemy knowledge of such movement could encourage preemption planning by certain enemy states, but it could also enhance the power of Israel's nuclear deterrent (because counterforce-targeted nuclear weapons are more likely to be judged usable). Depending upon Jerusalem's rank-ordering of nuclear strategy values and its expectations concerning enemy state reactions, disclosure, or taking the bomb out of the basement, could be more or less purposeful for Israel.

Countervalue strategies refer to the targeting of an enemy's cities and industries; in effect, the targeting of civilian populations. Should Israel be content with developing the relatively inaccurate apparatus of such an "assured destruction" posture, it could probably limit the prospect of preemptive enemy first-strikes. This prospect could even be limited further if the assured destruction posture were accompanied by open and fairly precise disclosure of Israel's nonthreatening nuclear stance. At the same time, should this posture fail to deter concerted enemy first-strikes, or enemy retaliations for Israeli preemptions, its intrinsic damage-limiting inferiority to a counterforce capability could produce much larger casualty figures. As we will soon see, excessive countervalue targeting could impair Israel's nuclear warfighting needs.

If, on the other hand, Israel were to start off with a declared nuclear warfighting or counterforce posture, enemy state perceptions of inevitable war with Israel could be enlarged. With such perceptions, belligerent leaders would have to decide whether or not it would be more gainful to await an Israeli preemption or whether to strike first themselves. Aware of this, Israel's leaders must determine not only the optimum configuration of countervalue and counterforce, but also the most favorable means and levels of disclosure.

How should Israel choose in the process of surrendering territories in exchange for "peace?" If Jerusalem should opt for nuclear deterrence based on assured destruction, it would run the risk of "losing" any nuclear war that might arise. If it should choose counterforce, certain enemy states could feel especially threatened, a condition that would likely heighten the actual prospects of nuclear weapons use.

In making its nuclear choices, Israel will have to confront a paradox. Credible nuclear deterrence, essential to security and survival - especially in a world made even more dangerous by the end of strategic depth and the creation of Palestine - would require recognizably usable nuclear weapons. If, after all, these weapons were inappropriate for any reasonable objective, they would not deter. Yet, the more usable the weapons would become in order to enhance nuclear deterrence - a usability communicated more or less effectively by a shift away from deliberate ambiguity - the more likely it is that they will actually be fired. Although this paradox would appear to recommend, inter alia, the deployment of the least-harmful forms of usable nuclear weapons, the likely absence of coordinated agreements with enemy states on deployable nuclear weapons points toward a different conclusion: Unless Israel were to calculate that the more harmful weapons would produce greater hazards for its own population as well as for target states, there would be no tactical benefit for Israel to opt for the least injurious usable nuclear weapons.

Regarding issues of nuclear usability, an excellent study has been offered by two target planners and theater force analysts at Los Alamos National Laboratory. While interested exclusively in the improvement of United States nuclear strategy, the arguments presented by Thomas W. Dowler and Joseph S. Howard II pertain instructively to Israel. In their analysis, Dowler and Howard evaluate nuclear weapons with very low yields ranging from 10 to 1000 tons. Seeking nuclear weapons whose power is "effective but not abhorrent," the authors detail the particular benefits of "micronukes" (weapons with a yield on the order of 10 tons or 20,000 pounds of high explosive); "mininukes" (weapons with a yield of about 100 tons); and "tinynukes" (weapons with a yield of about 1000 tons or one kiloton).

For Israel, a micronuke employed as an earth-penetrating warhead (EPW) could destroy all but the hardest command bunkers. Deliverable by gravity bomb, tactical cruise missile or tactical surface-to-surface missile, a micronuke EPW could also be used effectively to neutralize airfields. As a single micronuke strike could put an airfield out of commission for an extended time, use of these particular subkiloton weapons could reduce exposure of Israeli pilots to enemy defenses. This is because it would not be necessary to expect these pilots to execute follow-on strikes.

Should deterrence fail to prevent a launch of enemy missiles carrying nuclear or other mass-destruction warheads at Israeli forces, either as a first-strike attack or as an enemy retaliation for Israeli preemption, Israel would require an adequate defensive capability. To acquire such a capability, Israel could benefit from an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) carrying a mininuke warhead with a yield of approximately 100 tons. Seeking to destroy incoming warheads in flight (simply knocking the missile off-target might not neutralize its capacity to inflict great harm on Israeli forces), a mininuke fired by Israel could provide the needed power. Such power could prove vital because an incoming nuclear, chemical or biological warhead must be destroyed as far from its target as possible.

Once an armed conflict had actually broken out between Israel and certain enemy states, tinynuke warheads with yields of about 1000 tons could prove effective against tank and troop units. True battlefield weapons rather than agents of indiscriminate mass destruction, these tinynukes - deliverable by tactical air-to-air surface missile, tactical surface-to-surface cruise or ballistic missile, or artillery round - could eliminate any company-sized unit. Intended for very precise operations against known troop formations, these weapons would display lethal radii on the order of 500 meters against tank crews and 600 meters against infantry, artillery and support troops. As for the collateral damage and safe standoff radii of these tinynukes, they would range only to about 1500 meters. Moreover, utilized as airbursts, they should produce no significant local fallout.

Returning to the original doctrinal question of countervalue vs. counterforce, Israeli planners must commence prior investigations of enemy state inclinations to strike first and in retaliation, and of associated inclinations to strike all-at-once or in stages. Should these planners assume, for example, that certain enemy states in the process of "going nuclear" are apt to strike in an unlimited mode - i.e., to fire all nuclear warheads immediately - Israeli counterforce-targeted nuclear warheads, used in retaliation or in counterretaliation, would likely hit only empty silos/launchers. In such circumstances, Israel's only rational application of counterforce doctrine would be to strike first itself.

If, for whatever reason, Israel were to reject the preemption option (see below), given the above assumptions there would be no good reason to opt for counterforce. From the standpoint of compelling intra-war nuclear deterrence, a countervalue strategy could prove substantially more purposeful under such assumptions. Should Israeli planners assume that enemy states "going nuclear" are apt to strike first and to strike in a limited mode, holding some significant measure of nuclear firepower in reserve for follow-on strikes, Israeli counterforce-targeted nuclear warheads, used in retaliation, could have meaningful damage-limitation effects. Here, counterforce operations could serve both an Israeli preemption or, should Israel decide, for whatever reeason, not to preempt, an Israeli retaliatory strike. Moreover, should an Israeli first-strike be intentionally limited, perhaps because it would be coupled with a guarantee of no further destruction in exchange for an end to hostilities, such operations could serve an Israeli counter-retaliatory strike. This is the case because Israel's attempt at intra-war deterrence could fail, occasioning the need for follow-on strikes to produce essential damage-limitation.

In order to examine fully whether Israel would be better served by continued ambiguity or by disclosure (and if the latter, by what degrees of disclosure), we must first identify and understand the reasons behind Israel's nuclear forces. What, then, are these particular reasons? Why, exactly, does Israel need nuclear weapons? Once we can answer these antecedent questions we will be able to determine if Israel's bomb should remain in the basement or if it should be brought, more or less, into the country's "upper floors." In essence, therefore, the balance of this article is directed by the following hypothesis: If Israel moves beyond "deliberate ambiguity" to certain apt forms of "disclosure," its nuclear forces will be better able to fulfil their seven essential security functions.

First, Israel needs nuclear weapons to deter large conventional attacks by enemy states. The effectiveness of such Israeli nuclear deterrence will depend, inter alia, upon: (a) perceived vulnerability of Israeli nuclear forces; (b) perceived destructiveness of Israeli nuclear forces; (c) perceived willingness of Israeli leadership to follow through on nuclear threats; (d) perceived capacities of prospective attackers' active defenses; (e) perceptions of Israeli targeting doctrine (countervalue vs. countrerforce); (f) perceptions of Israel's probable retaliatory response when there is an expectation of non-nuclear but chemical and/or biological counter-retaliations; (g) disposition of the territories and the creation of "Palestine;" and (h) disclosure or nondisclosure of Israel's nuclear assets.

Significantly, the disclosure/nondisclosure component will affect Israel's pertinent deterrence needs not only directly, as expressed at (h) above, but also indirectly. That is, Israel's decision on disclosure, in all of its conceivable nuances, will impact (a) to (g) above. In the absence of apt forms of disclosure, Israel's enemies will be kept guessing about Israel's nuclear force vulnerabilities, destructiveness, willingness, active defenses, targeting doctrines, retaliatory responses, etc. Although it is certainly conceivable that such uncertainty would produce enemy caution rather than adventurous risk-taking, there is also great danger that it would have the contrary effect.

"Men as a rule willingly believe what they want to believe!" So says Caesar at Chapter 18 of the GALLIC WAR. For Israel, the impact of Caesar's insight became evident on October 5, 1973, with the start of the Yom Kippur War. Until then, the country had been committed to "the concept," the kontzeptziya, the wholly contrived notion that the Arabs were unwilling and incapable of renewing hostilities against the Jewish State. AMAN's (IDF military intelligence) overall assessment of enemy designs, lasting until October 5, 1973, was that war was "highly improbable" or "improbable." It was this fundamentally incorrect perception that created a monumental intelligence blunder, the "mehdal" in post-war Hebrew parlance.

If Israel believed what it wanted to believe, and not what was "objectively" out there, what about Israel's state enemies? Are they immune to such misperceptions? Or aren't they, in fact, more likely to see what they want to see? It would seem here that Caesar's maxim points to certain advantages, for Israel, of more explicit communications to its enemies about its pertinent deterrence capabilities and intentions.

These advantages extend not only to nuclear weapons themselves, but also to perceptions of Israel's secure command/control/communications/intelligence operations. To reduce the risks of "decapitation," Israel's military planners must consider the complex relationships between C3I invulnerability and predelegations of launch authority. This means that an essential aspect of Israel's nuclear deterrence posture could include increasing the number of authoritative decision-makers who would have the right to launch particular nuclear weapons under certain very carefully defined residual contingencies, circumstances most likely relating to the "Samson Option" scenario (see below).

As in all other aspects of nuclear weapons and military planning, there are negative factors to consider. Because the deterrence value of expanded decisional authority would require that prospective attackers learn in advance that Israel had actually taken these decapitation-avoidance predelegations (after all, without such advance learning, enemy states would be more apt to calculate that first-strike attacks were cost-effective), these states might feel increasingly compelled to "preempt." Such "preemption" incentives would stem from new enemy state fears of a fully intentional Israeli first-strike and/or new fears of accidental, unauthorized or unintentional nuclear strikes from Israel. Aware of these probable enemy state reactions to its predelegations of launch authority, predelegations which might or might not be complemented by launch-on-warning measures, Israel, reciprocally, could feel compelled to actually strike first, a preemption of "preemptive" attack that may or may not prove to be net gainful and that may or may not have been avoided by antecedent resistance to predelegations of launch authority.

Israel's leaders and military planners should understand that this entire scenario could be "played" in the other direction. Here, Iran or an enemy Arab state seeking to reduce its decapitation risks would implement predelegations of launch authority, thereby encouraging Israeli preemptions and, as a consequence, Iranian and/or Arab state "preemptions of Israeli preemption." Ironically, in a mirror-image of Israeli decisions on disclosure, Iranian or Arab state explicitness on predelegations could hasten enemy attacks against the Jewish State.

Second, Israel needs nuclear weapons to deter all levels of unconventional (chemical/biological/nuclear: CBN) attacks. The effectiveness of these forms of Israeli nuclear deterrence will also depend, inter alia, on (a) to (h) above. In this connection, Israel's nuclear weapons are needed to deter enemy state escalation of conventional warfare to unconventional warfare, and of one form of unconventional warfare to another. As in the case of nuclear deterrence of large conventional attacks, disclosure could remove problematic forms of ambiguity and further discourage enemy states from undertaking various forms of aggression.

Nuclear weapons must be informed by doctrine. Where this doctrine is left implicit, as has been the Israeli case for decades, it is left to enemy states to reconstruct expectations about Israeli capabilities and intentions. Where this doctrine is made explicit, as would be the case if the bomb were removed from the basement, these enemy states could extrapolate expectations from this doctrine directly. Of course, it is conceivable that more explicit articulations of Israeli nuclear strategy would be distrusted or even discounted, but disclosure would at least provide Israel with an opportunity for some input into enemy state calculations.

For Israel, the advantages of disclosure would likely be greater here, with respect to deterrence of unconventional attacks, than with respect to deterrence of large conventional attacks (above). This is because, leaving other pertinent variables constant for the moment, the presumed plausibility of Israeli nuclear reprisal is apt to be greater when unconventional weapons are used for aggression. A different assumption about disclosure's advantages vis-a-vis large conventional attacks could be reasonable if Israel were to couple its nuclear retaliatory threats with far-reaching conventional disarmament and/or with further territorial concessions, but such coupling would represent a tragic and potentially irretrievable error for the Jewish State.

No less tragic for Israel would be a decision to accept internationally-imposed limitations on its nuclear arsenal, limitations now being urged especially by Egypt and the United States with the approach of the NPT (Nonproliferation Treaty) Review Conference in April 1995. With such a decision, the question of disclosure would become moot. After all, "volitional" denuclearization consistent with expected NPT commitments would leave Israel with nothing to disclose. In consequence, Israel's deterrence requirements would all have to be met with conventional threats and/or U.S. "extended deterrence." This would not be possible!

Israel requires both conventional and nuclear weapons, complementary forces and doctrines to preserve the Third Temple into the next millennium. Significantly, the "Peace Process" endangers both interrelated requirements. Already, this Process, spawning shrinking strategic depth, has curtailed the capacities of Israel's conventional arms. For the very immediate future, it also threatens the capacities of Israel's nuclear weapons, a situation that would not only leave the bomb in the basement, but bury it there.

One last word about essential Israeli nuclear deterrence of enemy unconventional attack, a need that could be served more or less effectively by some apt measure of disclosure. Normally, strategic planners, examining the requirements of nuclear deterrence, distinguish carefully between conventional and unconventional attacks. For Israel today, however, such a sharp distinction could be misleading and dangerous.

Why? From now on, it is unlikely that enemy states would launch large conventional attacks against Israel unless these states had backup unconventional (possibly but not necessarily nuclear) forces. This means that the capacities of Israeli nuclear deterrence will now always have to be assessed vis-a-vis enemy state unconventional weapons. Hence, the question of disclosure will now always have to be asked ultimately in reference to nuclear deterrence of unconventional weapons.

It is conceivable, especially after Israel's ongoing surrender of territories, that some combination of enemy states, still effectively nonnuclear, could conclude that a combined conventional attack against Israel would be gainful. To prevent such a conclusion, thereby maintaining successful nuclear deterrence, Jerusalem would need to convince these enemy states that their prospective combined conventional assault would elicit a fully nuclear reprisal. This task could be made easier by appropriate communications to enemy states concerning disclosure, including purposeful communications of Israel's awareness that the conventional/unconventional threshold might still be breached first by the "conventional" enemy state attackers. Although it is likely that this task could also be made easier because of Israel's already-truncated strategic depth, the net effect of such truncation for Israel would surely be negative. Halting the "Peace Process," therefore, is a clear strategic imperative.

Third, Israel needs nuclear weapons to preempt enemy state nuclear attacks. This does not mean that Israeli preemptions of such attacks would necessarily be nuclear (more than likely, they would be non-nuclear), but only that they could be nuclear. Should Israel ever need to actually use its nuclear forces for such a purpose, it would signify the failure of these forces as a deterrent (as per number 2, above). Such failure is increasingly plausible because of the complex nature of nuclear deterrence in general and because of the unique context of the Middle East in particular.

To what extent, if any, would Israel's pertinent preemption capacity be impacted by disclosure? Even prior to answering this question, it would seem likely that disclosure could make preemption itself more likely. This is because enemy states could be apt to interpret Israeli movement away from deliberate ambiguity as something of a provocation, occasioning their own accelerated militarization/nuclearization. Aware of such acceleration, Israel could then feel especially compelled to preemptively destroy appropriate enemy hard targets.

On the other hand, disclosure could make enemy states more cautious. Should such greater caution be palpable, Israel's preemption incentives could well diminish. Here, moving the bomb out of the basement would not only impact Israel's preemption capacity, but would also reduce its preemption incentive.

But how would disclosure impact Israel's nuclear preemption capacity vis-a-vis enemy state nuclear attacks? The answer depends upon the prior issue of the effects of disclosure on enemy state apprehensions. If it is assumed that these effects would heighten such apprehensions of Israeli preemptive strikes, enemy states are apt to make more strenuous efforts to secure their pertinent military assets, making an Israeli preemption more difficult. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that these effects would diminish enemy state apprehensions of Israeli preemptive strikes, these states may let down their guard in securing pertinent military assets, making an Israeli preemption less difficult.

Whether or not Israeli disclosure would affect Jerusalem's inclination to abandon nuclear deterrence in favor of prompt preemptions could also depend, at least in part, upon the "Peace Process" and Israel's associated disposition of the territories. Would transformation of the territories into "Palestine" encourage removal of Israel's bomb from the basement? For now, Israel, still buffered from a hot eastern border by Judea/Samaria, may better afford to keep its bomb in the basement. If, however, this territory becomes Palestine, as now seems more and more likely, Israel would almost surely feel compelled to move from ambiguity to disclosure. Such a shift could, as we have seen, improve the Jewish State's nuclear deterrence posture, but it could also enlarge the chances of an Israeli preemption and/or a regional nuclear war. It would be far better for Israel to move toward disclosure without the compulsion factor of a Palestinian state.

Israel might, of course, feel new imperatives to preempt apart from any direct considerations of disclosure. Here, the loss of vital territories and associated strategic depth would be recognized as a condition encouraging enemy first-strikes. Anticipating such recognition, Jerusalem could feel especially high motivations to strike first itself.

Whichever side should ever strike first, a nuclear exchange between Israel and certain enemy states could ensue. Should that happen, the outcome of the conflict could depend, to a varying extent, upon Israel's prior decisions on disclosure. Should the bomb have remained in the basement, Israel's enemies would likely be less informed about Jerusalem's overriding obejectives and targeting doctrines. If, on the other hand, the conflict had been preceded by disclosure, these enemies would likely have a clearer sense of Jerusalem's strategy and tactics. Contrary to popular wisdom on such matters, enemy states with a clearer sense of Israel's plans could be decidedly less of a danger to Israel than ones who would be less well informed.

All things considered, it is extremely unlikely that Israel would ever decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. Although circumstances could arise wherein such a strike would be perfectly rational (i.e., the prospective benefits of such a strike would outweigh the expected costs), it is unreasonable to presume that Israel would allow itself to reach such dire circumstances. Moreover, unless the nuclear weapons involved were used in a fashion consistent with the authoritative expectations of the laws of war - the rules of discrimination, proportionality and military necessity - this form of preemption would clearly represent an egregious violation of international law.

Even if such consistency were possible, the psychological and political impact on the world community would be negative and far-reaching. Thus, an Israeli nuclear preemption could be expected only: (a) where Israel's enemies had acquired nuclear or other unconventional weapons judged capable of destroying the Third Commonwealth; (b) where these enemies had made clear that their intentions paralleled their capabilities; (c) where these enemies were believed ready to begin a countdown-to-launch; and (d) where Jerusalem believed that Israeli non-nuclear preemptions could not achieve needed minimum levels of damage limitation, i.e., levels consistent with state preservation. It follows that our guiding question of continued ambiguity vs. disclosure would become relevant to the success of a nuclear preemption by Israel only where these four conditions had first been satisfied.

Fourth, Israel needs nuclear weapons to support conventional preemptions against enemy state nuclear assets. With such weapons, Israel could maintain, explicitly or implicitly, a threat of nuclear counterretaliation. Without such weapons, Israel, having to rely entirely upon non-nuclear forces, might not be able to deter enemy retaliations for the Israeli preemption. Of course, Israel's nuclear counterretaliatory threat could be diminished by enemy state threats of unacceptably damaging counter-counterretaliations. There is an annoyingly complex infinite regress problem at work here (one certain to bother my readers), but its confusing and bothersome operation within the dynamics of escalation cannot merely be disregarded. Its complexity (I'm sorry!) does not rule out its relevance.

In considering conventional preemptions against enemy nuclear assets supportable by its own nuclear forces, Israel's decision-makers are sure to consider essential infrastructure variables. Certain enemy states that are acquiring nuclear weapons will be unwilling or unable to create the infrastructure needed to safely manage these weapons. Inadequate investment in nuclear weapons system survivability, for example, could generate dangerous enemy incentives to strike first.

With Israel's state enemies unlikely to possess a second-strike capability - the capacity to retaliate substantially after absorbing an Israeli attack - these states may calculate a distinct military advantage to striking first. Recognizing this calculation, Israel could confront an overwhelming incentive to strike first itself. Even in the best-case scenario, where Israel receives credible assurances from its state enemies concerning their rejection of first-strike options, Jerusalem would understand that such assurances could become meaningless in the wake of political upheaval, coup d'etat, etc. Faced with enemy states characterized by weak and authoritarian political institutions, fragile civil-military relations, and competing factions representing numerous ethnic and religious groupings, Jerusalem would recognize the danger posed by alienated elements within enemy states. The only reasonable antidote for this danger is apt to be preemption.

Again, we must ask, what would be the likely effects of disclosure upon Israel's pertinent preemption capacity, a capacity now defined from the standpoint of conventional expressions of anticipatory self-defense? In the absence of disclosure, enemy state fears of Israeli nuclear counterretaliation would have to be based upon the persuasiveness of continued ambiguity. Hence, if the enemy state believed that Israel's nuclear counterretaliatory forces were largely counterforce-targeted and "warfighting" in nature, their fears would likely be greater than if they believed that Israel's relevant forces were largely countervalue-targeted. This is the case, of course, not because counterforce-targeted weapons would likely be more harmful, but - on the contrary - because they would be less harmful and therefore more "usable."

Should Israel decide to take its bomb out of the basement, its capacity to communicate a warfighting rather than a city-busting nuclear strategy would surely be enlarged. Rather than rely on continued ambiguity and implicit threats, Jerusalem could increase caution amongst certain prospective targets of defensive preemptions by relatively explicit signaling of Israel's strategy and weaponry. All of this assumes, naturally, a rational adversary. Should Israel's post-preemption deterrence operations be oreinted toward a non-rational adversary, the question of ambiguity vs. disclosure would probably be moot because deterrence would likely have been immobilized.

Fifth, Israel needs nuclear weapons to support conventional preemptions against enemy non-nuclear (conventional/chemical/biological) assets. With such weapons, Israel could maintain, explicitly or implicitly, a threat of nuclear counter-retaliation. Without such weapons, having to rely entirely on non-nuclear forces, Jerusalem might not be able to deter enemy retaliations for the Israeli preemptive strike.

Should Israel maintain a threat of nuclear counter-retaliation implicitly, i.e., via continued ambiguity, it would appear that Israel's target would have substantially greater doubts about this threat than if it were maintained explicitly. After all, the escalatory burden would be squarely upon Israel, and this burden would carry with it some potentially overwhelming negatives from the standpoint of world public opinion. By moving toward some appropriate level of disclosure, Israel could signal its enemy that it had indeed already made a commitment to threat fulfillment, thereby contributing to the unlikelihood of enemy state retaliation.

The persuasiveness of an Israeli nuclear counterretaliatory threat following an Israeli preemption will always depend, in part, upon enemy expectations of Jerusalem's response to its own retaliation. These expectations are apt to be increasingly destructive to the extent that the post-preemption retaliation is unconventional. Once Israel had absorbed a chemical/biological/nuclear retaliation, the likelihood that it would "make good" on the promised nuclear counterretaliation would be high. Indeed, in the case of a nuclear retaliation, this likelihood would be extraordinarily high.

Sun-Tzu, in Chapter 3 of THE ART OF WAR ("Planning Offensives") remarks: "Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence." Understood in terms of Israel's nuclear strategy, Jerusalem's nuclear forces would be optimally effective via sustained nuclear deterrence. Yet, such effectiveness is no longer reasonable to expect, suggesting that the most attainable level of nuclear effectiveness must be achieved via post-preemption nuclear deterrence. In other words, Israel's best-case nuclear scenario from the perspective of Sun-Tzu's wisdom is one where an essential preemption could be launched without eliciting any enemy retaliation. For several reasons discussed above, this objective is apt to be better served by an accompanying policy of disclosure than by one of continued nuclear ambiguity.

Should Israel rule out preemption in all circumstances (probably because of overriding fears of negative world public reactions, especially from Washington), enemy states would ultimately strike first themselves. Should an enemy launch a nuclear strike against Israel, Jerusalem would certainly respond, to whatever extent was still possible, with a nuclear retaliatory strike. If an enemy first-strike were to involve other forms of unconventional weapons, Israel might launch a nuclear reprisal (depending, in large measure, upon Israel's expectations of follow-on aggression and on its associated calculations of comparative damage-limitation. If Israel were to absorb a massive conventional attack, a nuclear retaliation could not be ruled out, especially if: (a) the aggressor were perceived to hold nuclear and/or other unonventional weapons in reserve; and/or (b) Israel's leaders were to believe that non-nuclear retaliations could not prevent destruction of the Third Commonwealth. A nuclear retaliation by Israel could be ruled out only in circumstances where enemy aggression were clearly conventional, "typical" (i.e., consistent with previous instances of Arab attacks in degree and intent) and hard-target directed.

Should Israel feel it necessary to preempt enemy state aggression with conventional weapons, the target state's response would largely determine Jerusalem's next moves. If this response were in any way nuclear, Israel would assuredly resort to nuclear counterretaliation - a resort that could be communicated more or less effectively via apt forms of disclosure. If this retaliation were to involve chemical and/or biological weapons, Israel might also feel pressed to take the escalatory initiative (again, depending upon Jerusalem's judgments of enemy intent and its calculations of essential damage-limitation). Should the enemy state's response to Israel's preemption be limited to hard-target conventional strikes, it is most unlikely that the Jewish State would move on to nuclear counterretaliations. If, however, the enemy state's conventional retaliation were all-out and directed toward civilian populations as well as to military targets, an Israeli nuclear counterretaliation could not be ruled out. It would appear that such a counter-retaliation could be ruled out only if the enemy conventional retaliation were entirely proportionate to Israel's preemption, confined exclusively to Israeli hard targets, circumscribed by the jurisprudential limits of military necessity, and accompanied by explicit and verifiable assurances of non-escalatory intent.

Israel has absolutely no choice but to maintain all vital preemption options. To do this, of course, Jerusalem must maintain its essential nuclear weapons and articulate a compelling nuclear strategy. As we have seen, such a strategy will depend, inter alia, on decisions regarding nuclear disclosure.

Nevertheless, it is now conceivable that such decisions would never even be made. This is because Israel might yield to American and Arab pressure at the upcoming 1995 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, surrendering its nuclear option in exchange for "guarantees" of American protection and an expansion of the "Peace Process." Here there would be nothing left to "disclose," and Israel would be left open to dismemberment. Under such conditions, all the more so if NPT denuclearization of Israel were accompanied by a new state of Palestine, Israel would no longer have a preemption option. This is because Israeli counter-retaliatory deterrence would be immobilized by elimination of its nuclear weapons potential and because Israeli preemptions could not possibly be 100% effective against enemy state unconventional forces. A level of effectiveness less than 100 per cent might be tolerable if Israel had an operational anti-tactical ballistic missile capability, but such a capability - now being sought - is enormously problematic.

ATBM planning could be problematic for another reason. It could inhibit Israel's willingness to undertake essential preemptions. To the extent that Israel's leaders might have substantial faith in various forms of ballistic missile defense, faith likely enlarged by presumptions concerning the Peace Process, they might be increasingly willing to forego preemption. A "flip side" of this calculation is the effect of Israel's ATBM planning on enemy state decisions. Should these states believe that Israel`s ATBM would display an appropriately high degree of effectiveness, once it were actually deployed, such belief could discourage an attack decision against Israel by lowering the attacker's expected benefits. Of course, anticipations of such belief could enlarge the incentive of enemy states to attack before Israel's ATBM deployment.

Region-wide commitments to ATBM deployments would likely heat up the area nuclear arms race, occasioning all state parties to accelerate their offensive weapons capabilities. In principle, a region-wide ATBM agreement could prevent or slow down offensive weapons developments (by initiating a moratorium or an outright cassation of active defense measures), but - as a practical matter - it would stand no chance of success. Recognizing uncertainty and mistrust as givens in the Middle East strategic equations, Jerusalem has little choice but to continue full-speed with the Arrow and related projects, and with its ongoing search for hard-target kill capabilities. At the same time, aware that successful active defenses will require a near-perfect interception capability (because a single unintercepted nuclear warhead could produce unacceptable damage), and that such capability is essentially impossible to achieve, Israel has no choice but to maintain and to prepare tatctically for various preemption options.

Sun-Tzu comments, in Chapter 4 of THE ART OF WAR ("Military Disposition") that: "Those who excel at defense bury themselves away below the lowest depths of Earth. Those who excel at offense move from above the greatest heights of Heaven. Thus, they are able to preserve themselves and attain complete victory." Although "complete victory" is assuredly unattainable for Israel (a limitation that should be fully understood by Israeli military planners), Sun-Tzu's wisdom has serious implications for Jerusalem's faith in ATBM systems and associated schemes for a "multilayered defense." Israel can not and should not seek to excel at defense. It must not place its security hopes on a space-based Bar-Lev line.

Sixth, Israel needs nuclear weapons for nuclear warfighting. In the best of all possible worlds for Israel, this need would never arise. But Israel does not live in the best of all possible worlds, and this need cannot be ruled out. Hence, nuclear warfighting options must continue to be taken most seriously by Israeli planners and decision-makers who are concerned about the Middle East's "future battlefield."

The most plausible paths to nuclear warfighting for Israel are the following: (1) enemy state nuclear first-strikes against Israel; (2) enemy state non-nuclear first strikes against Israel that elicit Israeli nuclear reprisals, either immediately or via incremental escalation processes; (3) Israeli nuclear preemptions against enemy states with nuclear assets; (4) Israeli non-nuclear preemptions against enemy states with nuclear assets that elicit enemy state nuclear reprisals, either immediately or via incremental escalation processes. Other pertinent paths to nuclear warfighting include accidental/unintentional/inadvertent nuclear attacks among Israel and regional enemy states and even the escalatory consequences of nuclear terrorism against the Jewish State.

Both Israeli nuclear and non-nuclear preemptions could produce instances of nuclear warfighting. This would depend, in part, on the effectiveness and breadth of Israeli targeting; the surviving number of enemy state nuclear weapons; and the willingness of enemy state leaders to risk Israeli nuclear counter-retaliations. In any event, the likelihood of nuclear exchanges would appear to be greatest where pertinent enemy states were allowed to deploy ever-greater numbers of increasingly destructive unconventional weapons without some form of timely Israeli preemptive interference. Should such deployment take place, as now appears the case in Iran, Israel could effectively forfeit the non-nuclear preemption option, being forced to choose between a no-longer-timely nuclear preemption and waiting to be attacked first. This means that the risks of Israeli nuclear preemptions, of nuclear exchanges with an enemy state, and of enemy state nuclear first-strikes could all be reduced by expeditious Israeli non-nuclear preemptions directed at critical hard targets. As a practical matter, such essential preemptions are precluded by the so-called "Peace Process."

As long as Israel is determined to endure, there are conditions that could compel Israel to undertake nuclear warfighting. This is the case so long as enemy state first-strikes against Israel would not destroy Israel's second-strike nuclear capability; enemy state retaliations for Israeli conventional preemption would not destroy Israel's nuclear counter-retaliatory capability; Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear weapons would not destroy enemy state second-strike nuclear capabilities; and Israeli retaliation for enemy state conventional first-strikes would not destroy enemy state nuclear counterretaliatory capabilities. It follows, from the standpoint of Israel's nuclear strategy needs, that Jerusalem should prepare to do what is necessary to ensure the likelihood of (a) and (b) above, and the unlikelihood of (c) and (d).

How, then, might disclosure help Israel to accomplish these objectives? Regarding (a) and (b), removing the bomb from the basement could increase enemy state disincentives to strike first by signaling Israel's substantial force invulnerability. Regarding (c), removing the bomb from the basement could increase enemy state disincentives to retaliate by signaling an Israeli capacity to preemptively destroy nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Regarding (d), removing the bomb from the basement could increase enemy state disincentives to strike first conventionally by signaling an Israeli capacity to destroy nuclear counterretaliatory capabilities. In all of these cases, it is assumed that disclosure would serve to communicate credible expectations about the secure deployment of Israeli nuclear forces; the active defense of Israeli nuclear forces; the penetration capability of Israeli nuclear forces; and the underlying targeting strategy of Israeli nuclear forces. It follows that disclosure per se could not necessarily improve utilization of Israel's nuclear weapons. It is essential that disclosure be appropriately nuanced, that it be coupled with apt forms of communication to pertinent enemy states.

In "translating" broadly theoretical plans for disclosure into precise forms of communication, Israeli planners would quickly learn the imperatives of nuance. For example, to ensure enemy state perceptions of Israeli nuclear force invulnerability, these planners could seek to communicate their country's general plan for launch-on-warning. Yet, this strategic doctrine, which calls for a retaliatory or counterretaliatory launch of bombers and/or missiles on receipt of warning that a missile attack is underway, could heighten enemy state incentives to strike first themselves (possibly even because these states would feel it necessary to "preempt." Hence, explicit Israeli communications of LOW could be decidedly counterproductive, producing the very opposite of intended effects.

The problem here would lie in the greatly compressed time available to Israel's decision-makers functioning under prompt launch options and corresponding enemy state uncertainty concerning thresholds of attack above which Israel would opt for prompt launch. Even if well-defined thresholds were known to enemy state leaders (this assumes the antecedent premise that Israeli decision-makers had actually communicated such authoritative definitions), they could be low enough to be exceedingly destabilizing. To make matters even more complex, there is, of course, a certain mutuality and (possibly) synergy between Israel and its enemies regarding launch-on-warning and associated protective matters. Thus, enemy states could choose to attach "hair trigger" launch mechanisms to nuclear weapon systems, and/or adopt launch-on-warning policies, possibly coupled with certain pre-delegations of launch authority. Combined with some measure of "disclosure," these enemy moves could greatly heighten Israel's incentives to preempt and, ultimately, enhance Israel's need for nuclear warfighting weapons and tactics.

Whatever the expected consequences of "disclosure" by enemy states, it is not an issue subject to Israeli control. What is at issue here is Israeli disclosure, at varying levels and in varying degrees of specificity. Significantly, removal of the bomb from Israel's basement could provide considerable security benefits to the Jewish State. But it could also prove to be a double-edged sword, generating greater costs than benefits under certain conditions.

If, for example, Israel should seek to reduce the perceived vulnerability of its nuclear forces by some intentionally disclosed combination of multiplication/dispersion/hardening, enemy states could come to believe, erroneously, that Jerusalem was preparing for first-strike attacks. Such erroneous beliefs could be even more likely if Israel should seek simultaneously further reduced nuclear force vulnerabilities via appropriate forms of active and passive defenses. Ironically, in seeking to stabilize nuclear deterrence by signaling an enemy/enemies that its own nuclear forces were not vulnerable to disarming first-strikes, i.e., that these were exclusively second-strike nuclear forces with "assured destruction" mission objectives, Israel could create the dangerous impression that it was preparing to strike first. Here, Israel's attempts to convince enemy states that it was not preparing for preemption could backfire, offering new incentives to these enemy states to "preempt" themselves.

The alternative for Israel would be to maintain ambiguity about nuclear force protection, leaving protective efforts undisclosed, but such continued ambiguity would almost certainly be self-defeating, and would carry additional and possibly even intolerable security risks. After all, should Israel's enemies calculate that Jerusalem's nuclear forces were vulnerable to first-strike attacks, they would want to exploit current but potentially transient Israeli weakness. Moreover, because too great an Israeli nuclear force vulnerability could encourage Israel to strike first, and because Israel's state enemies would understand this calculation, Israel's enemies could have compelling reasons to launch prompt "preemptive" attacks.

Nuclear warfighting is linked to nuclear deterrence. Early on, Raymond Aron, who understood this linkage, described what he called "the measures to be taken in case the threat fails. Later, in the evolution of American defense policy, Jimmy Carter's Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, declared: "In our analysis and planning, we are necessarily giving greater attention to how a nuclear war would actually be fought by both sides if deterrence fails."

The "countervailing nuclear strategy" articulated by Brown expressed the presumption that nuclear warfighting capacity was needed not only if nuclear deterrence were to fail, but also because such a capacity, properly disclosed, could enhance nuclear deterrence (paradoxically, making nuclear warfighting capacity less necessary for actual nuclear warfighting): "There is no contradiction between this nuclear warfighting focus on how a war would be fought, and what its results would be, and our purpose of insuring continued peace through mutual deterrence. Indeed, this focus helps us achieve deterrence and peace, by ensuring that our ability to retaliate is fully credible." There may be an important lesson here for Israel.

Seventh and last, Israel needs nuclear weapons for the "Samson Option." Although this particular use of nuclear weapons would be profoundly catastrophic by definition, preparation for this option could represent an integral and even indispensable component of Israel's nuclear deterrent, preemption and/or warfighting capabilities.

In regard to prospective contributions to Israeli nuclear deterrence, preparations for a Samson Option could help to convince enemy states that aggression would not be gainful. This is especially the case if Israeli preparations were coupled with some level of disclosure. By learning in advance that Israel's pertinent nuclear weapons were sufficiently invulnerable to first-strike destruction and that these weapons were identifiably countervalue in mission function, enemy states are less likely to undertake aggression. This does not mean, of course, that all of Israel's nuclear weapons should be or appear to be countervalue targeted, as such a posture would largely undermine deterrence, preemption and warfighting capacities.

Preparations for a Samson Option might also help Israel by virtue of what strategists sometimes call the "rationality of pretended irrationality." Since actual execution of a Samson Option could be construed as irrational in certain circumstances (i.e., where such execution would elicit greater costs than benefits), enemy states might become more cautious than if they were convinced that Israel were altogether rational. It follows that disclosure, to the extent that it would enhance the impression of Israel's apparent irrationality, could serve the best interests of Israeli nuclear deterrence. Tactically, this would mean communicating to enemy states that Israel could be willing to destroy enemy population centers under certain circumstances and that its pertinent nuclear weapons were already countervalue targeted. Practically speaking, such communications would be exceedingly delicate, as too great an impression of Israeli "irrationality" could encourage enemy state preemptive attacks. Again, countervalue targeting must never be the core of Israel's nuclear deterrence posture (quite the contrary!), but only a part of that portion of Israeli strategic planning associated specifically with Samson Option requirements.

In regard to prospective contributions to Israel's preemption requirements, preparations for a Samson Option could help to convince Israel that essential defensive first-strikes could be undertaken with diminished expectations of unacceptably destructive enemy retaliations. This would depend, of course, on Israeli judgments concerning enemy state perceptions of Samson weapons vulnerability and on enemy state awareness of Samson's countervalue-oriented force posture - judgments contingent upon antecedent Israeli decisions on disclosure and on Israeli perceptions of the effects of disclosure on enemy state retaliatory prospects.

Here, too, "rationality of pretended irrationality" calculations may figure importantly. As in the case of Samson and Israeli nuclear deterrence (above), last-resort preparations could assist Israeli preemption options by displaying a willingness and capacity to take certain existential risks. But Israel's planners must be mindful that pretended irrationality could be a "double-edged sword." Brandished too "irrationally," Israeli preparations for a Samson Option could encourage enemy state preemptions.

In regard to prospective contributions to Israel's nuclear warfighting options, preparations for a Samson Option could convince enemy states that a clear victory would be impossible to achieve. After all, even after overwhelming the Jewish State and its military forces, these states would likely face their own overwhelming destruction. Here it would be important for Israel to communicate to potential aggressors that Israel's countervalue-targeted (Samson) weapons were additional to, and not at the expense of, its counterforce-targeted (warfighting) weapons. In the absence of such an explicit communication, preparations for a Samson Option could effectively impair rather than reinforce Israel's nuclear warfighting options.

It should now be recalled that Israeli preparations for nuclear warfighting must be understood not as a distinct alternative to nuclear deterrence and preemption needs, but as essential and even integral components of these needs. Several years ago, Colin Gray, reasoning about U.S.-Soviet nuclear relations, argued that a vital connection exists between "likely net prowess in war and the quality of pre-war deterrent effect." Elsewhere, in a published debate with this writer, Gray said essentially the same thing: "Fortunately, there is every reason to believe that probable high proficiency in war-waging yields optimum deterrent effect."

Extrapolating from these arguments, which link nuclear warfighting capabilities to nuclear deterrence and (implicitly) preemption capacity, to the Israeli case, Jerusalem should now ask the following questions: Why should enemy states be more likely to be deterred from initial acts of aggression by an Israel that has announced its intention to dominate escalation processes during a nuclear war than by an Israel that remains content with a capacity for "assured destruction?" As an Israeli search for nuclear warfighting capability would heighten enemy state fears of an Israeli first strike, wouldn't this search actually degrade Israel's security? Moreover, as Israel's nuclear weapons that are counterforce-targeted to conform to nuclear warfighting doctrines of deterrence would produce substantially less damage to enemy states than would extensive countervalue attacks, wouldn't these weapons have a significantly reduced deterrent/preemption effect? These are difficult questions that need to be asked, again and again and again, not because Israel can dispense with a nuclear warfighting capability (a capability that it requires whatever its effect on nuclear deterrence/preemption), but because this capability must be optimized between the ongoing needs of nuclear deterrence/preemption and the always possible needs of nuclear engagement.

Israel needs nuclear weapons. As we have noted, these weapons are needed to fulfil essential deterrence options; preemption options; warfighting options and even, residually, the Samson Option. To the extent that moving beyond deliberate ambiguity to disclosure can serve these needs, removing the bomb from the "basement" could serve Israel's overall security requirements. It follows, inter alia, that Israel's particular nuclear weapons choices should be made in cumulative conformance with the seven (7) options that have been discussed and with the pertinent forms and levels of disclosure.

Let us conclude with Sun-Tzu, who would have appreciated the need for an Israeli strategic dialectic. All military calculations, he recognized, deal with balance and interdependence between the orthodox and the unorthodox: "The unorthodox and orthodox mutually produce each other, just like an endless cycle. Who can exhaust them?" For Israel, deciding whether or not to remove the bomb from the basement, deciding how to remove that bomb and how much to remove it, are questions that can be answered more or less creatively. These are not simple questions, with merely straightforward "yes" or "no" answers. Quite the contrary, they are questions of enormous complexity. Acknowledging this complexity, and building its strategic theory accordingly, Israel must learn to use the orthodox in unorthodox ways, acting not merely to disclose, but to reveal purposefully, subtly, and with long-term nuclear advantage.

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