“It is not enough that we ascribe freedom to our will on whatever ground, if we do not have sufficient ground for attributing it also to all rational beings. For, since morality serves as a law for us only as rational beings, it must also hold for all rational beings; and since it must be derived solely from the property of freedom, freedom must also be proved as a property of all rational beings; and it is not enough to demonstrate it from certain supposed experiences of human nature (though this is also absolutely impossible and it can only be demonstrated a priori), but it must be proved as belonging to the activity of all beings whatever that are rational and endowed with a will. I say now: every being that cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom is just because of that really free in a practical respect, that is, all laws that are inseparably bound up with freedom hold for him just as if his will had been validly pronounced free also in itself and therefor in theoretical philosophy. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:447-8
Image by Johannes Plenio.
This book is an in-depth examination of Kant’s understanding of the will. I argue, contra most of Kant’s contemporary commentators, that there was never a “great reversal” in Kant’s thinking concerning his deduction of the validity of the moral law: the second Critique does not repudiate the arguments Kant made in Groundwork. Further, Kant never became a proponent of moral dogmatism. Once Kant’s understanding of the structure of the will is understood, the principal argument in Groundwork III can be shown to follow. Moreover, I show that both in Groundwork and in the second Critique Kant distinguishes between two different deductions: one of these deductions is valid, and the other is impossible. The second Critique puts forward the same position we find in Groundwork (no reversal); however, the focus of each work is different. While Groundwork is mainly concerned with the structure of the rational will, the second Critique tackles the problem of moral motivation in finite, yet sensibly conditioned beings such as ourselves. Getting the structure and differences between the two deductions right is necessary if we are to understand Kant’s strategies for warding off moral skepticism.
Book Chapters:
- Introduction
- Power and Insight
- Deep Structure of Kant’s Categorical Imperative
- Freedom and Insight
- Freedom and Laws
- Freedom and Internalism
- Problems with Freedom
- Freedom and Unity of Consciousness
- Epilogue