"Although it certainly sounds questionable, it is in no way reprehensible to say that every human being makes a God for himself, indeed, he must make one according to moral concepts (attended by the infinitely great properties that belong to the faculty of exhibiting an object in the world commensurate to these concepts) in order to honor in him the one who made him. For in whatever manner a being has been made known to him by somebody else, and described as God, indeed, even if such a being might appear to him in person (if this is possible), a human being must yet confront this representation with his ideal first, in order to judge whether he is authorized to hold and revere this being as Divinity. Hence, on the basis of revelation alone, without that concept being previously laid down in its purity at its foundation as touchstone, there can be no religion, and all reverence for God would be idolatry." (Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone, AA, 6: 169)
Synopsis
In my chapter “What Perfection Demands,” I argue that Kant had a developmental theory of human consciousness. This goes a long way in safeguarding the consistency of Kant’s position: radical evil can both be universal and at the same time something that is imputable to morally undeveloped beings. In my article on Kant’s Robust Theory of grace, I show that Kant did in fact have a strong conception of grace.
My recent work on Kant’s religion has focused on Kant’s understanding of what he calls radical evil and his conception of grace. I am currently working on a piece on Kant’s understanding of conscience. Two semi-recent papers are:
- “What Perfection Demands: An Irenaean Reading of Kant on Radical Evil,” Kant and the Question of Theology, edited by Chris L. Firestone, Nathan A. Jacobs, and James H. Joiner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 183-200. Available on Academia.
- “Kant’s Robust Theory of Grace,” in Con-Textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy, 2017, No. 6, pp. 302-320. Available on Academia.