THE DEATH OF PHILIP II
E. BADIAN

THE DEATH of Philip II of Macedon was a sad story. His life had been glorious enough. Superior to happy Austria in her heyday, he combined ability at waging war with skill at marrying: the complicated history of his matrimonial affairs mirrors the progress of his political expansion. Olympias, his Molossian wife, descended from Greek heroes and Illyrian chieftains, saw no harm in that. Her son Alexander had always been recognised as crown prince, had been brought up as befitted his station, and from the age of sixteen had been given extensive political and military responsibilities. The only man who might have been considered a rival was Amyntas IV, for whom Philip had in fact acted as regent, and who had at that time been recognised as king. However, there was no reason to fear any danger from Amyntas, whom Philip had allowed to live as a private citizen. There was ample precedent for this in Macedon, and no reason to suspect that, if and when the time came, the displaced king would be a real danger to the heir apparent. At any rate, Philip—who was in a position to judge—clearly thought so; for while marking out his own son as successor designate, he not only let Amyntas live at his court, but actually married him to one of his own daughters. Nor do we hear that Olympias and Alexander ever objected.

Then, in 337 B.C., an unexpected storm broke. Philip acquired another bride, but this time a Macedonian lady, Cleopatra. At the wedding feast, Attalus, the bride’s uncle, insulted Alexander, implying—what was probably true, and indeed obvious enough—that this marriage was intended to give the country a legitimate (i.e. fully Macedonian) successor. Alexander reacted violently; and the outcome was disastrous for him and his mother: Olympias fled to her native Epirus and the prince was exiled, going to “the Illyrians.”

1 Bella gerant alii: tu, felix Austria, nube.
2 Satyrus, ap. Ath. 13.5; Plut. Al. 9.11f.
3 Justin 7.5.9f.; cf. IG VII 3055.9; Tod, GHI 164A (with notes).
4 See A. Momigliano, Filippo II Macedone (Florence 1934) 13f.
5 Cynane; she bore him Eurydice, who was later to marry Philip III Arridaeus. See H. Berve, Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage (Munich 1926) 2.229, s.v. Κυνάνη. (This work will be cited hereafter as “Berve.”)
6 Sources collected in Berve 213f., s.v. Κλεοπάτρα, 434.
7 Plut. Al. 9.5f.
8 Olympias, who was not only a foreigner, but a very difficult person, was bound to arouse opposition. We are not told who “the Illyrians” were: hardly the two great kingdoms on the Macedonian borders, those of Clitus and of the Taulantii under Glaucias.
Before long, Plutarch tells us, he was allowed to return, through the good offices of the Corinthian Demaratus. But we have little evidence of reconciliation and much of continued insecurity. There is a significant pointer: Parmenio, Philip's second-in-command and best friend, gave his daughter to Attalus in marriage, although his eldest son Philotas had apparently been a friend of Alexander. It is clear what this experienced man, who must have known the King's mind better than most, thought of Alexander's chances.

Soon another incident was to show that he was not the only one. A Carian dynast, Pixodarus by name, seized power in his native country from the lawful ruler; and, having thus offended his suzerain the Great King, naturally sought aid from Philip, who was by then openly proclaiming his intention of invading the Persian Empire. He asked for the hand of Philip's son Arridaeus for his daughter. It is clear that Philip must have welcomed the request: political marriages were always one of his main weapons, and nothing could have been of greater importance to him, at a time when he was just assembling his forces for the invasion of Asia that began in 336, than a firm foothold in the difficult province of Caria. However, Alexander, hearing of the negotiations, rightly or wrongly drew the conclusion that he had been deliberately ignored; and he sent a secret messenger to Pixodarus, trying to substitute himself for Arridaeus. In the story, Philip, hearing of this, explains to his errant son that the Crown Prince of Macedon was too good to marry into a Carian family, and all live happily ever after. It is a delightful way of glossing over the uncomfortable incident. In fact, Alexander's feeling of insecurity cannot be disguised: whether or not he was right, he must have had good reason for thinking that the Carian deliberately preferred the half-witted Arridaeus to himself. More significant still is the outcome of the affair: Pixodarus abandoned his projected alliance with Macedon, made his peace with the King and secured recognition from him. The clever barbarian, seeing the whole affair from outside, had drawn his own conclusions on the desirability of the Macedonian court, as it then was, as a protector. Harem intrigues were familiar to Orientals, and their outcome was likely to be disaster to the dynasty.

In Macedon, the result of the affair was that Alexander's personal friends were banished, not to return until after Philip's death. Alexander's

(See RE, s.v. "Kleitos 11" and "Glaukias 7."). They later used the first opportunity of attacking Alexander after his accession. A more likely ally would be Langarus of the Agrianes: he is attested as a friend of Alexander's in Philip's lifetime (Arr. 1.5.2) and showed outstanding loyalty to him later. See Berve 230, s.v. Αὔγαγαρος.

*Plut. Al. 9.5f.

**Attalus: Curt. 6.9.17; Philotas: Plut. Al. 10.

***For what follows, see Plut., loc.cit. Cf. Berve 320f., s.v. Πίξιδαρος.
isolation was worse than ever. Yet he still had friends, who could bide their time. Antipater, in particular, seems to have been attached to the prince. We find him left in charge of Macedon in 340 together with Alexander and visiting Athens together with him after the battle of Chaeronea. In the absence of Parmenio and Attalus (who took charge of the invasion of Asia in the spring of 336), Antipater was probably the most influential figure at court. And Antipater, we shall see, had reason to disapprove of Philip and distrust him.

In the spring of 336 there was a new development. Hitherto, Olympias and Alexander might still have hoped for help from Epirus, where Olympias' banishment might be taken as a slight. But Philip now offered his daughter Cleopatra to Olympias' brother Alexander of Epirus. The Epirot had grown up in Macedon and had gained his throne with Philip's help. He had no intention of risking it for the sake of his sister's honour. He accepted Philip's offer, and the wedding was celebrated with great pomp. (The couple later had two sons.) Philip's action is, of course, very significant. Engaged on a campaign in Asia, of which he would soon have to take personal charge, he had to make sure of peace in Europe; and it is interesting to see him taking deliberate steps to deprive Olympias (and, by implication, Alexander) of possible support there. Philip had clearly made up his mind, in the sense indicated by Attalus at the wedding feast, and the position of the Crown Prince was becoming desperate: spared in the meantime, so that the kingdom might not be left without an immediate successor (for Philip clearly wanted a son of his own to succeed him, and Alexander was the only one who had the necessary character and experience), he knew that he would be safe only until Philip's new wife bore a son—or, at the most, until that son was ready to be trained for the succession: for Philip would want to avoid a guardianship by Alexander, which would give the latter the chance that Philip himself had seized. Once this stage was reached, Alexander would be nothing but an embarrassment and a danger to the lawful successor; and he would not be difficult to remove.

It was at this wedding, however, that Philip seems to have made his final and fatal mistake. It was not unknown for Macedonian kings to be worshipped as gods after their death. But in Asia, in the course of the victorious campaign of spring 336, Philip had come across a new form of adulation and found it much to his liking. At Ephesus, where he had

12 Plut. Al. 10.2. Cf. Arr. 36.5ff.: a flashback with less precise chronology.
13 Isocr. ep. 4.
14 Sources in K. J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte (Leipzig-Berlin 1914) 341. 573.
15 See Berve 19ff., s.v. Ἀλέξανδρος, 38.
16 On this and what follows, see Momigliano, op. cit. (see n. 4) 172ff.; cf. C. Habicht, Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte (Munich 1956) 11ff. (I do not accept a divine cult of Philip at Amphipolis.)
established democratic government, his statue had been placed in the temple of Artemis. It was probably as a result of this that Philip conceived the extravagant idea of having his statue carried with those of the twelve Olympians at his daughter's wedding. This must have given great offence to some. We cannot here discuss the controversial question of the cult of living men before Alexander the Great; but it is clear, at any rate, that in 336 the deification of a ruler was not by any means universally accepted or approved even in the Greek world—not to mention Macedon, with its tradition of Homeric kingship. In particular, however, we happen to know that Antipater was strongly opposed to this practice; he would not permit it in the case of Alexander later.\textsuperscript{17} Antipater had already perhaps suffered a political setback, as against Parmenio, in connection with Philip's marriage to Cleopatra; Alexander had been almost disinherited, and the task of launching the invasion of Asia had gone to Parmenio and his son-in-law. Their absence provided an unusual opportunity, and the King's divine aspirations an unusual temptation.

In the event, the wedding that saw Philip's admission among the Olympians also saw his sordid end. The story is told at great length, especially by Diodorus:\textsuperscript{18} the sexual insult to Pausanias and his terrible revenge made a tale dear to the Greek heart. Yet there are two facts that cannot but strike the reader: Pausanias' grievance was against Attalus, who had inflicted the insult on him and who was at that time in Asia (Philip came into it only indirectly, as not having punished Attalus at the time); and the whole grievance dated back about eight years.\textsuperscript{19}

We recall the poet's lines:

\begin{quote}
Das Unzulängliche,
Hier wird's Ereignis.
\end{quote}

But that was in another place: it is not a maxim for historians. Of course, there is no need to disbelieve the personal motive as such: Aristotle, who must have known the men and the incident, believed it.\textsuperscript{20} The important question is the one Aristotle is not concerned to treat: how, and for what

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\item Main accounts in Plut. \textit{Al.} 10.3f.; Diod. 16.93f. Cf. Berve 308f., s.v. Παυσανίας, 614.
\item Diod. 16. 93.6—showing that ibid. 8f. is anachronistic (an explanation probably inserted by Diodorus' source). The nature of the incident, as well as the precise setting in section 6, makes the choice between the two certain.
\item Arist. \textit{Pol.} 5.10.8, 1311b. He confines himself to the private grievance, since this subject is what he happens to be treating. His failure to mention the political background of 336 need not cause surprise. Since they were not relevant to his purpose, we cannot tell whether he believed the various official versions (which, of course, in no way exclude the personal motive). But without drawing any firm conclusion, we might note his failure to use those versions later in the chapter, where they would be relevant and where he seems to be rather short of illustrations.
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purposes, was the ancient grievance reactivated at that precise moment? It was easy enough, later on, to find a plausible story, convenient for whatever propagandist purposes one had in mind: it could even be claimed that Pausanias had been bribed with Persian money. It is significant that no one suggested this at the time. Pausanias was not a mere nobody, ready to sell his sword to the highest bidder: he was a Bodyguard, one of the noblest in the land. And we have no shadow of evidence of any connection between Macedonian nobles and the national enemy, until some of them were driven to it by Alexander's initial purge.

Another claim could be made at the time, more usefully if not more plausibly. The Lyncestian dynasty had traditionally been rivals and often unwilling subjects of the kings at Pella: it was only Philip who had tamed the Macedonian barons by gathering them under his supervision at his court. Three brothers of the dynasty were then living. As soon as Alexander had been installed on the throne, two of them were accused of complicity in his father's assassination and at once executed. Did these princes seriously fancy their chances of succeeding Philip II? The question is not difficult to answer in the light of what actually happened; and the actions and fate of the third brother, Alexander, are of particular interest.

As soon as Philip was dead, Antipater presented the young Crown Prince to the army, which acclaimed him as king. (This seems to have been the way in which Macedonian kings were appointed.) Now, one of Antipater's daughters had married Alexander of Lyncestis. Antipater's son-in-law, unlike his own brothers, was quick to do homage to the new king. As a result, his life was spared and he was held in high honour and given positions of great responsibility—at least until the King, safely away from Antipater, felt strong enough to arrest him, several years later. (In due course he was executed, in the purge that followed the death of Philotas, though in no way involved in the charges against the latter.) We are left with a peculiar situation: the two brothers who were supposed to have procured Philip's assassination were taken entirely by surprise by the course of events and presented themselves as meek and helpless victims to his successor; while the third brother was obviously well prepared for what happened and took immediate action on it—but the action was submission to the new king, and the man concerned was Antipater's son-in-law.

21 Arr. 2.14.5: Alexander alleges that Darius had boasted of this—which is possible (it would explain how Alexander thought of the idea), but in any case inconclusive. (Cf. Stalin's immediate assumption of responsibility for Trotzky's death, which does not help to clarify the facts.)

22 See Berve 80, s.v. Άθηβαίος (Berve is non-committal).

23 See Berve 46f., s.v. Άπικωτος, 94. The source is poor; but, as we shall see, it is supported by much circumstantial evidence.

24 Berve 17f., s.v. Άλεξανδρος, 37 (with sources also for what follows).
Regicide committed by a high-ranking noble as the result of a long-forgotten grievance against someone else—perhaps (as one might claim later) through treasonable relations with the national enemy; perhaps (as seemed more useful to claim at the time) at the instigation of two brothers who took no advantage of the opportunity thus offered and were, in fact, the first victims of the new situation created—regicide which, with the support of a powerful noble who probably had his own reasons for hating the dead king, ended (and was the only conceivable way to end) the isolation and insecurity of a crown prince—regicide committed in the providential absence of that prince’s chief opponents on military service: such are the facts and such the clues in this historical thriller, which scholars have usually been so diffident about solving. At the time, as we happen to know,\(^2\) many were less hesitant; hence the multiplicity of red herrings that had to be drawn across the trail.

But the end was not yet. There were still some dangerous persons alive. Cleopatra (Philip’s widow) and her baby daughter were butchered by Olympias, quick to return to Macedonia. Alexander, conveniently, was left to deplore the brutal deed. Amyntas, son of Perdiccas, had been the rightful king whose throne Philip had usurped. But, as we have seen, Philip did not indulge in useless butchery: Amyntas was left alive, honoured and harmless. After Alexander’s accession he disappears. Curtius, in a speech assigned to Alexander, mentions him as a pretender against Alexander in the early days of the reign; Justin says Alexander killed him. We have no reason to deny it.\(^3\)

There was still danger in one direction: Parmenio was away in Asia, in charge of the bridgehead established there. His friends and followers held powerful positions, and he was fully committed to the party of Cleopatra and Attalus. Alexander at once sent an assassin to kill his son-in-law, who was serving under him. Attalus had done homage and protested his loyalty. Treasonable negotiations could later be discovered.\(^27\)

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\(^2\) See Plut. *Al.* 10; Justin 9.7. That Olympias (who was in Epirus) collaborated directly with Antipater is not very probable, especially in view of the evidence for their mutual dislike.

\(^3\) Cleopatra: Justin, *loc. cit.; Plut. Al.* 10. Amyntas: Curt. 6.9.17 (cf. 10.24); Justin 12.6.14. Other victims mentioned by Justin are not worth discussing. Tarn spent much time trying to disprove their existence (Alexander the Great [Cambridge 1948] 2.260f.), since he claimed that Alexander only committed two murders. Once this is seen to be absurd, we need hardly worry about one or two less important ones. Plutarch (*Al.* fort. 1.3, 327c) alleges that all eyes in Macedon were turned on Amyntas (presumably the son of Perdiccas II) and the sons of Attalus of Lyncestis. There is no reason to think that this statement is based on any real evidence. It seems to be developed solely out of Alexander’s well-known action against these men. Plutarch is here committed to rhetorically extolling Alexander’s success in overcoming serious obstacles at the beginning of his reign. We have seen that Amyntas was considered harmless; and in the *Life of Alexander* there is no reference to him as a pretender.

\(^27\) See Berve 94, s.v. *Ἀτταλός, 182.*
none were alleged at the time, and no attempt was made to bring him to trial. He was known to be popular with the army and was too powerful to be allowed to live. Moreover, he had once signally insulted Alexander, and the new king never forgave. The deed could not be done without Parmenio’s co-operation. Parmenio had to decide where he stood. For the wily old Macedonian baron it was not difficult: it was better to be on the winning side and exact one’s price. He directed the assassination of Attalus.\(^{28}\) When Alexander invaded Asia, Parmenio and his friends (as is well known) were entrenched in the leading positions in his army.\(^{29}\) In the long run, he had dug his own grave: the technique that he had used against his son-in-law could be used against the old man himself by a hitherto loyal follower.\(^{30}\) But that was in the distant future.

The death of Philip II thus fits into the pattern of Macedonian court politics and of the life and career of Alexander the Great. It must be viewed against the background of Philip’s last years, and in the light of the plot against Parmenio, the murders of Alexander of Lyncestis and of Callisthenes, and the great liquidation of satraps and commanders on Alexander’s return from India. As for Alexander, he never forgave his father for the danger and humiliation that he had inflicted on him. As soon as he felt strong enough, he insulted Philip’s memory\(^{31}\) and even denied his paternity.\(^{32}\) As in other attested cases, his resentment did not stop at the grave he had helped to dig.\(^{33}\)

\(^{28}\) Diod. 17.2, fn.; 5.2; Curt. 7.1.3.
\(^{29}\) For a brief summary, see “Alexander the Great and the Loneliness of Power,” \textit{AUMLA} 17 (1962) 80f.
\(^{30}\) Cleander. See Berve 204, \textit{viz.} \textit{Κλέανδρος}, 422.
\(^{31}\) Arr. 4.8.6; Plut. \textit{M.} 50; Curt. 8.1.23f.
\(^{32}\) See especially J. R. Hamilton “Alexander and his ‘so-called’ Father,” \textit{CQ} n.a.3 (1953) 152f.
\(^{33}\) I should like to thank Mr. P. A. Brunt for reading and improving this article. He is not, of course, responsible for the opinions expressed.
THE END OF PHILIP

It is impossible to understand the circumstances of Philip's death in 336 without taking into account the conditions of the Macedonian monarchy. By that date the royal house, the Temenids, had reigned for three and a half centuries. The founder, Perdikkas, had come from Peloponnesian Argos. He was a member of the Temenids who ruled there as descendants of Herakles, son of Zeus, and in the words of later oracles he founded his capital "by the waters of the Haliakmon" and called it Aigeai (Goat-town) after the "gleaming-horned, snowy-white goats" which lay there asleep. The site is at Vergina. There the kings were buried under a tumulus, as the Temenids, it seems, were buried at Argos, and the saying was that so long as the kings were buried there the Temenids would rule Macedonia. The break happened after Philip. The Macedonians to whom Perdikkas came were primitive pastoral people who grazed their flocks on the uplands of Olympus and Pieria in the summer and on the coastal lowlands in the winter. They owed their subsequent prosperity and power to their Temenid kings, for whom they had the deepest affection and veneration. Thus Philip was at the same time a Greek of the highest lineage and a Macedonian monarch.

The relationship between the monarch and the Macedonians was primarily military. The king was elected by the Makedones under arms; they beat their spears on their shields and their leaders donned their cuirasses to show that they would fight for their king. Since the lives of the Macedonians were dominated by wars with their neighbours, they gave the king almost absolute powers of command in war and in peace. Ceremonies of state were conducted under arms. So too trials for treason: the king prosecuted, the assembly judged, and anyone found guilty was killed usually by the weapons of the armed assembly. As the life of the king was vital to the life of the state, the punishment for treason was death not only of the traitor but of his family.

It was probably in the interest of military efficiency that the tribes of the pastoral stage, among
which the Argeadai were the royal tribe, were replaced by a city-organisation for settled communities in most of Macedonia. Men-under-arms were "Makedones from Pella" or from other places: other persons were simply "Pellaioi" or "Aloritai", citizens of Pella or Aloros, etc. The "Makedones", i.e. the citizens of the Macedonian state, were the military élite. From them the king chose his commanders and his courtiers: they advised, fought and feasted as his "Friends" and "Companions", and their sons were educated together with the sons of the royal house as "Pages", waiting upon the king at table, joining him in the royal hunt and being flogged by the king for any misconduct. The king led his Companions into battle. His special guards were seven "Bodyguards" of high rank, the older Pages and an élite group of either Companion Cavalry or, in Philip’s time, "Foot-Companions", as occasion demanded.

In order to provide heirs the kings were polygamous: Philip perhaps more than most in having seven or eight wives, and among them an Illyrian, a Molossian, two Thessalians, a Getic and probably a Scythian. The children of these marriages, and no doubt the wives themselves, were held in equal honour, and this was important not only for the succession but also for international diplomacy. They bore Philip several sons, but death by disease and in action reduced them to two by 337: the incompetent Arrhidaios, and the very capable but younger Alexander, who had led the cavalry charge at Chaironeia. Good sense, as well as inclination, led Philip at the age of forty-five to take another wife, Kleopatra, the ward of a leading Macedonian commander called Attalos, and to hope she would bear him sons. By then, 337, the mothers of Arrhidaios and Alexander were past child-bearing.

Polygamy had its dangers. The queens quarrelled, especially over the succession, each wanting her own son to succeed, and also in jealousy of one another. Thus Olympias, a woman of tempestuous temperamental, the mother of Alexander, was angry with Philip for marrying Kleopatra. She became estranged from him. More serious were quarrels between half-brothers, which might pass from generation to generation and split the country. When Alexandros I died c. 452, he left at least five sons — Alketas, Philippus, Perdikcas, Menelaos and Amyntas —, and they and their sons too became contenders for the throne. By 399 it seems that the lines of the first two had come to an end in the struggle, but the next seven years saw kings descended from the other three: Orestes, Aeropos, Pausanias and Argaios from Perdikcas, Amyntas the Little from Menelaos and Amyntas from Amyntas. This last won the day as Amyntas III and the rest of the Temenid kings were descended from him. When Philip became regent and then king, he had to contend not only with Pausanias and Argaios of Perdikcas' line but also with three half-brothers, Archelaos, Arrhidaios and Menelaos. He survived as king only by eliminating all five of them. At the time of Philip's death those in the Amyntas line were in order of age Amyntas, son of Perdikcas III (a child king in 359 and now married to Kynna, a daughter of Philip), Arrhidaios and Alexander. But there were also descendants of the other branches which stemmed from Aeropos, Argaios and Amyntas the Little, kings in the 390s; among them were Leonnatos and Perdikkas (both bodyguards of Philip) and, as we shall see, "the sons of Aeropos". A reigning king gave high offices to all loyal princes (the treaty of Perdikcas II with Athens illustrates this), but he did what he could to designate a successor and a reserve. Thus Philip made Alexander his deputy in Macedonia, gave him command of the Companion Cavalry at Chaironeia and sent him as ambassador to Athens. At the same time he used Amyntas as an ambassador in 337.

The goings-on at the Macedonian court were ridiculed by the sophisticated Greeks of the south, who lived in republican city-states and regarded any king as a despot, and their attitude was inherited and shared by the Roman writers who provide much of our evidence. For example, Greek and Roman
writers chose to regard one wife as “queen” and the others as “concubines” (slave-women in a Greek household) and rated the Pages as slaves. So they portrayed Menelaos as a bastard, Archelaos as a slave-woman’s son, and Amyntas the Little as a slave-boy waiting on Aeropos (three of these four being kings in the 390s). The mother of Philip, Eurydike, was fair game. She was described as “an illiterate Illyrian” and she was said to have married her daughter to her own lover, Ptolemaios; plotted to kill Amyntas and replace him on the throne with Ptolemaios; killed her son Alexandros and replaced him with Ptolemaios; and then killed her second son, Perdikkas, without a pang for her little grandson, Amyntas. Such malicious fabrications, to which royal personages are still exposed, had a wide circulation in the Greek and Roman world. So too with Philip’s court. He was represented as having one queen, Olympias, and like Hypereides, an Athenian orator, many mistresses. When Olympias withdrew to the court in Molossia, some time after the marriage of Philip and Kleopatra, this was blown up into a royal “divorce.” And when Alexander showed his sympathy for Olympias and fell out with his father, this was magnified into the “banishment” of Alexander by Philip.

The truth was different. During the estrangement some friends of Alexander were exiled by Philip, but not Alexander. As the designated successor, Alexander had been given experience in Thrace, on the Danube campaign, on the Greek campaign and at Athens; now he sat in some role in Illyria. On the day of Philip’s death Alexander was to have walked beside him in the procession. There may well have been a quarrel between Alexander and Attalos at the time of Philip’s marriage with Kleopatra, but the lurid details which Plutarch gave have all the marks of journalistic sensationalism. Again Plutarch’s story about Pixodaros’ daughter is unhistorical as it stands; for it represents Arrhidaios as a “bastard” and has Philip mocking Pixodaros as a “barbarian slave to a barbarian.” The suggestion that Alexander wanted to marry at this point is itself suspect, since as king he delayed his marriage for so long. Whatever quarrels there may have been between Philip and Alexander, we cannot know them, and the setting of the scene on the day of Philip’s assassination shows that Philip ranked Alexander next to himself.

The assassination occurred during the celebration of a state wedding between Kleopatra, daughter of Philip and Olympias and so full sister of Alexander, and Alexandros, brother of Olympias, the reigning king of Molossia. It was a great event for both royal houses, and the two Alexanders were good friends. It was also unprecedented, in that the celebrations were attended by envoys from the Greek states, delegates from the Balkan dependencies and friends from abroad, as well as by leading Macedonians. The theatre at Aigeai was packed with these distinguished guests at dawn, when the first procession entered from the parodos: twelve magnificent statues of the Twelve Gods and with them a thirteenth statue “fit for a god”, that of Philip (suggesting, if not claiming, that he was a god). It had been intended that Philip, flanked by the two Alexanders, bridegroom and heir, should then enter; but at the last moment, while they were waiting in the parodos, Philip sent the Alexanders and his own Friends ahead. They entered and took the seats reserved for them by Philip’s throne in the front row facing the stage.

Meanwhile Philip was telling his select Foot
Companions to stand far aside, and when they entered they duly fanned out to focus attention for the king. In came Philip wearing a white cloak, to the huzzahs and congratulations of the assembled company: for he was at the pinnacle of success. At that moment, all unexpectedly, death struck. “One of the seven Bodyguards, Pausanias, seeing the king isolated, ran from behind, struck him dead, and rushed out towards the gates and the horses which had been prepared for the get-away. Some of the Bodyguards ran to the king; the others — among them Leonnatos, Perdikkas and Attalos — ran after the assassin. Pausanias was well ahead. He would have leapt onto his horse and got away, had he not caught his foot in a vine and fallen, so that Perdikkas and the others caught him as he was rising from the ground, speared him and killed him.”

On that day or the next the Macedonians of Aigeai and of the neighbouring regions were summoned to an assembly under arms. They met to elect a king. Their choice was Alexander, and some leading Macedonians donned their cuirasses and escorted him to the nearby palace. Alexander’s first task was to enquire into the assassination. Why had there been more than one horse prepared? Since no assassin provides the means of pursuit, Alexander must have assumed that more than one person had intended to kill and probably to kill more than one victim. Perhaps to end Philip’s line in effect by killing Philip and Alexander at his side. Not of course at the moment of entry when closely guarded, but during the play when they were sitting as spectators. As it happened, Philip’s last moment change of plan gave Pausanias the chance. He alone struck, anticipating and aborting the full plot. Who, then, might have been Pausanias’ accomplices? Perhaps those who killed him and so prevented interrogation; perhaps some of the guards or some of the Friends; or others near the throne; and behind them perhaps a foreign power, such as Athens or Persia, or/and a coterie of Macedonians anxious to put someone other than Alexander on the throne. Such thoughts must have sprung to everyone’s mind at the time.

Aristotle reported the personal motive of Pausanias, resentment that Philip had allowed him to be outraged “by those with Attalos”, and Diodoros supplied an unsavoury homosexual background, as follows. Pausanias, having been supplanted in Philip’s favours by another man, taunted the latter, who showed his courage in battle by defending the king and losing his life very gallantly in 337. Those who knew censured Pausanias, and in particular Attalos invited Pausanias to dinner, made him drunk and had him sexually assaulted by his grooms. Pausanias appealed to Philip but got no redress. Whether Diodoros’ details are true is undiscoverable. Aristotle’s assertion that Pausanias had a personal motive connected with Attalos for killing the king should be accepted as correct: for he knew the court and wrote for contemporaries of the event. It does not, of course, dispense with the probability of a wider plot and a political motivation.

Enquiries into the movements and contacts of Pausanias and all who came under suspicion must have taken some weeks. When they were complete, the trial was held by the assembly of Macedonians. A fragment of papyrus, found at Oxyrhynchus in Egypt, preserves a Hellenistic historian’s account of the trial, at least as provisionally restored. “They (the Macedonians) acquitted those with him (Philip) in the theatre and his escorts and those round the throne. He (Alexander) handed the diviner over to attendants to bury ... and by the burial ...” In this trial, in autumn 336, the immediate entourage and the guards were acquitted. The diviner, having pronounced the omens favourable that day, paid the price of his profession. We know from other sources that three sons of Aeropos were accused. Two were found guilty of complicity, by name Heromenes and Arrhabaios; the third, Alexandros, was acquitted through the influence — at least in part — of the young king, whom he had been one of the first to acclaim by donning his cuirass. This Alexandros was certainly a member of the royal house. For when the leaders of the revolt at
Thebes said that the king was dead, they asserted that this Alexandros was in command, that is as his successor. Again, in winter 334-3, the Persian plan according to a Persian agent was to assassinate the king and put this Alexandros on the throne. The father of these three, Aeropos, was then either the grandson of the king Aeropos of the 390s or a descendant of Menelaos. The epithet “Lynkestes” which was applied in our sources to distinguish this Alexandros from the king Alexander is an indication not of racial descent but of residence. He was a resident of Lynkos, just as Ptolemaios had been called “Alorites”, a resident of Aloros. At the time of the trial the king treasured the adherence of this prominent member of the royal house.

“Alexander took every possible care for the funeral of his father”, said Diodoros and the recent discoveries at Vergina may bear him out. Now Justin gave a very strange account of that funeral. His aim was to incriminate Olympias, and he (or his source) put his own interpretation on the traditional facts. If we keep to his facts, we may see what was done in the funeral at Aigeai. The king’s remains were under a tumulus: those found guilty of complicity were executed “at the tumulus”; the corpse of the assassin was hung, crucified, over the remains of the king and was later taken down and burnt. Another source adds that the sons of the assassins were executed too. Finally, an annual sacrifice was instituted at the tumulus — not to the assassin, as Justin said, but to the dead king, who was thus in some sense deified. We know from other sources that two Macedonian kings were worshipped as gods, Amyntas III at Pydna and Philip at Amphipolis, no doubt after death. The thirteenth statue in the procession had been symbolic of what happened so soon afterwards.

Though Philip was dead and buried, there were further repercussions. Two of the Bodyguards who had killed the assassin, Leonnatos and Perdikkas, were not made Bodyguards of Alexander until they won that honour by acts of valour. The third, Attalos, remained under suspicion. His conspicuous courage and genial manner made him extremely popular with the Macedonians, his ward’s marriage to Philip had raised his prestige and perhaps his ambitions, and he now held high command in the army in Asia Minor. Diodoros reports as facts what may have been merely suspicions at the time, namely that Attalos was negotiating with Athens and corresponded with Demosthenes with a view to the Greek states rising and overthrowing Alexander. When Alexander thought he had grounds for bringing Attalos to trial, he sent a trusted officer with troops to Asia Minor. His orders were to bring back Attalos alive, but if that proved impossible to kill him as quickly as he could. Had he been brought back alive, he would have been tried for treason. In fact he was killed. No doubt he was condemned posthumously as a traitor by the assembly, and his family were executed under the law of treason: among the relatives were Kleopatra and her baby, a son born to Philip just before the assassination. That was probably in early 335.

In the same year Amyntas, son of Perdikkas, the child king of 359, was arraigned for treason. He was found guilty and executed. Plutarch made the comment that discontented Macedonians looked to Amyntas and the sons of Aeropos, i.e. as leaders of rising and as possible successors to the throne. He may have been thinking of the two sons of Aeropos who had been executed in 336; but if he meant to associate Amyntas with “the sons of Aeropos”, he must have been using the term in the wider sense of “the descendants of Aeropos”. Who were the discontented Macedonians? One was certainly Amyntas, son of Antiochos, a close friend of the executed Amyntas. He now fled and entered Persian service. Later, according to Arrian, he established a means of communication between the Persian king and Alexandros Lynkestes, and a Persian agent was sent to offer the throne of Macedonia to Alexandros Lynkestes if he should kill Alexander. The Persian agent was captured. Alexander put the facts before his staff of Friends. They advised him to remove Alexandros Lynkestes from the command of the
Thessalian cavalry, a very powerful force, and put him "out of the way". This was done. Arrested in 334-3, Alexandros Lynkestes was brought to trial only in 330: then the Macedonians in assembly found him guilty of treason and executed him with their spears.

When we look back over the whole affair from the antecedents in the royal house down to the execution of Alexandros Lynkestes in 330, we must note that constitutional procedures were being followed. These were based probably on precedent and "the unwritten law" and not on recorded statutes; but that made their authority, if anything, greater. The assembly of Macedonians had the right both of electing a king and of deposing a king (as they deposed Amyntas III in 393-2 and Amyntas IV c. 358), but by precedent they elected only a member of the Temenid house. The assembly had the right of judging cases of treason. Though the king prosecuted, it was no foregone conclusion. In 399 the killing of Archelaos during a royal hunt by Krateuas, a Page, did not lead to a verdict of guilty. In 336 Alexandros Lynkestes and other suspects were acquitted, and later in Asia several persons were accused of treason but acquitted. By the Greek standards of the time, indeed by some modern standards, trial by popular jury was considered the most equitable, and there are no grounds for making the assembly of the Macedonians an exception. The king had the right to arrest suspects. Sometimes a suspect was killed or killed himself in the course of arrest; but that happens even today. It is therefore incorrect to speak of Alexander killing Attalos or Amyntas.

The findings of the Macedonian assembly have the first claim on our credence. They were that the assassin Pausanias had been in league with two sons of Aeropos, members of the royal family, and on prima facie evidence that they had conspired also with Attalos. Quite separately they found Amyntas, son of Perdikkas II, and probably others unnamed in our sources guilty of conspiring against Alexander. They carried out the unwritten law that the family of those found guilty of treason were executed, this including Kleopatra and her infant child. Next, we have the indications in Diodoros that Demosthenes and probably other Athenians were aware of the plot to kill Philip, and the suspicion of Alexander, which Arrian reports, that Persia had also played a part in organising the conspiracy. All we can say is that these were likely hypotheses. Demosthenes was certainly fanatical enough in his hatred of Philip and Macedonia, and Persia may well have planned to kill Philip and his heir in 336, as she planned later to kill Alexander by the hand or agency of Alexandros Lynkestes.

If the findings of the Macedonian assembly are accepted as correct, there was considerable opposition within Macedonia to Philip's policies. There is one sign of it in the advice given to Alexander not to pursue Philip's forceful policy in Greece: and in Macedonia the transplantation of populations, the constant military training and operations and the unrelenting ambition and demands of Philip must have caused much resentment in some circles. By 336 it must have become clear that Philip's son and designated successor was no less ambitious and would make no less rigorous demands. If Philip's policies were to be arrested, it was necessary to remove both Philip and Alexander by assassination. The succession to the throne or the regency would then fall not on the half-witted Arrhidaios but on a descendant of Aeropos or on Amyntas, son of Perdikkas, whichever was the more likely to prove a capable king and commander. In the opinion of the Theban leaders, it was likely to be Alexandros, son of Aeropos, 92. Philip's wife Olympias, the daughter of Neoptolemos king of the Molossians, had a forceful personality and a mystic nature that often led her to violent, irrational actions. Her role in the murder of Philip has always been the subject of fierce controversy, renewed after the recent discoveries at Vergina. Her portrait is preserved on a medallion from the Roman period. Thessalonike, Archaeological Museum.
so-called Lynkestes. A conspiracy on these lines and with these aims has at least the merits of probability within the circumstances of the royal house and the Macedonian state.

The speculations of later writers begin by dismissing the findings of the Macedonian assembly as incorrect. They do so without having access to the evidence at the time, and usually without an understanding of the constitutional procedures. From this arbitrary assumption they pin the blame on Olympias as the arch-planner, who let assassins loose on the very day when her daughter was being married to her brother and when her son Alexander was an easy victim too. Then Justin, excerpting an Augustan writer called Pompeius Tragus, describes Olympias, enraged by her “divorce”, planning, but failing, to drive her brother Alexandros, king of Molossia, into a war of revenge against Macedonia, and then instigating Pausanias to murder Philip and preparing the horses for his get-away. The deed done, she ran (from Molossia over high Pindos) to attend the obsequies of Philip; at night she crowned the crucified Pausanias with a gold crown; later, she cremated Pausanias’ corpse, had a tumulus built over it, and persuaded the people on grounds of “superstition” to make an annual sacrifice to the assassin. Next, she killed the baby at Kleopatra’s breast and compelled Kleopatra to hang herself; and she dedicated the assassin’s sword to Apollo. “All this”, says Justin, “was done so openly, that she seems to have been afraid that it would not be realised she had committed the crime herself”.

What a story! It is in the class of bad detective novels or television plays. But in real life, not in a jungle but in a civilised state with constitutional procedures, it is fantastic to suppose that an estranged queen could have acted thus and imposed her will on the Macedonians. Plutarch, writing later than Pompeius Tragus, watered the story down to almost nothing and made Olympias the instigator. Finally, Pausanias either found in another source or himself invented a final horror: Olympias killed the baby and Kleopatra by dragging them across the top of a burning cauldron.

The next step for the sensational writer was to incriminate Alexander himself. Justin begins by saying that Alexander was “not unaware” of his mother’s plan and of her part in the killing of his father; then after the assassination he makes Alexander organise the killing of Kleopatra’s baby and follow this up by killing those relations of Kleopatra who were in prominent positions. Plutarch joins Justin but cautiously: Alexander, he says, was suspected, but he was away when Olympias killed Kleopatra so cruelly and he was angry with her. Justin assumes a society in which a king kills whom he pleases or organises the killings behind the scene, as in the worst days of the Roman Emperors. It is absurd to suppose that Alexander would have staged an assassination on the very occasion when he was himself exposed to the dagger, that he would have chosen to have the king murdered in the presence of envoys from the whole of Macedonia’s orbit of influence, and that the assassin would not have realised that Alexander’s first duty would be to prosecute the assassin and have him killed by the Macedonian assembly. If we keep a historical perspective, the complicity of Alexander is as incredible as the alleged actions of Olympias.

The real interest of Philip’s end is that it reveals a considerable opposition to his policies among some leading Macedonians. It warned Alexander as successor to those policies that he would encounter opposition and might himself become the target of conspiracies among the leading Macedonians. What seems to have broken down in Philip’s case was the ability of the king to win and maintain the support of the leading Macedonians, among whom the members of the royal house and the Bodyguards and Friends held a prominent position. Alexander in his turn was threatened by conspiracies of the same origin.

The assassination of Philip has always been seen as a critical event in world history. If Philip had lived to an old age, he would probably have held the Greek states to the terms of the Greek League and obtained
more co-operation from them, and he might have restricted his conquests to Asia Minor or to the Euphrates line, in order to give Macedonia a central position in his sphere of domination. As it was, the assassin's steel put the power of Macedonia at the disposal of a young king, who showed less patience than Philip in dealing with the Greek states and who had an imperious urge to win glory by conquest.
pea (58). Ma questa differenziazione fra uno stadio del bello e uno stadio del bene può aver attratto l’attenzione di un autore neopitagorico, avvezzo a pensare per processi derivativi e a mettere in rapporto i concetti fra loro secondo lo schema della πρῶτος.

In ogni caso, il risultato, così come ci appare in Giamblico, è estremamente fragile e incoerente, sempre nella irrisolta tensione fra andamento derivativo e andamento progressivo.

Se ritorneremo quindi, come soltanto relativamente valide, alle testimonianze aristoteliche su Speusippo, che cosa resta del sistema speusippiano di derivazione anticipante il neopitagorismo? Prima di poterglielo attribuire con un qualche margine di probabilità, occorrerebbe poterlo riconoscere con altrettanta probabilità nella testimonianza giambliche. A chi scrive, ciò non sembra in verità legittimato dal testo, dalla loro logica intrinseca, dal loro linguaggio.

Margherita Isnardi Parente

SUNTO. — Il passo di Giamblico, de comm. math. sce. 4, 15, 6-18, 13 Festa, che è divenuto nella critica degli ultimi decenni il punto di partenza per una ricostruzione del pensiero di Speusippo in chiave neopitagoriana, sembra in realtà da interpretarsi come una rilettura tarda della testimonianza aristotelica su Speusippo passata attraverso il trascendentale neopitagorico; esso presenta una notevole incongruenza filosofica, nella sua inesauribile contraddizione intrinseca fra processione derivativa e sviluppo progressivo dell’essere, e una notevole irrecettiva di linguaggio e di terminologia teoretica.

(58) Il ragionamento di Aristotele sembra seguire questo sviluppo: i pitagorici (o platoniciti pitagorizzanti) vogliono dimostrare che i numeri determinano l’esistenza di beni effici, pertinenti al mondo della πρῶτος, ad esempio la ἁρμονία; ma ciò è impossibile, in quanto di per sé tale tipo e specie dello ἀρμονία, proprio della πρῶτος, è assente dall’esistenza del numero. Non vi è nessun accenno di riferimento su questi avversari di loro teorie al riguardo, e l’andamento del ragionamento sembra nel suo insieme prettamente aristotelico. La distinzione può peraltro aver dato origine a una più tarda teoria della ‘gradualità’ fra κακός e ἀρμονία nell’ambito di una qualche speculazione neopitagorica sul numeri, di cui Giamblico ci riporta l’eco.

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With a master’s touch, Professor Badian has reconstructed the atmosphere at the Macedonian court in the months between Chaeronea and the assassination of Philip by the royal somatophylax Pausanias of Orestis (1). His compelling interpretation of the behaviour of Philip and Alexander makes clear the extent to which the young prince may have felt himself threatened by his father’s recent actions. No future study of Alexander’s career and character can fail to reckon with the possibility that Alexander’s feelings of insecurity drove him into a plot to murder his father (2).

Even in antiquity there were those who doubted the official explanation, which held the Lyncestian prince responsible (3),

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acting either on their own or in the service of Dareus the paymaster (4). According to Aristotle and Dio­
sorus, Pausanias assassinated Philip for personal revenge, because Philip had not granted him justice for the gross outrage done him by Attalus (6). Plutarch and Justin report that some did not hesitate to see the hand of Olympias or even Alexander behind the assassination plot (8). Modern scholars, on the whole accepting the conspiratorial theory, have doubted that Pausanias was motivated solely by his


(5) Aristotle Politesis 1311 b 2; Dio­

(9) Justin 9.8.4-7; Plutarch Alexander 10. Continued popular speculation on the possibility of a conspiracy probably lies behind the «viligate» testimony that Alexander at Sisyphus asked of the oracle: τον πόλεμον δε μεταλαμάνει τις γενεσίδες φονείς του κοινού δι' τινα δικαλαθήσειν Dio­

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(8) See esp. Bickell, 111 B 606 n. 2; Bre­

(12) Bickell, 111 B 606 n. 2; Bre­

(13) Diodorus 14.32.0-4.
daughter to Alexander of Epirus [(10)]. Diodorus then pauses for a
digestion on the background of the murder. The assassin Pausanias,
his tells us, was a native of the canton of Orentis. A royal
body-guard, he had become the lover of Philip. Jealous at Philip's
obviously lustful intentions towards another young man, also
named Pausanias, he severely upbraided the second Pausanias.
Although mortally wounded by these insults, the second Pausanias
remained silent for the moment. However, confiding his plans to
Attalus, one of his friends, he resolved to put an end to his life
in a truly glorious manner. A few days later, during a battle
between Philip and Pleurias, king of the Illyrians, he stood in
front of Philip receiving on his own body all the blows aimed at
the king [(11)]. And so perished the second Pausanias.

[(10) The basic discussion of the date of Philip's assassination is still
Beloch II p. 59-60. From IO II 1 1.240 it is clear that Philip was still
alive in the tenth Prytany at Athens. Following Beloch, it is generally
thought that Philip's death occurred shortly thereafter, for Philip was
busy with war preparations at the time of the wedding (Justin 9.6.1), and
Philip was hardly the man to fritter away an entire summer. So, e.g.,
Berve, Alexandrerreich II 212; Welcker, Diodorus 100; Meine, Alexander
29; M. Sonnt, ed. and comm., Diodorli Siculi Bibliotheca Liber XVI (Florence
1899). The dating of Philip's assassination to midsummer 336 requires
acceptance of the view that Alexander began the count of his reignal
years from the first new year after his accession rather than from the actual
date of his assumption of the kingship, for our sources are almost
unanimous in attributing to Alexander, who died 10 June 323, a reign of
twelve years and seven months (exclusive, Diodorus 17.117.5) or eight
(Inclusive, Arrian 7.28.1) months. For 10 June as 29/20 Datlas, see A. E.
Samm, Ptolemaic Chronology (Munich 1962) 41-47. The statement of the
Oxyrhynchus Chronographer, P. Oxy. I 12, 31-32, that Alexander reigned
thirteen years most likely represents a rounding off rather than a reflection
of accurate tradition. So too Livy 49.9. Alexander's reign is rounded off
to twelve years by Erastosthenes ap. Chem. Strom. I 158 and Forsyby ap.
Fossb. I 169. The alternative is to follow Diodorus, Geschichte des Helleni-
nismus I 98, 354, and to date the death of Philip to fall, 336.

[(11) For Pleurias, see E. Mezei, « Isocrates' Brief an Philipp und die
zweite Philippika », Hitzungsberichte der Königlich Preussischen Akademi-
der Wissenschaften (1909) 769-81, who identifies Pleurias with the Pleurates
mentioned in Didymos' commentary on Demosthenes XI.22. The name
appears later in the royal house of Skodra (Polybius 2.2.4), and Meyer
suggests that this was also the home region of Philip's opponent. So too
Lenschke, « Pleurias », RE XLI 239.]

However, this story of lust and violence did not end with his
noble suicide. Diodorus continues the tale:

This affair having become celebrated, Attalus, being a member of the
court circle and having much influence with the king, invited Pausanias
to dinner. After filling Pausanias with a large amount of neat wine,
Attalus gave him to the pretenders for rape and other sexual
hot. When he had recovered from his drunkenness, Pausanias, greatly
pained both physically and mentally by the abuse of his body, accused
Attalus before the king. However, although provoked by the madness
of the act, Philip did not want to punish Attalus both because of his kinship
and because he needed him at the moment. (For Attalus was the nephew
of Cleopatra, the wife whom Philip had married [(12)], and, courageous in
war, had been chosen as a general of the advance force being sent into
Asia. Nonetheless, the king wanted to soothe Pausanias' righteous anger
at his calamity. Therefore he gave him noteworthy gifts and advanced
him in honor among the royal bodyguards. Pausanias, however, held fast
in his inevitable anger, and was eager to take vengeance not only on the
perpetrator of the outrage but also on that man who had not avenged him.
In particular the sophist Hermocrates contributed to his plan. Pausanias
was studying with him and in the course of a lecture he asked how one
might become most renowned. The sophist answered that he should kill
him who had done the greatest deeds. For in the memory of that man would
be included his murderer. Pausanias linked this statement with his private
anger; and on account of his passion making no delay in his decision, he
contrived his plot in the following manner at the very games which are
in question [(13)].

Diodorus then relates how Pausanias struck down Philip,
and, fleeing, was killed by a group of bodyguards, including
Leonnatus, Pericles, and a certain Attalus [(14)].

[(12) In fact, it is almost certain that Attalus was Cleopatra's uncle,
as in Euphrates 85 ap. Athenaeum 13, 557d; Pausanias 8.7.7; Plutarch
Alexander 9.

[(13) Diodorus 10.92.7-94.4.]

[(14) As Berve, Alexandrerreich II 232, 313, argues, these men were
clearly part of Philip's bodyguard, somatophylakes here being identical
with the royal hypoaspists, not with the narrow inner circle of the king's
personal staff.

This is identified by the young age of the young men mentioned
and by Diodorus' implication that they were part of a large body of men.
There is no reason to suppose that these were part of Alexander's rather
than Philip's bodyguard. Used as it is without any modifiers, somato-

phylakes here must mean the king's bodyguard. For the various problems
The emphasis is quite different in the case of the other primary sources, Plutarch and Justin. Plutarch's account is brief:

When Pausanias killed Philip because, at the instigation of Attalus and Cleopatra, he had been publicly outraged and had not received justice, then the greater part of the blame fell upon Olympus on the ground that she had exhorted and spurred on the angry young man. However, a false accusation also touched upon Alexander. For it was rumored that when Pausanias spoke with Alexander after the rape and bitterly complained about it Alexander quoted the lament verse from the Medea, "The giver of the bride, the bridegroom and the bride." (15)

Nonetheless, Plutarch points out, as though in refutation of this charge, Alexander sought out and punished the accomplice connected with the term nomatophyia, see Renck, Alexanderreich II 25-30, 122-29; and Tank, Alexander II 139-42, 148-54.

For Leonnatus and Perdiccas, see Renck, Alexanderreich II 253-35, 313-30.

Leonnatus was from Pella, not Oretis (Arrian 6.28.4). According to the Suda, Leonnatus was raised with Alexander. Upon the death of Arbyas he was made one of Alexander's personal staff (nomatophyia, Arrian 3.5.5). Perdiccas was indeed from Oretis (Arrian 6.28.4). Of his boyhood relations with Alexander, nothing specific is known; but already in the campaign against Cilicia, we find him in command of a task. Plutarch Alexander 15 mentions him as one of the friends of Alexander who was offered but declined a generous gift from the royal estate. He seems to have been named to Alexander's personal staff in 320. See Renck, Alexanderreich II 314. Thus two of the players of Pausanias were close to Alexander and were marked out by him for rapid advancement. Unfortunately, the third of these, Attalus, cannot be identified certainly. See Renck, Alexanderreich II 92 n. 3. He is most commonly identified as Attalus, son of Andromene (Renck, ibid., no. 181). No Wieseler, Diodorus 191 n. 2; Mau, Alexander 29. This Attalus was a contemporary of Alexander (Curt. 8.13.21) and a brother-in-law of Perdiccas, although we do not know when he died (Diodorus 18.37.2). He is first mentioned in connection with the trial of Philotas, and he never belonged to Alexander's personal staff. However, in addition to this Attalus, we have mention of two other possible candidates, Renck, no. 185, 184.

(15) Plutarch's language makes it clear that he did not believe that Alexander was implicated: θύγατρις δέ τις καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος διαβολή λέγεται γὰρ ἐνέχυςτον αὐτῷ τοῦ Παυσανία μετὰ τὴν ὑδρίν ἔκθεσιν... προένεγκαθαι το... ἱματισμον. (16) Justin 9.7.

Justin 9.6.4-5.

(16) It is true that in his brief reference to the assassination of Philip, Aristotle Politics 1311 b2 does not refer to a plot. However, this does not prove that Aristotle rejected or did not know the story of the conspiracy. His silence may be because his mention is not relevant here. Aristotle is not giving examples of conspiracies but rather of men moved by revenge rather than ambition. On this point, see Raman, «Philip II», 247 n. 30. Although Diodorus makes no reference to a plot in his long account of the assassination of Philip, at the beginning of his narrative of Alexander's reign he notes that immediately upon assuming the kingship Alexander plotted with some of his men to kill the king. Alexander III 364, 1-4. Although Diodorus makes no reference to a plot in his long account of the assassination of Philip, at the beginning of his narrative of Alexander's reign he notes that immediately upon assuming the kingship Alexander plotted with some of his men to kill the king. Alexander III 364, 1-4.
consideration. Quite different is Justin's Philip, who makes light of the young man's misfortune and makes no attempt to mollify Pausanias by gifts and promotions (20).

Momigliano has suggested that the account in Diodorus represents merely an amplified version of that found in Justin (21). However, the very different tenor of their portrayal of Philip would seem to argue against this view. Moreover, Diodorus makes no mention of the conspiracy, which plays so large a role in Justin. Furthermore, in Justin it is Attalus and his fellow guests who molest Pausanias, not the muleteers. So too Diodorus does not refer to Attalus' earlier liaison with Pausanias. It seems clear then that Diodorus and Pompeius Trogus-Justin drew their accounts from separate traditions.

Plutarch's brief remark do not contradict any points in the fuller account of Justin. In both is found the story of the drunken brawl between Alexander and his father at Philip's wedding banquet (22). Both mention the possibility of Alexander's implication in his father's murder, but both emphasize the role of Olympias. This suggests an ultimate common source for the accounts of Plutarch and Trogus-Justin. Variations in the two are perhaps best explained by the different interests of a biographer of Alexander and of an abridger of a universal history writing a section on Philip.

Source criticism has expended a great deal of effort on Philip's reign without reaching any firm conclusions (23). Duris, Dylus, and Theopompus have all been suggested as the single source for Diodorus' account of Philip's death. Other have seen in

(20) As is well known, throughout his history Diodorus presents in general a more sympathetic picture of Philip than does Justin. Cf. e.g., Diod. 16.14.2, Justin 7.4; Diod. 16.71.2, Justin 8.3.1-15; and Diod. 16.72.1, Justin 8.6.4-8.
(22) Plutarch Alexander 9.6.12; Justin 9.7.4.7.
(23) The only treatment of the sources as a whole for the reign, R. Schubert, «Untersuchungen über die Quellen zur Geschichte Philipp II» (Königstein 1904), is not entirely satisfactory.

it a confusion of two sources (24). So too, numerous treatments of the sources of Plutarch's Alexander and of Trogus-Justin have led to very divergent results (25). Fortunately, the concern here is not with the ultimate source of our accounts. We are seeking simply to fix the time of the crime which drove Pausanias to murder. In this matter, there is agreement between both versions


A discussion of Diodorus' sources depends to a large extent on the view of his method of composition: did he choose one source and almost mechanically reproduce it or did he write his own history by comparing two or more sources or even by changing sources frequently? For the former view, see, e.g., E. Schwartz «Diodorus», RP IX 1907-97; and more recently, Hammond, «The Sources of Diodorus XVI», 74-91; R. Strickland, Proceedings of the African Classical Association 6 (1963); Sorzi, Diodoro IX-XVI. For statements in various forms of the latter view, see Schubert, Untersuchungen, with with the earlier literature (of which H. Pack, «Die Quellen des Bertihs über den heiligen Krieg im XVI. Buche Diodoras», Hermes 117 (1909) 179-201, is especially interesting, Momigliano, «Diodoro», 222-43; Tarn, Alexander 11 63-91; R. Dews, «Diodorus and his sources», American Journal of Philology 83 (1962) 383-92, who argues that Diodorus used one main source but from time to time turned to other sources to enhance the moral value of his history.


(25) For the vexed problem of the sources to Plutarch's Alexander, see I. Ratz, Quellenkritische Untersuchungen zu Plutarch's Alexanderbiographie (Diss. Hamburg 1964), with the earlier literature (of which A. Goldscheider, Die Quellen der Alexanderhistoriker [Breslau 1882] esp. 327-28, is still especially useful); H. Homer, «Beobachtungen zu den Helenistischen Quellen der Plutarch-Viten», Rito 41 (1963) 195-207; and the excellent remarks of Hamilton, Alexander XII-XIII. M. Schaefer, Geschichte der römischen Literatur II (Munich 1935) 322-29.
of the story, that in Diodorus and that in Plutarch and Justin (29). Diodorus is quite explicit. Immediately after the rape, Pausanias goes to Philip with his accusation. Philip cannot punish Attalus, who is already his in-law and has been chosen to be a general of the advance force. Diodorus thus clearly places the attack on Pausanias between the marriage of Philip to Cleopatra in late 338 or early 337 and the sending of the advance force into Asia in the spring of 336 (27). Plutarch’s reference to Attalus and

Cleopatra as the cause for Pausanias’ rape and failure to obtain justice is elliptical; but it, as does Alexander’s quote from the Medeis, places the episode within the context of the young girl’s position of influence as the new bride of Philip.

Opinio communis has generally rejected this explicit testimony on the grounds that Diodorus, in contradiction to his later remarks, had earlier placed the rape of Pausanias within the context of a war between Philip and the Illyrians. The last Illyrian war mentioned by Diodorus for which he gives a date falls in the year 344 (29). Therefore the entire incident, the assault, the accusation of Attalus before Philip, and the king’s failure to punish Attalus, is dated to 344 (29). This is supported by reference to Justin’s statement: Pausanias... primum perturbationis anales supplices ab Attalo fuerat (29).

In the first place, it should be emphasized that Diodorus does not explicitly identify the Illyrian war mentioned in connection with Pausanias and Attalus (16.93.6) with that described under the year 344 (16.69.7). 16.93.6 may refer to a later Illyrian war of Philip not known from another source. It is just possible that in 337 Philip, as Alexander was to do later, undertook an Illyrian campaign to secure his northern border before marching into Persia (29). Regardless of the date of the Illyrian conflict, a close

murder (Diodorus 17.2.3) is of little help, except to suggest that a reasonable length of time expired between Philip’s marriage and death. So too between marriage and murder enough time must be allowed to account for Alexander’s flight and reconciliation and the Ptolemaic affair (Plutarch Alexander 8.5-10.5).

(29) Diodorus 16.93.7.

(30) See the works listed above n. 6.

(31) Justin 9.6.5.

(32) On the basis of this very passage, Diodorus 16.96.6, Schaeffer, Demonsthenes und seine Zeit 58, postulated such an Illyrian expedition in 337. We know so little of Philip’s activities between Chaeronea and his death that this cannot be dismissed out of hand. It is also possible that Diodorus has confused his northern wars and that the incident of the second Pausanias’ suicide belongs to Philip’s campaign against the Scythians and Triballi after raising the siege of Byzantium, Justin 6.1-3; Diodorus 16.77.2. However, as Ranke, Ἡ Περσας, 241, points out, the specific details of Diodorus’ account, including the name of King Pleurias, argue for its authenticity.
analysis of Diodorus does not confirm the view that he makes the war against the Illyrians contemporaneous with the rape of Pausanias. He describes the quarrel between the two minions named Pausanias and the suicide of one of them during the Illyrian war. Then, using the genitive absolute διαβορηθέντος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ for a transition, Diodorus relates the tale of the outrage of Pausanias by Attalus and his failure to obtain justice, which he proceeds to place in the period after Attalus had become Philip’s in-law. The genitive absolute in no way ties the date of the rape to that of the suicide of the other Pausanias. It simply implies that the attack occurred some time after the suicide had become a celebrated event. A more specific date is then supplied by reference to the kinship of Philip and Attalus and to the proposed advance force of the Persian expedition.

Thirdly, Justin does not support the argument that the multiple rape of Pausanias at the instigation of Attalus occurred in 344. Justin does tell of an earlier unspecified insult to Pausanias by Attalus, suffered when Pausanias was primis pubertatis annis. However, it was at an indefinite but later date that Attalus added insult to injury by that famous outrage (haec foeditas). Justin’s account offers no real clues to a more specific date for this latter attack. The term adulescens, used for Pausanias at the time of the assassination, is notoriously vague (32). Justin writes that after the outrage Pausanias often (essepe) complained to Philip. However, even if the rape be dated to February 336, shortly before the sending of the advance force, and even if Philip’s death be put in June 336, a period of four months leaves ample time for numerous complaints. Finally Justin states Pausanias turned against Philip because he saw himself laughed at and put off by various deceptions and became he saw Attalus honored with a generality. In the absence of any other temporal references, this suggests, if nothing more, that the assault and subsequent complaints of Pausanias fell in the period shortly before spring 336.

Thus the evidence does not support the commonly accepted view that the humiliation of Pausanias occurred eight years before he exacted his revenge. Anyone attempting to reconstruct the sordid scenario of rape, murder, and revenge must start from the fact that both Diodorus and Plutarch securely place Pausanias’ rape and failure to obtain justice after Philip’s marriage to Cleopatra and that this date is consistent with the account of the other main source, Justin.

As the ancients thought, Pausanias acted out of purely personal motives (33). Modern doubts on this point have been allayed, it is hoped. His motive for revenge was fresh, not eight years old. The moment chosen was one when Attalus was in Asin Minor. This not because it was most advantageous to Alexander, but rather because the thought of his enemy winning glory in the field drove Pausanias to action. Moreover, the idea of killing Philip at the wedding games appealed to his deranged mind. Enraged by Philip’s bestowal of new honors upon Attalus, Pausanias decided to regain honor and glory by striking down Philip, false judge and greatest man in the world. The anecdote about Hermocrates the sophist is an obvious invention, but one which may offer an insight into the mind of a regicide (34). The sophist’s reference to the fame to be won by the slayer of Philip was

(32) Cicero can use the term to describe himself at age forty-four, Phil. 2.48. Thirty seems to have been the standard termination of adulescens, Varro op. Censor. 14; Isidorus Origenes 11.2.4.

(33) Although all of the sources, except for Aristotle, refer at some point to a conspiracy, see above n. 3, 10, 19, none of these indicates that Pausanias acted for any other reason than personal revenge. Bosworth, « Philip II », 93-97 dismisses all the ancient sources for Philip’s assassination as bad and unworthy of serious consideration. It is arbitrary, hypocritical, and unjustified, in the absence of any contradictory ancient evidence, to dismiss the evidence of a contemporary witness of the caliber of Aristotle. Furthermore, although they represent two traditions, Diodorus and Plutarch and Trogus-Justin agree with Aristotle on the fundamental motive of Pausanias and agree among themselves on the essential elements in the story of Pausanias’ misfortune. Despite considerable speculation on the assassination, none of the ancient sources suggests that Aristotle or anyone else invented the story that Pausanias’ outrage at the hands of Attalus led him to murder Philip. All accept it as undisputed fact. It is extremely cavalier to replace such firm ancient evidence by an unsupported modern reconstruction.

(34) The Suda refers to a Hermocrates from Issus in Caria as the teacher of Callimachus, s.v. Καλλιμάχος. It is not entirely impossible that he could have been in Macedonia at this time. However, he seems to have been a grammarian. PBNAIOL, « Hermocrates », RE XV 887.88. Plutarch Alexander 55, attributes a similar saying to Callisthenes.
Antipater is implicated by his presentation of Alexander to the the sort to activate a psychopath. That Pausanias was unbalanced is indicated by his choice of the most spectacular of assassination settings: Philip laid low at the height of his career before thousands of spectators, all of whom would testify that the humiliation of Pausanias had been avenged. Had he lived to be tried and executed, Pausanias might well have gone to his death like Guiteau, chanting, "Glory, glory, glory!"

A demented mind can be the tool of a conspiracy. Motivated solely by personal revenge, Pausanias could have been used like a well-honed weapon by those who from personal ambition sought Philip's death. It may be, as some thought in antiquity, that Alexander led such a plot. This is no more than a possibility. However, in several valuable, recent contributions, this possibility has been elevated to certainty; and Alexander stands convicted of parricide (35). Alexander, it is argued, contrived to kill his father because he feared Philip was planning to replace him as heir with a son by Cleopatra. A coalition of nobles led by Parmenio and his son-in-law Attalus was forcing Philip to do this, because they refused to accept a half-Macedonian crown prince. Alexander had been threatened and isolated by Philip's recent actions, including the marriage to Cleopatra, the banishment of Alexander's friends, and the proposed marriage of Alexander's sister Cleopatra to Alexander of Epirus. Philip's offer to marry Arhidnaeus to the daughter of the Carian dynast Pizodaros was further evidence for Alexander that his father meant to oust him as heir. Antipater joined Alexander from hatred of Philip, arising out of the latter's pretensions to divinity and his choice of Parmenio instead of Antipater to lead the advance force (36).

(35) Hamilton, "Alexander's Early Life", 121-22; Milne, Alexander 31, "There can be little doubt that Alexander became king by becoming a parricide". So too, J. V. Muir, Greece and Rome, Sec. 2. 12 (1905) 113; Ellis, 'Ammian Perdikka', 24. Roseworth, "Parricide", 97, protests against the view of Alexander as a parricide. These views are based on Diodorus, "Philip II", 244-60; but they transform into fact what he presents as a well argued hypothesis.

(36) For the divine honors to Philip, see esp. C. Hardie, Gottham schematism and greekische Eldade (Munich 1906) 11-16; with F. Theeg, Charisma (Stuttgart 1967) 1 114; and the summary of the evidence in F. Dvornik, Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy, Dumbarton Oaks Studies 1968 (Washington D.C. 1968).

army and by the fact that Antipater's son-in-law was the only Lyncestian prince to do homage to Alexander and thus to be saved. The other two brothers were caught unprepared. The assassin Pausanias was killed lest he implicate the instigators.

This view is developed with compelling logic. Yet, without twisting the evidence of straining the imagination, each of these points can be interpreted quite differently and perhaps more in accordance with the ancient testimony.

Until Chaeroneia, Philip's regard for his brilliant young son is striking. At sixteen Alexander was left as regent; at eighteen he led the left at Chaeroneia (37). In explaining their subsequent quarrels the personal element should not be underestimated. Deeply attached to his mother and spurred on by her, Alexander was no doubt wounded by Philip's blatant disregard for Olympias (38). Philip may have seen Alexander's defiance as proof that he had brought the boy along too quickly. To learn to rule the boy needed discipline and the removal of certain bad influences. All this was compounded by the intrigues of courtiers and by that failure of communication between father and late adolescent son so common in all times (39).

The evidence does not clearly indicate that Philip was seeking to discard Alexander as heir. We have no reason to assume that Philip married Cleopatra at the behest of a faction of nobles led by her uncle and Parmenio with the intention of producing a new heir to supplant Alexander. Of a notoriously passionate nature, Philip had often married for political advantage (40). However, in this case, as Satyrus and Plutarch tell us, he married Cleopatra because he was in love with her (41). Polygamy as well as

(37) Plutarch Alexander 2; Diodorus 10.86.
(38) Plutarch Alexander 9.8.
(39) Plutarch Alexander 10.1-5.
(40) For a list of his wives see Satyrus fr. ap. Athen. 557c. Theopompos, fr. 27 ap. Polib. 8.11.1 considers Philip's many wives an another sign of his uncontrollable lasciviousness, while Satyrus suggests that political advantage stood behind many of the unions. The two views are not mutually exclusive.
(41) Plutarch Alexander 9.8; ο Φιλάρρος ρήτορον, ερασικος ευ στράτηγος, Μαβαρος, Μελαντος, ο Φιλάρρος, έρασικος ευ-στράτηγος, χωρίς χρείας. Υφερματος 9: έγγυα Αλεξάνδρου ροδοθεος, Without pressing the point it can be suggested that Satyrus contrasts Philip's marriage of passion to Cleopatra, which threw his household into turmoil, with his earlier marriages for policy's sake.
concubinage were probably traditional in the Macedonian royal house. This was not the first time since his marriage to Olympias that he had brought a second wife into his household; but now he may have gone further and may have actually divorced the hateful Epirote on grounds of adultery. At the least, she was dishonored by the second marriage; and she fled with her son to Epirus, where she remained until after Philip's death. No doubt Philip preferred her in exile. Even before his marriage to Cleopatra, Olympias' hatredfulness had sparked quarrels between father and son. Philip may have hoped that his second wife would drive her from court and thus weaken her influence over Alexander. Secondly, by creating a new queen, a Macedonian, and by dishonoring Olympias, Philip may have sought to destroy her as a political threat. Macedonian queens had plotted the deaths of kings in the past. Philip himself could remember Queen Eurydice, who had killed her son Alexander, even as she had plotted the death of her husband Amyntas.

We know of five sons and one daughter of Alexander I. His heir, Perdiccas, had one son by a slave, Simnebo, as well as a son by his legal wife Cleopatra (Plato Gorgias 471 a-e). It was the son of the slave, Archelaus, who succeeded him as king. Archelaus, although already married, took a second wife, Cleopatra, who was probably his stepmother (Aristotle Politics V.1311 b). We know of two wives of Amyntas (Justin 7.4.4.5). In the cases of Archelaus and Amyntas, there is no clear evidence of bigamy. However, the polygamous unions of Philip II, Alexander III, and the Diadochi strongly support the view that polygamy was traditional in the Macedonian royal house.

According to Satyrus, fr. 5, Philip married Meda, daughter of the Thracian king Cothelas, bringing her in as a second wife to Olympias: γῆςις ἐν καθέναν ἐπισυνάγοντες τῆς Ὀλυμπαίας. Of Philip's other wives, only Cleopatra is described in the same terms: καθεν καθέναν ἐπισυνάγοντες τῆς Ὀλυμπαίας. Neither Satyrus nor any other source except Justin 9.5.9; 11.11.2-4, states that Philip actually divorced Olympias. Justin 11.11.2-4, claims that Olympias was divorced on grounds of adultery, because she had conceived Alexander by a huge serpent. The tone is so vicious that it is tempting to reject Justin's statement as an invention, stemming from Cassander's propaganda against Olympias. Berve, Alexanderreich II 284 n. 2, among others, does not believe that Philip divorced Olympias.

Plutarch is our only source for the Pixodarlis incident, and we should again be chary of putting faith in his details. He makes it quite clear that the dynast sought to match with Arrhidæus because he had no idea that Alexander was a possible candidate. The possibility of wedding Alexander to his daughter was far more pleasing to him. Philip forbid it because he thought that Philip had good cause to fear the like from Olympias. In short, Philip married Cleopatra out of passion; but the legal union with her, supplanting Olympias, may have been due to a desire to eliminate Olympias as a storm center around which disgruntled elements could rally. The marriage was directed against Olympias, not against Alexander.

Without any encouragement from Philip, Attalus could have dreamed that one day his own nephew would reign with himself as regent. Drunk, he gave voice to his dreams. It is not to be doubted that there was a very ugly scene between father and son at the wedding banquet. Nonetheless, it is most uncertain to what extent the actual details can be reconstructed from the story preserved in Satyrus, Justin, and Plutarch. Even accepting the story in its outlines, little weight should be attached to what was said or done by tempers inflamed by prolonged drinking. Philip had clearly underestimated his son's devotion to his mother. Yet the important point is that Philip persuaded Alexander to come back home after he had fled to Illyria.

Plutarch emphasizes the role of drink in the quarrel: Α'νδρας εν τη αίσθημα και λαβειν την ἀλήθειαν. Attalus prays for an heir of the Macedonian race (γένος). Alexander replies that he is γένος, a legitimate child of a legitimate union. The implication is that Cleopatra is but a concubine. Any child born by her to Philip will be ἄγενος. Philip reacts to the implied insult to Cleopatra.

Satyrus fr. 5; Plutarch Alexander 9.7-11. These may clearly derive from a common source. The toast of Attalus should not be treated as historical fact. It is a literary tour de force by a rhetorical historian, involving a play on the word γένος. Attalus prays for an heir of the Macedonian race (γένος). Alexander replies that he is γένος, a legitimate child of a legitimate union. The implication is that Cleopatra is but a concubine. Any child born by her to Philip will be ἄγενος. Philip reacts to the implied insult to Cleopatra.

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the position of bridegroom to a Carian dynast's daughter too lowly for the crown prince of Macedonia. Alexander's action indicates his mistrust of his father. According to Ptolemy, who was among those exiled by Philip, Philip's marriage to Cleopatra had made Alexander suspicious of his father (51). As Plutarch relates, this mistrust was inflamed by the venomous tongues of his friends and mother (52). These friends later portrayed themselves as faithful to Alexander (53). However, it is likely that Philip banished them to rid Alexander of their had influence, not as a part of a plot to leave Alexander isolated without support.

To secure Epirus was an essential element in the expansionist program of any Macedonian king. Philip's marriage to Olympias, niece of Arybbas of Molossia, was part of such a plan (54). Having put aside Olympias, and before marching into Persia, Philip had to renew his ties with Alexander, Olympias' brother, whom he had placed on the throne (55). Thus the marriage of Cleopatra, daughter of Philip and Olympias. By tying the Molossian more closely to the Argead house, Philip sought to protect himself from whatever malevolent influence Olympias might seek to exercise over her brother. It is not necessary to see this alliance as directed against Alexander.

However, far from seeking to disgrace Alexander, Philip

(51) Arrian 3.6.5. Ptolemy is the obvious source for this passage in Arrian. Despite Berve, Alexanderreiche II 105, Arrian's account of the occasion of the exile of these friends does not contradict Plutarch Alexander 10.5. Arrian does not specify that they were exiled at the time of Philip's wedding. We can conclude that they were exiled as a result of the Ptoxodarus affair.

(52) Plutarch, Alexander 10.1.

(53) Arr. 3.6.5. Thessalus, the actor used to carry Alexander's offer to Ptoxodarus, was brought back to Macedonia in chains. However, he was not executed, the normal punishment for high treason in Macedonia; and we find him, alive and well, taking part in the tragic contest at Tyre (Plutarch Alexander 29). Philip's relatively lenient treatment of Thessalus prevents my following Berver, sf Philip II. 245, and Hamilton, Alexander 55, in arguing that Philip treated Alexander's action as high treason.

(54) Satyrus fr. 5.

(55) Diodorus 16.72.1; Justin 6.6.4-8. For Philip's relations with Epirus, see N. G. I. Hammond, Epirus (Oxford 1967) 617, 553-34, 546, 687; and more briefly, the excellent remarks of Hamilton, Alexander 2-3.

(55a) Justin 6.6.8.

sought to honor his son on the very day of his assassination. Philip chose Alexander, crown prince of Macedonia, to march beside him into the theatre at Aegae (55a). Alexander's position of honor here before the eyes of Greeks and Macedonians alike would seem to invalidate the assumption that Philip was actively planning to disgrace Alexander and to replace him as heir.

Although still a young man of forty-seven, Philip had obviously put a good deal of effort into the training of Alexander as his heir (56). He would have given much thought to the chaos into which Macedonia was plunged after the assassination of Archelaus left only a child as heir, soon murdered by his regent (57). Apart from the perils of his proposed Persian campaign, Philip, as did every Macedonian king, had to consider assassination an omnipresent likelihood (58). Considering this it seems doubtful that he would have risked the ruin of his life's work by allowing a faction of nobles to force him to alienate Alexander with the expressed intent to replace him by a yet unborn son of Cleopatra. Is it not more likely that Philip and Antipater had mapped out a course of action which, in the event of the king's sudden death, would permit Alexander without difficulty to accede to the kingship and to continue Philip's work? Such a plan might include the elimination of any possible claimants to the throne, such as had plagued the first years of Philip's reign (59). From his youth Antipater had been Philip's close friend and advisor. There is no evidence that their relationship had changed in the months before the assassination (60).

(56) For Philip's age at his death, see Justin 9.8.1.

(57) For the chaotic political history of Macedonia between the assassination of Archelaus and the accession of Philip, Gynæ.Macedonien 104-38, is still much the best work.

(58) In the forty years between Archelaus' and the accession of Philip, at least four Macedonian kings were assassinated and one died in the field.

(59) In the first years of his reign Philip faced three pretenders to the throne. Diodorus 16.2.

(60) Plutarch, Regum et imperatorum appollégmata 27 p. 178H; Caryllus ap. Athen. 10.435d; Justin 9.4.5. See Berve, Alexanderreiche II 46. The Suda preserves the tradition that Antipater, alone of the Diodochi, did not permit the divination of Alexander, thinking it an implety. From this it has been argued that Antipater broke with Philip over the latter's pretension to divinity. See above n. 35-39. According to Diodorus 16.92.5.
The choice of Parmenio to lead the advance force may reflect Philip's intention to leave Antipater as regent or as advisor to Alexander as regent (61). In conclusion, Antipater's acumen in arranging the accession of Alexander can best be interpreted as the execution of a contingency plan created by Philip and himself in case of the king's sudden death.

The promptness of Antipater's son-in-law, Alexander the Lyncestian, son of Aeropus, to do homage to Alexander is not proved he was party to a plot on the life of Philip, inspired by Alexander or anyone else. He was Alexander's friend (62); and it was only natural that he stood at the side of the man who was the obvious and indeed only possible choice to succeed Philip. His prompt action together with his friendship with Alexander and his kinship with Antipater saved his life for the moment. Although the exact nature of their claim to the throne is not known, his brothers are generally thought to have been executed as possible pretenders (63). The same is true of the Lyncestian, son of Aetopos, to do homage to Alexander is not the execution of a contingency plan created by Philip all by himself in case of the king's sudden death.

It is taken to mean that the Lyncestian, son of Aetopos, to do homage to Alexander is not the execution of a contingency plan created by Philip all by himself in case of the king's sudden death.

In the parade at the wedding games of his daughter, along with statues of the twelve gods kovu to Philip, the Lyncestians' Onkios and Hecuba, together with the statues of the Twelve Gods, were seen as possible pretenders to the throne. See Plutarch de Alexandri Fortuna 327c, and Arrian 1.25.3. As Ptolemys Alcides showed, not only members of the Argead House could aspire to the throne of Macedonia. See Gyras, Macedonicae 129-20.

(61) Despite F. Schachermeyer, Alexander der Große (Graz-Vienna 1949) 499 n. 35, the common view rightly holds that Antipater was advisor to Alexander during the latter's regency in 340. This is indicated by Isocrates Ep. 4. 80, e.g., Brvne, Alexanderreicht 11 46; and Hamilton, Alexander 22. He was almost certainly regent in Macedonia during Alexander's campaign of 336. See Brvne, Alexanderreicht 46.

(62) Arrian 1.25. Since Arrian uses the correct technical term filos for the king's companion, filos is here taken to mean that the Lyncestian was the personal friend of Alexander. They were probably not the sons of King Aeropus. See Beloch, III 77, and Brvne, Alexanderreicht 11 109. Despite Bosworth, s. Philip II's, there is sufficient evidence to warrant the assumption by Badian, s. Philip II's, 248, and Wolf, Diodorus 121 n. 3, that the sons of Aeropus were seen as possible pretenders to the throne. See Plutarch de Alexandri Fortuna 327c, and Arrian 1.25.3. As Ptolemys Alcides showed, not only members of the Argead House could aspire to the throne of Macedonia. See Gyras, Macedonicae 129-20.

(63) For the murder of Amynatas III, see Justin 12.6.14. Olympia saw the murder of Pleistomenes and her child. Justin 9.7.12; Pausanias 8.7.7. Justin 11.2.3, also refers to Alexander's murder of a brother Caran. The existence of this brother is accepted by Brvne, Alexanderreicht 11 199, and denied by Tarn, Alexander II 293-92. For the assassination of Attaus, on the grounds that he was plotting with the Athenians, see Diodorus 17.6.3-2.

(64) No source gives a complete list of the alleged conspirators in the plot. The Lyncestian princes are named only as partakers in the plot. Arrian 1.25.2. Plutarch Alexander 10.8, and Diodorus 17.2.1, could not be less specific. Justin 12.6.14, gives no reason for the murder of Amynatas, but Curtius 6.19.17, has Alexander speak of a plot on his life between Amynatas and Philotas. The idea that Atilas had conspired against Philip would have seemed too ridiculous, so another plot, with the Athenians against Alexander, was laid at his door. Diodorus 17.6.3, and Justin 11.5.1-3, preserve the real reason for these executions: the removal of all possible rivals.

(65) Plutarch de Alexandri Fortuna 327c.

(66) Ellis, de Amynatas Perikles, 15-24.

(67) Plutarch Alexander 29; Arrian 2.6.3, 2.13.2; Curtius 3.8.2, 3.9.3. See further Brvne, Alexanderreicht 29, 67.
and it was Amyntas son of Antiochus who, at the time he fled from Macedonia, supposedly brought to Dareius a treasonous letter from Alexander the Lycecean. 

The sons of Aeropus and Alexander's cousin Amyntas seem then to have been real threats to Alexander. Attalus was his personal enemy; and after the death of Philip, his popularity with the army made him a possible rival for the throne. Ptolemy Alorites had shown that other than the members of the Argead house could aspire to the kingship of Macedonia.

The enormous responsibility enhanced to Parmenio and his sons at Ptolemy Alorites' death showed that other than the members of the sons of Alexander, there clearly existed a rift among the Macedonian nobility. At any rate, by ruthless but sagacious action at his succession, Alexander healed this rift. Seen within the context of earlier Macedonian history, the remarkable fact about Alexander's reign is that he abduced himself from Macedonia for almost thirteen years without civil war or pretenders with political advancement. The common assumption that Parmenio was the father-in-law of Attalus is based entirely on the speeches which Curtius attributes to various participants in the trial of Philotas: Hic [Philotas] Attalo sororem suam in matrimonium dedit. Inventions and errors abound in the rhetorical speeches which Curtius attributes to various participants in the Philotas affair. Despite ample opportunity, none of the other sources refer to this alleged relationship between Parmenio and Attalus; and their silence is far weightier evidence than Curtius' rhetoric.

Thus Parmenio, like Antipater, was devoted to Philip and to his son Alexander. After the marriage of Cleopatra to Philip there clearly existed a rift among the Macedonian nobles. Friends of Alexander were exiled, according to them, because they were faithful to Alexander and his mother. Philip saw them as troublemakers, who sought to turn Alexander against him by spreading lies. The question of loyalty to Olympus or to the new queen, not to Alexander, may have been at the center of the division among the nobility. At any rate, by ruthless but sagacious action at his succession, Alexander healed this rift. Seen within the context of earlier Macedonian history, the remarkable fact about Alexander's reign is that he abduced himself from Macedonia for almost thirteen years without civil war or pretenders.

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(60) Arrian 1.25.3. For a different interpretation of this material, see Ellis, Amyntas Perdikka, 15-24, who accepts Badian's overall view of the assassination; and Bosworth, Philip II, 83-106, who argues that the sons of Aeropus represented the nobility of Upper Macedonia, disaffected by Philip's marriage to Cleopatra, and that they absented the murder of Philip. His arguments are partly vitiated by his reliance on the view that Pausanias' motive was eight years old and by his assumption that there is no evidence that the sons of Aeropus were possible pretenders to the throne.

(61) Pintarch Alexander 9.7.
(62) Diiodorus 17.3.3-4; 17.5.1-2.
(63) Green, Macedonien 128-29.
(64) Badian, Philip II, 240; Miller, Alexander 27-28; Hamilton, Alexander 24; Bosworth, Philip II, 192; Ellis, Amyntas Perdikka, 24.
(65) Diiodorus 17.5.2; Curtius 7.1.1-5.
(66) As Badian points out, The Death of Parmenio, Transactions of the American Philological Association 91 (1960) 392, the only evidence brought forward against Philotas was his failure to move on to Alexander information about the plot, Arrian 3.26.2-3.

(67) There are clear mistakes of detail, e.g., the statement, 6.11.38, that all those named by Nicleschus were executed at one time. We know for certain that Amyntas, although named by Nicleschus, was found innocent and was not punished, Arrian 3.27.1-3. So too, Demetrius, named by Nicleschus, was only arrested after the execution of Philotas and the other conspirators, Arrian 3.27.5. The story mentioned only in Curtius' account of the conspiracy of Philotas, 6.11.22-23, that Parmenio had been involved in a conspiracy with Hegesicles is rightly rejected as an invention of a later apologist by Badian, The Death of Parmenio, 302. So too Curtius seems to have invented an earlier conspiracy between Amyntas, the son of Perdiccas, and Philotas, 6.9.17. Given Alexander's lack of evidence against Philotas, Arrian 3.25.2-3, and there been in fact any rumor about Philotas' involvement in an earlier conspiracy, this would surely have been brought up at the trial. These clear inventions of Curtius strongly suggest that the alleged marriage of Philotas' sister to Attalus, found in no other source, is also an invention.
rising to plague him. Certainly his speed and ruthlessness in nipping conspiracy in the bud was instrumental in securing the stability of his reign (78). Nonetheless, the devotion of the Macedonian nobles and the army is striking.

As candidates for the answer to the question cui bona oeades Philippus, Dareus and Olympias are at least as likely as Alexander. Olympias and Dareus had real reason to wish Philip dead. Alexander in fact had no cause to believe that Philip, forced by a faction of nobles including Parmenio, was planning to replace him as heir. However, the hostility and suspicion which his father had provoked in him by dishonoring Olympias made him receptive to the malicious gossip of mother and courtiers. The extent of Alexander's fear and resentment is indicated by the devotion he later showed to those who stood by him and his mother (79). Such false suspicions could have led Alexander to plot his father's murder. Yet clear evidence is totally lacking. The most important piece of circumstantial evidence implicating Alexander is that Pausanias was not captured and questioned. Instead he was killed by three men, at least two of whom were close friends of Alexander (80). But it should be pointed out that these men were Philip's bodyguards and that they had not been among those «faithful» friends of Alexander whom Philip had exiled as bad influences. Is it not as likely that they killed Pausanias out of over-enthusiasm and inexperience and that they were honored by Alexander, not to silence them, but because they had avenged his father's murder? (81).

In conclusion, any treatment of Philip's assassination might best start from the view that Pausanias acted from purely personal motives. That he was the tool of a conspiracy is possible. That Alexander was the instigator or even party to such a conspiracy must be accounted as nothing more than a possibility. The events leading up to the assassination and the act itself can be explained plausibly without any implication of Alexander.

Not unprecedented in the bloody annals of Macedonian history was the assassination of a powerful and successful king by a former lover motivated by personal revenge for an affront to his honor. Archelaus, the most successful of Philip's predecessors, was struck down at the height of his career. The three assassins were former lovers, all of whom had been insulted by the king. To continue the parallel, despite several days of disorder following the murder, the succession of Orestes, son of Archelaus and still a child, was effected quite smoothly (82).

J. Rufus Fears

SUNTO. — Ancora un esame delle fonti per far luce sull'assassinio di Filippo II di Macedonia. L'assassinio Pausanias agli scontati per motivi personali, a clic per vendicare una umiliazione subita da parte di Attalo, con gusto di Filippo. Inoltre, non esistono fonti che permettano di stabilire con certezza la complicità di Alessandro nell'uccisione del padre.

(81) Whatever his personal feeling toward his father might have been, at the start of his reign Alexander set a perfect example of filial piety; the execution of his father's murderers, the celebration of his funeral rites, and the continuation of his work.

(82) Aristotle Politics 6.1311b; Plutarch Amatorius 23. According to the spurious Plutarch dialogue, Alexides II 141d, Archelaus was killed by a favorite, who himself sought the throne. As in the case of Philip's assassination, Diodorus' account of the death of Archelaus, 14.37.6, makes no reference to a conspiracy. Instead, the king is said to have been killed accidentally while hunting. Aelian Historia Varia 8.9, gives the versions of both ps-Plato and Aristotle. The detailed information supplied by Aristotle makes it clear that his version is to be preferred.

After this article was completed, my attention was drawn to the posthumously published study of K. Kraft, Der 'rationalis' Alexander, ed. H. Gesche, Frankfurter Athistorische Studien 5 (Kölnnütz 1971). Kraft's examination of the murder of Philip, 11.41, and the present study complement each other. Although approaching the subject from different points of view and with different emphasis, Kraft and I independently reached the conclusion that an analysis of the ancient evidence does not support the view that Alexander was involved in a plot to kill Philip.
Few if any contentions regarding the distant past are open to proof or disproof—and none of significance. The best that may be done, in history no more nor less than in theoretical physics, is to argue that one interpretation more comfortably embodies and rationalizes the available evidence than another. But whereas the physicist will then go on to predict on the basis of his hypothesis, and hence to test it, the historian cannot. For him general acceptance is in the end the only relevant—the only possible—criterion; and even that is temporal and not absolute, for different generations conceive differently of what is humanly credible. This paper is no more than an attempt to suggest that one reconstruction of the circumstances of Philip's assassination better assimilates the evidence than another.

In 1963 Professor E. Badian's 'The Death of Philip II' was published, arguing that Philip's murder at the hands of the young Orestian nobleman Pausanias was in fact instigated by a coalition of interested persons: primarily Alexander (perhaps along with Olympias), who was being ousted from his heritage by pressure from a group of nobles headed by Parmenion and Attalos; Antipatros, whose own position may have been under threat from the same group and who resented the divine pretensions alleged of Philip in Diodoros' account (16.92.5, 95.1); and Alexandros of Lynkos, who was Antipatros' son-in-law. My aim here is to re-examine the evidence for and the assumptions underlying this view, which has been almost invariably accepted by subsequent authors, at least in its substance.

1. Phoenix 17, 1963, 244ff.
ATTALOS AND ALEXANDER

Attalos' Insult

Three authors preserve the story of a clash between Attalos and Alexander not long before the latter's accession to the Macedonian throne. Plutarch (Al. 9. 4f), Athenaios (13.557de) and Justin (9.7.2-5) provide, in varying degrees of detail, accounts of the incident, illustrating (as they all comment in one way or another) the difficulties King Philip brought upon his own head by taking his seventh wife, Kleopatra. The clash seems a significant one and has long been held as evidence of a breakdown in relations at the court in Pella. Badian sees in it (along with several other data) signs that Philip had decided to replace Alexander as his legitimate and intended successor, so providing the prince and his mother with the most credible of motives for wishing the king dead.

There are some variations between the three accounts and these should be noted. Plutarch's, the longest and most circumstantial, sets the scene, as does Athenaios', during the actual festivities of Philip's wedding to Kleopatra: while Justin is rather more vague (it happened in convivio), the difference is hardly significant. In both Athenaios and Plutarch the action is initiated by a drunken though telling remark by the bride's uncle (and guardian), which raises doubts as to Alexander's legitimacy; scholars have been uncertain whether to take this as an aspersion on the young man's paternity (which is what Plutarch and Athenaios say) or on his provenance (which is what some would like it to mean). In the more detailed account of Plutarch this is couched in the form of an appeal to the guests to pray now for a legitimate heir to the kingdom as issue of the marriage, while in Athenaios it is an undisguised insult: 'Now indeed legitimate princes and not bastards shall be born!' Plutarch has the prince furiously rejoin, 'Do you then take us for bastards?' and hurl a skyphos at Attalos. Athenaios knows of no verbal reply; only that the prince

Badian's view in substance, elaborating on one aspect. R. L. Fox, Alexander the Great (1973) 17ff, does not depart from the main arguments but prefers Olympias to Alexander as the culprit. K. Kraft, Der 'rationale' Alexander (1971) 23ff (on which see Badian, Gnomon 47, 1975, 48ff), disagrees utterly. I did accept the thesis (esp. JHS 91, 1971, 24) but came in my recent work, Philip II & Macedonian Imperialism (1976), Chapter 8 with notes, to express considerable misgivings, although taking a generally less committed view than that expressed in the present paper.

3. For example, Milns p. 28 and Fox p. 503 prefer the literal meaning: cf. Badian, Phoenix 17, 1963, 244, Bosworth p. 102 and Green pp. 88f.

Plut. Alex. 9.4-5
... at the wedding of Kleopatra
... Attalos, in his cups, bade the Macedonians pray for a legitimate successor.
... Alexander replied, 'Do you then take us for bastards?'
... and threw his skyphos at Attalos.
... Philip leapt to his feet with drawn sword
... but tripped and fell
... and Alexander said... etc.

Athenaios 13.557de
... during the wedding
... Attalos said, 'Now legitimate princes and not bastards shall be born!'
... Alexander threw his kylix at Attalos, who threw his poterion back.

Justin 9.7.3-5
... at a banquet
... Alexander quarreled first with Attalos
... and then with Philip

... Philip chased Alexander with his sword...
...Alexander took refuge in Epeiros... and then Alexander went on to the Illyrians.

Now all this seems very Macedonian and very plausible, so that it has been common practice simply to combine useful and flavoursome details from all three accounts into a composite whole. But the points of difference may have significance. Neither Plutarch nor Tragus (Justin) names his authority, but Athenaios is, he says, drawing on the biography of Philip by Satyros, the third-century Peripatetic biographer. Earlier in the same passage this source has listed Philip’s wives and their offspring in an account that while rhetorically adorned and rearranged is fundamentally accurate (see Section II (a) below). But we are not yet in a position to speculate on whether Satyros himself had available any reliable sources contemporary with Philip and Alexander. To identify the authorities used by Trogus/Justin has always proved extremely difficult; the haste, carelessness and tendentiousness of the epitomator has done too much violence to what may have have been a not wholly damnable piece of historiography on Trogus’ part. Likewise, although we know something of Plutarch’s sources for the reign of Alexander we could do no more than guess at his source for this story. But our concern, in any case, is not so much to put a name to sources as to identify their context and interests. To this we shall return, for the moment noting merely that, although Plutarch’s version includes many embellishments that Justin’s does not, these two appear nevertheless to have a common origin. What they, but not Satyros, share is the whole matter of Philip’s implicit association with Attalos’ viewpoint. From Plutarch and Justin we infer that Alexander’s legitimacy was under threat from his own father. In Satyros, in spite of the context of the story, we find only the implication that Philip’s last marriage caused dissen­sion among the members of his family and court. In his version only Attalos is cast, against the young hero, in the villain’s role.

b) Pausanias the assassin

Of the assassination of Philip we possess more or less detailed accounts by Diodoros and Trogus/Justin in addition to a brief reference by Aristotle—

...Olympias fled to the Molossians... and Alexander went on to the Illyrians.

the last datable reference, in fact, in the Politics. This last is to the effect that Philip was killed because he allowed Pausanias, the assassin-to-be, to suffer insult at the hands of Attalos and his friends (Pol. 5.8.10. 1211b2): this among a list of instances demonstrating the author’s contention that attacks on a leader qua person (rather than qua office-bearer) arise out of hubris on the leader’s part. To Aristotle Pausanias acted out of personal motives provoked by Philip’s hubris. (Or does he mean that Pausanias was provoked by Attalos’ hubris, which Philip failed to punish? At any rate, the attack here falls squarely within the category of personal, not political attacks).

In the accounts of Diodoros (16.91.2-93.2) and Justin (9.6-7) we find a good deal more information but also, as we might have expected, a substantial number of discrepancies, which the two are here summarized to demonstrate.

Diodoros 16.91-93

Pausanias, an Orestian bodyguard of the king, was loved by Philip... but became jealous of another man and drove him to suicide in battle.

Attalos, sympathetic to the deceased, abused Pausanias.

Pausanias complained to Philip, who was sympathetic but unwilling to act because of his kinship by marriage with Attalos and because he had appointed him (A.) to the advance-army, and so tried to mollify him (P.) by gifts and advancement. Therefore Pausanias’ anger with Attalos extended also to Philip.

Justin 9.6-7

Pausanias, a noble Macedonian youth, was abused (in his early youth) by Attalos. Pausanias complained to Philip, who was unsympathetic and ridiculed him, adding to his humiliation.

Therefore, especially when Philip appointed Attalos to an advance-army command, Pausanias’ anger was directed against Philip.

Pausanias’ deed was also instigated by Olympias, who resented her divorce and the preferment of Kleopatra, and by Alexander, who feared the rivalry of his stepbrother and so, at a banquet, quarreled with...
Pausanias posted horses for his escape, then... killed Philip, tried to escape but tripped, fell and was caught and himself killed by pursuing bodyguards.

Attalos and then Philip (see ita.), after the flight of Alexander and Olympias they were recalled but reconciled with difficulty to Philip (see also Plutarch Al. 9.6). Olympias urged her (Epeirote) brother to make war on Philip, but he was dissuaded by an offer of marriage to Philip’s daughter Kleopatra. Olympias prepared horses for the escape of Pausanias, who... killed Philip and was himself killed;

...and then Olympias publicly crowned the dead assassin, cremated his body on Philip’s, had a tomb built for him, provided for annual sacrifices to his manes, forced Kleopatra to suicide after first killing her daughter in her lap, and consecrated Pausanias’ sword in her own ‘maiden’ name.

It is at once evident that, for all the dramatic detail, Diodoros relates a much simpler story than Justin. In essence he gives only the version of Aristotle, adding some detail on the origins of the feud between Pausanias and Attalos which in no way affects the substance of the story, together with the explicatory datum that Philip failed to satisfy Pausanias because he found it inexpedient to act against Attalos. In Diodoros and even Aristotle, we may remark, questions of second-degree hubris aside) the guilt appears only secondarily attached to the king or his assassin; the real villain, again, is Attalos. It was through the impropriety of his behaviour that Pausanias was stirred to righteous anger (Diod. 16.93.8f). The subsidiary guilt is shared by Philip, who was at fault in failing to punish him (Aristotle, loc. cit.), and Pausanias (particularly in Diodoros and perhaps implicitly in Aristotle, though the extreme abbreviation makes this unclear), for, in spite of the king’s sympathy and his generous attempts to atone for his general’s delinquency, he nursed his grievance implacably (Diod. 16.93.8f) and fell into the error of seeking undying fame through regicide (Diod. 16.94.1f).

Justin’s treatment begins (9.6.1-8) with an account fundamentally similar, although certainly less detailed and, partly through his omission of ‘Pausanias’ fault in the feud with Attalos and partly through the statement that Philip not only scathingly rejected the young man’s complaint but himself deliberately added to his humiliation, less favourable to the king⁶. But after (like Diodoros but more strongly) making the point that Attalos’ command in the Macedonian advance party, which crossed to Asia Minor in spring 336, particularly compounded Pausanias’ sense of grievance towards the king (9.6.8.1, Justin sets out on a new tack altogether (9.7.1-14). On this we shall shortly follow him.

First, however, it may be noted that with the account of Aristotle we are, for the first time so far, dealing with an indisputably contemporary view. It also ought to be an informed one. He was a close associate of the Macedonian royal family⁷ and may even have been among the guests present in Aigai at the time of the assassination; at any rate, few sources of any period were better placed to know what they were talking about than Aristotle on the Macedonian court.

Diodoros’ source at this point, similar in viewpoint, as we have noticed, to the contemporary Aristotle, appears to be Diyllos, an Athenian. His position, as represented in other passages drawn on by Diodoros, tends to be anti—rather than pro-Macedonian; indeed it is partly on this basis that he has been identified. Son of the Attidographer Phanodemos, who played a prominent role in Athenian civic and political affairs between about 346 and 330, he will have been born in the 350s, and wrote a universal history in 26 books covering the period from 357 (where Ephoros left off) to 297. In spite, then, of a demonstrably anti-Macedonian viewpoint and of the fact that he long outlived the period when it might have been unsafe to reflect unfavourably on Philip or Alexander (if there ever was such a time in Athens), he gives us a version apparently uninfluenced by the extremely strong views that filtered through to Justin. And, almost as much so as Aristotle, he is a genuine contemporary. These two sources have to be taken seriously.

Returning to Justin, we note first that his second line of attack (9.7.1-14), which explicitly links Olympias and even Alexander with the murder, seems

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6. See also Plut. Al. 10.4.
unlikely to derive from a source published in Alexander's lifetime. But, more important, his ultimate authority is not only violently anti-Olympias but so hyperbolically as to forfeit all credibility. While it is at least plausible that Philip's wife and son connived at his death (judicious scholars have believed it), it is totally impossible that Olympias acted publicly in the way this version alleges. Moreover, the conclusion is unavoidable that, whoever (whether Trogus or an earlier source used by him) was responsible for grafting the second version onto the first (at 9.6.8/7.1), the second is entirely from the one source; Olympias' alleged glorification of the dead assassin (which is impossible) is a continuation of her alleged preparations for the murder (9.7.9-11). The story of Attalos' insult sits firmly in the sequence of data comprising this version. The prima facie plausible, it seems, begin to lose credit by their indissoluble association with the incredible.

Secondly, the latter version is not at all favourable to Alexander. Although no attempt is made to implicate him in the worst excesses alleged of his mother, he is nevertheless made her colleague in the instigation of the murderer to his deed. Further, from this account the inference is unavoidable that the king, his father, had rejected Alexander's legitimacy at his successor.

In attempting to trace Justin's ursprüngliche Quelle, then, we need to find circumstances in which unfavourable implications as to Alexander's status were not inexpedient and in which detestation of Olympias, a positive zeal to blacken her name, was extremely pronounced. Such a context is obvious. Antipatros' difficulties with the Queen Mother during his regency for Alexander appear attractive, but not enough. A viewpoint of this sort would fit better at a time when there need be no concern over Alexander's Argead legitimacy. The ideal context presents itself in the struggles of the contenders for Antipatros' position in the aftermath of the old regent's death. In 318/7 Kassandros, his eldest son, won general Macedonian support for his claim and prevailed upon Philip III (or upon his wife Eurydice) to depose Polyperchon (whom Antipatros had nominated) and to elevate him instead. Polyperchon, armed with Alexander's widow, Roxane, and his young son, retired to Epeiros where he won the support of the ageing, but still fiery Olympias, who saw in him her last opportunity to recover her son's throne in his grandson's name. There followed a confrontation, during which Olympias captured Philip III and Eurydice, when they overawed Macedonian throne defection to her, and executed them. When her subsequent massacre of the new regent's supporters was interrupted by Kassandros' approach, Olympias shut herself and her forces in Pydna, where she was besieged and finally captured, tried before the military assembly of the Macedonians and killed by relatives of those she had slaughtered. Her body was even officially refused proper burial. During these months, and I think, only then, when Kassandros' fear and hatred of Olympias reached its peak, when his need to discredit her and her son in the eyes of their remaining supporters was extreme, do we find circumstances exactly fitting those presupposed by Justin's second source.

The story in Justin (9.7.3-5) of the clash between Philip and Alexander (over Attalos' insult) in 337, with which this article began, is, as we have noticed, firmly located in that very context—that is, in a source heavily contaminated with later propaganda irrelevant to the ostensible circumstances. The story itself, we may surmise, might appear fitted for official circulation in the aftermath of Attalos' treason in 335 (see Section I (c)), but what almost certainly disqualifies at least Justin's particular version of it from that milieu is the implication it carries of Alexander's illegitimacy as Philip's successor and, in particular, of Philip's alignment with that imputation. It can hardly square with the new king's interests. The conjecture may be further strengthened. We have already noted that, regarding the insult of Attalos, the versions of Justin and Plutarch, at least, appear to derive from a common source. We have now added that Justin's appears to be associated with the anti-Olympias propaganda before and during Kassandros' reign. It should now be pointed out in addition that as in Justin so (only otherwise) in Plutarch is there the explicit link made between Pausanias, Olympias, and Alexander in the murder of Philip (Plut. Al. 10.4). Not only the anti-Olympias propaganda but also the Philip-versus-Alexander imputation appears late and tendentious. If on that ground we also refuse to grant automatic credit to the notion in Justin and Plutarch that Philip was prepared to repudiate Alexander's legitimacy, we find ourselves left with the testimony of Aristotle and Diyllos, that Pausanias planned the regicide out of personal motives—as well, provisionally, as that of Satyros, whose account of the Alexander/Attalos quarrel (since it does not give Philip's sanction to the charge against his son and his wife) may possibly be considered to derive from a different source and may, therefore, provide independent evidence of a feud between the son and the uncleby-marriage of the king.

c) The alleged treason of Attalos

Among the sources dealing with this affair early in Alexander's reign there is a good deal of telescoping and chronological confusion. The most
appears to have him in mind, noting that Alexander 'put to death all his step-
shortly after Philip's death (23.2). Justin (11.5.1) does not name Attalos but
The attempt by Demosthenes to make contact with Attalos appears to belong
in late summer 336. But at what date this source ended the sequence is another
here, sent to 'the king's generals in Asia') and places its despatch, again,
He had indeed later thought better of it and sent off Demosthenes' letter, with
affirmations of his own devotion, to his master. But Hekataios struck, so re­
moving the last dissident element in the overseas army (17.5.2). The narrative
then turns to Asian affairs, setting out to put Dareios, Alexander's opponent­
to-be, in his proper context (17.5.3-6.3). There follows a brief summary of the
Memnon before Diodoros turns to Alexander's Danubian campaign of spring/
summer 335.

Apart from a number of details that make little sense, at least without
further explanation, the main difficulty here is that since Attalos' defection
and death are treated in the context not of affairs in Asia Minor, where he was,
but of the Athenian attempts in late summer 336 to raise Greece in revolt,
one can have no real confidence in the common inference that the whole
Attalos sequence took place within two or so months of the accession. In view
of Diodoros' standard chronographic practice all we can say is that his source
appears to have begun the story in the immediate aftermath of Philip's death.
The attempt by Demosthenes to make contact with Attalos appears to belong
in late summer 336. But at what date this source ended the sequence is another
matter.

Plutarch in his Life of Demosthenes knows of the letter (actually letters
here, sent to 'the king's generals in Asia') and places its despatch, again,
shortly after Philip's death (23.2). Justin (11.5.1) does not name Attalos but
appears to have him in mind, noting that Alexander 'put to death all his step-
mother's relatives whom Philip had advanced to positions of dignity or military
command'. He also says that this happened 'when Alexander set out for
Asia', and the chronological pointer is of particular interest here, raising for
the first time in the evidence the possibility that although the Athenian over­
tures may have been made in the first weeks of Alexander's reign the king's
counter-move was not completed until late 335 or even early 334. This in fact
(although overlooked, so far as I know, by all but Badian) is clinched by
testimony in Polyainos (5.44.4) that Attalos was still in his command at a
time independently datable to 335, almost certainly after the middle of that
year11. It appears, reasonably enough, that what finally induced the general
to declare his loyalty was the collapse of the revolutionary movement in Greece
on the conquest and destruction of Thebes. When Alexander actually despatched
Hekataios on his mission must remain uncertain, but if the king had
already determined at his accession to eliminate Attalos then he was remark­
ably slow to act.

The alleged treason itself repays examination. In the fearful ructions
following Philip's death there was a concern felt among influential Macedonians
that the difficulties were of too great magnitude to be handled by the
mere youth now occupying the throne. If, as we are told, Alexander was even
advised to abandon Greece in favour of holding, at any rate, the Macedonian
frontiers (Plut. Al. 11.2) then the situation was itself frightening enough to
encourage treason among those well placed in the kingdom; they would leg­
imately have feared that Philip's (and their own) gains would be lost through
Alexander's inexperience. That treachery should flower in such circumstances
is not at all surprising. But what may be stressed is the corollary: that treason
known to have existed at that time may be adequately explained in terms of
its own immediate context. We are not obliged to posit that its seeds had been
planted at an earlier time.

If our chronology is now roughly correct then an answer may be pro­
posed to one most puzzling question. How can Attalos have been so greatly
and fatally mistaken as to believe that his protestations of loyalty would
disarm Alexander? By mid or late 355 other prominent Macedonians, un­
comfortable for one reason or another, were already putting themselves (or
so they hoped) beyond Alexander's reach in the realms of the Persian King12.

12. Such refugees included Amyntas, the son of Antiochus, (Arrian 1.17.9, Diod. 17.48.2,
Curtius 3.11.18, Plut. Al. 20) and Aristomedes the Pheraian (Arrian 2.11.2); on the likely
date see Badian (loc. cit. in n. 11) p. 42, Ellis, JHS 91, 1971, 20f and Section II (c), below.
But Attalos did not join them; instead he threw himself on the king’s mercy. Now native he was if we judge by the result, but we can hardly assume that he was insane. From his vantage-point it must have looked likely that his warranties would be believed and accepted. The first consequence of that inference is that he is virtually proven innocent of having ‘actually set his hand to treason’; had he done so his only salvation lay in flight and he can hardly have failed to know it. His crime, it seems, was not one of commission and accordingly no source can point to any specific delinquency. Rather, first, he had erred at most in delaying his declaration, presumably (given our chronology) for a year or more; secondly he had failed to recognize Alexander’s own sense of insecurity at this critical time (on which a little more will be said below). It must have been demonstrable, that is to say, that Attalos had not actually turned his hand, as Diodoros says, against the king. But he had perhaps kept that option open for too long for his own safety.

There is a second consequence of his admission: he surely can not have suspected that there were reasons for the king to procure his death, however innocent he might be of recent treason. To have staked his life (when an alternative was available) on the benevolence of a man he had openly and grievously insulted, in a way that itself amounted to treason, whom he had even driven (or on whose behalf he had driven others) to regicide, is just not credible. This man who pleaded innocent of treason neither was technically guilty of it nor had irremediably prejudiced the king against himself in advance.

The account in Athenaios/Satyros of Attalos’ insult, provisionally retained as apparently uncontaminated by later libel, must also, it seems, be abandoned. It may be that Satyros, while expurgating its more improbable elements, failed to recognize that the residue too was a product of Kassandrian propaganda. But it seems more likely that the elemental story in fact took its origins from the circumstances of 335/4, when Alexander had Attalos killed on what and for a quite different purpose, further details had become attached, and in exact that purpose). It could of course contain no hint that Philip had entered - Attalos, perhaps, had not been so wrong. This, I suggest then, is the probable Ur-source of the story of Attalos’ insult, found in that original form by Satyros some decades later. Meanwhile, twenty years after Attalos’ liquidation and for a quite different purpose, further details had become attached, and in that embroidered state it bypassed Satyros to reach Trogus and Plutarch.

I. THE WIVES AND CHILDREN OF PHILIP

a) The list of Satyros

Philip was always married for military purposes. In the twenty-two years of his reign, as Satyros says in his Life of him, he married Audata the Illyrian and had from her a daughter Kynna; and he married Phila, the sister of Derdas and Machatas. Wishing to commandeer the Thessalian nation he had children by two Thessalian women, one the Phthiotic Nikeipolis, who bore him Thessalonike, the other the Larissian Philonna, from whom he had Aridaios. He also acquired the Molossian kingdom by marrying Olympias, from whom he had Alexander and Kleopatra. When he took Thrace the Thracian king Kothelas joined him, bringing his daughter Meda and a substantial dowry. By marrying her he brought her in besides Olympias. Then, after all these, he married Kleopatra, sister of Hippostratos and niece of Attalos; and by bringing her in besides Olympias he affected his whole life. For immediately, during the wedding itself...[the story of Attalos’ insult follows]...And Kleopatra bore Philip a daughter named Europe.

Athen. 13.557bcd

Satyros was no historian. This passage is intended not only to provide a list of Philip’s wives and children but also to illustrate its opening bon mot. Those words appear to come from Satyros himself (either that or Athenaios has reworked the list to fit his own observation) and are borne out aptly, but not quite exactly, by what follows.

The Audata-marriage, the first mentioned, is paradigmatic. It may have been Philip’s first but there is some reason for suspecting otherwise; and, given that the list could scarcely begin with a datum that did not exemplify its opening generalization Audata’s primacy in the list can not be taken as an absolute guarantee of it in fact—especially when, as we shall see, there is a

13. I have already discussed this passage, in rather less detail, in Philip II & Mac. Imp. 211ff.
quite glaring case of anachronism to follow. The second wife listed, but perhaps the first married, Phila, is merely named and identified; she clearly did not fit the pattern and so was included for completeness (a pointer perhaps to Satyros’ fundamental reliability on this subject) but quickly passed over. But with the chain broken, so to speak, Satyros evidently feels the need to reinforce his theme and so stresses that the next two women listed were acquired for the purpose of getting control of Thessaly. Nikesipolis, whose own name is eminently appropriate, bore Philip a daughter whose name even better maintains the theme of the passage. It must be for this reason, since the difficulty was to follow the non-military case of Phila, that the author has put Nikesipolis (who was married no earlier than 352) before Olympias as well as her own compatriot, which is in both instances, if effective, incorrect. The case of Philinna, while it may be germane to the theme (we do not know the precise circumstances of her marriage, probably in 358, but it was likely contracted to seal an alliance with the Aleuad house of Larisa and contributed to the close bonds with and eventual control over the Thessalian Koinon which Philip was able to contrive), simply does not look so impressive, and so was moved down the list. With Olympias the Molossian kingdom is ‘acquired’ with Meda so is the ‘Thracian’. (In this latter, in fact, Satyros is misleading, but only to the extent that Kothelas was properly Getic, not Thracian) At this point the author appears to acknowledge that he has been playing somewhat fast and loose with the chronology for he emphasizes for the first time that Olympias and Meda are in the correct order; this he repeats with Kleopatra, in both cases by means of the verb ἐπείσαγειν. We are hence also entitled to hold that Meda and Kleopatra were not necessarily the only wives to follow Olympias, that someone else may have been advanced in the queue for particular reasons—and of Nikesipolis, as we have noticed, this is true. With Kleopatra, clearly a negative instance of the martial theme, the continuity of the passage is lost and, as if in acknowledgement, the author changes the subject to dilate on the effect of her marriage on Philip’s affairs.

While we may concede that Satyros has taken liberties with his chronology, we must nevertheless conclude, from his own indications, that he has done so wittily and not in ignorance of the truth. (This should apply equally in the event that it was Athenaios who reworked Satyros’ passage to illustrate an observation of his own). There is then the minor slip over Kothelas’ ethnic and there is the miscalculation of the length of Philip’s reign, which lasted nearer twenty-four than twenty-two years. Otherwise, only one challenge has been made against Satyros’ accuracy.

Attempts have been made in ancient and modern times to manufacture a third and last son for Philip, one Karanos, son of Kleopatra. These, in spite of two recent revivals, have not been successful. The best chronological indications available to us allow time for Kleopatra to produce only one child of the king, at any rate before his death. It is not possible that the marriage was celebrated before the spring of 337; the only conceivable movement in its date would be downwards. Neither is it plausible to assume (a desperate expedient) that the girl was already pregnant to Philip several months before her marriage. By July 336 only one pregnancy can have run to term; and, according to one source (Diod. 17.2.3), ‘a child (paidion) was born to Philip only a few days before his death’. It may appear strange that the sex is not given here, but it is less so in view of the fact that Diodoros has just mentioned that Alexander, after his accession, planned to kill Attalos (whom he calls Kleopatra’s ‘brother’) because he saw in him a rival for the throne (Section I (c), above). Nevertheless, there is admittedly a good deal of confusion in the sources. It is Justin who names ‘Caranus’, the ‘brother of Alexander by his stepmother’ as a rival for the throne (11.2.3, of 9.7.3; see also 12.6.14, Paus. 8.7.7); but elsewhere he has Olympias killing Kleopatra’s daughter (9.7.12). With such data no conviction can be held without qualification, perhaps, but we may note, at the least, that the main point of implicit agreement is that Kleopatra bore only one child. Even Justin, who has both male and female, never mentions both together; and, since his references are hopelessly confused and his account likely contaminated by the same anti-Olympias and anti-Alexander propaganda as we have noted in these and other passages, there seems no justification for crediting him over Satyros.

16. Before mid-352, when Philip first captured Pherai, such a marriage was hardly possible: Ehrhardt, CQ 17, 1967, 296ff.
17. Griffith, loc. cit. in n. 15.
18. Olympias was married to Philip at some time in 357. (Alexander was born in summer/autumn 356; Hamilton, Plat. Al. Comm. 7).
19. Steph. Byz., s. ‘Getia’, Jordanus, Getica 10. The marriage must have been arranged during Philip’s final Thracian campaign of 342-339, probably near the beginning.
21. Green pp. 87ff dates the marriage to autumn 338, at which time Philip was settling Central Greek and Peloponnesian affairs prior to the convention of the Hellenic League at Korinth in the winter and spring (for the date see Wilcken, SB München 1917, 20ff). After that the king returned home (Diod. 16.89.3); thus in the spring, at the earliest.
22. Fox p. 503 dates the marriage to spring 337 but wonders whether Kleopatra was already pregnant to Philip. The same objection applies as to Green’s date for the marriage (n. 21).
I have noted elsewhere my own and others' observations as to the likely dates for Philip's marriages and the births of their products, and repeat here, against Satyros' list, what seems the likely chronology.

Satyros' List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WIVES</th>
<th>CHILDREN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Audata, 359</td>
<td>Kymina (b. 359-356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phila, 359/8 (or pre-359)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikesispolis, 358</td>
<td>Aridaios (b. 357-354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philina, Olympias, 357</td>
<td>Alexander (b. 356), Kleopatra (b. 355-352)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikesispolis, 352</td>
<td>Thessalonike (b. 351-348)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meda, 342</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kleopatra, 337</td>
<td>Europe (b. 336)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There remains one general problem with Satyros' list. Is a distinction intended between wives proper and other women, concubines or whatever? I think not. I have argued that Satyros' evidence, so far as we can test it, is in all essentials reliable, which means that, failing other evidence (which does indeed fail), we have either to take him at his word or to resort to our own prejudices. The crux, of course, is that while of five of these liaisons he uses one or other inflexion of the verb 'to marry', from the two Thessalians: and it seems to be this (though I have almost nowhere found it stated explicitly) that has led scholars to separate wives and 'concubines'.

But further examination repays the effort, for there is in fact another of whom the verb 'to marry' is not used in this author's normal way. 'When [Philip] took Thrace the Thracian king Kothelas joined him, bringing his daughter Meda and a substantial dowry'. We have already noticed that at this point in his list Satyros evidently felt the need to reassure his readers that Philip happened to mention that the king was now, as not earlier, working chronologically, and it is only incidentally, in the course of establishing that fact, that he happens to mention that the marriage of Meda was indeed a marriage: 'by marrying her he brought her in besides (or 'added her to') Olympias'. In other words, in compiling his list of marriages (Philip married for military purposes), he does not feel himself obliged to repeat the same verb every time. Meda's was a marriage, but this is made explicit only for a reason that does not apply in the case of the two Thessalian women, of whose acquisition he also uses a different form of wording. Further, I have already suggested that the Nikesispolis-marriage was advanced out of its proper place in the order because of its especially neat correspondence with the guiding theme of the passage. In that case it would seem improbable that Satyros expected his readers to take it as something other than a marriage. If, as it seems, he needed at that point to reassure the original theme, weakened by the unavoidably negative instance of Phila, he need not, after all, have done so with Nikesispolis. He could instead have simply reversed the proper order of Philinna and Olympias, advancing the latter to the demonstrative role played in the passage by Nikesispolis, retaining the grouping of the two Thessalinas and doing less violence to their correct places in the relative order: that he did not argue that he saw in the Nikesispolis-marriage a perfect instance of the generalization. If we wish to claim that Philinna and Nikesispolis were mere concubines we certainly cannot do so on the basis of Satyros' choice of words. He did no more than vary his phraseology to temper the monotony of a list that was by its nature repetitive.

The point might be strengthened by arguing on the basis of Philip's diplomatic needs. Arguably the least important marriage was that with Phila, probably contracted exclusively to give him an ally to the north of Thrace against which he could crush those tribes of the interior that would give him trouble in the great Thracian campaign of 342-340. Yet she became, according to Satyros, his wife. Can he have offered less to the Larissian, the bonds with whose family were so vital for and so productive in his relations with his southern neighbour? And that at a much earlier date, when firm and reliable alliances were desperately necessary to his efforts to consolidate the Macedonian frontiers! Philip may have had concubines and mistresses, but what Satyros gives us is a list of his wives.

b) Aridaios the son of Philina

There is a fair possibility that Alexander the Great was not the elder of Philip's two sons. The best date for the marriage of Aridaios' mother seems to be 358, a year before the king formed with Arybbas of Epeiros the alliance sealed by his marriage to the Molossian's niece and ward, Olympias.

23. See my Philip II & Mac. Imp. esp. pp. 46ff. 61f, 84ff, 166ff, 21ff with notes.
24. Green p. 515 n. 55 is the exception.
Of course the relative order of the marriages does not alone prove Philinna's son to have been born before Alexander. But it does raise that possibility.

We know that Aridaios was simple-minded: we are told it, some such explanation is needed to make sense of the young man's survival through the tempestuous first years of Alexander's reign, and it is always understood in the tortuous circumstances existing after the latter's death without heir\textsuperscript{27}. We have more cause to doubt the additional datum that the prince's mental deficiency was brought about by some drug fed him by Olympias, which may be no more than a product of the propaganda manufactured against the old queen in the last year or so of her life. Indeed, since the information appears in Plutarch's \textit{Alexander} (77.5), which, as we have seen, contains distinct traces of the anti-Olympias source, that seems very likely; like the data already discussed, this exhibits the two characteristics that it denigrates Olympias primarily but that it also shows no concern (as we shall see) over the unfavourable implications this has for Alexander's status.

But while for that reason we need not give it serious credence, we are obliged to question, as with any deliberate libel, the basis on which its credibility should rest. This may admittedly be only that Macedonians in 317/6 knew well of Aridaios' incapacity, perhaps remembered that he was not born with it and might be persuaded to believe that Olympias, about whom far worse was circulating, was capable of having criminally caused it. But the most obvious motive to attach to Alexander's mother in this matter was that she acted out of overreaching ambition for her own son. For such a libel to be believed, that is to imply, people ought to have found it plausible that Aridaios had been a genuine competitor of the son of Olympias— that, in other words, Philip's third wife was as inherently capable of bearing the heir as his fourth (or his twenty-fourth), and that Aridaios was older than Alexander.

Now Aridaios (as Philip III) did follow Alexander onto the throne, and this may only be because, despite his handicap, the alternatives (even, eventually, the infant Alexander IV) were even less satisfactory. Certainly the fact of his accession does not by itself prove that Aridaios' regal qualifications were ideal (though it allows that as a probability). But neither does the order of their accessions prove anything as to their relative ages, for, given that during Philip's reign a perfectly good reserve candidate was at hand, it may well be that when Aridaios' deficiency was recognized (or achieved) Alexander was simply elevated into his place. At any rate there is no positive reason to infer from the passing over of Aridaios by Philip that his mother's status was lower than that of Olympias, and there is some reason to wonder whether her son would actually have been Philip's successor had he been capable. If that were not so, then the alleged intervention by Olympias would be, if true, less easily explicable and, if false, a pointless libel.

c) Olympias and Kleopatra

It seems difficult to deny that we are dealing with a straightforward polygamous situation. Even with Olympias, unfortunately, we have no good evidence of her standing in Philip's court. Her few appearances in the sources for his reign— almost wholly in later authors— are arguably only consequent upon the role she played as Queen Mother during Alexander's reign, especially during his absence in the east, and most of all upon the more directly political part she played in her own right after his death. Wives (as distinct from mothers), were, we ought to expect, of no particular significance except insofar as they bore the king sons or, less important, daughters. The former would include the heir presumptive, as well as reserves in case of his death and, no doubt, high and occasionally trustworthy officials of state; the latter might serve the same function as their mothers before them. The fact (and only this fact) that she had produced the natural heir would give one wife a superior status. Olympias, I suggest, was not married as the chief of Philip's wives, as his 'queen': she was, after all, married for the same reason as most of the others, and the diplomatic interests behind her marriage can hardly be seen as more pressing than those behind several of the others. Instead she became Philip's 'queen' either when she bore him his first son or, if Alexander was not the first, when it was realized that his elder brother was incapable of succeeding Philip on the throne.

Satiros' list, then, so far as we can tell, both essentially accurate (except for the matter of order) and complete (provided that we refuse to disinter Karanos), should give us, if we can date or at least order its marriages, a succession of women married largely for reasons of external or internal diplomacy but thereafter deriving their main (if not sole) importance from their

\textsuperscript{27} References in Berve \textit{loc. cit.}. \textsuperscript{28} The only pre-Hellenistic source known to me is Aischines 3.223, referring to some date in the late 340s (see Demosthenes 18.136f), and preserving nothing of significance.
regenerative success and whose place in any court hierarchy was determined solely by the degree of such success.

This being so, we may be confident that Olympias was already Philip's wife (among others, we may suppose, although it is just possible that all of the earlier three had died) when he married Nikesipolis, who bore him only a daughter, and then Melea, who had even less success. There is certainly no evidence even to hint that Olympias left her position, or her son's threatened in 352 or 342 (although, since neither marriage did, as things happened, produce any conceivable threat, we ought not perhaps to expect much)29. But we are asked to believe that she was driven by the marriage of 337—the mere marriage, not even the birth of a future pretender—to recede.

The allegation that Olympias was in some sense 'divorced' is easily disposed of. Justin (9.5.9, 9.7.2, 11.11.3) alone makes it, and his evidence is unacceptable for two general reasons. First, he is the author most heavily contaminated by the anti-Olympias source already identified and consistently represents her alleged role in and after Philip's death as her crazed response to the frustration of her own and her son's ambitions. Secondly he intrudes (where no other source does) the notion of 'divorce' clearly because he thinks the only way open to Philip of taking a new wife is by first divorcing the last. (Compare 7.5.5, on Amyntas III's wives, and 11.2.3, 9.8.3 is too vague to help here.) Thus in account of Alexander's visit to the oracle at Siwah he has the king enquiring 'inter alia' of his ownaternity and of Olympias ‘divorce for adultery’ (11.1.11). But this is merely Trogus' misconception at work, as the accounts of Arrian (3.3.2), Diodoros (17.51.3) and Curtius (4.7.27ff) make clear: the belief was that Alexander was concerned with the divinity of his lineage, not the legitimacy of his conception. We have no good reason for believing that Olympias was divorced, nor that as a consequence she left the court or the country (see also Section IV).

For the first six marriages it is very easy to infer diplomatic motives (if 'internal' in the case of the Upper Macedonian Phila) and, presumably because no such motive for the Kleopatra-marriage suggests itself (thus some have represented it as an autumnal love-match on the king's part)30, it is understandable that critical modern scholars should seek to find it in the area of court politics. But there is a simple yet powerful alternative. While Philip had amassed a forbidding battery of wives, their endeavour (and his) had been remarkably unfruitful: no more than four daughters and, much worse, a mere two sons, of whom only one had much promise.

Much of the king's energy over two decades and more had gone into the making of Macedonia a politically, militarily and economically stable state; and over the past decade he had devoted painstaking care to producing a settlement with the Greek states sufficiently viable to allow the Asian campaign to proceed without the prospect of an explosive rebellion once the Macedonian expeditionary army was out of easy reach or suffered some setback31. With the settlement at Korinth in winter 338/7 the time for the campaign had almost arrived. It would doubtless extend over several years, however, and would involve many dangers, not least to the king himself. The odds that any Macedonian king would die in his bed were in any case markedly short, but in Philip's case they were about to shrink even further. With him into Asia would certainly go his heir, as he had done on the recent Greek campaign. Both would be at high risk—and so, consequently, would be the stability of the kingdom. Should Philip die, Alexander was ready and trained to fill his shoes (and even that, as events were soon to show, was disruptive enough of Philip's arrangements). But should both die there was serious cause to fear for the safety of the kingdom and its royal house. For this reason, undoubtedly, Philip arranged the marriages of Amyntas, his nephew, to Kyne, his eldest daughter (Arrian, suce. Al. 22; Polyain. Str. 8.60). Should the worst happen in Asia, this man would be the only immediate choice for king—or, if the army were to insist upon Aridaios, his regent would at least be his nearest male relative. In the longer term, however, Philip might provide himself with more sons, including, ultimately and if necessary, a 'second-string' heir. He needed to marry again, that is, for the eminently practical reason that he was deficient in sons when there might be little time left to make the deficiency good. (The Temenidai themselves, it is worth remembering, had retained the throne as late as 337 only because Amyntas III had produced enough sons to continue replacing the prematurely deceased and the [right] When Philip married Kleopatra, that is to suggest, he did so for reasons which posed no threat to Alexander—or, what was probably contingent upon that, to Olympias.

29. There is a late tradition that Nikesipolis died three weeks after the birth of Thesalonike (Steph. Byz. n. 'Thessalonike').
30. Plut. Al. 9.4: Philip had 'fallen in love par' hellanikon with the girl'. How (since the king was only forty-six years old and far from his dotage) should we interpret the mild censure? Should he have been past falling in love or just past marrying for so frivolous a reason? Compare also Beloch, Gr. Gesch. 3 III 1, 665, Berve, Das Alexanderreich 1 p. 434.
31. I have argued elsewhere (Archaia Makedonia ii and Philip II & Mac. Imp., esp. 232ff) that the Peace of Philocrates was intended by Philip to allow what the settlement of Greece in 338/7 did make possible: the king's virtual withdrawal from active participation in Greek mainland affairs.
There does remain, perhaps, some question as to the reasons for Philip’s choice. Wife he needed, one young and strong enough to bear healthy sons; but why Kleopatra, niece and ward of Attalos—himself soon to be, if not already son-in-law of the powerful Parmenion (Curtius 6.9.18)? (Attalos too, who was evidently without heir, decided to follow the king’s example in providing for the future, it seems). The first answer in Why not? The king must marry. For the first time (or perhaps the second, depending on the irretrievable circumstances of the Phila-marriage more than two decades earlier) the connection was not of necessity governed by international considerations. The smoothness with which affairs had gone so shortly before at Korinth had seen a fitting close to what Philip could well assure himself was a phase of his reign that need not be relived. The Balkan peninsula was now substantially settled. He himself had no further need of foreign wives; rather, for the future, he had his own daughters to offer to kings whose alliances he found expedient—as to his Epeirote cousin a year later. For Philip, therefore, it did not matter what nationality he sought in his next (and not necessarily last) wife, but at present there was at any rate no compulsion to prefer a non-Macedonian. His wife-to-be must be of marriageable age but unmarried; she ought to be of a status befitting the honour; she might appropriately be the daughter (or ward) of a trusted, loyal and successful friend. The range of choice can not have been large, and we are not obliged to find anything sinister in the selection of Kleopatra. Neither, I suspect, was Olympias.

Although our sources seem less than confident, it is most likely that Kleopatra was the niece of Attalos; evidently her own father was dead and her uncle was her guardian. Her brother Hippostratos, beyond his mere name, is quite unknown to us, but, whatever his age, he presumably did not survive Alexander’s purge of his family (see below). Of the provenance of Attalos we are likewise ignorant, but it has been inferred by dangerously circular reasoning that he was Lower Macedonian. His wife-to-be must be of marriageable age but unmarried; she ought to be of a status befitting the honour; she might appropriately be the daughter (or ward) of a trusted, loyal and successful friend. The range of choice can not have been large, and we are not obliged to find anything sinister in the selection of Kleopatra. Neither, I suspect, was Olympias.

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Attalos married, somewhere near the end of Philip’s reign, a daughter of Parmenion. The latter’s own provenance is at best conjectural, but if we can say anything at all it is that he was himself more than likely Upper Macedonian, possibly even of the royalty that had ruled the principedom of Pelagonia before its incorporation by Philip into the Macedonian kingdom. Philip’s assassin was Upper Macedonian (from Orestis), as were at least two of the three named bodyguards said to have killed the killer. Whether or not a lowland/upland conspiracy behind Philip’s death is theoretically plausible, it is certainly not supported by the evidence. And, even if by some international transposition we agreed to regard Olympias as an honorary Upper Macedonian, it is doubtful, given the polygamous nature of Philip’s marriages, whether it would follow that Alexander, as Philip’s son, was regarded as less than Macedonian. Further, it requires a certain effort of the imagination to picture a deputation of lowland nobles complaining of the dilute blood of the heir to a king as much Illyrian as his son was Molossian. The scenario might as least provide a moderately testing exercise in self-expression for a class of foreign service cadets. Whatever we are to make of Attalo’s alleged jibe at the ‘legitimacy’ of Alexander (if indeed we should.

32. She is called variously the niece, the sister and even the aunt of Attalos (references in Berve, Das Alexanderreich II p. 213 n. 4).
33. His existence is attested for certain only in Satyros ap. Athenaios 13.557d (Section II (a), above) and he presumably died in 335/4 (Justin 11.5.1, Section I (c), above). There is no particular reason for identifying him with the Hippostratos who fell in Illyria in 345: Did. in Dem. 12.646f.
35. Bosworth, loc. cit. lnn. 34.
36. Strabo (7.7.8, c. 326, 9.5.11, c. 434, and cf. FGH F107) believed in a kinship of blood, which, as Bosworth p. 98 shows, is unacceptable; but, on the sole basis (1 discount Thuc. 2.80.6, which is worthless) of the appearance of an Orestian and a Parauanian among the synarchontes named in a fourth-century document of the Molossian koinon. Bosworth proceeds to construct a theory that Upper Macedonians and Epeirotes were somehow regarded indiscriminately, at least by Lower Macedonians, as one and the same (pp. 98ff).
37. Professor Edson has suggested (in a paper unpublished, so far as I know) that IG II/III 1, 190 (on which see Wilhelm, Beitr. z. griech. Inschriftenkunde 275) may name Parmenion as king of the Pelagonians (11.4-5); and that, while that can be little more than an educated guess, the literary evidence in any case favours an Upper Macedonian identification for the family. In 335 a Philotas commanded the Upper Macedonian cavalry (Arrian 1.2.5), which ought to mean that he was himself from that area (Curtius 3.2.6). Of his identity we cannot be absolutely certain, but only months later Philotas, the son of Parmenion, was in command of the entire Companion Cavalry (Arrian 1.14.1, Diod. 17.17.4).
38. Pausanias: Dion. 16.93.3. For the bodyguards, Leonnatos (Orestes? Lynkos?), Attalos (possibly Tymphaia) and Perdikkas (Orestis), see Berve, Das Alexanderreich II Nos 466, 181 (? see p. 232 n. 2) and 627.
By that time, Alexander had won considerable success in dealing with the Greek problems consequent upon Philip’s death. Macedonian confidence in him must have been on the rise and he could now afford to take some steps that might have been dangerously unpopular and open to misinterpretation a year before. His major challenge still lay before him: to demonstrate to friend and friend alike that he could command the coming crusade with the same distinction as might have been expected in his father. So he did, in the event, but in prospect he had to reckon with the possibility of early setbacks and, in that case, another eruption of the discontent of late 336 in Macedonia. Against that event there were only two defences: most importantly, to win and continue winning once the war began; but as insurance he might cannily remove the potential foc of opposition at home. For this reason he did not accept Attalos’ assurances, though that hapless man thought he would, and for this reason he wiped out the remnants of the family: Kleopatra, Europe, presumably Hippostratos and perhaps others. It was probably at this same time too that the king’s cousin Amyntas was killed. It was no time, with the heir of Philip preparing for his supreme test, to leave the kinsmen of Philip (by milk or by marriage) able to capitalise on his failure.

II. PHILIP AND ALEXANDER

a) Alexander, Parmenion and Antipatros

The assumption that the Kleopatra-marriage posed a threat to Olympias, I have argued, is at the very least dubious. Her position depended on that of her son; and his position, on grounds of birth, possibly of age and certainly of health and training, was for the time being, if not for the rest of his life, unassailable. If, I suppose, Kleopatra had produced a son and that before her husband’s death or acceptably soon after then one might argue that Alexander’s succession had come under threat. But Kleopatra produced no son, might never do so and, even if she did, would need to see that infant protected for a long time in a harsh environment before she could give him any reason to doubt his ability. By that time, Alexander had won considerable success in dealing with the Greek problems consequent upon Philip’s death. Macedonian confidence in him must have been on the rise and he could now afford to take some steps that might have been dangerously unpopular and open to misinterpretation a year before. His major challenge still lay before him: to demonstrate to friend and friend alike that he could command the coming crusade with the same distinction as might have been expected in his father. So he did, in the event, but in prospect he had to reckon with the possibility of early setbacks and, in that case, another eruption of the discontent of late 336 in Macedonia. Against that event there were only two defences: most importantly, to win and continue winning once the war began; but as insurance he might cannily remove the potential foc of opposition at home. For this reason he did not accept Attalos’ assurances, though that hapless man thought he would, and for this reason he wiped out the remnants of the family: Kleopatra, Europe, presumably Hippostratos and perhaps others. It was probably at this same time too that the king’s cousin Amyntas was killed. It was no time, with the heir of Philip preparing for his supreme test, to leave the kinsmen of Philip (by milk or by marriage) able to capitalise on his failure.
for his coming campaign, the suggestion that he should decide almost on the eve of his departure, to hazard on such a dim and distant possibility all his hard-won achievements by disrupting the stability of his court is very difficult to credit.

If we can agree to abandon the assumption that the Kleopatra-marriage by its very nature threatened Alexander then a number of related and contingent assumptions become (at least) open to question. The marriage of Attalos to Parmenion’s daughter has been taken to imply an alignment directed against the Crown Prince[34]. But the suggestion would not seriously be made unless Alexander’s own position were thought to have been in some sort of doubt: and I have suggested, as a perfectly reasonable motive for Attalos, that he too, apparently without sons, ought to have taken thought for the future. It might be held that the marriage suggests the emergence of a faction pressing its own advantage at the expense of Philip’s other (than Parmenion) most highly placed officer, Antipatros[44]. But in the absence of evidence this is a very long shot. There is no reason to suspect that the fate of either Parmenion or Antipatros was any less promising than his past. Both were of the highest standing, were clearly respected and trusted by the king and were given by him the weightiest responsibilities. Interestingly, they tended to operate in complementary rather than competitive areas, Antipatros in the gubernatorial and diplomatic, Parmenion in the military. Each could look to the coming campaign to serve his interests well—as, in spite of Philip’s death, so it did, at least at the beginning.

Regarding the proposed involvement of Antipatros in the murder of Philip: since what he obtained after Philip’s death, the regency of Macedonia in Alexander’s absence, was exactly what, on the basis of all previous indications, he could have expected to get in Philip’s[42], the only conceivable motive accessible to us is that he feared his position was being undermined. But the marriage of Attalos, the only possible evidence for such a contention, need have no such rationalization: unless we already have reason for suspecting friction here there is no reason for reading sinister implications into it.

The relationship between Alexander and Parmenion, whatever its nature in 336, certainly soured during the next few years before the murder of the latter in 330. But to explain the events of 330 we do not need to go back to those of 336. They may easily be elucidated in terms of the insecurities of the young king struggling to assert his own authority against the stature of a man who had been commanding Philip’s armies—as indeed this was still Philip’s army—before Alexander’s birth. Such a reconstruction is no more—and perhaps even less—difficult to credit than to agree (as we know was true) that Antipatros and Alexander came eventually to mistrust each other even though they had begun the reign in especially close interdependence. Similarly, as I have argued, the treason (or rather the contemplation of treason) indulged in by Attalos may quite naturally arise out of the circumstances following, not preceding, the accession of Alexander[43]. I do not mean, of course, to suggest that the court of Philip was free of tensions and friction: it would be surprising if it were. Rather, I believe that these particular later events quite naturally find their context in later circumstances.

b) The Lynkestians

Immediately after the deaths of Philip and Pausanias, it seems, two members of the Lynkestian nobility (and possibly royalty) were seized and executed as accessories in the regicide[44]. A third brother, Alexandros, who was the son-in-law of Antipatros, was (so it was later said) suspected of complicating matters. He was the first, or among the first, to salute Alexander as the new king, donned his armour and escorted him into the army—before Alexander’s birth. Such a reconstruction is no more—and perhaps even less—difficult to credit than to agree (as we know was true) that Antipatros and Alexander came eventually to mistrust each other even though they had begun the reign in especially close interdependence. Similarly, as I have argued, the treason (or rather the contemplation of treason) indulged in by Attalos may quite naturally arise out of the circumstances following, not preceding, the accession of Alexander[43]. I do not mean, of course, to suggest that the court of Philip was free of tensions and friction: it would be surprising if it were. Rather, I believe that these particular later events quite naturally find their context in later circumstances.

40. Badian, Phoenix 17, 1963, 245.
41. ibid., 247. Badian also suggests that Antipatros resented Philip’s ‘divine aspirations’ (since he later resented Alexander’s: Suda, S. ‘Antipatros’, Badian, JHS 81, 1961, 16ff) as implied in the alleged display of a statue of the king with the Twelve Olympians at the marriage (Diod. 16.925, 95.1, with Clem. Al. Protr. 10.36ff. Lucian, Dial. Mort. 13.2). I have elsewhere discussed the question of Philip’s ‘divinity’ (Philip II & Mac. /&; 506 n. 248; following the argument of R. Curn, Philip II & Mac. &; the City-State, diss. Columbia 1966, 240ff, that Diodorus’s evidence is the invention of Hellenistic rhetoric. There may have been cults of Philip, but that is rather different from Philip’s regarding himself as a god, or requiring others to do so. Green pp. 81ff has revived the old argument from the statues in the Olympic Phillipion (Paus. 5:25:29), but, as was pointed out forty years ago by Monnigiano (Filippo il Macedone 153), that building was erected years after Philip’s death, probably late in Alexander’s reign, and as a treasury, not a sanctuary.
42. See Berve, Die Alexandrerrreich ii No. 94 for Antipatros’ early career, including his regency during Philip’s absence on the Thasian campaign beginning in 342. When the young Alexander later became regent, Antipatros (although evidently absent at times on emergency commands: Theopompos, FGI 115 F 217, F. Schachermeyer, Alex. 9 n. 74) continued as his adviser, as Isokrates’ fourth letter implies.
43. I do not dispute Badian’s interpretation of the growing tension between Alexander and Parmenion that resulted in the latter’s murder in 330 (JAPA 91, 1960, 324ff, AULMA 17, 1962, 307f = Badian, Studies in G. & R. Hist. 192ff), but merely argue that the enmities manifested in the relationship between the youthful king and many of the pre-Philipian nobles were the product of Alexander’s reign, and not Philip’s.
44. Arr. 1.23.1, Justin 11.2.1, Diod. 17.2.1, Phut. 43.10.8; perhaps also P.Oxy. 1799 — FGI 149 (on which see Bosworth, CJ 21, 1971, 93ff but also Green p. 524 n. 65).
palace at Aigai. These events have been held to suggest that Alexander sought scapegoats to distract attention from his own involvement, or from those who had been involved on his behalf. As Badian most succinctly put it, ‘...the two brothers who were supposed to have procured Philip’s assassination were taken entirely by surprise by the course of events... while the third brother was obviously well prepared for what happened... and [he] was Antipatros’ son-in-law’.

Even if such an implication were admitted, we could not go on automatically to infer from it that Alexander was himself guilty. As the apparent beneficiary he was no doubt aware of the conclusions, just or not, that some of his subjects might draw unless he were to distract their attention. But further points may be made. To say that two of the brothers were taken by surprise (which is critical to the implicit argument) is to go beyond the evidence. All we know is that they were taken more or less straight away, which is hardly by itself proof of their innocence. (We might assume, on the contrary, that they were captured while contriving that the sequel to a murder they had engineered went according to plan.) To say that Alexandros was well prepared again represents a step beyond the evidence; all we know is that he did what any quickwitted, opportunistic and ambitious (or even loyal) officer ought in the circumstances.

I do not suggest that we can confine ourselves to what is explicit in our sources, but merely stress the obvious, that one’s interpretation of the implicit must depend heavily on prior assumptions. It seems equally plausible, prima facie, that Heromenes and Arrhabaios were involved and that Alexandros, taking better precautions (and in any case better insured through his marriage connection with Antipatros) quickly acted to protect himself. Alternatively, he was innocent but acted loyally and intelligently. After all, if it is plausible (as Badian implies) that he was involved but his brothers not, then in principle it should be equally allowable that his brothers were and he not, which is on the face of it what the evidence says. One might even imagine a third general possibility: that the three were innocent but that two exhibited, as Upper Macedonians, more elation than was prudent at such a time. But so far as their execution is concerned on the assumption that Alexander himself was innocent of the assassination, it is likely enough that he feared that those apparently guilty would want him dead next after Philip; to have removed promptly those he saw as ringleaders is understandable.

45. Arrian 1.25, Curtius 7.1.6f, Justin 11.2.1f, Ps-Kallisth. 1.26. The last-named says that Antipatros presented Alexander to the army for acclamation as king.

However, speculations aside, there is at least a consistent element in the evidence to suggest the complicity of these brothers. There is first the reference by Plutarch (de fort. Al. 1.3, 327c) to highly inflated feelings among the Macedonians: ‘all Macedonia was festering and looking towards Amyntas and the sons of Aeropos’. This is found in a list of Alexander’s immediate difficulties on mounting the throne. It is admittedly the author’s purpose here, by stressing the magnitude of the odds against him, to demonstrate the extent of Alexander’s own qualities (rather than his good fortune) in overcoming them. Exaggeration is likely enough. I have argued elsewhere that other evidence supports the contention that Amyntas (the son of Perdikkas III) was later involved in a plot against the king, as the latter was in later years to claim. But there remains the possibility that Plutarch actually knew no more than that two (and later the third) of the sons of Aeropos were executed and that Amyntas fell for the same alleged reason a year or so later; the rest may be mere inference. We need to look further.

We have noticed that one of the three brothers escaped (if that is the word) the king’s hand in mid-336 and that there are reasons, other than the possibility of innocence, capable of explaining his survival. Perhaps, as Curtius (7.1.6) neatly expresses it, ‘he was exempted from punishment rather than guilt’. But he was not the only member of the family so to escape. One of his dead brothers had left two sons. Amyntas, son of Arrhabaios, had perhaps been one of Philip’s envoys to Thebes before Chaironeia and was one of the four known commanders serving with the advance-army in Asia Minor at the time of Philip’s death. Whatever his association, if any, with the deed, he was absent and so at least not an accomplice in the fact. After the launching of the main campaign in 334 he is found in a prominent role before and in the battle on the Granikos. Several months later he commanded the left wing of the phalanx (Parmenion’s usual position) in the awkward uphill assault on Sagalassos. Thereafter he is never again mentioned. In the mean-

47. See also Plut. Al. 11.1f.
48. JHS 91, 1971, 15ff. R. M. Errington, JHS 94, 1974, esp. 25ff, has now challenged my interpretation, arguing that the pieces of evidence I adduced collectively can be explained independently and on other grounds. He may be correct, but I see no way of proving it either way. My view has the advantage of explaining Plutarch’s reference (de fort. Al. 1.3, 327c) to the central role played by Alexander’s cousin Amyntas (see also Curtius 6.9.17, 10.24) as well as by the three Lyncestians; whereas Errington’s leaves such notices isolated.
51. Arrian 1.28.4.
time his brother Neoptolemos had fallen at Halkharnassos, but, oddly enough, we do not know on what side he was fighting. He is singled out by name both in Arrian (1.20.10) who calls him a defector to Dareios, and in Diodoros (17.25.5), who nominates him as the most prominent casualty on the Macedonian side: and I can suggest no way, unfortunately, on grounds either of evidence or of logic, of deciding which version to prefer. But in the winter following Neoptolemos’ death and very shortly before Amyntas’ last appearance, their uncle was arrested on suspicion of treason. After escaping the fate of his own brothers, Alexandros had held significant commands under Alexander, first as military governor of Thrace (Arrian 1.25.2) and then, once the campaign began, as leader of the Thessalian cavalry (ibid., Diod. 17.32.1f). He was now seized—according to Arrian (1.25.1f) on the word of a Persian envoy captured by Parmenion and examined and despatched to Alexander. The captive is alleged to have carried a letter from Dareios to the Lynkestian promising that if he should kill Alexander he would be rewarded with one thousand gold talents and the throne of Macedon. The offer, it was further alleged, was not unsolicited, for when Amyntas, son of Antiochos, had defected in late 335 he had taken a letter from Alexandros to the Persian king.

So far as I can see, it is again impossible to make much of this information, and the other sources of it do not help (Curt. 7.1.5ff, 8.8.6, Diod. 17.32.1f; 80.2, Just. 11.7.1f). The difficulty is that, especially if we assume a strong desire on Alexander’s part to remove the Lynkestian, we must acknowledge that at least part of the charge was not remotely open to investigation. It has to be said that it is (and probably was) plausible; but, if there was genuine evidence, it does not survive. That allowed, however, there nevertheless seems no strong reason for dismissing the story out of hand. There is to be taken into account, first, the view of Arrian, problematical though it be, that this man’s nephew Neoptolemos had sought and found refuge among the Persians. More importantly, there is the charge Alexander levelled against Dareios in 333, that those who had murdered Philip acted under his instructions, a feat of which he had openly boasted (Arrian 2.14.5). Now almost certainly Alexander’s letter was composed for its effect not on Dareios but on the Macedonian troops. Even so, this allegation was presumably included on the assumption that the Macedonians knew of or suspected a connection between the Persian crown and the murder of Philip. There is no short but persistent Persian theme running through the alleged activities of the sons (and grandsons) of Alexios. But it is no more than that and, beyond observing that there is nothing implausible in supposing that Dareios, seizing the Persian throne at a most difficult time, sought to disrupt the Macedonian campaign plans by arranging the assassination of Philip. I should not wish to give this hypothesis any very serious credence. All that we may say with any safety is that in the heat of the critical moment two Lynkestians either were believed to be involved with Pausanias or were seen to be credible scapegoats for the expiation of private or public guilt.

c) Alexander and Philip

From the time—whether at birth or later—that the young Alexander was recognized as the heir apparent, he was (we have no warrant for doubting) groomed for the role he would, barring accidents, one day play. By 342 he was regarded internationally as the next king. In 340, at the age of sixteen, he occupied the regency exercised for the past two years of Philip’s final great Thracian campaign by Antipatros. During a brief foray into the rugged mountains north of Macedonia he founded a military colony, Alexandria, in his own name. There is no reason to regard this as an impertinence on his part; it is just as likely that Philip, his son consulting him on the matter, himself proposed it; that would certainly be consistent with his apparent zeal in promoting Alexander’s status and experience.

At Chaironia the prince commanded, probably, the Companion Cavalry and, although (as it happened) it was apparently Philip’s infantry on the right that won the day, there was every reason to suppose, when dispositions for battle were made on the plain before Chaironia, that the Macedonian horse would play its usual critical role. After the battle, out of respect for Athenian pride, the king forbore himself from setting foot on Attic soil. But details of the settlement had to be transmitted to the Athenians, and that by envoys whose standing was too unassailable to give offence to the sensitive. Alexander was one of them (and Antipatros another). When the Athenians in an excess of relief cast about for suitable responses, they decided inter alia

52. C. B. Welles, in the Loeb Diodoros Vol. viii pp. 188f n. 1, prefers Diodoros’ version, as I do, 'in view of the continued trust reposed by Alexander in his brother', but this is far from decisive.
54. See Isok. Ep. 5 implies.
56. Plut. Al. 9.1.
57. See Green pp. 66f seems to imply.
to confer their own citizenship on Philip and Alexander. Philip in all this gave no sign whatsoever that he for his part saw in Alexander anything but his destined successor or indeed that he was aware of disgruntlement on the part of others. To the contrary: he not only groomed his son for the responsibilities of kingship but positively thrust them upon him at the earliest conceivable age, almost, it seems, going out of his way to make him known, accepted and respected as a leader in his own right. He gave, it seems, the same careful attention to the matter of his own succession as he did to all other matters of state. Thus, too, he decided to marry his nephew Amyntas to his eldest daughter Kynna (Section II (c), above). He would not—so far as lay within his power—allow his own death, and perhaps that of his natural heir, to destroy the stability and strength he had created in the kingdom.

Into this atmosphere of foresighted planning, when the aspirations of the previous years approached their climax, Philip intruded—so we are asked to believe—an entirely new and totally unforeshadowed disruption. To have abandoned his heir at this point would be incomprehensible. Since he had produced no substitute, nor could he for a number of years, it would have been precipitous and unnecessary. But it would also have been dangerous. Alexander’s responsibilities and his achievements over at least the past three years had inevitably attached significant Macedonians—young and perhaps older—to his person, men who admired him, who sought and gained his favour, or who simply saw (in the universal way) the means, in their association with him, of their own advancement. Philip must have realized and accepted this. He will not have been naïve enough to think that he could so conspicuously prepare his son for succession without, in effect, presenting him with a personal power base. There was nothing ominous in that, for Alexander and Philip were each dependent on the other: the one to guarantee the other’s name and work, the other to prepare for the one’s assumption of power.

What could possibly have happened to disrupt these apparently secure arrangements? On the premise that Philip was too sensible to have initiated any change, it has been deduced that the king learnt or came to suspect that Olympias and Alexander were plotting treason against him and so acted to cut them off from power. This, so far as I can see, rests on two prior assump-

59. On the care and generosity of Philip’s dealings with Athens (especially remarkable by contrast with his treatment of Thebes) in the aftermath of Chaeroneia see Polyb. 5.10.1ff, Justin 9.4.6, Diod. 16.87.3, Plut. Phok. 16.4, Demosthenes Ep. 3.11f, Ellis, Philip II & Mac. Imp. 199 ff.

60. Green pp. 90ff.
In the same side of the balance has also to be set the increasing likelihood, as the start of the Asian campaign approached, that any fears Alexander may have entertained would be resolved by the course of events. There would have been for him no urgency. Kleopatra had not even produced a son. If she did, then it might be sensible to consider action. But only if the son were born, were healthy and were able to survive the first critical months and years—and if Philip were still alive—might it become imperative.

But that is too hypothetical. The point is that at no time in the past, whatever difficulties had lain ahead, had Philip given the slightest sign that he was under pressure on Alexander’s account or that he himself had any qualms. Can we believe then that he suddenly became vulnerable to a viewpoint on the part of others that, had it existed at all, must have existed for years; and this when he stood at the very acme of his success and power? I think not.

IV. LOOSE ENDS

Conscience has been defined as a small voice warning that someone may be watching. I must confess, on the understanding that anyone watching cannot have failed to notice for himself, that I have so far neglected two matters given some prominence in previous discussions. I have suggested nothing in explanation of the departure of Olympias and Alexander from Macedonia in 337 (as reported by all three of the authors who retail the story of Attalos’ slur and, in others, at odds with the evidence. The marriage of Philip with Kleopatra, Antipatros and the Lynkestian Alexandros.

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The references in Aristotle and Diodoros (Diyllos), as well as in Justin’s first version, point to a personal motive behind Pausanias’ deed. Now it is true that such catastrophic events will always attract speculation and rumour, and equally so that propagandists with rhetorical, political or personal axes to grind will represent them in terms appropriate to their own designs. But it seems not unlikely in this particular case that the multiplicity of prime movers—Alexander, Olympias, the Upper Macedonians, the Persian king—proposed by different people at different times finds at least a part of its explanation in the very fact that no one could really lay hold of any motive but the personal. Aristotle confined himself, I suggest, to what appeared to him to provide both the true and the substantially adequate explanation. In embroidering upon this both Diodoros and Justin (in his first account) go beyond Aristotle in implicating Attalos, an accretion made plausible (and perhaps even occasioned) by that noble’s fate a year or so later. Is there anything inherently implausible about the story of Pausanias? Badian calls attention to two weaknesses. Pausanias’ grievance, he cautions, ought to have been directed against Attalos, not Philip. But, since Aristotle, ‘who must have known the men and the incident’, was able to accept that, ‘the important question is...how, and for what purposes, was the ancient grievance reactivated at that precise moment?’ As I have already made clear, I do not believe that there was any ‘precise moment’ with which Pausanias’ act coincided;

61. See note 41.
the relevant moment was that which he defined. I must say, even though Aristotle (given his limited purpose) found no further explanation necessary, that Diodoros provides a (to me) satisfying reason for the transfer of Pausanias' resentment from Attalos to Philip, especially when we remember what Justin rightly stresses, that the assassination shortly followed Attalos' important appointment to the advance-party command—and moreover very likely coincided with the early reports from across the Hellespont that the coastal cities and islands of Anatolia were flocking to join the jubilant Macedonian flag-bearers. In Macedonia, with the eyes of all Hellenes watching, Parmenion, Attalos and their colleagues were, after Philip, the heroes of the moment. The heady atmosphere at the wedding at Aigai, of Alexander of Epeiros and Kleopatra, daughter of Philip and Olympias, whether or not we accuse Diyllos/Diodoros (16.91.4-93.2) of exaggeration in representing it, was produced by these reports, not by the nuptial festivities. Given his grievance, the strength of the compulsion driving Pausanias and the aptness of the occasion he selected are clear.

The grievance, I believe, was not an old one. According to Diodoros (16.93.6), the origins of Pausanias' hatred for Attalos came about in and shortly after a war fought by Philip against an Illyrian chief, Pleurias. This name bears a similarity to that of Pleuratos, an Illyrian defeated by Philip in 345, and on this sole basis many scholars have conflated the two campaigns and merged the two Illyrians, adopting the earlier date, which is firmly vouched for. But Diodoros explicitly (and Plut. Al. 10.4., for what it is worth, implicitly confirms this) places the campaign against Pleurias in 337, and there is no reason for disbelieving him solely on account of the similarity of two names. The feud, it seems, found its origins in the affairs of summer 337, and there is no reason for disbelieving him solely on account of the similarity of two names. The feud, it seems, found its origins in the affairs of summer 337, failed to be resolved satisfactorily by Philip during the next several months and drove Pausanias to breaking-point during the events of spring and summer 336.

So much said, I return to the exile of Alexander and Olympias and to the Pixodaros affair, having admitted that I see no easy way of resolving the difficulties they raise. Plutarch, Athenaios and Justin concur in having the prince and his mother leave Macedonia in the immediate aftermath of the Alexander/Attalos (in Athenaios), or Alexander/Attalos/Philip (in Plutarch

and Justin) feud at Kleopatra's wedding (see section I (a)). If I have interpreted properly the premises on which Attalos' surrender to Alexander in 335/4 was based and have correctly placed the original sources for this episode in the circumstances of 335/4 and 317/6, then the story of the insult is a fiction and the 'exile' stands isolated from any known antecedents or causes. With the reminder that no author refers to any exile who is ignorant of the 'feud', I can only state my personal belief that it too is almost certainly untrue—but that, if not, it arose out of circumstances totally lost to us.

With Pixodaros the problem is even more difficult. The story occurs only in Plutarch (Al. 10), with no shred of confirmation, as to essentials, elsewhere. No other source for the Karian dynasty knows of (or at least mentions) it. It is a precious little drama, whose minor roles (like that of Demaratos in the 'exile' piece: Plut. Al. 9.6) are played by almost suspiciously appropriate stock characters, the two tragic actors, engaging in their typical subsidiary pursuits, as servants of the Macedonian court and as go-betweens in international politics, and Alexander's devoted friends suffering banishment on his account. The latter feature appears to lend circumstantial support to the whole: as a result of the business, says Plutarch, Philip exiled four of Alexander's comrades—a list repeated by Arrian (3.6.4-7) with one additional name. They were banished, says the latter, because they were loyal to Alexander when he 'fell under Philip's suspicion' after the marriage to 'Eurydike' (presumably Kleopatra; some Macedonian queens are known to have changed their names at marriage) and the dishonour done to Olympias by the king. All that this need mean, of course, is that while Arrian did not get his information direct from Plutarch, both authors had access to some source available in the early or mid-second century AD. Admittedly, the names of participants in this episode—as in the story of the 'exile'—look relatively impressive to us: Demaratos, Aristokritos, Thessalos and Alexander's friends, Harpalos, Ptolemaios, Nearchos, Erigyios and Laomedon. None is manufactured. But not only is their participation unconfirmable; it also has no observable

63. See my Philip II & Mac. Imp. 221 ff.
64. Did. in Dem. 12.64 ff, Hammond, ABSA 61, 1966, 241 ff. The first to conflate the two, as Hammond notes, was Meyer (SB Berlin 1909, 75B ff), who has been followed almost without exception or question. For the date of the campaign against Pleuratos see Cawkwell, CQ 13, 1963, 126 ff.
65. See Arrian 1.23.7, Diod. 16.74, Strabo 14.656 ff.
66. See also Plut. Mor. 708/C, 179C; evidently Plutarch considered this an uplifting little romance.
67. On Thessalos and Aristokritos see Berve, Das Alexanderreich ii Nos 371 and 125.
68. On Harpalos, Nearchos, Erigyios and Ptolemaios see ibid Nos 143, 544, 302, 668; for Laomedon, added in Arrian's list (3.6.4-7) see No. 464.
69. Even though Ptolemy is said to have been one of the exiles, Arrian probably did not get the information from him: he gives the information out of context only as an aside, when mentioning the financial appointment of Harpalos.
consequences. In the exile story Demaratos appears out of the blue, delivers a moral homily (one that appeals immensely to Plutarch)\(^\text{65}\), reconciles father and son and disappears (until 334 at Granikos, where he again does his bit for Alexander: Arrian 1.15.6). In the Pixodaros story Thessalos delivers his message to the Karian (who is disingenuously delighted) and escapes to Korinth, whence Philip orders him delivered in chains, and likewise disappears (until 331: Arrian 3.1.4), although with a Macedonian garrison in the city it was a questionable place of refuge and ought to have returned him quickly and easily. Four or five of Alexander's friends are exiled, but not one is damaged in any way that might find even indirect confirmation elsewhere\(^\text{66}\).

Let it be admitted that there is nothing intrinsically improbable in the main substance of the Pixodaros affair. The Karian dynast, with Persian power dissipated under the puppet-rule of Arses, may credibly have joined the stream of Greek states in Asia Minor which welcomed the Macedonian advance-guard; but the accession of Dareios, the death of Philip and the counter-thrust by Memon could well have combined to make his ambitious independence suddenly less attractive; and so Pixodaros returned meekly to the fold. (Had we been told only that he sought alliance and then renounced it, we should have no hesitation in thus explaining it). But what we are given combines the fundamentally explicable and plausible with a notion I have argued on general grounds is late and false and then provides it with a list of characters neatly cast but playing dramatic roles devoid of any discernible link with whatever else is known of them. Again all I can say is that, at any rate in the form given by Plutarch—and especially when its implications are matched against the matters I have attempted to cover in this paper, I disbelieve, but cannot rationalize it. That I feel less penitent on that account than I perhaps should is due to my suspicion that, given the nature of our evidence, any explanation capable of absorbing comfortably every scrap of information would be ingenious rather than likely.

It would be unnatural had so momentous an event not attracted a variety of versions, theories and rationalizations. It would be equally unnatural for the historian to forswear political explanations of the politically significant

\(^{70}\) See note 65.

\(^{71}\) In the same category is Justin's datum (9.7.7) that when Olympias was in Epeiros at her brother's court she was inciting him to go to war with Philip. It was, of course, inconsistent with his view of her that she should do otherwise, and it needed not disturb him that the Epeiroitic king did not accede to her wishes, for Philip, he thought, simply bought off the man by making him his son-in-law. Since what Olympias allegedly intended was not realized, the story has the serviceable virtue that it is by nature irrefutable.

without a battle. In the beguiling plenty of the sources for Philip's assassination, I have tried to show, there is very little real sustenance; but what there is—the best evidence and the safest assumptions—virtually compels the conclusion that this deed was hatched alone, in the solitary mind of a lunatic\(^\text{72}\).

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\(^{72}\) I became aware of J. Rufus Fears' stimulating article, 'Pausanias, the assassin of Philip II' (\textit{Athenaeum} 53, 1975, 111-135), too late to take it into account in this paper. I note that, while our conclusions coincide regarding Pausanias, we differ over much else, largely as the result of discrepant views of the sort of use that may be made of the bulk of the sources. Further relevant works have since appeared: N. G. L. Hammond, 'Philip's Tomb' in historical context', \textit{GRBS} 19, 1978, 331ff; W. Heckel, 'Kleopatra or Eurydike?', \textit{Phoenix} 32, 1978, 155ff and 'Philip II, Kleopatra and Karanos', \textit{Riv.Fil.} 107, 1979, 385ff; E. D. Carney, 'Alexander the Lyncestian: the disloyal opposition', \textit{GRBS} 21, 1980, 23ff. Dr M. B. Hatziopoulos (to whom I am most grateful for a copy of his ms) has reached the conclusion, on quite different grounds from my own, that the details of the Pixodaros-affair are a later literary invention, chronologically impossible: 'A reconsideration of the Pixodaros affair', \textit{Studies in the History of Art} (Nat. Gall. of Art, Washington), forthcoming.