Classical
Chinese Civilization
SIDEBAR
Chronology
Of Classical Chinese Dynasties
Hsia Kingdom (Legendary) 1994-1523
B.C.
Shang
Dynasty 1523-1028
B.C.
Chou
(Zhou) Dynasty 1027-221 B.C.
Chi’in (Qin) Dynasty 221-202
B.C.
Han
Dynasty 202
B.C.–220 A.D.
Three
Kingdoms 220 A.D.–265 A.D.
Six
Dynasties 265
A.D.–589 A.D.
****************************************************
Overview
The history of Ancient
China runs parallel to that of the rest of the Classical world system. Early
hominids arrived in the region by 800000 BP; Paleolithic habitation has been
recorded by 50000 BP; and numerous Neolithic settlements are on record by 8000 BC.
Environment
The
Great plain of northern
Further
south, much like southern
To
the west, the agricultural plains of
The
early history of
***********************
SIDEBAR:
ORACLE BONES
Day
Gui Si divined:
Ke inquired: no ill fortune
during the Xun (the 10 day week)?
The
king prognosticated and said: there will be bad fortune. There will be trouble
that will be inflicted, arriving 3 times.
5
days later, trouble was indeed inflicted from the west. Zhi
Mu stated that Tu Fang reached the eastern border
region and inflicted casualties on 2 towns. Gong Fang also came to graze in our
fields in the western border region.
***************************
This
archaic script employed a combination of characters that was both pictographic
and logographic, that is, symbols
used to designate actual spoken sounds. By the late Bronze Age some 2000
characters were in use. This script gradually evolved to form the foundation of
modern Chinese writing. Aspects of the proto-Chinese script appear to have emerged
from the process of prognostication itself as well as from the belief that oracular
activities enabled the king (and others) to communicate with deceased ancestors.
Unlike
urban settlement patterns in the West, in Bronze Age China settlements were
organized according to urban clusters, elite
enclosures (fortified precincts) surrounded by a scattering of workshops and
artisan villages. The remains of the enclosures demonstrated that they were
constructed typically of pounded earth through the use of wood framing. At the
excavated remains of the Shang capital at
The
Chinese textual tradition maintains that the Xia dynasty was deposed by the
Shang family (1523-1028 BC). For the Shang we are much better informed, not
only by surviving historical texts, but by the recovery of more than 100,000
inscribed oracle bones at the capital of
All
three of the dynasties Xia, Shang, and Zhou succeeded one another without
evidence of cultural interruption or external interference. Each dynasty most
probably overthrew its predecessor by military means, something historically
confirmed in the case of the Zhou. Having ejected the Shang, the Zhou (1027 to
221 B.C., headquartered in
The
power and legitimacy of the Zhou were weakened gradually by their inability to
confront mounting raids by Turkic and Mongolian marauders from the north.
Roving bands of horse-mounted warriors repeatedly pillaged and plundered the
settlements of exposed feudal states. The burden of incessant warfare forced
the Zhou emperors to impose higher demands on their vassals for military
manpower and supplies, even as their legitimacy waned. In 771 BC an alliance of
overburdened feudal lords attacked the Zhou emperor at his capital, sacking the
city and killing the king. One prince of the realm managed to escape eastward to
The
rising emphasis on mounted warfare created equally high demand for war horses.
Horses achieved nearly mythical status in Chinese lore. Horse trading and horse
breeding became crucial to Chinese military expansion; particularly in demand
were imported horses from the far western steppes of Central Asia that were
known to be larger, stronger, and allegedly sweated blood. To combat the
tactical advantage of cavalry, meanwhile, rival polities abandoned obsolete
forms of aristocratic chariot warfare in favor of large formations of infantry
armed with powerful crossbows (another Chinese invention), increasingly
mobilized from local peasantry. The need to furnish large armies with armor and
weaponry placed heightened demand on mining and metallurgy, particularly in the
eastern states where iron ore was accessible by sea from mountainous regions to
the south. Once introduced Chinese iron smelting achieved higher levels of
proficiency than it did in the West. By inventing technologies such as
hand-pumped bellows and charcoal produced from coal, the Chinese were able to
achieve the high firing temperatures necessary to produce carbonized steel. The
deadly combination of Hunnic cavalry formations and
heavily armed mass infantry inevitably revolutionized Chinese warfare and made
the outcome of feudal confrontations irreversible.
The
political and social instability that accompanied the ineffectual leadership of
the Zhou thus set in motion a number of changes. As accelerated warfare displaced
local dynasties and their hierarchies, leadership cadres abandoned the old ways
of feudal society in favor of new forms of employment. Scholars and former
officials with skills acquired through service with unsuccessful feudal states
migrated through
Classical Chinese
Philosophies
Confucianism
According to tradition Confucius or Kung Fu Tzu
(551-479 BC) was precisely one such example of a displaced learned official.
Raised and educated in the feudal state of Lu (modern
Confucius’
teachings furnished a code for the newly emerging Chinese “gentry-based” ruling class. Much
like Buddhism, Confucius did not challenge the essentials of the traditional Chinese
religious world view, but offered instead instruction for the conduct of mortal
life on earth. In many ways he was a traditionalist, committed to Shang era
beliefs in the ancestor cult and the Mandate of Heaven. He insisted, however,
that the heavenly god T’ien should not be regarded so
much as the arbitrary king of the heavens as he should the embodiment of a universal
system of order and legality, the so-called principle of tao. Humans needed likewise to conduct
their earthly affairs in accordance with Tao. To insure the safety of the
Chinese people, for example, the emperor needed faithfully to observe the
established ceremonies and to offer prescribed sacrifices in accordance with the
law. Lesser individuals likewise needed to conduct their lives in such a way
that harmony was preserved between the cosmic order and human society. This
harmony presupposed the subordination of the individual to the community
according to clearly defined principles of rank. In Confucian philosophy everyone in society had a
defined place in the social order that was referenced by its superiority and/or
subservience to related members of society. The status of each individual carried
with it an obligation to maintain the social fabric through proper behavior. According
to this philosophy rank was ordered according to Five Confucian relationships:
Ř Ruler to Subject
Ř Husband to Wife
Ř Parent to Child
Ř Older Sibling to Younger
Sibling
Ř Friend to Friend
The
five relations displayed two fundamental assumptions about Chinese social
relations, namely, that no two persons were equal and that inequality was expressed
according to three basic criteria, age, gender, and social rank. At the
core of Confucianism stood the individual. “It is man that can make Tao great,” Confucius
observed. Although Confucius taught numerous virtues, his cardinal virtue was jen, which is variously
translated as humanity, love, or human kindness. To Confucius, jen was simply jen,
another word for the individual. It defined the very essence of the virtuous person.
Significantly the Chinese character for the word consisted of two parts, one representing
the individual and the other human relations or society. The ideal virtue,
therefore, involved both the perfect individual and the perfect society. This was
the goal not only of Confucianism but of all Chinese philosophy.
For
Confucius the ideal citizen was the superior individual, or the chun-tzu, literally, the son of a ruler. Until the
era of the Warring States, the chun-tzu was
plainly an aristocrat; however, to Confucius the superior individual achieved jen not through blood lines but through moral
excellence. Such a person was wise, benevolent, and courageous; he was
motivated by righteousness instead of by profit. He studied the Way, Tao, and
loved humanity. Confucianism thus emphasized a code of human behavior. He left
unanswered the question whether by nature humans were inherently good. "By
nature humans are alike," he said, "but through practice they become
different." Confucius proposed that China be governed by a new class of
“virtuous men,” enlightened individuals who selflessly devoted their energies
to the maintenance of the social order and the welfare of the people. Self-perfection,
family harmony, social order, and world peace could all be attained so long as
balance and harmony were achieved between the individual and society. Only in
such a state could Tao, the moral law of the universe rooted in the Mandate of
Heaven, prevail. As Confucius insisted, “Without knowing the Mandate of Heaven
one could not become a superior man.” Confucianism therefore summed up both the
complaints and the aspirations of the emerging “gentry” class that would govern
Han-era China. The new elite that replaced the feudal aristocracies of the
Warring States were educated in Confucian schools and knew the requirements of literacy,
courtesy, and refined behavior. Around 100 BC officials working under the
imperial Han dynasty initiated a system of state examinations to recruit future
officials like themselves from students educated in the Five Chinese Classics. While
in practice state officials tended to be recruited from within the gentry class
itself, in theory Han dynasty officialdom became accessible to any educated, respectful,
well bred citizen. The consequence of the Confucian system of regularized
education and examination was to produce a sustained,
educated elite to govern over the uneducated agricultural masses. These leaders
tended to be “generalists” rather than specialists, “gentlemen,” rather than
“professionals.” There is no denying, however, that when extended across the
breadth of the Chinese society, this system enabled the ruling class to
withstand crises and political and social turmoil by replenishing and
reconstituting itself time and again with talented leadership cadres. The kings
of the Han Dynasty likewise embraced Confucianism because it provided them with
theoretical justification for their own authority and served as a useful means
to maintain order. Confucian notions of “enlightenment,” of devotion to public
service, and of proactive participation in and maintenance of the social order
bore obvious similarities to Stoicism in the Greco-Roman World.
Taoism
In
the same manner that Epicureanism challenged Stoic philosophy in the West, Taoism framed a popular response to Confucianism in
China. According to tradition Taoism was articulated by an elder contemporary
of Confucius, named Lao-Tzu (now dated c. 350 BC), but in accordance with the
tenets of the philosophy itself, it evolved and matured anonymously through the
work of numerous intellectuals, simply known as the “masters.” Like
Epicureanism Taoism expressed a sense of futility in so far as the efforts of
humankind to improve the natural order were concerned. Even though Taoists
denounced conventional morality, they cherished love, wisdom, peace, and
harmony no less than the Confucianists. Unlike Confucianism, however, their Tao was
not the Way of humans but the Way of nature. According to Lao-Tzu, Tao was the
standard of all things to which all humans must conform. Tao was eternal,
absolute, and existed beyond space and time; in its operation it was
spontaneous, everywhere, constant and unceasing, always in transformation, progressively
proceeding through cycles before finally returning to its root. At the core of
this philosophy was the duality of opposites, Yin and Yang, male and female,
light and darkness, Being and Nonbeing, revolving in a state of perpetual dynamic.
According to Lao Tzu, all things carried the Yin and embraced the Yang. Through
the blending of their opposite material forces Yin and Yang achieved harmony. The
Yin-Yang ideal dictated that in marriage there should be the harmony of the
male and the female; in landscape painting that of mountain and water; and in
spiritual life, that of humanity and wisdom. It was futile for humans to
attempt to oppose nature, to improve it, or to overcome it. Much like the
Epicureans, the principal objective of the Taoist was to become a sage, or a person
of “sageliness within and kingliness without.” Also
like Epicureanism, Taoist “sageliness” demanded withdrawal
from society and the abandonment of political ambition for a life devoted to
the contemplation of Tao. This
was more than a metaphysical argument; passivity, frugality, and simplicity
were the necessary prerequisites of enlightened behavior. It was only through
the realization that everything pursued its own independent course and yet came
around to form one harmonious whole that happiness and freedom could be
attained.
Confucianism
and Taoism became countervailing philosophical schools as China emerged into
empire. They survived from an era of “One Hundred Schools of Thought,” in
part because their proponents successfully incorporated the tenets of competing
philosophies over time. Taoism enjoyed many attributes in common with Buddhism,
particularly its doctrine of renunciation of the material world. This opened
the way for the transmission of that particular world view to China. Taoism’s
oppositional character to the formalistic, increasingly aloof culture of
Confucianism also made it increasingly popular with the masses. By the time of
the later Han Dynasty (AD 9-202), Taoism absorbed aspects of popular mysticism,
shamanism, and witchcraft. Alchemy and medicine became Taoist stock in trade,
along with promises of immortality and rebirth. By the close of the Classical
era the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove were ridiculed as drunkards and
eccentrics. According to a contemporary source, the Seven Sages “all revered
and exalted the entities of Non-Being and Non-Action and disregarded the rites
and law. They drank wine to excess and disdained the affairs of this world.”
One sage, Liu Ling used to declare that to a drunken man the “affairs of the
world appear as so much duckweed in a river.” Notoriously he rode about the
capital city in a small cart drawn by a deer, accompanied by a servant bearing
a large pot of wine. However, these critics failed to recognize that through
their eccentric, drunken behavior the Taoists were expressing a deliberate
protest against the formality, ritualism, and elitism employed by Confucian scholars to
distance themselves from everyday society.
Legalism, the third major intellectual
development of the era of the Warring States, was not strictly a philosophic
school at all. In fact, this school of thought rejected all philosophic
disputation, Confucian or Taoist, as futile and baneful to the interests of the
state. To philosophers such as Hsun Tzu (Xunzi, c. 250 BC), humans were inherently evil, corrupt,
rebellious, disorderly, and undisciplined. The job of the king and his
officials was to steer the flawed masses to correct behavior through the use of
codified law, main force, and examples of severe punishment. Like Confucianism
Legalism emerged with unemployed upper class elements who peddled their
knowledge and political experience to competing Chinese warlords toward the end
of the Era of the Warring States. However,
the Legalists abandoned faith in the moral tenets of Confucianism and made
their peace with the new social order. Legalists insisted on the exclusive authority
of the ruler and his ministers. The power of the emperor was restricted only by
his responsibility toward s heaven. The ruler should have little to do with the
day to day affairs of government. His job was to perform the numerous,
complicated rituals that maintained the Mandate with Heaven. This also meant
that he had to follow and enforce basic rules of morality to prevent the repeal
of his mandate as might be indicated by ominous oracular signs. The king’s chancellery
represented the engine of the imperial will; its purpose was to draft measures to
propel the Chinese people on its course. Progressively codified into law, these
strictures were applied equally to elements at all levels of society. By 200 AD
the Han Dynasty penal code grew to 26,272 paragraphs in 960 volumes. Beneath
the court administrators everyone else was viewed as a commoner. The people’s primary
duty was to live and work for the ruler and to obey without question the orders
emanating from his chancellery. Infused by Legalism, the ministries of Ch’in
and Han Dynasty China exerted absolute control over their subjects. In the
proper hands, this totalitarian authority could achieve massive public undertakings
and galvanize the Chinese state to withstand crises; in the wrong hands it
amounted to raw, arbitrary tyranny. Not surprisingly, legalism was first
adopted by the rulers of the western principality of Ch’in, where non-Chinese
influences were pronounced. It left its most profound impact in the historical
record of beheadings, the ultimate punishment impose not only on murderers and
thieves, but on ministers, generals, and even chancellors accused of malfeasance
and treason against the realm. Beheadings form a recurring backdrop to the
narrative of the Han Dynasty, leading one to believe that the dispensation of
capital punishment was swift, capricious, and arbitrary. No one in Chinese
society was so lofty as to assume that he could escape the penalty of death for
capital crimes. Even China’s greatest historian, Ssu-ma
Ch’ien, (Sima Qian, ca. 100 BC) was forced to submit to the penalty of
castration when accused of deceiving the throne. The argument used to justify
this phenomenon reasoned that the Han emperors were bound by the law code of
the legalists every bit as much as their subjects. As the adopted sons of
heaven, the emperors were obliged to follow and to enforce basic rules of
morality; failure to punish malefactors could result in the withdrawal of
heaven’s mandate. As the representatives of heavenly justice, therefore, the
emperors had a religious obligation to inflict severe punishments on criminals and
thereby prevent the disruption of the harmony between heaven and humankind. As
one Legalist commented, “Anciently the Sage Kings knew that man’s nature was
evil, partial, bent on evil, corrupt, rebellious, disorderly, and without good
government. Hence they established the authority of the king to govern man;
they set forth clearly the Li (ritual
or code of morality) and justice to reform him; they established laws and
government to rule him; they made punishments severe to warn him, and so they
caused the whole country to come to a state of good government and prosperity.”
Therein lay one of the inherent contradictions of Chinese society. Imperial
China became a state based on the rule of moral authority; it came to value
learning above birth or wealth; it administered an empire with a bureaucracy composed
of dedicated, highly educated officials. On the other hand, it imposed a legal
system that employed fear as its primary deterrent, one that exacted
punishments of cruel and barbarous severity. Confucian ideals of justice and
benevolence may have been prominent in the theory of government, but it was
absent in its legal tribunals.
The Ch'in Dynasty (221-202 B.C.) rose from one of the many competing feudal
dynasties of the Warring States era. Situated in the western Shensi (Shaanxi), “ the land between the two passes,” Ch’in was more
practicably defensible than its rival states in the east; it was also more
heavily exposed to nomadic influences. Early leaders of the state recruited Hsiung Nu cavalry contingents and mobilized the entire
peasantry into the army. Ch’in Shih Huangdi ('first emperor'), the ruler from
which the dynasty receives its name, was able to establish dominance by force
of arms and after conquering all surviving feudal principalities assumed the title,
Huangdi,
“supreme ruler.” Formerly used exclusively to refer to legendary, semi-divine
heroes, Ch’in’s assumption of this title furnishes one of several indicators of
his megalomania. Another survives in the form of his burial memorial, a massive
tumulus surrounded on all sides by interred formations of more than 7500
life size terracotta statues of warriors. Arranged in battle
formation the statues were apparently intended to guard him in the afterlife and
were crafted and erected at considerable public cost. Remarkably, the face of
each terracotta warrior is unique, indicating that artists sketched
representative members (if not each and every member) of his army before
molding the statues. Ch’in’s terracotta army, perhaps only a fraction of which
has thus far been revealed, ranks today among the archaeological wonders of the
world. Everything else about Ch’in suggests that he was cruel and ruthless
tyrant, determined to exploit the full laboring potential of the Chinese
population in pursuit of his grandiose scheme for world domination. By relying
on brute force and cold administrative efficiency, Ch’in successfully transformed China from a cluster of squabbling feudal
states into a unified bureaucratic empire. Although Ch’in’s dynasty did
not survive his death, it left an enduring legacy to
As
noted above, Ch’in’s regent had been a
successful if ordinary merchant, and he otherwise surrounded himself with
foreign generals of nomadic background and revolutionary ministers and
officials of legalistic mindset. These in turn conferred patronage on equally
minded recruits from the displaced educated elements of the Warring States. A
great military organizer, Ch’in successfully crushed the remaining feudal
states of his generation and eradicated their leadership by forcibly evacuating
the defeated noble families to his capital, Hsien
Yang (Xianyang) in Shensi (Shaanxi). Allegedly some 120,000
families of the aristocracy were transported to
In
place of the feudal aristocracy the Ch’in’s administration dispatched military
officers to the defeated eastern states to rule them as conquered terrain. Now
devoid of aristocratic leadership, the tax-burdened rural peasantry rose repeatedly
in rebellion and had to be forcibly suppressed. Once effectively in control,
Ch’in’s ministers devised a uniform system of administration that divided the
newly assembled realm into provinces, with the provinces themselves divided
further into prefectures. Newly conquered non-Chinese territories were
similarly organized into commanderies with military
governors. This enabled officials dispatched from the central administration to
monitor activities all the way to the “grass roots” level. Ultimately, the
Ch’in Dynasty adopted a system similar to that of the Achaemenid
Dynasty of Persia, with civil and military governors assigned to overlapping
fiscal and military jurisdictions in the same provinces, and with the affairs
of each subject to the scrutiny of a third comptroller dispatched by the
emperor himself. The balance of power achieved between these three officials
prevented any one of them from organizing a powerbase capable of threatening central
authority. The usefulness of this system of “checks and balances” was
recognized by the Han and later dynasties who
perpetuated its use. Having more or less secured control of the countryside and
its resources, the Ch’in administration next set to work on massive public
works programs, ostensibly in the interest of Chinese society as a whole. As noted above, in 214 BC Ch’in’s
administration set to work rebuilding the system of the fortification walls
that had previously been constructed piecemeal by various warring states in the
north. When finished the refurbished and reorganized 5,000-kilometer-long Great
Wall extended all the way from Manchuria in the east to Tun
Huang in the west. [In its present state, the Great Wall was rebuilt under the
Ming dynasty between 1368 to 1644 AD.] This last
mentioned garrison town served as the military headquarters of the general
assigned to the “Protectorate of the Western Regions” and guarded the passes that led to the Tarim Basin. The construction of the Great Wall not only
combated the rising nomad threat to the north, it also positioned Chinese
military forces to investigate, and if necessary to conquer distant trading
centers to the west. Hundreds of thousands of laborers and convicted criminals
were forcibly conscripted and dispatched to the remote and dangerous “Western
Regions” to build and defend these walls. Folk ballads that were still sung in
modern times record the lament of everyday people
forcibly separated from their village homes and families, never to return. Other
public works closer to home, such as the dredging of new canals on the great
rivers, the design of connecting road networks, the construction of new
administrative centers in the prefectures, and not least, the building of the
tomb and palace of Ch’in himself in Hsien Yang, were
likewise initiated as laboring projects for the regime’s mounting population of
“criminals.” Arguably a military genius, the emperor’s innate megalomania left
him increasingly vulnerable to magic and superstition. His palace was
constructed according to various astronomical and magical principles; his tomb
was laid out in accordance with the cosmological map of the universe. He ceaselessly
indulged magicians who promised him means to immortality. Convinced by reports
of the existence of a distant overseas island where the inhabitants were
immortal, he commissioned a naval expedition to set sail in search of it (like
the thousands of laborers dispatched to the Great Wall, these sailors never
returned).
Driven
paranoid by the breadth of his unpopularity, Ch’in lived and worked in closely guarded
secrecy. Knowledge of his everyday movements in the vast palaces at Hsien Yang was restricted to a handful of trusted eunuchs. When
he died while journeying in the eastern provinces in 207 BC, the hundreds of
soldiers and officials that attend his imperial cortege marched across the
entire length of China to Hsien Yang completely unaware
of his demise. His accompanying minister went so far as to place a cart of
rotting fish directly behind the emperor’s wagon to throw people “off the
scent.” Heavy handed tyranny, mounting requisitions, incessant warfare along
the frontiers, and the brutal repression of a restive population eliminated any
likelihood that his dynasty could survive. On the news of his death, the empire
was wracked by uprisings in every quarter. The government endured a sequence of
rebellions; six pretenders to the throne were eliminated in rapid succession.
After several years of chaos the general Liu Chi successfully removed the
nominal head of the Ch’in dynasty. Assuming the imperial name Kao Tsu, Liu Chi founded the Han
dynasty (202 B.C. to 220 A.D) and successfully restored political
stability in China.
The Han Dynasty (202 B.C. to
220 A.D)
The Han dynasty took its name from the river that
flowed through the dynasty’s domains in Szechuan and southern Shensi. Its
capital was located in Ch’ang An. Kao Tsu’s first task was to determine a way to reassemble the
tattered state that the Ch’in had left behind. Kao Tsu
had risen from the ranks as a military officer and had attained power by
assembling around him a cadre of similarly rebellious warlords. To reward them
for their support he assigned them territories as new artificially created
feudal states. He also restored some of the ancient feudal kingdoms, though in
much diminished size. This placated his two most difficult constituencies and
convinced them to accept his authority. Once secured with the Mandate of Heaven
as emperor, he made certain that succession to the imperial throne would remain
restricted to members of his own family. In the countryside he maintained the the Ch’in governing system of provinces, commanderies, and prefectures and selected hand-picked
officials to rule. Although posing as a traditionalist, Kao Tsu
allowed this dual tiered governing system to pursue its natural course.
Inevitably the smooth efficiency of the central administrative out paced the
poorly organized, decentralized governments of the feudal states. Kao Tsu and his successors kept a tight reign on the feudal
kings by summoning them repeatedly to court and by ordering them to be removed
(and beheaded) at the slightest provocation. Even the generals who had helped
Kao Tzu’s rise to power were summarily executed for real or alleged
conspiracies. As the Han administration grew more confident of its authority,
it imposed additional laws to weaken the dynasties of the feudal states. For
example, a decree of 144 BC mandated that inheritance within feudal states must
be divided equally among all sons of a feudal king. This guaranteed that vassal
principalities would gradually diminish in size even as they multiplied in number.
In the event that a feudal line failed to produce an heir, the kingdom was summarily
absorbed into the Han provincial administration. Generation by generation, the
feudal states dwindled in stature. When Kao Tsu first
established the system some 143 feudal fiefs were recognized by the emperor; by
the end of the Han dynasty some 241 feudal states existed on a much reduced
scale. Typically their size was reduced to a radius of two or three
communities. The provincial territories of the Han greatly eclipsed those of
the surviving feudal houses.
In
place of the aristocracy, the Han turned to the leadership of Confucian
scholars recruited from the emerging gentry class.
Like the nobility the gentry class relied on lineage
groups to provide security in turbulent times. Gentry
clans relied on subordinate branches of the family to maintain control of
agricultural terrain at the local level. Members of the principal branch,
meanwhile, received the necessary education to pursue political affairs at the
capital. Rank within the family lines determined one’s place in the network,
just as education in the Chinese “Classics” determined one’s eligibility for government
service. Some gentry clans claimed descent from
ancient families, but this was no longer a prerequisite. Most gentry families were newly arisen from careers in
officialdom, trade, and warfare. All gentry families sustained themselves on
landed estates that they leased to tenants. Subordinate branches of the family
normally lived in countryside and supervise the agricultural work. In many
instances they served as tax collectors and thus extended the scrutiny of the
imperial bureaucracy over the local agricultural population. Subordinate
branches of the gentry clan combined resources to
assist the politicians of the senior branch with their official careers. The
politicians typically forged political marriages and engaged in political
combines at various levels of the bureaucracy to further their careers and to
obtain benefits that they shared with their wider families. If a family
politician fell out of favor at the court or was convicted or even executed for
an alleged crime, the entire lineage group would inevitably bear the impact.
Within a generation or two, however, the family would invariably rebound with a
new crop of educated politicians. As a result, gentry families remained
relatively secure in their wealth and status.
Han Dynasty
To
recruit gentry scholars into the government, the Han
rulers successfully promoted principles of Confucianism as tenets of the
regime. Naturally they emphasized first and foremost the Confucian relationship
of the subject’s obedience to the king. Implementation of the state examination
process guaranteed a steady stream of Confucian Chun tzu or educated gentlemen into the
cadres of the imperial bureaucracy. The Han kings surrounded themselves with an
array of court officials, including three imperial counselors, nine ministers
of state, eight generals, and scores of palace attendants. Following the Ch’in
model, the secretariat of the court chancellor imposed inspectors throughout
the ministries and various branches of the provincial administration to insure
accountability at the periphery. The large
distances from the court in Ch’ang An
naturally restricted the ability of the central administration to control
affairs in the provinces. Local officials in the commanderies,
for example, enjoyed relatively wide latitude to govern on their own, though
they could be summoned to the palace at the slightest hint of disloyalty.
Similar distinctions emerged between civilian and military sectors of the
government. Since statistics were crucial to central planning, officials at the
local level worked diligently to collect and to transmit accurate information
to their superiors. As a result surviving Chinese records furnish detailed,
fairly reliable census figures, not only for the provinces of China but even
for the non-Chinese people in distant protectorates. In 1 AD, for example, the
census recorded 12,400,000 households and 57,000,000 inhabitants in the Han empire.
During
times of war eight supreme generals were commissioned to mobilize the imperial
army. These generals assumed authority over all forces furnished by the
provinces, the feudal principalities, the foreign protectorates, and even the
imperial palace guards. Throughout the era of the early Han Dynasty (202 BC - 6
AD) the main focus of the Chinese military establishment was the incessant
confrontation with the Hsiung Nu empire to the north
(estimated at 2 million in population). Considerable debate raged at the court
regarding the most suitable policy for dealing with the Hsiung
Nu. One faction argued for a policy of offensive operations that requiring the
undertaking of extremely costly and dangerous campaigns in the remote and
inhospitable regions of the Hsiung Nu. Another
faction argued in favor of appeasement on the assumption that an effective
combination of diplomatic engagement (including treaties and arranged marriages
between Chinese Han princesses and the kings of the Hsiung
Nu) and “gifts” (typically in the form of foodstuffs and tens of thousands of
bolts of valuable silk) would gradually inure the leadership of the Hsiung Nu to the benefits of good relations with the Han,
based in part on material dependency. Through the repeated employment of
“gifts”, marriages, and treaties, however, it became increasingly clear to the
Han administration that the shanyu and the ruling council of the Hsiung
Nu exerted little genuine control over the Hunnic
warlords on the periphery. Regardless of the wishes of their distant overlords,
the local leaders of this segmentary society raided
and plundered Chinese settlements along the frontiers without scruple.
Inevitably, the tide turned in favor of the militaritsts
and a succession of powerful generals were dispatched
to the western and northern boundaries to confront the Hsiung
Nu with force. After a series of difficult campaigns, several of which ended in
disaster, the Han dynasty succeeded in breaking the unity of the Hsiung Nu confederacy in 51 BC and purchased itself a brief
span of frontier security.
The
logistical support required by these desert and steppe operations point to
another challenge to be overcome by the Han Dynasty, namely, overland
transport. The Han showed remarkable flexibility modulating between the use of
incentives to stimulate private economic initiative and direct intervention in
the economy through the creation of imperial monopolies. Through the
construction of interconnected networks of canals and roads the Han
administration was able to transport grain produced as tribute in the eastern provinces
all the way to the western capital of Ch’ang An and
beyond. To encourage the necessary transport of supplies to the western war
zones, the Han offered incentives such as official rank to those capable of
arranging these activities. With the conquest of territories in the southwest
around 100 BC, the emperor Wu Ti (141-86 BC) actually attempted the seemingly
impossible task of constructing a road network across the rugged, densely
forested terrain of Southeast Asia to India, embarking on the ancient
equivalent of the modern “Burma Road.” The central administration likewise
offered incentives to the poor as well as to criminals to encourage them to
serve on the frontiers. When complaints arose about the manipulation of prices
of the essential commodities of salt and iron, the government intervened to
create state monopolies. Although many of these ventures proved costly, the
projection of force westward, northward, and southward enabled Han dynasty to secure
its borders and to achieve domestic tranquility, while at the same time methodically
gathering reliable information about peoples beyond the imperial horizon. One
particular diplomat, Chang Ch’ien, was sent by the
emperor Wu Ti in 138 BC to negotiate an alliance with a break-away element of
the Hsiung Nu known as the Yueh
Chih. The Yueh Chih had been driven beyond the Pamir Mts. by
their nomadic rivals but had successfully formed a new confederacy in Central
Asia that included the Kushan conquerors of northern
India. Chang Ch’ien pursued his diplomatic travels as
far as the Indus and returned to the court at Ch’ang An in 133 BC with detailed information about the urban
societies that existed in India, Iran, and beyond, not to mention the exotic
prestige goods that these made available to China. Chang Ch’ien’s
mission helped sway Han policy toward direct intervention in the western region
and culminated in the conquest of the oases states of the Tarim
Basin by the Chinese general Li Kuang-li. In 104 BC
Li Kuang-li mounted an invasion of the lands beyond the
Pamir Mts., marching his army across the Oxus River into Afghanistan. In 97 AD,
Pan Chao, a commander of the Later or Eastern Han Dynasty, led a second Chinese
army of 70,000 men across the Pamir Mountains. This army advanced unopposed all
the way to the shores of the Caspian Sea. The significance of these Chinese
expeditions to the formation of the ancient world system will be discussed in a
later chapter. For now it suffices to note that reliable information about the
outside world began to replace the exaggerated accounts of traders and
travelers and placed the Han dynasty on more solid footing in its dealings with
the outside world.
Collapse of the Han Empire
Dissensions
among competing factions of gentry families in the
government eventually exposed the Han Dynasty at its core through destructive
power struggles. On the demise of a given Han emperor the family of his most
powerful wife (the dowager empress) typically attempted to seize power either by
choosing a successor or by replacing the members of the ruling family with
those of the empress’s “consort” family in all important positions of state. For
a span of 20 years during the Eastern Han Dynasty, one particular consort
family, the Liang, generated no less than 6 princes, 3 empresses, 6 imperial
concubines, 3 grand generals, and 57 ministers and provincial governors. After
jockeying for position for decades, elements of the Wang family usurped the
throne in 9 AD, setting in motion a violent civil war that raged between the
Wang and collateral branches of the Han family until 25 AD. By the time that the Han successor, Kuang Wu Ti, restored order, his capital in Ch’ang An had been destroyed, forcing
him to relocate eastward to Lo Yang in Honan to be closer to the agricultural
heartland. Here the Eastern Han Dynasty managed to survive until 202 AD. Palace
intrigue among the most powerful families continued to plague the regime, along
with munities in the army, and widespread peasant rebellions such as the
rebellion of the Red Eyebrows at the time of the Wang usurpation and that of
the Yellow Turbans in 184 AD. The fury of these mass uprisings, typically led
by charismatic commoners who claimed mystical and magical abilities, took years
to overcome and left everyone in the government dismayed.
Distracted
by such internal dissensions the Han administration lost its grip on the
frontiers, as well as on the agricultural countryside in the provinces. Gradually,
the cost of maintaining this massive land-based empire became too burdensome. The
collapse of the Han Dynasty in 202 AD ushered in four centuries of civil war
known as the Era of Disunity (220-588 AD). This era was characterized by repeated
attempts of powerful warlords to re-consolidate China only to result in further
chaos. Meanwhile, new confederacies of the Hsiung Nu
and the Toba emerged as threats in the northwest and the northeast
respectively. In the fourth century AD these peoples invaded the Chinese
heartland in a decisive manner. They settled along the Yellow River as overlord
populations, destroying settlements and driving many of the elite families of
the gentry southward beyond the Yangtze River to reconstitute themselves in newly
formed kingdoms. Through the development of a unified culture extended across a
vast landmass, the Chinese managed to forge one of the great world empires of
the Classical era, believed by some to have been the largest civilization of
that time. After long periods of violence the Chinese were able to achieve a
sustained period of stability that brought prosperous urban society to a wide
population. Although Chinese society relied on absolute monarchy to achieve stability,
its monarchy based its authority on religious and philosophical principles of a
higher moral order reinforced by a legal code that was increasingly applicable
to all citizens. This furnished an important deterrent against tyranny and
encouraged the participation in the Han regime by wider elites. Most of all, the
empire was governed by a broad class of property holding families, whose
leadership was determined through processes of education and examination. The
intellectual requirements of government rank insured an essential competency in
the imperial administration and fostered a sense of dedication throughout the
bureaucracy. With careful attention to detail and loyal adherence to the
hierarchy the Chinese had managed to overcome difficulties of distance and topography
to assemble a unified empire and to project force into distant regions. Despite
its continental separation from the other urban civilizations to the west,
Classical China made a significant contribution to the ancient world system.